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ABSTRACT
In 2005 States accepted that there is a responsibility to protect (“RtoP”) populations when 
“man’s inhumanity to man” rises to the fore and that those entrusted to respond effectively 
should undertake appropriate protective action, not simply rely on “it” going away. The 
question which the thesis explores, largely from a legal and practice based perspective, is 
what the evolution of each component of RtoP discloses, over the past seven years, about its 
scope, status, viability and, more specifically, whether RtoP as it currently stands adds value 
to, or just newly packages, old protection policies.
The extensive practice reviewed, including over four hundred State views and fifteen 
country-specific studies, identifies which positions in the existing literature on RtoP may 
require revisiting, and what issues merit greater attention given their potential practical and 
policy significance. Where appropriate, the established field of minority protection is utilised 
to ground assessment of RtoP’s value added and identify possible policy implications of, or 
explanations for, the development of a responsibility which is still in its formative years. In 
so doing, present understandings of RtoP’s relationship to minority protection are examined 
and developed.
The view taken is that RtoP’s relationship with existing protection mechanisms is 
multifaceted and evolving, adding value in some ways but also creating points of departure. 
Whilst the broad based State support for RtoP developed since 2005 is cause for celebration, 
the Libya and Syria conflicts illuminated tensions inherent in RtoP, including whether it is 
possible to resist regime change and remain neutral in civil wars where governments 
perpetrate RtoP crimes. Until there is a greater cohesion among policymakers to address 
some of the controversial issues and other outstanding ambiguities, then it is quite likely that 
the focus on “RtoP” from 2005 will now shift perhaps to more “PtR” -  “Protecting the 
Responsibility”.
DECLARATION/STATEMENTS
DECLARATION
This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not 
being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.
STATEMENT 1
This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated. 
Where correction services have been used, the extent and nature of the correction is 
clearly marked in a footnote(s).
Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A 
bibliography is appended.
STATEMENT 2
I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available for photocopying and 
for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside 
organisations.
Signed:(
S
(candidate)
(candidate)
Signed 5  (candidate)
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements 1
List of Tables and Figures 2
Abbreviations 3
Chapter One: The Responsibility to Protect ... Construction, Change and 
Contemporary Consideration
Introduction 5
1 RtoP’s Refinement (2001-2005) 8
1.1.1 Who Owes RtoP and On What Basis? 8
1.1.2 A Responsibility to Protect Populations, but from what Harm? 10
1.1.3 RtoP: What does it Entail? 14
2 Current Commentary on RtoP 20
2.1 RtoP’s Bearer Concept 22
2.2 RtoP’s Beneficiary Concept 24
2.3 The Scope, Duration and Value Added of Primary RtoP 24
2.4 The Nature, Character, Scope and Value Added of Secondary RtoP’s Activation 25
2.5 The Scope and Value Added of Secondary RtoP 27
2.6 Legal Status and Character 30
2.7 The Relationship between RtoP and the Field of Minority Protection 31
3 Methodology 33
3.1 Classification and Handling of Sources 33
3.1.1 State Views 34
3.1.2 Case Studies 34
3.1.3 Reports and Statements of Significant International, Regional and National Actors 36
3.1.4 Minority Protection 3 7
3.2 Thesis Structure 40
3.2.1 Chapter Two: The Concept of the Bearer and Beneficiary -  A Responsibility to Protect 
or Preclude? 41
3.2.2 Chapter Three: Primary RtoP -  Old Policies New Package? 42
3.2.3 Chapter Four: The Activation of Secondary RtoP -  A Uniform Standard or Sliding 
Scale? 43
3.2.4 Chapter Five: The Scope of Secondary RtoP -  Status Novus vs. Status Quo? 44
3.2.5 Chapter Six: The Legal Status and Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP -  
Another Case of Legitimacy vs. Legality? 45
3.2.6 Chapter Seven: The Scope, Viability and Value Added of RtoP -  Research Results and 
Recommendations 46
Chapter Two: The Concept of the Bearer and Beneficiary - A Responsibility to Protect 
or Preclude?
Introduction 48
1 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept 50
1.1 “State” 50
1.1.1 Occupied Territories: The Israel-Gaza Conflict (2008-2009). 51
1.1.2 Secessionist Enclaves: The Russia-Georgia Conflict (2008) 52
1.1.3 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept in Non-State Territories 54
1.2 “National Authorities” 56
1.2.1 Contested National Election Results Require Verification: Kenya and Zimbabwe 
(2008) 57
1.2.2 The then Existing Government will not concede Power to the Internationally 
recognised Government: The Cote d’ Ivoire (2010) 58
1.2.3 The Existing Government Faces an Armed Insurrection due to Perpetrating RtoP 
Crimes: Libya and Syria (2011-onward) 59
1.2.4 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept in States with Competing “National Authorities” 62
1.3 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept: General Findings 64
2 The Concept of the Secondary RtoP “Bearer” 71
2.1 A Direct Responsibility? 72
2.1.1 The UNSC: Bearer or Actor? 72
2.1.2 Regional Organisations: Bearer or Actor? 74
2.1.3 The Secondary RtoP “Bearer” Concept: General Findings 76
3. The Beneficiary Concept 80
3.1 State Practice 81
3.1.1 Implications for the RtoP Framework 83
(i) Persons Protected from RtoP Crimes 83
(ii) Primary RtoP’s Territorial Scope 84
(iii) Scope of the Harmful Acts which RtoP Covers 85
(iv) Scope of Implementation Means 87
3.1.2 Implications for the Wider Obligations to which RtoP relates 88
(i) Human Rights 89
(ii) International Criminal and Humanitarian Law 92
3.1.3 The Concept of the Beneficiary in State Practice: General Findings 92
3.2 International Practice 98
3.2.1 Approach One: “Populations” 98
3.2.2 Approach Two: The Protected Persons of the RtoP Crime(s) Apprehended 99
3.2.3 Approach Three: Detail the Specific Characteristics of RtoP Beneficiaries in Each Case
100
3.2.4 The Concept of the Beneficiary in International Practice: General Findings 102
Conclusion
Chapter Three: Primary RtoP - Old Policies, New Package?
103
Introduction 107
1 The Scope of Primary RtoP 108
1.1 The Negative Duty 108
1.2 Positive Duties 110
1.2.1 General Implementation Measures 110
1.2.2 Specific Implementation Measures 112
2 The Substance of Primary RtoP: General Findings 122
2.1 States Obligations under Primary RtoP 123
2.2 Variable Means of Implementation 124
2.3 The Duration of the Primary RtoP Duty 129
2.4 The Value Added of Primary RtoP 134
2.4.1 Strengthens and/or Clarifies the Requirements of Existing Rights/Obligations in an 
RtoP Context 134
2.4.2 Extending Obligations to Cover States who are Not Parties to all Relevant Treaties
137
2.4.3 Broadens Reach of Relevant Obligations to Go Beyond States to the International 
Community 138
2.4.4 Primary RtoP may develop to Create New Rights/Obligations 139
3 Monitoring Compliance with Primary RtoP 142
3.1 National RtoP Advisers 143
3.2 The UN Human Rights Council 143
3.3 Periodic Review 146
3.4 Security Council Committee / Global Strategy 147
Conclusion 148
Chapter Four: The Activation of Secondary RtoP - A Uniform Standard or Sliding 
Scale?
Introduction 152
1 The Substantive Aspects of Secondary RtoP’s Activation in Practice 154
1.1 The General Nature of the Activating Threshold 156
1.2.1 Establishing Imminence 161
1.2.2 The Scope of Decision Making on the Imminence of RtoP Crimes 164
1.2 The Character of Activation: Standard or Sliding Scale? 167
1.2.1 The Significance and Value Added of a Sliding Scale Approach 169
1.2.2 Present Literature 173
2 Institutional Aspects of the Activation Process 176
2.1 The UN Security Council 176
2.2 The UN Human Rights Council 181
Conclusion 183
Chapter Five: The Scope of Secondary RtoP - Status Novus vs. Status Quo 
Introduction 188
1 Early Warning and Assessment 190
1.1 Sources of Information: A Double-Edge Sword? 190
1.2 Scope of the System: Value Added or Doubling-Up? 193
2 International Assistance and Capacity Building 195
2.1 The Character of Assistance: Structural vs. Operational Measures 195
2.1.1 Present Literature 202
2.2 To whom should Assistance be Provided? 205
2.2.1 Present Literature 213
2.3 The Consensual Nature of International Assistance: Obtaining Consent 216
2.3.1 Acquiring Consent: Coercion and Inducements 216
2.3.2 Present Literature 218
2.4 Types of Assistance: Humanitarian, Military and Diplomatic 220
2.4.1 The Scope and Objectives of Providing Assistance 220
3 The ‘Timely and Decisive Response’ Pillar 222
3.1 Peaceful Responsive Measures 222
3.1.1 The Meaning of “Peaceful” 223
3.1.2 Types of Peaceful Responsive Measures 226
3.1.3 The Nature of Peaceful Responsive Measures 228
3.2 Non-Peaceful Responsive Measures 229
3.2.1 The Scope and Substance of the Decision Making Process 231
3.2.2 Filling the Gap: Coercing, Inducing or Bypassing UNSC Authorisation 237
3.2.3 Secondary RtoP’s Non-Peaceful Discharge: The Question of Regime Change 243
Conclusion 247
Chapter Six: The Legal Status and Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP:
Another Case of Legitimacy vs. Legality?
Introduction 250
1 The Legal Status of Primary RtoP 255
1.1 The Creation Phase (2005) 255
1.2 The Refinement Phase (2006 - 2008) 256
1.3 The Implementation Phase (2009 onward) 259
2 The Legal Status of Secondary RtoP 265
2.1 The Creation Phase (2005) 265
2.2 The Refinement Phase (2006-2008) 269
2.3 The Continued Refinement and Moves toward Implementation Phase (2009 onward)
273
2.4 The Legal Status of Primary and Secondary RtoP: General Findings 281
3 The Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP 290
3.1 Duty, Right or Responsibility? Present Literature on the Character of Secondary RtoP
291
3.1.1 Duty to Protect 291
3.1.2 Right to Protect 293
3.1.3 Responsibility to Protect 294
3.2 The Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP: General Findings 297
3.2.1 A Way Forward? Secondary RtoP and the Emerging Notion of “Responsibility” 298
Conclusion 300
Chapter Seven: RtoP’s Scope, Value Added and Viability - Research Results and 
Recommendations
Introduction 304
1 The ‘Narrow’ but ‘Deep’ Nature of the RtoP Framework 304
2 RtoP’s Relationship with Existing Obligations/Practice is Multifaceted 305
3 RtoP can add Value to Existing Obligations/Practice in Four Ways 309
4 Efforts to make RtoP more Politically Palatable are of Varying Significance and 
Effectiveness 311
4.1 Effect One: Weaken RtoP’s Capacity to Protect All Populations 311
4.2 Effect Two: Build Broad Based Political Support for RtoP 313
5 A Way Forward? Recommendations for RtoP’s Future Development 316
5.1 Recommendation (1): Maximise the UN Secretary-General’s Annual RtoP Reports and 
UN General Assembly’s Annual RtoP Thematic Debates 319
5.1.1 RtoP’s Beneficiary Concept 322
5.1.2 Primary RtoP 324
5.1.3 Secondary RtoP’s Activation 326
5.1.4 International Assistance 329
5.1.5 Outcomes of Secondary RtoP’s Discharge 331
5.2 Recommendation (2): Capitalise on the Increasing Number of National RtoP Advisers 
and Annual Meetings of the Associated Network of RtoP Focal Points 332
5.3 Recommendation (3): Bear in Mind the Broader Existing International Framework to 
which RtoP belongs: Minority Protection 333
5.4 Recommendation (4): Develop RtoP in a Slow but Steady Manner 334
6 The Responsibility to Protect: A Cause for Concern and Celebration 335
Annex I 337
Annex II 351
Bibliography 363
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to take this opportunity to extend my deepest thanks to those who ensured that I 
had the requisite support, assistance, care, and much more, throughout this project. First, 
thanks are owed to the School of Law at Swansea University and the Thomas and Elizabeth 
Williams Scholarship for providing the financial support necessary for this research.
I would like to thank all the staff in the School of Law at Swansea University, past and 
present, who encouraged me to begin this project and who gave me invaluable opportunities 
and continued assistance throughout the research period. I owe particular thanks to Professor 
Andrew Halpin and my second supervisor, Professor Volker Roeben, for entrusting me to 
carry out a range of teaching duties in the School as well as to assist them in their joint 
research project at a very early stage of my research.
I extend special thanks to my supervisor, Dr Helen Quane, and to Professor Carsten 
Stahn, whose undergraduate international law modules, provided a name to the issues which 
first captivated me as a child, growing up just outside the site of the Lockerbie air disaster, 
disturbed, yet intrigued, by the images of Bosnia and Rwanda flooding through on the 
television. I am sure that, without the opportunity to study these modules, my path would 
have quite likely been very different.
I am eternally indebted to the unwavering guidance, encouragement, support and general 
care that Dr Quane gave me at both an academic and personal level throughout the PhD. It 
has been both a pleasure and an honour to study under the supervision of such a remarkable 
academic and individual for the past years.
I am forever grateful to Professor Stahn for introducing me to the “Responsibility to 
Protect”, providing constructive assistance, encouraging me to strive academically and to 
commence this PhD. I feel most privileged to have had the opportunity to learn from such a 
gifted, inspiring academic and a truly kind, generous and supportive man.
Completing the PhD would have been a far more difficult task were it not for my elder 
sister, Joanna Elizabeth Halbert, showing constant interest in my work. I would like to thank 
her for the unqualified support she gave me and for always being there to listen. I look up to 
her now more than ever.
Deepest thanks are owed to my parents, David and Elizabeth Ann Halbert, who have 
shown me care, love, patience and support at every stage of my life. As a child, my parents 
taught me the meaning and value of Robert Bum’s references to “man’s inhumanity to man” 
and “a man’s a man for a’ [all] that”. As an adult, they encouraged me to explore those 
phrases more deeply, making sacrifices to ensure that I could and showing constant faith in 
my capacity to do so. Special mention must be given to my mother, friend and the most 
selfless person I know. I am eternally thankful for her kindness, devotion and unconditional 
support and belief in me -  “thank you Mum”.
I dedicate this work to my family in view of all they have done and continue to do for me 
and for teaching me the values and sharing in the experiences which underscore it.
* * *
1
LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES
Table A: ‘The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept’ 65
Table B: ‘The Secondary RtoP "Bearer" Concept’ 76
Table C: ‘Trends in State Views on RtoP's Beneficiary Concept’ 92
Table D: ‘Examples of the Persuasive Rationale which Underscores the Overlap between
Various Components of RtoP and Existing Obligations/Practice’ 306
Table E: ‘Notable Contributions to RtoP’s Development by Small States’ 315
Table F: ‘The Outcome Document RtoP Paragraphs in light of Subsequent Practice’ 316
Figure 1: ‘Interaction between RtoP Components’ 320
Figure 2: ‘The Approaches taken to the Outcome Document RtoP Provisions in UN
Secretary-General RtoP Reports to date’ 321
2
ABBREVIATIONS
A. P. S. Rev. American Political Science Review
Afr. J. Int’l & Comp. L African Journal of International and Comparative Law 
Am. S. Int’l L. Insights American Society of International Law Insights 
Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. American Society of International Law Proceedings 
Am. U. Int’l Rev American University International Law Review 
AU African Union
Cambridge Student L. Rev Cambridge Student Law Review 
Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 
Case W. Res. J. Int’l L Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
Crim. L. F Criminal Law Forum
CSCE Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y Denver Journal International Law and Policy
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EP European Parliament
Fordham L. Rev Fordham Law Review
Griffith L. Rev. Griffith Law Review
GRtoP Global Responsibility to Protect Journal
HCNM High Commissioner for National Minorities
HLP High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
ICC International Criminal Court
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IC J International Court of Justice
ICLQ International Comparative Law Quarterly
ICON International Journal of Constitutional Law
I.J.R.L International Journal of Refugee Law
ILC International Law Commission
Int. J. M inority and Group Rts. International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 
Int’l J. International Journal
Mich. J. Int’l L Michigan Journal of International Law
N.Y.U.J. Int’l L. & Pol. New York University Journal of International Law and Politics
NELQ Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly
Nordic J. Int’l L Nordic Journal of International Law
NTC National Transitional Council of Libya
Nw. Univ. J. Int’l Hum Rts Northwestern University Journal of International Human 
Rights Law
Or. Rev Int’l L. Oregon Review of International Law 
OSCE Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
3
P5 Five Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council (Russia, China, France, 
United Kingdom and the United States)
PBC Peacebuilding Commission 
R2P Responsibility to Protect 
Res Resolution
Rome Statute Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 
RtoP Responsibility to Protect
SAPG United Nations Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 
SNC Syrian National Council
Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev Suffolk Transnational Law Review 
Tex Int’l L. J Texas International Law Journal
U. Pa. J. Int’l L. University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
UNGA United Nations General Assembly
UNHCHR United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
UN OHCHR United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNM IL United Nations Mission in Libya
UNOCI United Nations Operation in the Cote d’Ivoire
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General
W is. Int’l L. J Wisconsin International Law Journal
4
CHAPTER I
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT... 
CONSTRUCTION, CHANGE AND CONTEMPORARY 
CONSIDERATION 
Introduction
The 1990s brought to the fore the full depth of “man’s inhumanity to man” and the mixed 
responses of the international community thereto. The UN Security Council’s [UNSC] 
failure to act effectively in response to the 1994 Rwandan genocide highlighted that the 
world could not always rely on this body to take the steps necessary to protect a population 
from grave harm.1 In 1999, the UNSC’s failure to agree on a robust response to the situation 
in Kosovo resulted in the use of unauthorised armed force to protect the Albanian population 
from Serb forces,2 renewing debate over the permissibility and legality of so-called 
‘humanitarian intervention’.3 Is the use of armed force for human protection purposes 
legitimate? Can it be legally undertaken without the prior authorisation of the UNSC? What 
human rights violations warrant the use of armed force? How grave should those violations
1 J Alvarez, ‘Crimes o f States/Crimes o f Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’ (1999) 24 Yale J. Int’ L 365; J Sarkin and 
C Fowler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Duty to Prevent Genocide: Lessons to be Learned from the Role 
of the International Community and the Media During the Rwandan Genocide and the Conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (2010) 33 (1) Suffolk Transnat’l L. Rev 35 and R Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure 
o f  Humanity in Rwanda (Arrow Books, London 2004).
2 T G Weiss, Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect (2nd edn Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 
Oxford 2005) and K Booth, The Kosovo Tragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (Frank Cass, London 2001).
3 Humanitarian intervention is the subject o f many definitions but, throughout this thesis, the concept will be used 
in accordance with the following definition o f Harhoff: ‘[A]rmed force applied by one or more other states into 
the territory o f the conflict state for a particular humanitarian purpose’. F Harhoff, ‘Unauthorised Humanitarian 
Interventions: Armed Violence in the Name o f Humanity?’ (2001) 70 Nordic J. Int’l L. 65, 70-71. On the concept 
o f humanitarian intervention see generally, T G Weiss, Humanitarian Intervention (Polity Press, Cambridge 
2007); N Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (OUP, Oxford 2003); J 
Welsh (ed), Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (OUP, Oxford 2004); O Spiermann, 
‘Humanitarian Intervention as a Necessity and the Threat or Use o f Jus Cogens’ (2002) 71 N.J. Int’l L. 523; J 
Rytter, ‘Humanitarian Intervention without the Security Council: From San Francisco to Kosovo - and Beyond’ 
(2001) 70 N.J. Int’l L. 121; J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should 
Intervene? (OUP, Oxford 2010); N Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: “Humanitarian” Intervention 
and the Standards o f  the West (Pluto Press, London 2012); C Badescu, Humanitarian Intervention and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (Routledge, Abingdon 2011); A Hehir, The Responsibility 
to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 
2012) 57-82 and 149-177; G Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006- 
2007) 24 Wis Int’l L. J. 703; A Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and 
the 2005 World Summit’ (2006) 20 (2) Eths & Int Affs. 143; J Pattison, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Jus in Bello’ (2009) 1 GRtoP 364; C Lu, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Moral 
Ambition and Political Constraints’ (2007) 62 Int’l J. 942 and G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending 
Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C. 2008) 31-50.
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be? States had reached no agreement on these questions by the end of the 1990s, leading the 
former UN Secretary-General [UNSG] to ask:
‘[I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica -  to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity?’4
In response to this question, the then Canadian Prime Minister5 announced the establishment 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS]. ICISS were 
mandated to reconcile the ‘seemingly irreconcilable’6 principles of State sovereignty and 
international intervention for human protection purposes, including the use of armed force.7 
Following a series of roundtables with stakeholders in human protection issues,8 the ICISS 
published their final Report in 2001. The Report promoted the “Responsibility to Protect” 
[RtoP] as a framework which suitably balanced respect for State sovereignty and the 
permissibility of international action to protect a population inside a State from grave harm.9 
RtoP was subsequently endorsed in the 2004 Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, 
Security and Change10 [HLP] and the 2005 Report of the former UNSG. The latter 
encouraged States to ‘move towards embracing and acting on’11 RtoP and recommended that 
the Report be discussed at the forthcoming session of the UN General Assembly12 [UNGA]. 
This paved the way for RtoP’s official introduction to UN Member States.
Between April and September 2005 States participated in the drafting of the Outcome 
Document for consideration at the September 2005 World Summit.13 Gaining State
4 Report o f the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, ‘We the Peoples: The Role o f the United Nations in the 21st 
Century’ (2000), 48 <http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm> accessed 12 August 2012.
5 For a discussion o f the composition, structure and processes o f the Commission, see International Commission 
on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography and Background 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 341-398. (ICISS, Research, Bibliography and 
Background).
6 ICISS, Research, Bibliography and Background, ibid, 344.
7 ICISS, Research, Bibliography and Background, ibid. The Commission’s mandate supplemented previous 
attempts to reconcile these competing principles. On this see M Bettati and B Kouchner, Le Devoir d ’Ingerence: 
Peut-On les Laisser M ourirl (Denoel, Paris 1987); T Blair, “Doctrine o f the International Community”, Speech 
delivered at Chicago Economic Club, 24 April 1999 [considered in Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending 
Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (n 3), 33-34]; K Annan, ‘Two Concepts o f Sovereignty’ The Economist 
(New York, 18 September 1999) <http://www.economist.com/node/324795> accessed 10 October 2012; F Deng 
and R Cohen, ‘Exodus within Borders: The Uprooted Who Never Left Home’(1998) 77 (4) Foreign Affairs 12 
and F Deng, Sovereignty as Responsibility (Brookings Institution, Washington D.C. 1995).
8 On this see, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 83 (ICISS Report). For the records o f the 
roundtables, see ICISS, Research, Bibliography and Background (n 5), 349-399.
9 ICISS Report, ibid, vii.
10 Report o f the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility’ (2004) UN Doc A/59/562, vii-x and 130 (HLP Report).
11 Report o f the Secretary General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for 
A ll’ (2005) UN Doc A/59/2005 (UNSG Report, ‘In Larger Freedom’). For a discussion o f the contribution o f this 
Report to RtoP’s conceptual construction see, C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101 (1) AJIL 99.
12 Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’, ibid, 59.
13 For a comprehensive discussion o f the lead up to the World Summit see A Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: 
Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 65-97.
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agreement on the specific language which should be used regarding RtoP was a protracted 
and fraught process, requiring several drafts to be formulated.14 However, in terms of RtoP, 
the World Summit concluded encouragingly with States adopting the Outcome Document as 
UNGA Resolution 60/1 by consensus.15 Significantly, this included a section devoted 
entirely to RtoP.16
The thesis examines the way in which RtoP has evolved, predominately from a legal 
perspective, in the seven years since the Outcome Document’s adoption and, more 
specifically, what this practice tells us about RtoP’s scope, viability and the value which it 
adds to existing protection mechanisms. This chapter outlines the conceptual framework of 
this assessment, the main themes in existing academic debate on RtoP and the research 
methodology.
Part one outlines the main themes in RtoP’s development and refinement between the 
2001 ICISS Report and 2005 World Summit. The chapter illustrates that fundamental 
changes were made to RtoP during this period, thereby clarifying why this thesis 
concentrates on practice between 2005 and 2012.
Part two explains that a substantial body of literature on RtoP arose in response to the 
abovementioned stages of development. The present author summates the main themes in 
present debate, outlining the range of significant questions which present debate on RtoP 
raises and sets aside.
14 The drafts o f 3 June, 22 July and 5 August 2005 are reprinted in See the World Federalist Movement, ‘State- 
by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect’ (11 August 2005)
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/civilsociety?view=fjrelated&id=2411> 
accessed 11 August 2012. ‘President's Draft Negotiating Document for the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the 
General Assembly o f September 2005, submitted by the President o f the General Assembly’ (6 September 2005) 
paras 127-130; ‘Draft Negotiated Outcome Document’(12 September 2005, 8 am) paras 127-130 and ‘Draft 
Negotiated Outcome Document’ (12 September 2005,12:30 pm) [omitting any provisions on RtoP] 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/united-nations?view=fjrelated&id=2410> 
accessed 11 August 2012.
15 UN General Assembly Resolution 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1. (Outcome Document).
16 The consensus adoption o f  RtoP by States represented a major milestone in RtoP’s development and, therefore, 
the Outcome Document’s three paragraphs on RtoP merit replication in full: ‘138. Each individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
This responsibility entails the prevention o f such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international should, as 
appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in 
establishing an early warning capability. 139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII o f the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of 
the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity 
and its implications, bearing in mind the principles o f the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress 
before crises and conflicts break out. 140. We fully support the mission o f the Special Adviser o f the Secretary- 
General on the Prevention o f Genocide’. Outcome Document, ibid, paras 138-140.
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Part three explains the methodology of the thesis. It outlines that RtoP’s analysis is 
predominately practice based, utilising over four hundred State views on RtoP, case studies 
and the national, regional and international documents which inform, or otherwise influence, 
RtoP’s 2005-2012 development. This section explains that the thesis uses the field of 
minority protection to strengthen its analysis of RtoP’s significance, value added and 
implications at a policy, legal and practical level. Part three concludes with an overview of 
the range of issues which are examined in the thesis chapters, including key themes in 
present literature.
1 RtoP's Refinement (2001-2005)
Three main questions underscored RtoP’s refinement between the 2001 ICISS Report and 
2005 Outcome Document. Who owes RtoP and on what basis? What harm does RtoP seek to 
protect populations from? What does RtoP entail? The varying ways in which these question 
were addressed between 2001 and 2005 merit reflection.
1.1.1 Who Owes RtoP and On What Basis?
To the ICISS, the development of human rights law had clarified that State sovereignty 
entailed responsibilities, requiring the State to protect persons within its territorial borders in 
order to enjoy respect for its sovereignty by external actors.17 Drawing upon this concept of 
State ‘sovereignty as responsibility’,18 ICISS outlined that all States owed a ‘default’19
17 ICISS Report (n 8), 14. Academics have suggested that sovereignty was conditional upon protection o f 
inhabitants prior to the post-war human rights movement. For example, the construct o f  ‘natural rights’ devised 
by natural law thinkers. See for e.g. S Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey 1999) 8; Stahn ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 111 
and R Thakur and V Popovski, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and Prosecute: The Parallel Erosion o f Sovereignty 
and Impunity’ (2007) 1 The Global Community Yearbook o f International Law and Jurisprudence 39, 49. See 
further, A Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making o f  International Law  (CUP, Cambridge 1995); G 
Kreijen, State Sovereignty and International Governance (OUP, Oxford 2002); M Martinez, National 
Sovereignty and International Organisations (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996); H Spruyt, The 
Sovereign State and its Competitors (Princeton University Press, Princeton 1994); K Bennoune, ‘Sovereignty vs. 
Suffering: Re-Examining Sovereignty and Human Rights through the Lens o f  Iraq’ (2002) 13 (1) EJIL 243 and C 
Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic Change (CUP, Cambridge 1995).
18 For an overview o f  the meaning o f this principle, see generally ICISS Report, ibid, 28. On the origins o f the 
principle, see especially, R Cohen, “From Sovereign Responsibility to RtoP” in W Knight and Egerton F (eds), 
The Routledge Handbook o f  the Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, Abingdon 2012) 7-21; L Axworthy, “RtoP 
and the Evolution o f State Sovereignty” in J Genser and I Cotier (eds) The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise 
o f  Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (OUP, Oxford 2012) 3-16; Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: Global 
Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 8-34 and E C Luck, “Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect” 
in A Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Nijhoff, 
Leiden 2011) 13-24.
19 ICISS Report, ibid, 17.
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responsibility to protect their inhabitants [“primary RtoP”20]. Recognising that States are 
sometimes ‘unable or unwilling’21 to provide this protection, the ICISS advised that primary 
RtoP was supplemented by the international community’s ‘residual’22 responsibility to 
protect States’ populations [“secondary RtoP”]. The key difference between these two 
responsibilities lies in the point at which their discharge comes into effect. Given that 
sovereignty is a defining attribute of statehood,23 all States’ owe their populations primary 
RtoP without exception. In contrast, ICISS noted that secondary RtoP is a ‘fallback 
responsibility’24, coming into practical effect when States cannot or will not fulfil primary 
RtoP.25
The Reports of the High-Level Panel and former UNSG affirmed ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’26 as the basis of primary RtoP and secondary RtoP as a responsibility in its 
own right.27 The Outcome Document also recognised primary and secondary RtoP, but better 
distinguished their nature. Whilst ‘[e]ach individual State’28 committed to protecting ‘its 
populations’29 on a general basis, the international community agreed that it should take a 
range of steps as part of its responsibility to protect populations when certain circumstances 
arose.30 Subsequent practice has upheld the Outcome Document’s clear delineation of RtoP 
as that which requires ‘[e]ach individual State to protect its populations’31 from RtoP crimes 
and the international community to undertake protective actions toward this end.32 The scope 
of the harm which State and the international community have a responsibility to protect 
populations from merits fuller reflection.
20 The RtoP that States owe to their own population has been summated in different ways. Whilst ICISS termed it 
‘default’ RtoP, Hehir refers to it as ‘internal’ RtoP. The present author considers that Evans summation o f the 
responsibility as “primary RtoP” and, the international community’s responsibility as “secondary RtoP” most 
appropriately denotes the character and scope o f the responsibilities. For this reason, the thesis will invoke the 
terms “primary RtoP” and “secondary RtoP” from this point onward. See respectively, ICISS Report, ibid, 17; 
Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (n 3) 69 and 
Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’, ibid, 709.
21 ICISS Report (n 8), 7.
22 ICISS Report, ibid, 17.
23 ICISS, Research, Bibliography and Background (n 5), 6.
24 ICISS Report (n 8), 11.
25 ICISS Report, ibid, 17.
26 HLP Report (n 10), 17-18. The then UNSG seemed to recognise the concept, albeit implicitly, in his statement 
that ‘no legal principle - not even sovereignty - should ever be allowed to shield genocide, crimes against 
humanity and mass human suffering’. Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 11), 34.
27 HLP Report, ibid, 65-66. See also, Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’, ibid, 35.
28 Outcome Document (n 15), para 138.
29 Outcome Document, ibid.
30 Outcome Document, ibid, paras 138-139.
31 Outcome Document, ibid, para 138.
32 For e.g. in the Report o f the UN Secretary-General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 
2009) UN Doc A/63/677, 10-15 (Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP). The affirmation o f primary RtoP in 
subsequent practice is outlined in chapter three.
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1.1.2 A RtoP Populations, but from what Harm?
Throughout RtoP’s development, different actors adopted competing approaches to the scope 
and nature of the harm to which primary and secondary RtoP relate. ICISS dealt with this 
issue as part of the discussion of when RtoP’s discharge through armed force is warranted.33 
To ICISS, armed force could be used when a population sustains ‘conscience-shocking’34 
harm, such as:
‘[L]arge scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or 
not, which is the product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or 
inability to act, or a failed State situation; or large scale “ethnic cleansing,” 
actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts 
of terror or rape’.35
ICISS elaborated on the kind of contexts which may entail these forms of harm. For 
example, ICISS suggested that RtoP should be discharged in relation to acts which are (i) 
regarded as genocide in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide 1948, specifically those which ‘involve large scale threatened or actual loss of 
life’;36 (ii) crimes against humanity and war crimes in treaties like the Geneva Conventions, 
including the Additional Protocols, provided that the acts in question ‘involve large-scale 
killing or ethnic cleansing’;37 and (iii) in ‘situations of State collapse and the resultant 
exposure of the population to mass starvation and/or civil war; and overwhelming natural or 
environmental catastrophes, where the State concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, 
or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened’.38 Thus to ICISS, 
RtoP could be discharged through the use of armed force in relation to harm which (i) is 
intentionally perpetrated (e.g. ‘with genocidal intent’);39 or (ii) arises unintentionally (e.g. by 
State actors’ omitting to act because they lack the capacity to do so effectively, such as ‘a 
failed State situation’).40 The HLP Report provided that RtoP applied to situations of 
‘avoidable catastrophe’.41 This excludes RtoP from applying to all natural disasters. 
However, the inclusion of ‘avoidable’42 suggests that the HLP considered that RtoP should 
cover natural disasters in which the population is sustaining harm, such as ‘mass starvation
33 ICISS Report (n 8), 32-34. On this element o f the ICISS Report, see N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: 
A Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 22 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 355, 365.
34 ICISS Report, ibid, 33.
35 ICISS Report, ibid, 32.
36 ICISS Report, ibid, 33.
37 ICISS Report, ibid.
38 ICISS Report, ibid.
39 ICISS Report, ibid, 32.
40 ICISS Report, ibid.
41 HLP Report (n 10), 65, emphasis added.
42 HLP Report, ibid, emphasis added.
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and exposure to disease’,43 because of the actions or inaction of the State’s national 
authorities. For example, if national authorities (i) refuse the humanitarian assistance which 
is offered by external actors; or (ii) distribute assistance in a discriminatory manner, such as 
by not providing assistance to certain ethnic groups in the State. The former UNSG’s Report 
did not discuss the scope of the harmful acts which RtoP should cover in similar detail but, 
rather, simply provided that RtoP applies to ‘the potential and actual victims of massive 
atrocities’.44 The Outcome Document helped to clarify the meaning of ‘massive atrocities’,45 
specifying that RtoP covers the harmful acts which can amount to ‘genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.46
Examination of State views during the Outcome Document’s drafting suggest that 
limiting the harmful acts which fall within RtoP’s scope to the abovementioned was not a 
controversial decision.47 This view is further supported by the fact that subsequent practice 
has affirmed that RtoP is limited to genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing ‘until such times as States agree otherwise’.48 Thus, whilst the Outcome 
Document does not explicitly affirm the State ‘sovereignty as responsibility’49 concept, its 
acceptance by States suggests that they recognise that the international community’s 
interference in their internal affairs to protect populations from these harmful acts does not 
violate State sovereignty.50 This recognition is quite likely underscored by wider 
developments in the years preceding the World Summit. By 2005, several instruments had 
contoured and prohibited genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes51 and, therefore, 
most States had already undertaken some of obligations to protect populations from these 
particular harmful acts.52 There was also an understanding that gross human rights violations,
43 HLP Report, ibid.
44 UNSG Report, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 11), 35.
45 UNSG Report, ibid.
46 Outcome Document (n 15), paras 138 and 139.
47 The United States views during the drafting process are an exception. The significance and potential 
implications o f  this view are discussed in the substantive chapters, particularly chapter two and four.
48 Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP (n 32), 8; International Law Commission, ‘Provisional Summary 
Record o f the 3015th Meeting o f the 6th July 2009’ (15 July 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3015, 11 and 
International Law Commission, ‘Second Report on the Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters’ (7 May 
2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/615, 5. For the International Law Commission’s discussions on RtoP see UNGA, ‘Report 
o f the International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth Session’ (2006) UN Doc A/61/10, 468; UNGA, ‘Report o f the 
International Law Commission: Sixtieth Session’ (2008) UN Doc A/63/10, 322-323 and International Law 
Commission, Provisional Summary Record o f the 3019th Meeting o f the 10 July 2009’ (22 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SR.3019, 3-9.
49 ICISS Report (n 8), 28.
50 S Rosenberg and E Strauss, “A Common Approach to the Application o f the Responsibility to Protect” in D 
Fiott et al, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach (The 
Madariaga College o f Europe Foundation, Brussels 2012) 59.
51 For e.g. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 December 
1948, entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 and Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court 
(adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 arts 6-8. (Rome Statute).
52 Rosenberg notes that the drafting o f the Outcome Document suggests that the decision to formulate RtoP 
around the four crimes was made ‘in order to limit the application o f the RtoP to exceptional grave situations, 
where international law had already defined limitations to the principle o f sovereignty’. Rosenberg and Strauss (n 
50), 59.
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such as genocide (i) are internationally wrongful acts in which the international community 
as a whole has a legitimate interest and for which the State can incur responsibility;53 and 
(iii) can, since the International Criminal Court’s [ICC] establishment in 2002, be 
investigated by its Office of the Prosecutor,54 either at the Prosecutor’s instigation,55 request 
of a State party56 or a UNSC referral.57 In order to appreciate the range of contexts to which 
RtoP applies, it is useful to outline the kind of acts which can constitute genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing.
As it has long since been recognised that genocide and crimes against humanity can be 
committed outside conflict contexts,58 a requirement for conflict would arise when RtoP is 
invoked on the pretext of responding to war crimes.59 War crimes can arise from the 
perpetration of numerous acts in international or internal armed conflicts. In both conflict 
contexts, war crimes can include acts such as (i) grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions60 
(e.g. wilfully killing61 and occasioning serious injury,62 destroying and appropriating 
property,63 and torture and inhuman treatment64); and (ii) the conscription or enlistment of 
children under fifteen years old for the active participation in hostilities.65 Other acts are 
specific to the nature of the armed conflict. For example, using poisonous weapons,66 
intentionally launching attacks against civilians for non-military objectives67 and the forcible
53 For example genocide and racial discrimination more broadly. See particularly, Barcelona Traction Light and 
Power Company Case, International Court o f  Justice, ICJ Reports 4, para 32. For a discussion o f  this recognition 
by the Court see S Ratner and J Abrams, Accountability fo r  Human Rights Atrocities in International Law: 
Beyond the Nuremberg Legacy (OUP, Oxford 1997) 40. For a discussion o f the way in which the development o f  
the law on State responsibility for an internationally wrongful act underscores the RtoP framework, see 
especially: A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 25-27; E 
Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush - On the Assumed Legal Nature o f the Responsibility to 
Protect” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 18), 48; M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great 
Responsibility? The Concept o f  the Responsibility to Protect within the Process o f International Lawmaking’ 
(2010) 35 Yale Journal o f Int’l L. 469,482-484 and 508-513; J Welsh and M Banda, “International Law and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 
18), 216-220; L Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’ (2012) 12 (1) Hum Rts. L. Rev. 1,18- 
19 and 27-30; A Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 (3) EJIL 544, 540 and J 
Brunee and S Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use o f Force: Building Legality?” in Bellamy,
Davies and Glanville (n 18), 74-77.
54 On the powers and duties o f the Office o f the Prosecutor see Rome Statute (n 51) arts 53 and 54.
55 Rome Statute, ibid, arts 13 (c) and 15.
56 Rome Statute, ibid, arts 13 (a) and 14.
57 Rome Statute, ibid, arts 13 (b) and 16.
58 On this development, see for e.g. W A Schabas, Report: Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The 
Challenge fo r  the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International, London 2006) 8-9 and R Cryer et al, An 
Introduction to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 167.
59 For a good overview o f the legal elements o f war crimes and their criminalisation in national and international 
practice, see T McCormack T and G J Simpson (eds), The Law o f  War Crimes: National and International 
Approaches (Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1997).
60 Rome Statute (n 51), art 8 (2) (a) (i)-(viii).
61 Rome Statute, ibid, article 8 (2) (a) (i).
62 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (a) (iii).
63 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (a) (iv).
64 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (a) (ii).
65 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) [international armed conflict] and 8 (2) (e) (vii) [internal armed 
conflict].
66 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (b) (xvii).
67 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (b) (ii).
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transfer of a population by an Occupying Power,68 are acts which can amount to war crimes 
in the specific context of an international armed conflict. As the RtoP framework codified in 
the Outcome Document focuses on national authorities protecting their own populations and 
the international community’s role when this protection is not ensured effectively,69 RtoP 
will typically be invoked in relation to war crimes which are being, or are likely to be, 
perpetrated in an internal armed conflict.
There is some overlap in the acts which may amount to genocide and crimes against 
humanity. For example, both crimes can arise from the killing70 or forcible transfer71 of 
certain persons. The fundamental difference between genocide and crimes against humanity 
lies in the identity of the persons protected from the crimes and the nature of the further 
requirements for the commission thereof. For acts like the aforementioned to amount to 
genocide, they must be perpetrated ‘with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’.72 In order for such acts to amount to a 
crime against humanity, they must be ‘committed as part of a widespread or systematic 
attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge o/the attack’.73 Significantly, 
the “attack” dimension requires that there be ‘a course of conduct involving the multiple 
commission’74 of the acts ‘pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organisational policy to 
commit such attack’.75 Earlier practice considered the specific intent requirement of genocide 
as its dolus specialis76 and that which rendered it as the “crime of crimes”. A more recent and 
persuasive view is that this distinction does not render genocide any more heinous than 
crimes against humanity.77 A further distinction between genocide and crimes against 
humanity is that the latter may be perpetrated through ‘other inhumane acts’78 which are not 
explicitly referred to in relevant instruments. This provision enabled the International 
Criminal Tribunal’s for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda to address acts which their 
respective Statute’s did not explicitly refer to.79 In the context of the Rome Statute the 
provision ensures flexibility, enabling the ICC to prosecute new heinous acts that emerge in
68 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (b) (viii).
69 Outcome Document (n 15), para 139.
70 Rome Statute (n 51), arts 6 (a) and 7 (1) (a).
71 Rome Statute, ibid, arts 6 (e) and 7 (1) (d).
72 Rome Statute, ibid, art 6, emphasis added.
73 Rome Statute, ibid, art 7 (1), emphasis added.
74 Rome Statute, ibid, art 7 (2) (a).
75 Rome Statute, ibid.
76 A Cassese, ‘On the Use o f  Criminal Law Notions in Determining State Responsibility for Genocide’ (2007) 5 
(4) J Int Crim Justice 875, 881.
77 See for e.g. Schabas’ discussion o f this distinction, drawing upon the Report o f the Commission o f Inquiry on 
Darfur. Schabas (n 58), 9.
78 Rome Statute (n 51), art 7 (1) (k).
79 Cryer (n 58), 219.
13
subsequent practice, fall within its jurisdiction and meet the additional requirements for a 
crime against humanity.80
The final issue of relevance here is the significance of the Outcome Document’s explicit 
reference to “ethnic cleansing”.81 The term “ethnic cleansing” was used in its own right to 
describe the harm perpetrated in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia during the 1990s.82 
However, it is not codified as a distinct crime in present international law but, rather, is 
generally understood to be embodied within the scope of crimes against humanity83 (e.g. 
forcible transfer of a population, persecution). The Outcome Document does not clarify 
whether its reference to “ethnic cleansing” is intended in the sense of its reflection in present 
international law. However, we may draw upon the ICISS Report which also explicitly 
referred to “ethnic cleansing”.84 On the one hand, ICISS appeared to invoke “ethnic 
cleansing”85 as shorthand for some of the acts delineated in the Rome Statute as part of the 
actus reus of crimes against humanity. For example, the ‘physical removal’86 of parts of a 
specific group from a certain area reflects the understanding of ethnic cleansing as that 
which relates to the forcible transfer of parts of a population as a possible crime against 
humanity.87 Conversely, it is arguable that if the references to “ethnic cleansing” in the 
ICISS Report and Outcome Document were intended to be interpreted as relating to crimes 
against humanity, then why not refer to crimes against humanity only? Whether the ICISS 
Report and Outcome Document intended to denote a distinction between the two or, indeed, 
whether broader considerations may have underscored their segregation, are questions for 
consideration in the substantive chapters. At this point, it is enough to note that this 
distinction was made and, in the interests of simplicity and conciseness, the harmful acts that 
RtoP covers will be hereafter abbreviated to “RtoP crimes” without prejudice to the fact that 
“ethnic cleansing” may not be regarded as a distinct “crime”.
1.1.3 RtoP: What Does it Entail?
A central issue surrounding RtoP’s development during this period was what primary and 
secondary RtoP actually entail. The ICISS, HLP and former UNSG gave particular attention
80 Cryer, ibid.
81 Outcome Document (n 15), paras 138-139.
82 Human Rights Commission Resolution S-2/1, ‘The Situation o f Human Rights in the Territory o f the Former 
Yugoslavia’ (1992) UN Doc 1992/S-2/1.
83 See especially, D Scheffer, ‘Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2007-2009) 40 Case W. 
Res. J. Int'l L. 111,128.
84 ICISS Report (n 8), 33.
85 ICISS Report, ibid.
86 ICISS Report, ibid.
87 Rome Statute (n 51), art 7 (1) (d).
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to outlining the scope o f secondary RtoP. At the World Summit, the scope of primary RtoP 
was also developed.
The ICISS structured RtoP as a continuum of responsibilities to “prevent”,88 “react”89 and 
“rebuild”.90 ICISS adopted a wide view of prevention, recommending (i) the UN create an 
early warning system for human rights violations;91 (ii) the application of ‘root cause’92 
political,93 economic,94 legal95 and military measures96 to address the root cause of human 
rights violations; and (iii) ‘direct’97 preventive action be taken through the use of appropriate 
political,98 economic,99 legal100 and military101 measures. Essentially, direct and root cause 
prevention measures are distinguishable on the basis of when they should be deployed. 
Whilst root cause measures may be applied before any signs of human rights violations have 
emerged,102 direct measures should be discharged when indicators of a possible degeneration 
to human rights violations and/or conflict emerge.103
ICISS’s inclusion of a “responsibility to react”104 illustrates that it recognised that 
prevention will not always be successful. ICISS provided that the international community 
may react to harm sustained by a population in a variety of ways, including (i) targeted 
sanctions105 (e.g. arms embargoes and asset freezing);106 (ii) political mechanisms (e.g. 
suspending a State’s membership in regional and/or international organisations);107 and (iii) 
if certain criteria were met, the use of armed force.108 ICISS’s emphasis on the fact that the 
RtoP framework did not offer stakeholders a choice simply between ‘doing nothing or 
sending in the marines’109 suggests that it was mindful of illustrating RtoP as something
88 ICISS Report (n 8), 19-27.
89 ICISS Report, ibid, 29-37.
90 ICISS Report, ibid, 39-45.
91 ICISS Report, ibid, 21.
92 ICISS Report, ibid, 22.
93 For e.g. establishing national democratic institutions in order to combat factors like political repression. ICISS 
Report, ibid, 23.
94 For e.g. providing development assistance provision in order to help reduce the link between poverty and the 
perpetration o f human rights violations. ICISS Report, ibid.
5 For e.g. strengthening national legal provisions for minority protection in order to guard against violations o f  
minority rights. ICISS Report, ibid.
96 For e.g. improving the training o f military and security forces in order to deter their perpetration o f human 
rights violations. ICISS Report, ibid.
97 ICISS Report, ibid, 23-27.
98 For e.g. deploying human rights fact-finding missions in order to establish the nature o f  the situation on the 
ground. ICISS Report, ibid, 24.
99 For e.g. withdrawing development assistance in response to indicators o f human rights violations/conflict 
ICISS Report, ibid.
100 For e.g. through redress to the International Criminal Court or States’ exercise o f universal jurisdiction. ICISS 
Report, ibid, 24-25.
101 For e.g. the ‘consensual preventive deployment’ o f armed forces. ICISS Report, ibid, 25.
102 ICISS Report, ibid, 22.
103 ICISS Report, ibid, 23.
104 ICISS Report, ibid, 29-37.
105 ICISS Report, ibid, 29-30.
106 ICISS Report, ibid, 30.
107 ICISS Report, ibid, 31.
108 ICISS Report, ibid, 31-37.
109 Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 166.
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more than ‘another name for humanitarian intervention’.110 This comes through in the Just 
War-type criteria111 that ICISS proposed that the use of armed force in RtoP cases should 
satisfy, specifically that the use of armed force under RtoP should have the right authority,112 
a just cause,113 right intention,114 be undertaken as a last resort,115 through proportional 
means116 and when there is a reasonable prospect of success.117 In short, the criteria are 
central to ICISS’s efforts to formulate RtoP as that which reconciles the legality and 
legitimacy of the use of armed force for human protection purposes. Arguably, some of the 
criteria inadvertently reinforced the tension between legality and legitimacy, however. One 
example is ICISS’s depiction of the “right authority” requirement. ICISS acknowledged that, 
outside States’ exercise of the right to self-defence,118 the legal use of armed force requires 
UNSC authority.119 Recognising that political issues had prevented the UNSC from acting 
effectively previously,120 ICISS proposed routes through which to add political and moral 
legitimacy to the otherwise illegal use of armed force for human protection purposes. This 
included (i) invoking the UNGA’s Uniting for Peace Resolution to recommend the use of 
armed force;121 and (ii) regional organisation’s acquiring the UNSC’s approval of the use of 
armed force ex post facto122 (i.e. repeating ECOWAS’s approach in Liberia).123
To reach a decision inside or outside the UNSC on the legitimacy of using armed force to 
protect a population, ICISS advised that consideration should be given to the requirement of 
“just cause”.124 ICISS paid particular attention to this, probably because acceptance of 
humanitarian intervention was impeded partly by ambiguity over the specific character, 
nature, gravity and scale that human rights violations should have in order to warrant its 
application.125 As noted earlier, the baseline threshold for the use of armed force was that the 
level of harm being sustained by a population could be described as ‘conscience- 
shocking’.126
110 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (n 3), 56.
111 The criteria are discussed at length in chapter five.
112 ICISS Report (n 8), 32 and 47-55.
113 ICISS Report, ibid, 32-34.
114 ICISS Report, ibid, 35-36.
1,5 ICISS Report, ibid, 36-37.
116 ICISS Report, ibid, 37.
117 ICISS Report, ibid.
118 This right is provided for in customary international law and Article 51 o f  the UN Charter. For a discussion of  
the legal development and scope o f this right, see C Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (3rd edn OUP, 
Oxford 2008) 114-166.
1,9 ICISS Report (n 8), 47-50.
120 ICISS Report, ibid, 51-52.
121 ICISS Report, ibid, 53.
122 ICISS Report, ibid, 53-54.
123 For a discussion o f this case and the concept o f ex post facto UNSC authority for the use o f armed force, see 
e.g. Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (n 118) 421-423.
nXICISS Report (n 8), 32-34.
125 ICISS Report, ibid, 32.
126 ICISS Report, ibid, 33.
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The remaining criteria received less attention but still were clearly tailored to address 
further elements of the humanitarian intervention debate. The “right intention” requirement 
targeted the tension over whether the use of armed force should have a genuine protective 
purpose, and on how to ensure that protective claims were not camouflage for wider political 
motivations like regime change.127 To the ICISS, the best way to safeguard against the latter 
was to ensure that armed force was used collectively, not unilaterally.128 ICISS adopted an 
essentially “sliding-scale” approach to the requisite objective of using armed force, 
providing that it was sufficient that protection was the key motivation for the use of armed 
force in cases where wider policy interests were influential.129 For example, it was 
permissible for States to have an interest in using armed force due to an apprehension that, if 
force was not used, the situation inside the State could lead to humanitarian problems like 
heavy refugee flows.130 The “last resort” requirement is self-explanatory, urging the use of 
armed force to be the very last reactive measure considered, not that all other measures be 
unsuccessfully applied first.131 The “proportional means” requirement is similarly 
transparent, providing that the specific ways of using armed force is the minimum required 
in order to secure populations’ protection and, furthermore, pursuant to relevant international 
humanitarian law.132 Finally, the “reasonable prospects” requirement encouraged decisions 
on the use of armed force to encompass a progressive perspective, considering whether the 
use of armed force represents a viable route through which to end or prevent the harm at 
issue.133 At the same time, ICISS acknowledged that decision makers would have to assess 
whether the use of armed force could actually worsen the situation.134 Decision makers 
should deem the use of armed force to lack a ‘reasonable chance of success’135 if it is 
unlikely to ensure populations’ protection, or make matters worse.136
The “responsibility to rebuild”137 was directly linked to ICISS’s provision for using 
armed force as a reactive measure. This component dealt with two issues, specifically (i) the 
safeguards which may be implemented in order to reduce the prospects of the population 
sustaining further harm in the immediate or longer term; and (ii) the available options 
regarding the status and management of a territory in which armed force has been recently 
used. ICISS provided that the first “rebuilding” step is to establish safeguards for the
127 ICISS
128 ICISS
129 ICISS
130 ICISS
131 ICISS
132 ICISS
133 ICISS
134 ICISS
135 ICISS
136 ICISS
137 ICISS
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
Report,
bid, 35-36. 
bid, 36. 
bid. 
bid. 
bid.
bid, 37.
bid.
bid.
bid.
bid.
bid, 39-45.
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population in the areas of development,138 security,139 justice and reconciliation.140 ICISS 
explained that five protective tasks (minority protection,141 security reform,142 
disarmament,143 demobilisation144 and reintegration,145 mine action146 and non-impunity for 
mass atrocity crimes147) cross-cut the three aforementioned areas. ICISS’s discussion of 
territorial status and management essentially relates to the ICISS’s view that intervening 
forces should, wherever possible, act in pursuance of the people’s right to self-determination 
in rebuilding contexts. For example, in territories where there is no existing government, 
either prior to or as a result of the use of armed force, interveners should uphold the internal 
dimension of a people’s right to self-determination by organising national elections as soon 
as possible.148 This includes territories which have been placed under UN administration.149
Whilst the “prevent, react, rebuild” continuum150 was explicitly affirmed in the HLP 
Report,151 the former UNSG Report did so only implicitly in its recommendation for States 
to ‘move towards embracing and acting on the “responsibility to protect” potential or actual 
victims of massive atrocities’.152 The italicised terms reflect the nature of the responsibilities 
inherent in RtoP. Affirming that RtoP covers ‘potential [...] victims’153 tends to affirm that 
action should be taken before ‘massive atrocities’154 have been fully perpetrated and, 
therefore, that RtoP includes a “responsibility to prevent”. Furthermore, providing for action 
to be taken in order to protect the ‘actual victims of mass atrocities’155 may suggest that RtoP 
was considered to encompass responsibilities to “react” and “rebuild”.
No overarching continuum of “prevention, reaction and rebuilding” features in the 
Outcome Document. The Outcome Document explicitly affirms that primary RtoP entails a 
responsibility to prevent RtoP crimes156, ‘including their incitement’157 though ‘appropriate 
and necessary means’.158 In terms of secondary RtoP, the Outcome Document provides that
138 ICISS Report,
139 ICISS Report,
140 ICISS Report,
141 ICISS Report,
142 ICISS Report,
143 ICISS Report,
144 ICISS Report,
145 ICISS Report,
146 ICISS Report,
147 ICISS Report,
148 ICISS Report,
149 ICISS Report,
95 AJIL 76.
150 HLP Report (n 10), 66.
151 HLP Report, ibid.
152 Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 11), 34-35, emphasis added.
153 Report o f the UNSG, ibid.
154 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 35.
155 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 34-35.
156 Outcome Document (n 15), para 138.
157 Outcome Document, ibid.
158 Outcome Document, ibid.
bid, 42-43. 
bid, 40-41. 
bid, 41-42. 
bid, 65. 
bid. 
bid. 
bid. 
bid. 
bid, 66. 
bid.
bid, 43.
bid. See generally, M Matheson, ‘United Nations Governance o f Postconflict Societies’ (2001)
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the international community should (i) ‘encourage and help’159 States to fulfil primary RtoP;
(ii) apply peaceful measures in order to ‘help to protect’160 a population from RtoP crimes;
(iii) ‘take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the UNSC, in 
accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate’;161 and (iv) help ‘States 
build capacity to protect their populations’162 and to assist States ‘which are under stress 
before crises and conflicts break out’.163 Notably, the Outcome Document does not expressly 
provide for decisions regarding the use of armed force to satisfy the Just War-type criteria 
proposed in earlier Reports.164 Furthermore, the only explicit reference to a preventive 
responsibility is, as suggested above, made in relation to the scope of primary RtoP. 
Nevertheless, the provision for the international community to assist States ‘before crises and 
conflicts break out’165 may at least leave open the possibility of secondary RtoP entailing a 
preventive component. Conversely, the emphasis on providing assistance and capacity 
building ‘before’166 RtoP crimes are perpetrated equally highlights that the Outcome 
Document does not retain a specific rebuilding responsibility.
Significantly, a fuller understanding of the structure of the RtoP framework has been 
developed in subsequent practice, not least the UNSG’s 2009 Report on RtoP’s 
implementation.167 This Report divided the RtoP framework into three Pillars, specifically (i) 
the protection responsibilities of the State,168 attributable on the basis of ‘sovereignty as 
responsibility’169 and encouraging States to, for example, implement human rights measures 
effectively;170 (ii) the international community’s assistance and capacity building role,171 
promoting the contribution that the international community can make to populations’ 
protection from RtoP crimes through the consensual application of, for example, consensual 
diplomatic or military assistance;172 and (iii) the international community’s role in 
responding to RtoP situations in a ‘timely and decisive’173 manner by applying ‘peaceful
159 Outcome Document, ibid.
160 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
161 Outcome Document, ibid.
162 Outcome Document, ibid.
163 Outcome Document, ibid.
164 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For All (n 3) 60.
165 Outcome Document (n 15), para 139.
166 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
167 Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP (n 32).
168 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 8-9. See further, UNSG’s Address, ‘Responsible Sovereignty: International Co­
operation for a Changed World’ (15 July 2008, Berlin) UN Doc SG/SM/11701 and E C Luck, ‘The United
Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (August 2008) The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, 6-8 
<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/policyanalysis.cfm?id=345> accessed 8 October 2012.
169 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 6-7.
170 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 4.
171 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 9.
172 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 15.
173 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 9-10.
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means’174 or, ‘should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations’,175 discharging of ‘non-peaceful’176 measures, including 
through the use of armed force which is authorised by the UNSC.177
2 Current Commentary on RtoP
The above stages of development generated a body of literature which broadly examines 
RtoP’s scope, policy implications, legal status, character and interplay with existing 
obligations/practice. As the thesis focuses on RtoP’s development in practice following the 
Outcome Document, the strengths and weaknesses of RtoP literature preceding its adoption 
at the World Summit are not given detailed consideration.178 It should also be noted that a 
large volume of present literature considers RtoP from the perspective of international 
relations and political theory.179 Whilst the present author draws upon some of the theoretical 
assessments, the thesis mainly examines RtoP from a legal perspective.
For the purposes of this thesis, present literature on RtoP can be grouped into seven broad 
themes, specifically (i) who owes RtoP (RtoP’s bearer concept);180 (ii) who can benefit from
174 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 22.
175 Outcome Document (n 15), para 139.
176 Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP (n 32), 22.
177 Report o f the UNSG, ibid, 25.
178 Prominent examples include, J Levitt, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver without a Dam?’ (2003-2004) 
25 Mich. J. Int’l L 153 and I Williams, ‘Writing the Wrongs o f Past Interventions: A Review o f the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’ (2002) 6 (3) Int. J. Hum. Rts. 103.
179 See especially, D Chandler, ‘The Paradox o f  the Responsibility to Protect’ (2010) 45 (1) Cooperation and 
Conflict 128; D Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the Liberal Peace?’ (2004) 11 (1)
International Peacekeeping 59; Oman (n 33); A Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without Territory: From the Holy Roman 
Empire to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008-2009) 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 981; J Pattison, ‘Legitimacy and 
Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?’ (2008) 12 (3) Int. J. Hum. Rts 395; J Pattison, ‘Humanitarian 
Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect and Jus in Bello’ (n 3); P Cunliffe (ed), Critical Perspectives on the
Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Routledge, Abingdon 2011); Orford, International
Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (n 53); Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene? (n 3); K Engle, ‘Calling in the Troops: The Uneasy Relationship between 
Women’s Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2007) 20 Harv Hum Rts J 189 and Hehir, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (n 3).
180 The following are prominent examples o f commentary on RtoP’s bearer concept: L Arbour, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in International Law and Practice’ (2008) 34 Review of International 
Studies 445; S Rosenberg, “Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention” in Bellamy, Davies and 
Glanville (n 18), 191; M Kalkman, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow?’ (2009) 5 Cambridge 
Student Law Review 75; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush - On the Assumed Legal Nature 
o f the Responsibility to Protect” (n 53), 51-54; P Akhavan, ‘Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What 
Does Not Happen’ (2011) 22 (1) Crim. L. F. 1,13-16; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or 
Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11); Payandeh (n 53), 499-501; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  
Sovereignty’ (n 53), 539; H Nasu, ‘Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect and Conflict Prevention: 
Dilemmas o f Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 (2) Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 209, 
216-234; Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (n 3), 
15-20; Cunliffe, ibid, 55; K Tan, “The Duty to Protect” in T Nardin and M Williams (eds), Humanitarian 
Intervention (New York University Press, New York 2006) 95; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 217-226; L Glanville, 
“The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” in S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), Protecting the 
Displaced: Deepening the Responsibility to Protect (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2010) 295-297; S Koko, ‘Whose 
Responsibility to Protect? Reflections on the Dynamics o f  an ‘Abandoned Disorder’ in Somalia’ (2007) 16 (3) 
African Security Review 2.
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the protection offered by RtoP (RtoP’s beneficiary concept);181 (iii) the scope, duration and 
value added of primary RtoP;182 (iv) the nature, character and scope of secondary RtoP’s 
activation;183 (v) the scope and value added of secondary RtoP;184 (vi) the legal status and
181 The following are useful examples o f the treatment o f RtoP’s beneficiary concept by commentators: W Pace 
and N Deller, ‘Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect’ (2005) 36 (4) World 
Order 15, 26; N Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate Over where 
Authority should be Located fo r  the Use o f  Force (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo 2008) 16; 
Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 53), 522; N Wheeler and F Egerton, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: ‘Precious Commitment’ or a Promise Unfulfilled?’ (2009) 1 GRtoP 114, 123; E C 
Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (Keynote address, European Science 
Foundation Conference ‘The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice’ Linkoping, June 2010); Luck, 
‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 168); R Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ 
(2010) 2 GRtoP 15; The Editors, ‘Special Issue for GRtoP: Protecting IDPs and Refugees’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 5, 7;
E Mooney, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed ... Something Blue? The Protection Potential 
o f a Marriage o f  Concepts Between RtoP and IDP Protection’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 60; N Otsuki and N Turner, The 
Responsibility to Protect Minorities and the Problem o f  the Kin State (UN University, Tokyo 2010); W Kemp, V 
Popovski and R Thakur (eds), Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f  the Kin-State 
(UN University Press, Tokyo 2011); H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect’ 
(2010) 2 (3) GRtoP 232; J Bond and L Sherret, ‘Mapping Gender and the Responsibility to Protect: Seeking 
Intersections, Finding Parallels’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 133; I Skjelsbaek, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Prevent? 
Victims and Perpetrators o f  Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 154; E Stamnes, 
‘The Responsibility to Protect: Integrating Gender Perspectives into Policies and Practices’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 
172; S E Davies and S Teitt, ‘Engendering the Responsibility to Protect: Women and the Prevention o f Mass 
Atrocities’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 198; J Karlsrud and R Solhjell, ‘Gender-Sensitive Protection and the 
Responsibility to Prevent: Lessons from Chad’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 223; S Dharmapuri, ‘Implementing UN 
Security Resolution 1325: Putting the Responsibility to Protect into Practice’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 241 and S 
Whitman, “The Responsibility to Protect and Child Soldiers” in Knight and Egerton (n 18), 152-166.
182 Examples include: Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian 
Intervention (n 3) 74; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 48-51; A Bellamy and R 
Reike “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 18), 89-94; 
Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 118; D Giercyz, “The 
Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-Based Perspective” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 18), 101-
118; L Feinstein, ‘Darfur and Beyond: What is Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (2007) 22 Council on Foreign 
Relations 1; Otsuki and Turner (n 181); Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid; J Sarkin, ‘The Role o f the United 
Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional Organisations in Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights 
Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 53 (1) Journal of 
African Law 1,12  and E Aba and M Hammer, Yes We Can? Options and Barriers to Broadening the Scope o f  the 
Responsibility to Protect to include Cases o f  Economic Social and Cultural Rights Abuses (One World Trust, 
London 2009) 1-24.
183 The competing approaches adopted to this issue in present literature can be found in: Arbour, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 449; E C Luck, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade’ (2011) 3 GRtoP 387, 394; Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: The 
Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 90; D Amneus, Responsibility to Protect and the Prevention o f  
Genocide: A Right to Humanitarian Intervention? (The Living History Forum, Stockholm 2008) 19; Rosenberg 
and Strauss (n 50); A Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) 19 Eths & Int Affs 31; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political 
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11); C Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ (The Hague Justice 
Portal, 24 November 2011) <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12998> accessed 12 May 2012; 
Payandeh (n 53) and N Wheeler, ‘A Victoiy for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 
2005 World Summit’ (Paper presented at ‘The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?’ conference, University o f 
Toronto, 6-7 October 2005), 8
<http://cadair.aber.ac.Uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/197 l/l/a%20victory%20for%20common%20humanity,%20Whe 
eler.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012.
184 Prominent sources include: Sarkin, ‘The Role o f the United Nations’ (n 182), 12; J Volk et al, “Building 
Structures for Peace: A Quaker Lobby Offers Strategies for Peacemakers” in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds) 
Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact fo r  the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 
2009) 199-218; J Sarkin, ‘Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm of International Law in the Post- 
Libya Era? How its Third Pillar Ought to Be Applied’ (2012) 1 Groningen Journal o f  International Law 11, 26- 
35; A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention’ (2008) 84 (4) Eths and 
Int Affs 615,634; S Sharma, ‘Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to 
Implementation’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 121; Oman (n 33), 366-367; A Bellamy, ‘Conflict Prevention and 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 14 (2) Global Governance 135, 143-44; Bellamy, The Responsibility to 
Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13) 98-131; A Bellamy, ‘Realising the Responsibility to
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character of RtoP;185 and (vii) the relationship between RtoP and minority protection.186 The 
aforementioned themes in present literature are discussed in detail in the substantive 
chapters. Accordingly, it is sufficient for present purposes to outline the principal trends in 
present literature regarding each theme in order to identify at the outset the key issues which 
this writer considers merit further reflection because (i) such issues receive limited attention 
in present literature, despite their potential significance; or (ii) the standpoints taken to the 
issues in present literature merit revisiting in the light of relevant practice.
2.1 RtoP’s Bearer Concept
In present literature, limited attention is given to the significance and potential implications 
of the Outcome Document providing that ‘[e]ach individual State’187 and, more specifically,
188 189‘national authorities’, bear primary RtoP. Most commentators simply reiterate that 
States are required to protect their populations from RtoP crimes. However, in international 
law the term “State” is usually used with respect to territories which meet the criteria for 
statehood}90 Accordingly, there is the question of whether “State” is used in its legal sense 
in the Outcome Document and, if so, whether primary RtoP is owed by the national 
authorities of territories which do not meet the criteria for statehood, such as secessionist 
enclaves.
Russia’s claim to have a responsibility to protect its citizens residing in South Ossetia,191 
a secessionist enclave located inside Georgia, prompted discussion of the territorial scope of
Protect’ (2009) 10 (2) International Studies Perspectives 111, 120; M Matthews, ‘Tracking the Emergence o f a 
New International Norm: The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ (2008) 31 Boston College 
International and Comparative Law Review 137, 150-52.
185 Key examples are: Bellamy and Reike (n 182), 89-94; N S MacFarlane, C J Thielking and T G Weiss, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?’ (2004) 25 (5) Third World 
Quarterly 977; Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and fo r  All (n 3), 223- 
41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 456; 
Feinstein (n 182), 46-48; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 225; S Breau, ‘The Impact o f the Responsibility to Protect on 
Peacekeeping’ (2007) 11 (3) Journal o f Conflict & Security Law 429, 440 and 464; Nasu (n 180), 219; Payandeh 
(n 53); Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 25-57; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ ( n i l )  and G Shaffer and M Pollack, ‘Hard Versus Soft Law in 
International Security’ (2011) 52 Boston College Law Review 1147.
186 The main discussion o f this relationship can be found in: Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 181); Schabas (n 58) 
and Otsuki and Turner (n 181).
187 Outcome Document (n 15), para 138.
188 Outcome Document, ibid.
189 The majority o f commentators affirm this. See for e.g. Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality 
and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (n 3) 69-74; Amneus (n 183), 14; R Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines: 
Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2004) 62 (1) Canadian Institute o f International Affairs 1, 8 and Bellamy, 
Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13) 96.
190 It is commonly accepted that the criteria for statehood are reflected in Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties o f States (1933) (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 19 art 
1 (Montevideo Convention). The Article requires that a “State” have (i) a permanent population; (ii) defined 
territory; (iii) government; and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other States.
191 ‘[Ujnder the Constitution [the President] is obliged to protect the life and dignity o f Russian citizens, 
especially when they find themselves in the armed conflict. And today he reiterated that the peace enforcement
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100 101RtoP. Evans and Ruys assert that RtoP does not relate to the wider concept of the 
protection of nationals abroad, thereby suggesting that States’ national authorities owe 
primary RtoP to persons located within their territorial borders. Thakur194 left the question 
open, pointing to its complexity and need for further consideration:
‘If a State has the responsibility to protect citizens and foreigners alike on its 
territory, does it not also have the correlative duty to protect its individual 
citizens caught in danger on foreign soil?’195
Thakur’s question raises a host of issues which merit reflection in light of practice, not least 
whether State responses to Russia’s claim uphold the view that a State has a responsibility to 
protect its citizens residing in the territory of another State. If so, under what circumstances 
is this responsibility acquired? What are the potential implications of the approaches taken to 
the territorial scope of primary RtoP in practice to date? What do these approaches suggest 
about RtoP’s relationship with existing obligations/practice?
The Outcome Document’s reference to the “international community”196 as the entity 
which should discharge secondary RtoP is commonly discussed in present RtoP literature. 
Generally, commentators’197 examine whether the width and indeterminacy of the term 
“international community”198 impedes secondary RtoP having the character of a duty because 
it does not identify a solitary bearer. The present author considers that it is useful to examine 
this issue in more depth, if  only to determine the kind of considerations which underscored 
the decision not to identify a solitary bearer of secondary RtoP and, furthermore, the possible 
advantages and disadvantages of this decision. For example, does providing for secondary
operation enforcing peace on one o f the parties which violated its own obligations would continue until we 
achieve the results. According to our Constitution there is also responsibility to protect — the term which is very 
widely used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any remote part o f other regions. But this is 
not Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area, where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution o f the Russian 
Federation, the laws o f the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to 
protect’. “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (Ministry 
o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 August 2008)
<www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574al0026259770penD  
ocument> accessed 11 May 2012
192 G Evans, ‘Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 2 (1) Amsterdam Law Forum 25 
<http://ojs.ubvu.vu.n1/alfrarticle/view/58/l 15> accessed 12 May 2012.
193 T Ruys, ‘The “Protection o f Nationals” Doctrine Revisited’ (2008) 13 (2) Journal o f Conflict & Security Law 
233,267-68.
194 R Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect and the North-South Divide” in R Thakur, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use o f  Force in International Politics (Routledge, Abingdon 2011).
195 Thakur, ibid, 154.
196 Outcome Document (n 15), paras 138-139.
197 See especially, Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 
180); Rosenberg, “Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention” (n 180), 191; Strauss, “A Bird in the 
Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 51-54; Akhavan (n 180), 13-16; Payandeh (n 53), 499-501; Peters, 
‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 53), 539; Nasu (n 180), 216-234; Pattison, Humanitarian 
Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (n 3), 15-20; Tan (n 180), 95; Welsh and 
Banda (n 53), 217-226; Cunliffe (n 179), 55 and Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to 
Protect” (n 180), 295-297.
198 On the conceptualisation o f the “international community” more generally, see e.g. D Kritsiosis, ‘Imagining 
the International Community’ (2002) 13 (4) EJ1L 961 and G Abi-Saab, ‘Whither the International Community?’ 
(1998) 9 EJIL 248.
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RtoP to be discharged by the “international community”, not a specific member thereof, 
make its discharge more flexible?
2.2 R toP’s Beneficiary Concept
In present literature, the majority of commentators either affirm the Outcome Document’s 
“populations”199 beneficiary concept or that used in earlier RtoP Reports, such as 
“citizens”.200 Given that States accepted the final text of the Outcome Document, affirming 
its beneficiary concept seems reasonable. Nevertheless, the fact that RtoP’s beneficiary 
concept was altered between 2001 and 2005 prompts consideration of whether the concept 
has undergone any further refinement in subsequent practice and the significance and 
potential implications thereof.
2.3 The Scope, Duration and Value Added o f Primary RtoP
Whilst most commentators201 recognise that primary RtoP is a central component of the 
RtoP, the general view is that primary RtoP (i) merely restates States’ existing human rights, 
criminal and humanitarian law obligations;202 and/or (ii) requires States to comply with and 
enforce the aforesaid existing obligations effectively.203 Whilst this strand of literature 
usefully delineates primary RtoP’s legal basis, it suggests that primary RtoP merely 
repackages States existing protection duties and, therefore, sets aside the question of whether 
primary RtoP adds value to these obligations. In addition, focusing on the way in which
199 The majority o f commentators restate this. However, the following are useful examples: Wheeler, 
Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect (n 181), 16; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  
Sovereignty’ (n 53), 522 and Wheeler and Egerton (n 181), 123.
200 See for e.g. Amneus (n 183), 14; A M Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes of 
UN Reform’ (2005) 99 (3) AJIL 619, 620; Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 189), 7 and Charlesworth (n 181), 
234.
201 Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (n 3) 69- 
74; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 48-51; Bellamy and Reike (n 182), 89-94; 
Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 118; Giercyz (n 182), 101- 
118; E McClean, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Role o f International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 13(1) 
Journal o f  Conflict and Security Law 123; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in 
International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 448; Mooney (n 181), 84; Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP 
Protection’ (n 181), 26; H Slim, ‘Value versus Power: Responsible Sovereignty as Struggle in Zimbabwe’ (2010) 
2 GRtoP 150; Feinstein (n 182), 10; Oman (n 33), 374-78 and Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  
Sovereignty’ (n 53), 541.
202 See particularly, Hehir, ibid, 74; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush”, ibid; Bellamy and 
Reike, ibid; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid and Giercyz, 
ibid, 101-118.
203 For e.g. McClean (n 201); Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and 
Practice’ (n 180), 448; Mooney (n 181), 84; Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 181), 26;
Feinstein (n 182), 10; Oman (n 33), 374-78 and Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 
53), 541.
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primary RtoP encourages States to ensure that ‘fundamental human rights’204 are protected 
more effectively, leaves open the issue of whether certain human rights may bear more 
importance under primary RtoP than others.
Other commentators205 raise arguments which have a particular bearing on the duration of 
primary RtoP. Commentators206 like Stahn207 contend that the Outcome Document criteria of 
manifest failure and the inadequacy of peaceful means create a ‘complementarity trap’208 in 
the RtoP framework, triggering debate over whether the State or the international community 
is responsible for protecting populations. Conversely, Bellamy209 refers to primary RtoP as 
an ‘enduring’210 duty of States, suggesting that States primary RtoP duty subsists irrespective 
of whether secondary RtoP has been activated. The varying standpoints taken to the issue in 
present literature generate a range of questions which warrant assessment in the light of 
relevant practice. Which view, if any, best reflects the approach taken to primary RtoP’s 
duration in practice to date? What reasons underscore the approach taken?
2.4 The Nature, Character, Scope and Value Added o f Secondary RtoP’s 
Activation
Two main approaches are taken to the activation of secondary RtoP in present literature. 
Commentators, including Charlesworth,211 Luck212 and Arbour,213 tend to adopt a descriptive 
approach to the issue, affirming either the activating threshold used in earlier RtoP Reports214
204 Luck, ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 168), 2.
205 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 116-117; Wheeler, ‘A 
Victory for Common Humanity?’ (n 183), 8-9; Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?’ (n 183), 43; 
Payandeh (n 53), 498; Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ (n 183); Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and 
Omega o f Sovereignty’, ibid; R Cohen, ‘Strengthening Protection of IDP’s: The UN’s Role’ (2006) 7 (1) 
Georgetown Journal o f International Affairs 101; Nasu (n 180); Kalkman (n 180); V Holt and T Berkman, The 
Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace Operations (The 
Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington D.C. 2006); McClean (n 201); Otsuki and Turner (n 181) and Giercyz (n 
182), 192.
206 See especially, Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?’, ibid; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid; Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’, ibid; 
Payandeh, ibid and Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity?’, ibid, 8.
207 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid.
208 Stahn, ibid, 116.
209 A Bellamy, ‘The Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect’ (e-International Relations, 1 May 
2009) <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/05/01 /the-conflict-in-sri-lanka-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/> accessed 10 
October 2010. Giercyz comments that primary RtoP amounts to the ‘continuing’ responsibility o f States to 
protect their populations from RtoP crimes. Giercyz (n 182), 192.
10 Bellamy, ‘The Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect’, ibid.
211 Charlesworth (n 181), 234.
212 Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade’ (n 183), 394.
213 Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 449.
214 Two illustrations o f this approach are, Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 189), 7 and Charlesworth (n 181), 
234.
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or the Outcome Document.215 Other commentators adopt a prescriptive approach, considering 
the more intricate issues surrounding secondary RtoP’s activation. Wong216 is one example, 
recommending that legal understandings of the mass atrocity crimes to which RtoP relates be 
drawn upon in the course of decision making on whether to apply secondary RtoP. This 
raises the question of whether the legal basis of RtoP has influenced decision making on 
secondary RtoP’s activation in practice and, if so, to what extent. For example, is 
consideration given to both the actus reus and mens rea elements of RtoP crimes in 
decisions on secondary RtoP’s activation?
Scheffer217 also draws upon the legal definitions of RtoP crimes, suggesting that 
secondary RtoP’s activation overlaps with the substantiality test used to determine whether a 
crime is of sufficient gravity to fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction. This argument raises 
significant questions which warrant further reflection. Does practice sustain the view that 
secondary RtoP’s activation depends on the presence of similar factors to the substantiality 
test? Is there scope to argue that there is some divergence between the two? For example, are 
all of the acts which fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction also able to activate secondary RtoP?
Rosenberg and Strauss218 provide perhaps the most detailed assessment of secondary 
RtoP’s activation to date and raise a range of issues for consideration. Two arguments merit 
particular consideration in the body of the thesis. The first is the evidential issues which can 
arise if secondary RtoP’s activation is based upon the prospect of RtoP crimes arising in the 
future. Rosenberg and Strauss consider that such an approach requires decision makers to 
essentially predict what harm a population may sustain if the international community does 
not act promptly,219 thereby creating a risk that decision makers may overrate or underrate 
the potential harm. This raises questions of an evidential nature which warrant further 
examination. For example, are there any existing techniques which could help to guard 
against miscalculations regarding the harm which will quite likely be sustained by a 
population if secondary RtoP is not activated?
The second argument is of a more substantive nature. Rosenberg and Strauss consider 
that drawing upon the legal elements of RtoP crimes to determine secondary RtoP’s 
activation would ‘ensure the immediate demise’220 of RtoP’s preventive capacity. To the 
present author, this view raises a host of interesting questions for evaluation. Does practice 
suggest that it possible for secondary RtoP to be activated for preventive purpose and be
215 For e.g. Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 
449 and Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The First Decade’ (n 183), 394.
216 J Wong, ‘Reconstructing the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake o f Cyclones and Separatism’ (2009) 84 (2) 
Tulane Law Review 219.
217 Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” in Cooper and Kohler (n 184).
218 See especially, Rosenberg and Strauss (n 50), 55-72.
219 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 58 and Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” (n 
217), 93.
220 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 55.
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influenced by the legal elements of RtoP crimes? Could this approach be beneficial at a 
policy level by, for example, alleviating States concerns that secondary RtoP will be 
discharged before indicators of possible RtoP crimes emerge in the State?
2.5 The Scope and Value Added o f Secondary RtoP
Present literature on secondary RtoP can be broadly divided into five main themes. The first 
theme is the scope of secondary RtoP’s means of discharge. Particular attention has been 
given to the nature of the measures which can be used to prevent RtoP crimes from arising in 
a State. Commentators221 are divided on this issue. Whilst Sarkin222 and Rimmer223 consider 
that priority should be given to structural prevention measures which address the root causes 
of RtoP crimes, Bellamy224 and Oman225 favour operational measures which come into effect 
after the population has sustained some harm. The divide in academic opinion merits 
consideration in the light of State positions on the form of preventive measures which should 
be used to discharge secondary RtoP and, furthermore, the possible issues which underscore 
where State consensus on this issue lies presently.
The second theme relates to the more specific elements of secondary RtoP’s discharge. 
There is some discussion of the steps which the international community can take to ensure 
that the assistance offered is discharged in practice, particularly by coercing State consent to 
its provision by threatening the use of non-peaceful measures if  consent is not 
forthcoming.226 The significant question which arises from this line of argument is whether it 
will always be appropriate to look to the State to provide consent, not least in cases where 
the government is perpetrating RtoP crimes. Does practice suggest that the international 
community may identify other actors within the State as legitimate recipients of assistance?
221 For e.g. Sarkin, ‘The Role o f the United Nations’ (n 182), 12; Volk (n 184), 199-218; Sarkin, ‘Is the 
Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm o f International Law in the Post-Libya Era?’ (n 184) 26-35; S 
Rimmer, ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and the “Responsibility to Protect’” (March 2010) New Issues 
in Refugee Research, Research Paper No 185, UNHCR; Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem 
o f Military Intervention’ (n 184), 634; Sharma, ‘Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect’ (n 184), 121-138; 
Oman (n 33), 366-367; Bellamy, ‘Conflict Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 184), 143-44;
Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 98-131 and Bellamy, 
‘Realising the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 184), 120.
222 Sarkin, ‘The Role o f the United Nations’, ibid and Sarkin, ‘Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm 
o f International Law in the Post-Libya Era?’, ibid.
223 Rimmer (n 221).
224 Bellamy, ‘Realising the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 184); Bellamy, ‘Conflict Prevention and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (n 184) and Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass 
Atrocities (n 13), 98-131.
225 Oman (n 33).
226 See particularly, Matthews (n 184), 150-52; A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Five Years On’ (2010) 
2 Ethics and International Affairs 143, 147-53 and Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f  
Militaiy Intervention’ (n 184), 634.
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If so, is there scope to suggest that new routes through which to coerce State cooperation 
with the international community on the provision of assistance may be emerging?
In this section of present literature, particular attention is also given to whether the Just 
War-type criteria proposed by the ICISS should inform decision making on the use of armed 
force. Different approaches are adopted here. One view (defended strongly by members of 
the ICISS like Evans227) is that the criteria are central to RtoP’s effectiveness because they 
establish the parameters of a legitimate and legal use of armed force for human protection 
purposes.228 In contrast, Bellamy229 expresses concern over the extent to which the criteria 
could guide decision making in practice constructively, suggesting that they could instead 
impede decisive decision making by simply providing new rules for the UNSC to debate.230 
The present author considers that the potential merits of adopting the criteria warrant 
assessment in light of decision making on the use of armed force in Libya. Are the criteria 
necessary in contemporary international relations? Does Libya suggest that the criteria could 
further complicate the decision making process?
The third theme is the extent to which secondary RtoP’s means of discharge are novel. 
Commentators231 tend to focus on whether secondary RtoP introduces any changes to the 
existing regime on armed force, particularly whether it alters the requirement for UNSC 
authorisation. Whilst Libya has prompted assertions that RtoP strengthens the use of armed 
force for the specific purpose of human protection,232 commentators233 generally conclude 
that secondary RtoP reiterates the UN Charter’s provisions for the UNSC to authorise 
Chapter VII enforcement measures in order to maintain international peace and security. 
Whilst assessing RtoP’s interaction with the existing regime on armed force is of 
fundamental importance, it tends to set aside the question of whether other components of
227 Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For A ll (n 3), 128-148.
228 For e.g. Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 189), 13; Pace and Deller (n 181), 29; Kalkman (n 180), 85; Nasu 
(n 180), 223; MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 185), 988; R Thakur, ‘In Defence o f the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2003) 7 (3) Int. J. Hum. Rts. 160, 163 and Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in 
International Law and Practice’ (n 180).
229 Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Military Intervention’ (n 184).
230Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military Intervention’, ibid, 627.
231 See particularly, Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and fo r  A ll (n 3), 
223-41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 456; 
Feinstein (n 182), 46-48; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 225; Breau (n 185), 440 and 464; Nasu (n 180), 219; McClean 
(n 201), 129; J McCarthur, ‘A Responsibility to Rethink? Challenging Paradigms in Human Security’ (2008) 63 
Int’l J. 422,431-33; Wheeler and Egerton (n 181), 128-29; Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? 
Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ (n 3), 166; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political 
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 109; Payandeh (n 53), 507-508; A Bannon, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Question o f Unilateralism’ (2006) 115 Yale L. J. 1157 and J F Thibault, ‘Military Intervention 
and the Indeterminacy o f  the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 7 Human Security Journal 8.
232 For e.g. J Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP’ (2011) 25 
(3) Eths & Int Affs 255,258-260 and A Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the 
Norm’ (2011) 25 (3) Eths & Int Affs 263, 263-264.
233 See for e.g. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and fo r  All (n 3), 223- 
41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 456; 
Breau (n 185), 440 and 464; Nasu (n 180), 219; McClean (n 201), 129; McCarthur (n 231), 431-33; Schabas (n 
58), 14 and Wheeler and Egerton (n 181), 128-29.
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secondary RtoP are novel. For example, is there scope to suggest that secondary RtoP may 
alter traditional interpretations of the principle of neutrality in civil wars?
The fourth theme relates to the potential implications of secondary RtoP’s discharge. 
For example, commentators discuss secondary RtoP’s interplay with regime change,234 its 
capacity to “internationalise” human protection,235 to leave open the possibility of using 
armed force which has not been authorised by the UNSC236 and whether RtoP encourages so- 
called “suicidal rebellions”.237 Each of these potential implications merits deeper 
consideration, given the significant bearing which these controversial issues could have on 
secondary RtoP’s political palatability and, furthermore, RtoP’s interaction with the existing 
international legal and political framework. At the same time, the present author considers 
that there is a need to examine whether secondary RtoP can circumvent all of these 
implications and protect populations from RtoP crimes.
Finally, particular consideration is given to the routes through which to overcome 
impediments to secondary RtoP’s discharge, specifically the UNSC’s failure to authorise the 
requisite protective action. Proposals include using the UN General Assembly Uniting for 
Peace Resolution to recommend the use of collective measures, such as sanctions238 and 
armed force,239 to protect a population. Bellamy has also proposed that the risk of the UNSC 
failing to authorise the use of armed force, at least in a ‘timely and decisive’240 manner, may 
be overcome by coalitions of the willing or regional organisations invoking the concept of 
revived UNSC authorisation.241 These recommendations raise several issues for examination, 
including whether either proposal has State support and/or is compatible with the Outcome 
Document. In addition, there is the question of whether other steps to circumvent the 
UNSC’s failure to act have emerged in country-specific practice, such as Syria.
234 See especially, A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Regime Change’ (e- 
International Relations, 27 September 2011) <www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the- 
problem-of-regime-change/> accessed 12 July 2012; A Bellamy, ‘Stopping Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The 
Problem of Regime Change’ (Protection Gateway, 6 July 2012)
<http://protectiongateway.eom/2012/07/06/stopping-genocide-and-mass-atrocities-the-problem-of-regime- 
change/> accessed 12 July 2012 and L Arbour, ‘For Justice and Civilians, Don’t Rule Out Regime Change’ The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto, 26 June 2012) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/for-justice-and- 
civilians-dont-rule-out-regime-change/article4372211/> accessed 12 July 2012.
235 S Nouwen, ‘RtoP and Complementarity: Critical Lessons from the Practice o f  the ICC’ (Paper presented at the 
European Science Foundation ‘The Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice’ conference, Linkoping, 
Sweden, 10 June 2010) and F Megret, ‘Beyond the ‘Salvation’ Paradigm: Responsibility to Protect (Others) vs. 
the Power o f Protecting O neself (2009) 40 Security Dialogue 575.
236 Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ (n 
3), 166; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 109 and Payandeh 
(n 53), 507-508.
237 A J Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard o f Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’ (2008) 52 
International Studies Quarterly 49 and Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Military 
Intervention’ (n 184), 631-632.
238 Payandeh (n 53), 504-505.
239 See particularly, Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 189), 13; Breau (n 185), 434; Pace and Deller (n 181), 29; 
Kalkman (n 180), 85 and N Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures’
(2001) 2 Melbourne Journal o f  International Law 1, 12, 16 and 17.
240 Outcome Document (n 15), para 139.
241 Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 91.
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2.6 Legal Status and Character
Present literature does not consider the legal status and character of primary RtoP as a 
responsibility in its own right, quite likely because of the general presumption that it merely 
reaffirms States’ existing human rights, humanitarian and criminal law obligations.242 The 
present author considers that isolating primary RtoP’s legal significance and character to the 
existing obligations of States to which it relates tends to set aside the fact that, since 2005, a 
whole body of practice has developed with respect to primary RtoP. Accordingly, it is useful 
to examine whether the existing views on primary RtoP’s legal significance and character 
may merit reconsideration in the light of practice.
Different views are taken to secondary RtoP’s legal status. One view is that secondary 
RtoP could become new customary international law in the future ,243 Another perspective is 
that secondary RtoP lacks legal status in its own right but, as it relates to a range of existing 
obligations like those in the UN Charter, entails legally binding elements.244 The common 
view is that secondary RtoP is not a new legal obligation but a moral responsibility which 
adds force to the existing legal obligations to which it relates and, consequently, that the 
Outcome Document may represent soft law.245 Notably, limited attention is given to States 
views on the legal nature of secondary RtoP in these assessments. Thus, there remains the 
question of what State views on RtoP between 2005 and 2012 suggest about the way in 
which States perceive secondary RtoP’s legal significance. Do States consider secondary 
RtoP to constitute new customary international law and/or create new interpretations to the 
existing treaty obligations to which it relates, such as the UNSC veto power?
Competing views are also taken to secondary RtoP’s character. Some commentators 
assess whether secondary RtoP entails the character of a right,246 permission247 or 
responsibility248 to protect. However, debate centres on secondary RtoP’s capacity to become
242 See especially, Bellamy and Reike (n 182), 89-94 [outlining the legal duties which primary RtoP interconnects 
with under international criminal, humanitarian and human rights law] and Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing 
the Responsibility to Protect” (n 217), 77-98 [outlining the interplay between the RtoP framework and the legal 
basis and development o f international criminal law].
243 For e.g. MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 185), 988.
244 Several commentators allude to this view, see for e.g. Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass 
Atrocity Crimes Once and fo r  A ll (n 3) 223-41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in 
International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 456; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 225; Breau (n 185), 440 and 464; Nasu (n
180), 219 and Payandeh (n 53), 469-516.
245 See especially, Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 25-57; Stahn, ‘Responsibility 
to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ ( n i l )  and Shaffer and Pollack (n 185), 1232.
246 For e.g. Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 53), 533-535; Slaughter, ‘Security, 
Solidarity and Sovereignty’ (n 200), 621; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in 
International Law and Practice’ (n 180), 447-450; Brunee and Toope (n 53), 76; A Orford, ‘From Promise to 
Practice? The Legal Significance o f the Responsibility to Protect Concept’ (2011) 3 GRtoP 400,401 and R Mani 
and T Weiss, ‘RtoP’s Missing Link, Culture’ (2011)3 GRtoP 451,457.
247 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (n 53), 25.
248 See especially, Orford, ibid, 25-27; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 48; 
Payandeh (n 53), 482-484 and 508-513; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 216-220; Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect Beyond Borders’ (n 53), 18-19 and 27-30; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n
30
a duty, specifically a duty of care,249 duty to act,250 an imperfect duty251 or a provisional 
duty.252 Notably, each of the aforementioned corresponds with traditional formulations of the 
character which rules/doctrines can entail. This raises the question of whether secondary 
RtoP’s character may be reconciled more readily with more novel formulations, such as the 
notion of “responsibility” developed in a business and human rights context.
2.7 The Relationship between RtoP and the Field of Minority Protection
RtoP’s relationship with minority protection receives less academic consideration than 
RtoP’s interplay with other specific areas, such as refugee protection253 and gender issues.254 
Present literature on this issue focuses on RtoP’s impact on the role of Kin States in minority 
protection.255 Two themes in this section of the literature merit particular consideration. The 
first is whether secondary RtoP allocates any special responsibilities to Kin States. In Kemp 
and Popovski’s view,256 the requirement for secondary RtoP to be discharged collectively 
means guards against this.257 However, the present author considers that the possibility for 
Kin States to acquire special responsibilities under RtoP indirectly also merits examination. 
For example, is there scope for a Kin State exercising effective control in a secessionist 
enclave to become the bearer of primary RtoP, such as Russia in South Ossetia?
The second theme are the issues which can motivate Kin States to act against the State in 
which the minority group is located, including through using armed force without the prior 
authorisation of the UNSC.258 Motivations for intervention discussed include discriminatory 
national citizenship policies259 and territorial/resource disputes in the State in which the kin
53), 540; A Bird, ‘Third State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations’ (2010) 21 (4) EJIL 883, 886-888; 
Brunee and Toope (n 53), 74-77.
249 Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 180).
250 See particularly, Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 53), 539; Payandeh (n 53), 501 
and Nasu (n 180), 216-234.
251 Cunliffe (n 179), 55. See also Tan (n 180), 95; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 217-226 and Glanville, “The 
International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 180), 295-297.
252 H M Roff, ‘A Provisional Duty o f Humanitarian Intervention’ (2011) 3 (2) GRtoP 152-171.
253 Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 181); The Editors, ‘Special Issue for GRtoP: Protecting 
IDPs and Refugees’ (n 181), 7 and Mooney (n 181).
254 Charlesworth (n 181), 234; Bond and Sherret (n 181); Skjelsbaek (n 181); Stamnes (n 181); Davies and Teitt 
(n 181); Karlsrud and Solhjell (n 181) and Dharmapuri (n 181).
255 Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 181) and Otsuki and Turner (n 181).
256 Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid, 236.
257 Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid.
258 See J Castellino, “RtoP and Kinship in the Context o f Syria and Lebanon” and H S Denduangrudee,
“Problems and Prospects for RtoP: The Unilateral Action o f  Viet Nam in 1978” in Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, 
ibid, 122-143 and 144-167 respectively.
259 E Defeis, “Minority Protection, Bilateral Mechanisms and the Responsibility to Protect” in Kemp, Popovski 
and Thakur, ibid, 77. See further, O Shapovalova, “The Role o f Russia as a Kin-State in Protecting the Russian 
Minority in Ukraine” in Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid, 168-187.
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minority is located.260 The present author considers that the extent to which RtoP addresses 
these factors warrants further reflection in the body of the thesis. For example, could the 
nexus between a failure to fulfil primary RtoP and secondary RtoP’s activation encourage a 
minority to begin a territorial dispute with the State in order to compel the international 
community to intervene to protect them and, thereafter, recognise them as a “people” with a 
remedial right to self-determination?261
Schabas262 also thoughtfully outlines the existing international protection framework to 
which RtoP relates, with particular emphasis on mechanisms which contribute to protecting 
minorities from heinous crimes like genocide. Reference is made to the important role which 
treaty monitoring bodies and the UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC] have in monitoring 
State compliance with their human rights obligations.263 To the present author, the clear 
overlap between human rights violations and RtoP crimes raises a host of questions 
regarding the scope and nature of the UNHRC’s role in RtoP cases which merit assessment 
in the main body of the thesis. For example, is there scope to suggest that the UNHRC may 
monitor State compliance with primary RtoP as a separate obligation? Is it possible that the 
UNHRC may not only consider individual human rights violations, but the perpetration of 
the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers? Can this be reconciled with its human rights 
mandate? What implications could arise from the UNHRC’s role in RtoP cases?
Schabas264 also highlights the particular bearing which RtoP has on minority protection, 
outlining the mixed history of the international community’s management of the “minority 
problem” in practice preceding RtoP’s adoption. Schabas refers to Rwanda to highlight that 
political will sometimes be absent when the time comes to take robust action to protect 
groups from RtoP crimes265 and, perhaps most significantly, that the legal definitions of mass 
atrocity crimes may be used to stall responsive action.266 This prompts examination of 
whether the legal elements of RtoP crimes have inhibited RtoP’s discharge in a similar 
manner. In addition, Schabas discusses the way in which Kosovo testifies to the fact that, 
when international consensus on responding cannot be acquired, armed force may be used to
260 R Ako, “The Responsibility to Prevent Conflicts under RtoP: The Nigeria-Bassaki Situation” and J Tiburcio, 
“Brazilians in Paraguay: A Growing Internal Problem or a Regional Issue?” in Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid, 
208-228 and 188-207 respectively.
261 A remedial right to self-determination refers to the argument that gross human rights violations can activate a 
right to self-determination in order to put an end to and/or prevent future violations. Whether or not such a right 
exists remains the subject o f debate. However, it continues to be advocated by some states, including by Germany 
and Ireland in their written statements to the ICJ concerning the Court’s Advisory Opinion with respect to the 
status o f Kosovo. See <http://www.icj-
cij .org/docket/index.php?p 1 =3&p2=4&k=21 &case= 141 &code=kos&p3= 1 > accessed 2 February 2011.
262 Schabas (n 58).
263 Schabas, ibid, 15-22.
264 Schabas, ibid.
265 Schabas, ibid, 12-14.
266 Schabas, ibid, 12-13.
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protect minorities on the basis of legitimacy, rather than legality.267 This raises a host of 
questions for consideration in light of practice, including whether RtoP has overcome the 
need to resort to the use of legitimate, but illegal, armed force for human protection purposes 
when the UNSC fails to act effectively? Does RtoP add value to the wider concept of 
humanitarian intervention by, for example, contouring the point at which the use of armed 
force for human protection purposes becomes legitimate?
3 Methodology
The thesis explains and identifies to the reader (i) where consensus on RtoP’s component 
parts presently lies; (ii) which aspects of RtoP are in the process of evolution or contestation;
(iii) the policy, practical and legal considerations which underscore the scope and nature of 
RtoP’s development between September 2005 and 2012; and (iv) the issues surrounding 
RtoP’s components which require deeper reflection by relevant policymakers if RtoP is to be 
an effective contemporary protection framework. In order to clarify the way in which the 
thesis fulfils these objectives, it is necessary to explain the range of sources drawn upon, the 
role which minority protection has in the thesis and the substance of the following chapters.
3.1 Classification and Handling o f Sources
The thesis draws largely, but not entirely, on the way in which the main components, 
implications and potential value added of the RtoP framework have been approached in 
practice since the Outcome Document's adoption. Focusing on this period can help clarify 
where consensus, controversy and divergence on RtoP’s components presently lie. 
Furthermore, focusing on this period can help address some misconceptions about RtoP 
which arise from continued discussion of the RtoP framework established in the 2001 ICISS 
Report.268 This includes the “prevent, react, rebuild” continuum which was abandoned at the 
World Summit.269 To do so, priority is given to sources which directly relate to, or may 
otherwise inform, the development, role and potential implications of each component of the 
RtoP framework in country-specific and more general practice to date.
267 Schabas, ibid, 14.
268 For e.g. S Martin, ‘Forced Migration, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 
38, 59; McClean (n 201); Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and 
Practice’ (n 180), 448; Mooney (n 181), 84 and Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 181), 26.
269 See especially, Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 13), 98-194 and 
Whitman (n 181), 157-160 [both reviewing RtoP as per the “prevent, react, rebuild” continuum].
33
3.1.1 State Views
At relevant junctures, consideration is given to over four hundred State views on the RtoP 
framework surveyed by the present author. The State views considered in the substantive 
chapters are those delivered (i) during the drafting of the Outcome Document; (ii) at the 
Outcome Document’s adoption; (iii) at the 2009, 2010 and 2011 UNGA annual thematic 
debates on RtoP; (iv) UNSC debates on the protection of civilians in armed conflict; and (v) 
opening sessions of the UNGA.270 The concluding chapter also refers to State views 
delivered at the September 2012 UNGA thematic debate on RtoP which have a particular 
bearing on the issues discussed in the substantive chapters.271 The State views used in this 
thesis were not selected for specific reasons but, rather, are simply those available for 
assessment during the course of the research.
3.1.2 Case Studies
The fifteen country-specific situations in which RtoP has been invoked to date are used as 
“case studies”. Three factors were used to determine what country-specific situations should 
be classified as “RtoP cases”. First, RtoP must have been explicitly referred to in the specific 
situation at hand. Second, the reference to R2P must have been made by an actor who is in 
the position to (i) encourage RtoP to be practically applied (e.g. UNSG); or (ii) to contribute 
to its practical application (e.g. third States, regional organisations, UNSC and UNGA). 
Finally, the population must have sustained the harm at issue after States accepted RtoP at 
the World Summit.
Pursuant to these factors, the thesis considers the following case studies (i) Burma 
(2008);272 (ii) Zimbabwe (2008);273 (iii) the Israel-Gaza conflict (2008-2009);274 (iv) the
270 The State views surveyed are detailed in Annex I (a)-(i).
271 State views delivered at this debate are available at International Coalition on the Responsibility to Protect, 
‘Interactive Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response’
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 17 October 2012.
272 On the facts o f this situation, see International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in 
Burma’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-burma> accessed 12 August 2012 and 
D McClean and B Varner, ‘Nations Press Myanmar for Entry as More Aid Arrives’ (Bloomberg, Washington 
D.C., 13 May 2008)
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aWBhdHdNOjfo&refer=home> accessed 12 
August 2012.
273 For the facts o f Zimbabwe see International Coalition o f  the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in 
Zimbabwe’ <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-zimbabwe> accessed 10 August 2012. 
An interesting discussion o f the internal situation is provided by Slim (n 201).
274 For facts on the conflict, including allegations o f RtoP crimes, see International Coalition on the 
Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in Gaza: An RtoP Situation?’
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.Org/index.php/crises/l 78-other-rtop-concems/2750-the-crisis-in-gaza> accessed 12 
August 2012.
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Russia-Georgia conflict (2008);275 (v) Kenya (2008);276 (vi) Darfur (2006 onward);277 (vii) 
Democratic Republic of Congo (2008 violence);278 (viii) Kyrgyzstan (2010);279 (ix) Somalia 
(2008);280 (x) Guinea (2010);281 (xi) Cote d’Ivoire (2010);282 (xii) South Sudan (2011);283 
(xiii) Libya (2011);284 (xiv) Yemen (2011 onward); 285 and (xv) Syria (2011 onward).286 As 
the extent and significance of RtoP’s role in each case varies so too does the degree to which 
the case studies are invoked. Occasionally, reference is made to practice pre-dating RtoP’s 
2005 adoption, such as Kosovo and Rwanda. These references are made to highlight 
some of the possible implications or advantages of present approaches to RtoP.
Some of the case studies used in the thesis have received limited recognition as “RtoP 
cases” in present literature. For example, Bellamy289 argues that Somalia is a case in which 
RtoP is ‘missing in action’290 because no State expressed ‘their pleas in RtoP terms’.291
275 For the facts o f the conflict, see International Crisis Group, ‘Russia vs. Georgia: The Fall Out’ (2008), Europe
Report No. 195 <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/.../195_russia_vs_georgia the_fallout.pdf> accessed 12
November 2012 and Report o f the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the conflict in Georgia, 
‘Volume I’ (September 2009) <http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html> accessed 12 November 2012.
276 For details o f this crisis, see On the establishment and powers o f the Panel see particularly the African Union 
Peace and Security Council, ‘Information Note on the Situation in Kenya and the Evolution o f the Mediation 
Efforts’ (14 March 2008) AU Doc PSC/PR/2(CXV) and African Union Peace and Security Council, 
‘Communique’ (14 March 2008) AU Doc PSC/PR/Comm(CXV).
277 For background o f the situation see for e.g. D Mepham and A Ramsbotham, Darfur: The Responsibility to 
Protect (Institute for Public Policy Research, London 2006) and International Coalition o f the Responsibility to 
Protect, ‘Crisis in Darfur’ <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-darfur> accessed 12 
August 2012. This thesis is concerned with RtoP’s role in relation to the situation following the Outcome 
Document’s adoption. However, it should be noted that some States did refer to the RtoP framework laid down in 
earlier RtoP Reports in practice preceding 2005. See for e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f the United 
States, Algeria, Russian Federation and Chile to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 July 2004) UN Doc 
S/PV.5015 and Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 March 
2005) UN Doc S/PV.5158.
278 For background o f the situation see e.g. International Coalition o f the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in the 
DRC’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-drc> accessed 12 August 2012.
279 See, J Claes, ‘Preventing Conflict in the “Stans’” (23 April 2010) United States Institute o f Peace: Peace Brief 
No. 21 < http://www.usip.org/publications/preventing-conflict-in-the-stans> accessed 20 October 2012.
280 For a useful overview o f the situation see Koko (n 180).
281 For an overview o f the facts o f this case, see International Coalition o f the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in 
Guinea’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-guinea> accessed 12 August 2012.
282 For an overview o f the situation, see International Coalition o f the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in 
Cote d’Ivoire’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-ivory-coast> accessed 12 
August 2012.
283 For an outline o f the situation and the territorial claims therein, see International Coalition o f the 
Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in Sudan’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in- 
sudan> accessed 12 August 2012.
284 For a detailed overview o f events in Libya, see International Coalition o f the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The 
Crisis in Libya’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya> Last accessed 12 
August 2012.
285 UNSC Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014. (UNSC Res 2014).
286 For an overview o f the situation see International Coalition o f  the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in Syria’ 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria> accessed 12 August 2012.
287 The facts o f Kosovo are comprehensively outlined in a body o f  literature. However, a useful source is T G 
Weiss, Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect (n 2) 129-155. For a discussion o f Kosovo as 
events unfolded, see the 1999-2000 op-eds reprinted in R Thakur, The People vs. The State: Reflections on UN 
Authority, US Power and the Responsibility to Protect (UN University Press, Tokyo 2011) 1-18.
288 The following are some useful sources for the facts o f the case: J Alvarez, ‘Crimes o f  States/Crimes o f Hate’
(n 1) and Sarkin and Fowler (n 1).
289 A Bellamy, Global Politics and The Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (New York: Routledge, 
2011).
290 Bellamy, ibid, 64.
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However, examination of Security Council meeting records reveals that RtoP was explicitly 
referred to by Ghana292 and the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for 
Somalia293 and, therefore, that Somalia can be included in RtoP assessments.
In addition, the factors used to classify an RtoP case in this thesis differ from some of the 
approaches taken to this classification in present literature, not least the requirement that 
RtoP is explicitly cited by a relevant actor. Some commentators discuss RtoP’s role in 
situations in which RtoP was not cited by any stakeholder, such as Nigeria,294 North Korea295 
and Syria (pre-2011).296 Arguably, this can lead to lessons about RtoP’s scope and 
effectiveness being deduced from cases in which RtoP was not considered to be applicable, 
or not applied, by those in a position to discharge or influence its discharge in practice.
Finally, the timeframe of the case studies used in the thesis differs from that used by some 
commentators. In present literature, the situation in Darfur prior to the Outcome Document’s 
2005 adoption is often examined as an “RtoP case”.297 It is quite reasonable to discuss the 
way in which these cases underscored RtoP’s formulation and, furthermore, to examine what 
they tell us about the steps that States and the broader international community should and 
should not take to ensure populations are protected from mass atrocity crimes. However, this 
writer considers that it is necessary to exercise sufficient caution when drawing lessons about 
RtoP from practice which either preceded its formulation or its adoption by States. At the 
very least, this approach can undermine the evolving nature of RtoP in both principle and 
practice.
3.1.3 Reports and Statements of Significant International. Regional and National Actors
Throughout, consideration is given to the relevant reports and statements of significant 
international, regional and national actors. The UNSG’s Reports on the RtoP framework are
291 Bellamy, ibid, 66.
292 Statement o f the Representative o f Ghana to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 December 2007) UN 
Doc S/PV.5805.
293 Statement o f UN Special Representative o f  the Secretary-General fo r  Somalia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (20 March 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5858.
294 Nigeria is a good example. For examples o f R2P being cited in relation to this situation, see generally 
International Coalition o f the Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in Nigeria’
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-nigeria> accessed 12 August 2011 and Ako (n 
260), 208-228.
295 K M Bondevik and K Abrams, “Democratic People’s Republic o f Korea” in Genser and Cotier (n 18), 346- 
374.
296 Castellino (n 258), 122-143.
297 The drawbacks o f this are outlined in more detail in chapter four. The following are examples of 
commentators who consider aspects o f RtoP in light o f trends in Darfur: Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or 
Trojan Horse?’ (n 183); Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 
117 and Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity?’ (n 183), 8.
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a prime example. Since 2009 the UNSG has published an annual Report on RtoP.298 Each 
Report deals with a different component of, or issue surrounding, the RtoP framework. 
These Reports merit particular reflection because they are released for consideration by the 
UNGA at an annual thematic debate on RtoP. However, as the Reports are merely 
recommendatory, their role in the thesis is generally limited to (i) highlighting the way in 
which actors like the UNSG perceive the Outcome Documents RtoP provisions; or (ii) 
identifying some of the issues arising in practice which relevant actors have failed to address 
fully.
3.1.4 Minority Protection
Where appropriate, the field of minority protection is drawn upon to (i) assess where RtoP 
replicates and/or adds value to existing protective obligations/practice; and (ii) identify and 
explain the potential legal, policy and practical implications of present approaches to RtoP. 
In order to meet these objectives, the thesis uses a wide concept of a “minority”. At relevant 
junctures consideration is given to the interplay between RtoP and (i) minority groups who 
are in a dominant position in the State (e.g. Alawite minority in Syria); (ii) nomadic 
minorities (e.g. Roma); (iii) territorially cohesive minorities whose aims are akin to those of 
a “people” with a right to self-determination (e.g. Russian citizens in the secessionist enclave 
of South Ossetia, Georgia); (iv) long-established minorities who are denied 
citizenship/nationality (e.g. Rohingya); and (v) minorities newly established in the State for 
varying reasons (e.g. migrant workers in Libya, refugees).
Several reasons underscore choosing minority protection as a tool for assessing RtoP. 
First, minority protection introduces an interesting dichotomy into the analysis of RtoP. 
Whilst minorities are ‘genocide’s most frequent targets’,299 the fact that the ruling Al-Assad 
regime in Syria belongs to the Alawite minority, illustrates that minorities can also perpetrate 
RtoP crimes. This dichotomy means that RtoP’s relationship with minority protection can be 
complex, requiring policymakers to consider a range of deeper issues. For example, is it 
possible that secondary RtoP’s discharge against a government perpetrating RtoP crimes
298 Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP (n 32); Report o f the UNSG, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (14 July 2010) UN Doc A/64/864; Report o f the UNSG, ‘The Role o f Regional and 
Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) UN Doc A/59/744 and Report 
o f the UNSG, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response’ (25 July 2012) UN Doc A /66/874- 
S/2012/578.
299 K. Annan’s April 2004 speech commemorating the tenth anniversary o f  the Rwandan genocide, cited in 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights, ‘Specific Groups and Individuals: Minorities, Report o f the 
Independent Expert on Minority Issues’ (6 January 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/74, 18.
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may indirectly facilitate ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’300 in the territory against minorities which 
supported, or were considered to support, the regime?
Second, few would disagree with the view that minority protection and RtoP feature 
highly among those areas of international relations which trigger deep-seated apprehensions 
over the interplay between protection, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The established 
field of minority protection can therefore be usefully drawn upon in order to assess whether 
similar policy tensions could arise in relation to the relatively newly established RtoP 
framework. It is useful to briefly outline the two policy tensions which are given particular 
consideration in the substantive chapters and, furthermore, the kind of ways in which these 
issues will be utilised in the assessment of RtoP.
First, it should be noted that, with the exception of the right of minorities to existence, 
specific minority rights are predominately conferred on individual members of the minority 
group.301 This is because some States were concerned that devising rights which are 
conferred on, and enforced by, distinct groups makes the individual members of the group 
depend on the group for protection, rather than the State (so-called ‘centrifugal 
tendencies’302). The fear is that this strengthens individual member’s loyalty to the group and 
could create a “slippery slope” from the group claiming (i) a right to create autonomous 
territorial arrangements which reflect its ethnic, religious, racial, linguistic or national 
identity within the State; to (ii) a right to secede from the State.303 This reservation also 
underscores why (i) minority groups are not recognised as a “people” with a distinct right to 
self-determination; (ii) the creation of autonomous arrangements within a State has not been 
conferred as a right of minorities but merely as a best practice;304 and (iii) minority rights 
instruments often explicitly require the rights to be enforced with full respect to States’ 
sovereignty and territorial integrity.305 The second policy issue relates to “Kin States”.306
300 ICISS Report (n 8), 40. For a discussion o f reverse ethnic cleansing in the field o f minority protection more 
generally, see particularly W Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalisation o f Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 (1) ICON 1, 24.
That is, for the benefit o f ‘persons belonging to minorities’. See particularly, Article 27 o f  the ICCPR and UN 
Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992) 
UN Doc A/RES/47/135 arts 2-5. (1992 UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, 
Linguistic or Religious Minorities).
302 As Quane explains ‘[t]he fact that the individual is dependent on the group for the exercise and enforcement of  
these rights can have significant implications. It can reinforce the sense o f the allegiance to the group which can, 
in turn, heighten inter-communal differences and impede the development o f a sense o f common citizenship. It 
can also encourage members to look to the group to protect their interests rather than to the State’. H Quane, 
‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications o f Using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ 
(2007) 47 VA. J. Int’l L. 463,499.
303 On this see e.g. Kymlicka (n 299) and P Thomberry, ‘Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A 
Review o f International Instruments’ (1989) 38 (4) I.C.L.Q. 867, 874.
304 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Document o f the Moscow Meeting o f the Conference 
on the Human Dimension o f the CSCE’ (adopted 29 June 1990) para 35 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304> accessed 12 November 2012.
305 For e.g. Article 8 (4) o f the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, 
Linguistic or Religious Minorities (n 300) provides that ‘[njothing in the present Declaration may be construed as 
permitting any activity contrary to the purposes and principles o f the United Nations, including sovereign 
equality, territorial integrity and political independence o f States’.
306 That is, a State which has a bond with a minority group residing in another State’s territory.
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Throughout history, Kin States relationship with a minority group residing in another State 
has created tensions between the two States.307 To regulate the Kin State’s role in minority 
protection, relevant mechanisms provided that Kin States should only confer benefits upon 
minorities with the explicit consent of the State in which the minority was located.308 These 
instruments also clarified what benefits Kin States cannot confer, excluding actions like 
providing financial assistance to those seeking political or territorial change on behalf of a 
minority group in the territory of another State.309
At appropriate intervals, the thesis considers whether the respective components of RtoP 
may alleviate or compound the aforementioned policy tension. Could present approaches to 
the primary RtoP bearer add legitimacy to secessionist movements, thereby creating 
reservations over the potential for RtoP to strengthen the slippery slope from claims to 
autonomy to secession? Could trends regarding RtoP’s beneficiary concept potentially 
encourage secessionist tendencies? Do approaches toward primary RtoP entail the potential 
to exacerbate concerns over the relationship between group rights and ‘centrifugal 
tendencies’?310 Are commentators correct to consider that the RtoP framework does not, as it 
presently stands, empower the Kin State to act inappropriately?311 Or, alternatively, are there 
signs in practice which suggest that the Kin State may actually have a significant role in the 
RtoP framework? For example, is it possible that at least some Kin States may acquire a 
particular role in discharging primary RtoP because of outstanding ambiguities with respect 
to the primary RtoP bearer concept? Could existing proposals on RtoP’s early warning 
system encourage, albeit indirectly, the Kin State to increase its interference in the internal 
affairs of the third State in which the kin minority group is located? The policy tensions 
underscoring minority protection are also utilised to suggest possible explanations for why 
certain trends and concerns may have emerged in RtoP practice to date, thereby helping to 
develop a deeper understanding of the legal, policy and practical issues which underscore 
where present consensus and debate on RtoP lies. For example, could the issues surrounding 
autonomous arrangements underscore why States’ did not affirm the 2001 ICISS Report 
rebuilding responsibility at the 2005 World Summit?
Finally, the clear overlaps between minority protection and RtoP make the former a 
logical tool for assessing the extent of RtoP’s relationship with the existing international 
legal and political protection framework. Does the primary RtoP bearer concept replicate the
307 For practical examples, see generally Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 181), especially 77.
308 See generally, OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on 
National Minorities and Inter-State Relations and Explanatory Note (OSCE HCNM, The Hague 2008) (OSCE 
HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations) and Commission, ‘Report o f the Preferential Treatment o f  
National Minorities by their Kin State’ (2001) Doc. CDL/INF <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL- 
INF(201 l)019-e.pdf> accessed 18 June 2012.
309 OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations, ibid, 7, and Venice Commission, ibid, 21-23.
310 Quane (n 301), 499.
311 Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 181), 236.
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State as the duty bearer of existing human rights, including minority rights? Do present 
approaches to the concept develop upon those in a minority protection context, such as the 
link between State legitimacy, protection and external recognition inherent in the European 
Union’s criteria for recognising territories emerging from the former Soviet bloc as 
“States”?312 Do approaches to secondary RtoP’s activation add clarity to when the 
international community should act to protect minorities by identifying the specific point at 
which a State’s protective duties cease being ‘exclusive’313 and the international community 
should take protective action?
In some cases, assessing RtoP from the perspective of minority protection will be relevant 
to RtoP’s specific role in cases involving minorities, such as (i) RtoP’s capacity to 
strengthen/counter existing reservations regarding Kin States; and (ii) whether new 
minorities like migrant workers and refugees are encompassed within present understandings 
of RtoP’s beneficiary concept. At other times, the assessment will be relevant to RtoP’s 
application more generally. For example, considering the extent to which primary RtoP 
echoes the character of States human rights duties, including those relating to specific 
minority rights, is relevant to the scope of primary RtoP’s discharge in all contexts.
3.2 T h esis  Structure
Each of the five substantive chapters of the thesis explores a particular component of RtoP, 
specifically (i) RtoP’s bearer and beneficiary concepts; (ii) the scope, character, duration and 
enforcement of primary RtoP; (iii) the nature and character of secondary RtoP’s activation;
(iv) the scope of secondary RtoP’s early warning, assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful 
components; and (v) the legal status and character of primary and secondary RtoP. 
International lawyers will recognise that each of these components is fundamental to the 
formulation of any viable political or legal mechanism, including RtoP.
312 European Community, ‘Declaration on the Recognition o f New States o f New States in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union’ (16 December 1991) reprinted in R Caplan, Europe and the Recognition o f  New States in 
Yugoslavia (CUP, Cambridge 2005) Appendix I, 187-188.
313 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National 
Minorities in Geneva’ (1991), Section 3, para 3 <www.osce.org/hcnm/14588> accessed 12 October 2012 and 
OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 307), 11-12.
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3.2.1 Chapter Two: The Concept of the Bearer and Beneficiary -  A Responsibility to 
Protect or Preclude?
Chapter two examines the potential significance and implications of trends in State views 
and relevant practice regarding RtoP’s bearer and beneficiary concepts. In terms of the 
primary RtoP bearer, the chapter explores whether the Outcome Document refers to 
‘State’314 in its legal sense and, if so, is it only territories which meet the criteria of statehood 
that can bear primary RtoP? Drawing upon relevant trends in the Russia-Georgia and Israel- 
Gaza conflicts, the chapter considers who would bear primary RtoP in territories which do 
not meet the statehood criteria, such as secessionist enclaves and Occupied Territories. 
Consideration is also given to the Outcome Document’s reference to ‘national authorities’. 
Does this term refer to the government of the State? If so, who bears primary RtoP in States 
where (i) national election results are awaiting verification (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe); (ii) 
the internationally recognised government cannot take power because the then existing 
government will not concede leadership (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire); or (iii) the existing government 
faces an armed insurrection because it perpetrates RtoP crimes against its population (e.g. 
Libya and Syria)?
Chapter two explores whether practice supports the view that the Outcome Document’s 
reference to the ‘international community’315 is intended to denote the bearer of secondary 
RtoP. Reference is made to whether the “international community” concept may instead 
overlap with its usage in the contexts of State responsibility and minority protection, 
specifically as shorthand for the range of actors who have a vested interest in protecting 
populations from RtoP crimes. In what circumstances, do the respective interests of relevant 
actors arise? Does an “actors” approach help to make secondary RtoP’s discharge more 
flexible?
Chapter two outlines that continued affirmations316 of the “populations” beneficiary 
concept may be inconsistent with trends which have emerged in practice since the Outcome 
Document’s adoption and the potential implications thereof. The present author considers the 
potentially significant reasons for why a “populations” beneficiary concept is used in the 
Outcome Document, thereby raising questions over the suitability of still referring to the 
beneficiary concepts of earlier Reports, such as “citizens”.317 The chapter suggests that 
caution should perhaps be taken when outlining RtoP’s role in relation to specific sections of
314 Outcome Document (n 15), para 138.
315 Outcome Document, ibid, paras 138-139.
316 As per, for e.g. Pace and Deller (n 181), 26; Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect (n 181), 
16; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 53), 522 and Wheeler and Egerton (n 181),
123.
317 As per, for e.g. Amneus (n 183), 14; Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty’ (n 200), 620; Thakur, 
‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 189), 7 and Charlesworth (n 181), 234.
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populations, such as refugees,318 not least because these groups may fall outside the way in 
which some States appear to understand RtoP’s beneficiary concept (e.g. citizens of the State 
only).
3.2.2 Chapter Three: Primary RtoP -  Old Policies New Package?
Chapter three systematically analyses primary RtoP’s scope, character, duration, value added 
and methods for monitoring State compliance therewith. In so doing, the chapter illustrates 
that a volume of practice now exists in relation to primary RtoP as a significant component 
of RtoP in its own right.
The chapter considers whether practice to date suggests that primary RtoP may add value 
to, not simply affirm,319 the existing criminal, human rights and humanitarian law obligations 
of States to which it relates. For example, the chapter explores whether primary RtoP may 
add value by (i) clarifying the requirements of States aforementioned existing obligations in 
a specific RtoP context and, therefore, have a similar utility to treaties which clarify what the 
particular requirements of general treaties are in a specific context (e.g. the Convention on 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women); and (ii) by entailing the capacity to 
develop new rights/obligations, such as a collective right of populations to protection from 
RtoP crimes.
Drawing upon the approaches adopted to primary RtoP’s duration in practice to date, 
chapter three challenges the view that the RtoP framework entails a ‘complementarity 
trap’.320 It argues that both the State and the international community can, in certain contexts, 
be concurrently responsible for protecting populations’ from RtoP crimes. Accordingly, 
chapter three outlines that the relationship between primary and secondary RtoP is not 
necessarily an issue of the State’s responsibility shifting to the international community but, 
instead, the point at which the latter comes into practical effect.
Finally, chapter three assesses the advantages and disadvantages of recommendations 
regarding routes through which to monitor States’ compliance with primary RtoP. The 
present author surveys the capacity for compliance with primary RtoP to be monitored 
through (i) wider bodies, such as the UNHRC; and/or (ii) specific RtoP actors, such as the
3,8 Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 181); The Editors, ‘Special Issue for GRtoP: Protecting 
IDPs and Refugees’ (n 181), 7; Mooney (n 181); Otsuki and Turner (n 181); Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n
181); Charlesworth (n 181), 234; Bond and Sherret (n 181); Skjelsbaek (n 181); Stamnes (n 181); Davies and 
Teitt (n 181); Karlsrud and Solhjell (n 181) and Dharmapuri (n 181).
319 Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (n 3) 74; 
Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 53), 48-51; Bellamy and Reike (n 182), 89-94; Stahn, 
‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 118 and Giercyz (n 182), 101-
118.
320 Stahn, ibid, 116.
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newly appointed national RtoP advisers. By drawing upon relevant practice, chapter three 
identifies the potential policy and practical impediments to present recommendations, not 
least the possibility that utilising the UNHRC for monitoring compliance with primary RtoP 
could further politicise the body.
3.2.3 Chapter Four: The Activation of Secondary RtoP -  A Uniform Standard or Sliding 
Scale?
Chapter four examines what the approaches taken to secondary RtoP in country-specific 
practice to date suggest about the nature, character and scope of secondary RtoP’s activation. 
Part one of the chapter considers the substantive aspects of secondary RtoP’s activation. The 
present author outlines that the international community have typically discharged secondary 
RtoP’s assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful components when the population has sustained 
some RtoP-type harm and, therefore, that secondary RtoP’s seems to be activated when RtoP 
crimes appear imminent. The chapter considers whether this threshold adds value to existing 
mechanisms by, for example, avoiding the ambiguity which surround when the wider 
concept of humanitarian intervention could and should be discharged? To what extent, if 
any, does an imminence threshold enable the international community to apply secondary 
RtoP for preventive purposes? Do the factors taken into account when assessing secondary 
RtoP’s activation have the capacity to compound or overcome difficulties in practice 
preceding its formulation, not least waiting on the legal elements of genocide to be 
established as occurred in Rwanda?
The present author examines whether practice to date sustains present conceptions of the 
bearing which the legal elements of RtoP crimes have on decisions over secondary RtoP’s 
activation. Does practice sustain Wong’s321 view that secondary RtoP’s activation is 
dependent on the harm sustained by a population being perpetrated with the requisite mens 
rea of the RtoP crime apprehended? For example, is there a requirement that the international 
community consider that murder which amounts to a ‘widespread and systematic attack 
against a civilian population’ was undertaken with the requisite intent to kill and knowledge 
of the attack? Is there scope to argue that, in practice, decision makers may consider broader 
legal issues, such as whether the harm is being sustained by the protected person of an RtoP 
crime (e.g. a national, ethnical, racial or religious group322)? Is it appropriate to draw
321 Wong (n 216), 252-256.
322 Rome Statute (n 51) art 6, emphasis added.
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comparisons between secondary RtoP’s activation and the substantiality test used in 
international criminal law?323
In terms of the character of secondary RtoP’s activation, the chapter considers whether 
the Outcome Document324 criteria of manifest failure and inadequacy of peaceful means 
represent an overarching threshold for the activation of peaceful and non-peaceful secondary 
RtoP measures. Drawing upon trends in practice to date, the chapter explores whether 
secondary RtoP’s activation may be more appropriately explained as that which occurs on 
the basis of a sliding scale. To this effect, the present author suggests that there may actually 
be different tipping points for assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful secondary RtoP 
measures and, furthermore, that important policy considerations may underscore this 
approach.
The second part of chapter four assesses the institutional aspects of secondary RtoP’s 
activation process. Outlining the substance and scope of decision making on secondary 
RtoP’s activation in the UNSC, the present author considers whether the Outcome 
Document’s ‘case-by-case basis’325 provision may enable the UNSC to take into account a 
whole host of factors which the Outcome Document does not refer to when deciding whether 
secondary RtoP has been activated in particular cases. The way in which the criminal basis 
of RtoP encourages political bodies to draw increasingly upon international law is critically 
examined. Does this approach blur the distinction between political and judicial bodies? The 
role of the UNHRC in secondary RtoP’s activation is discussed in light of practice to date. Is 
it possible that the UNHRC’s role in monitoring State compliance with human rights may 
extend into monitoring compliance with primary RtoP, examining whether mass atrocity 
crimes are emerging and not merely relevant patterns of human rights violations? Can 
assessing the emergence of RtoP crimes be reconciled with the UNHRC’s human rights 
mandate in all cases?
3.2.4 Chapter Five: The Scope of Secondary RtoP -  Status Novus vs. Status Quo?
Chapter five examines the scope, value and potential implications of each of the main ways 
through which secondary RtoP can be upheld or practically applied, namely (i) early warning 
and assessment of RtoP crimes; (ii) assistance and capacity building; (iii) peaceful means; 
and (iv) non-peaceful means. In so doing, chapter five raises a range of significant questions
323 Rosenberg and Strauss (n 50), 58-62 and Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” (n 
217), 83-84.
324 Outcome Document (n 15), para 139.
325 Outcome Document, ibid.
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which require careful consideration by policymakers if RtoP is to be a viable protection 
mechanism.
Part one examines RtoP’s early warning and assessment system. Could present 
formulations of this system encourage, albeit indirectly, Kin States to increase their level of 
interference in the internal affairs of the State in which the kin minority is located? Does 
practice sustain the view326 that early indicators that RtoP crimes may be perpetrated could 
be overlooked because of developed States preoccupation with national security issues like 
terrorism?
Part two evaluates secondary RtoP’s assistance component at length, exploring whether 
assistance is provided through structural and/or operational prevention measures and the 
ways in which consent to the provision of assistance can be acquired. Particular attention is 
given to whether recent practice, such as the case studies of Libya and Syria, cast doubt over 
the general presumption that assistance will be given to the State’s national authorities.327 
Does recent practice suggest that the recipient of assistance can be more complex and that 
which has a direct bearing on wider issues, such as the relationship between secondary RtoP 
and the principle of neutrality in civil wars?
Part three considers secondary RtoP’s responsive component. Is the meaning of 
“peaceful” responsive measures settled among States? What factors are taken into account 
when determining whether or not to authorise the use of armed force to protect a population 
from RtoP crimes? Does practice suggest that there may be growing support among the 
permanent five members of the UNSC to refrain from wielding the veto in cases involving 
RtoP crimes? Do trends in recent practice open up possible avenues to coerce or induce 
UNSC authorisation for the application of non-peaceful means?
3.2.5 Chapter Six: The Legal Status and Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP -  
Another Case of Legitimacy vs. Legality?
Chapter six comprehensively assesses what trends in practice between 2005 and 2012 inform 
us with respect to the evolution of primary and secondary RtoP’s legal status and character. 
In doing so, the present author critically examines whether current understandings of RtoP’s 
legal status and character stand up against practice.
Chapter six considers the legal status of primary and secondary RtoP separately, 
proposing that primary and secondary RtoP’s legal development between 2005 and 2012 can
326 MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 185), 981; N Grono, ‘Briefing - Darfur: The International Community’s 
Failure to Protect’ (2006) 105 (421) African Affairs 621,628 and J E Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’
(Panel presentation at the ‘Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues o f International Law: Criminal 
Jurisdiction 100 Years After the 1907 Hague Peace Conference’, The Hague, 30 June 2007).
327 For examples see, Charlesworth (n 181), 235 and A Bellamy and P D Williams, ‘The New Politics of 
Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 (4) Int. Affairs 825, 827.
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be divided into three distinct phases. In terms of primary RtoP, the present author utilises 
trends in practice to challenge the view that primary RtoP’s legal status can be summated 
effectively by referring to its interplay with States existing human rights, humanitarian and 
criminal law obligations.328 To this effect, chapter six argues that primary RtoP encourages 
new interpretations of States existing human rights, humanitarian and criminal law treaty 
obligations by promoting new consequences for their breach, namely the application of 
secondary RtoP by the international community.
Chapter six explores the way in which secondary RtoP’s legal status has been approached 
in practice between 2005 and 2012, including in over four hundred State views. Does 
practice suggest that secondary RtoP’s may be legally significant by creating new 
interpretations of the existing treaty provisions to which it relates?329 Does national, regional 
and international practice add weight to, or undermine, the view that secondary RtoP creates 
no new legal changes to the existing regime on the use of armed force?330
The chapter assesses the extent to which, if at all, relevant practice upholds perceiving 
primary RtoP as a “duty”.331 It questions whether commentators may be encountering 
difficulty in fully reconciling the character of secondary RtoP with a duty, right, permission 
or responsibility to protect because this rests on a presumption that secondary RtoP can only 
be characterised in a traditional sense. The present author outlines the view that secondary 
RtoP may perhaps be reconciled more effectively with the novel notion of “responsibility” 
developed in the business and human rights context
3.2.6 Chapter Seven: The Scope. Viability and Value Added of RtoP -  Research Results 
and Recommendations
The concluding chapter draws upon the findings made in the substantive chapters and as part 
of the research to outline what practice between 2005 and 2012 tells us about the scope, 
viability and value added of the RtoP framework which stands today. Is the UNSG correct to 
summate the scope of RtoP as ‘narrow but deep’? In what ways does RtoP represent value 
added to the existing obligations/practice to which it relates? Have developments been 2005
328 Bellamy and Reike (n 182), 89-94 and Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” (n 
217), 77-98.
329 Payandeh (n 53), 491-92 [arguing that secondary RtoP may be used as a “dynamic interpretation” o f UN  
Charter obligations].
330 The following are good examples o f this position: Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity 
Crimes Once and fo r  All (n 3), 223-41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in International 
Law and Practice’ (n 180), 456; Feinstein (n 182), 46 and 48; Welsh and Banda (n 53), 225; Breau (n 185), 440 
and 464; Nasu (n 180), 219; McClean (n 201), 129; McCarthur (n 231), 431-33; Wheeler and Egerton (n 181), 
128-29; Brunee and Toope (n 53), 71-79 and Sarkin, ‘Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm o f  
International Law in the Post-Libya Era?’ (n 184), 26-28.
331 See particularly, Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 11), 118-
119.
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and 2012 succeeded in making RtoP politically palatable to States? Is there a risk that 
focusing on RtoP’s political appeal to States could undermine its capacity to protect 
populations effectively?
A range of proposals are made with respect to RtoP’s future development, including the 
way in which the annual UNSG Reports on RtoP and UNGA thematic debates could be 
maximised so as to begin deeper consideration of those elements of RtoP which remain 
unsettled. Is it possible to maintain an overarching beneficiary concept like “populations”? Is 
there a need for further reflection on who bears primary RtoP in territories which do not 
meet the criteria for statehood? Should policymakers give more detailed consideration to the 
issue of to whom assistance is provided in cases where the State’s national authorities are 
perpetrating RtoP crimes? Can regime change be anything but an acceptable outcome of 
secondary RtoP’s discharge in such cases?
The thesis concludes that RtoP has been substantially developed since its acceptance by 
States at the 2005 World Summit. Notwithstanding this, recent practice in cases like Libya 
and Syria raise significant questions about whether the RtoP which stands today can protect 
populations effectively in all cases. Is there scope to suggest that the immediate focus of 
policymakers may be less “RtoP” and more “PtR” -  “Protect the Responsibility”?
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CHAPTER II 
THE CONCEPT OF THE BEARER AND BENEFICIARY 
A RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT OR PRECLUDE?
Introduction
Throughout RtoP’s development,332 “States”333 have been identified as the primary RtoP 
bearer. This bearer concept was accepted by States at the World Summit, the Outcome 
Document providing that ‘[e]ach individual State’334 has ‘the responsibility to protect its 
populations’535 and, furthermore, that ‘national authorities’336 are mandated to comply with 
primary RtoP. Additionally, the Outcome Document provides that it is the ‘international 
community’337 which should provide assistance and use peaceful and/or non-peaceful 
responsive measures338 in order to discharge secondary RtoP. With regard to who is to 
benefit from primaiy and secondary RtoP’s discharge, the Outcome Document is clear, 
detailing ‘populations’339 as the beneficiaries of all elements of RtoP.
This chapter examines the scope, nature and character of RtoP’s aforementioned bearer 
and beneficiary concepts. Particular emphasis is placed upon whether the bearer and 
beneficiary concepts established at the World Summit have been upheld in subsequent 
practice. To do so, this writer has examined the approaches taken to RtoP’s bearer and 
beneficiary concepts within the range of cases in which RtoP has been cited to date and, 
furthermore, two hundred and fifty seven State views340 on RtoP which were delivered in the 
course of (i) the drafting of the Outcome Document and at its adoption;341 (ii) an extensive 
range of the UN Security Council [UNSC] debates on the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict;342 and (iii) the 2009 UN General Assembly [UNGA] thematic debate on RtoP’s
332 That is, within the Report o f the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The 
Responsibility to Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) (ICISS Report); Report o f  
the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’ 
(2004) UN Doc A/59/562 (HLP Report); Report o f the UN Secretary General, ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for A ll’ (2005) UN Doc A/59/2005 (UNSG Report, ‘In Larger 
Freedom’) and Report o f the UN Secretary General, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 
2009) UN Doc. A/63/677 (UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP’).
333 See accordingly ICISS Report, ibid, 13 and 17; HLP Report, ibid, 1,9,31,61,65; UNSG Report, ‘In Larger 
Freedom’, ibid, 35; UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 7-8.
334 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para 138. (Outcome Document).
335 Outcome Document, ibid.
336 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
337 Outcome Document, ibid, paras 138-139.
338 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
339 Outcome Document, ibid, paras 138-139.
340 State views surveyed for this chapter are detailed in Annex I (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) (i) and (i).
341 Surveyed State views are detailed in Annex I (a)-(e).
342 Surveyed State views are detailed in Annex I (i).
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implementation.343
Part one focuses upon RtoP’s “bearer” concepts. The primary RtoP bearer is discussed 
first and a range of questions are asked. For example, should the Outcome Document’s 
reference to “State” be interpreted in its legal sense i.e. in accordance with the generally 
recognised criteria for statehood?344 If so, who is responsible for discharging primary RtoP in 
territories which do not meet these criteria, such as secessionist enclaves and Occupied 
Territories? To explore these issues, the chapter examines the way in which the primary 
RtoP bearer concept was approached in the Israel-Gaza conflict (2008-2009) and Russia- 
Georgia conflict (2008).
The Outcome Document’s reference to “national authorities” is then examined. Does the 
international community’s recognition of a State’s “national authorities” in practice to date 
overlap with the approaches taken to government recognition? If so, has RtoP practice 
upheld the traditional approach taken to government recognition, recognising States’ 
“national authorities” as those who are in effective control of the territory? Alternatively, are 
there signs in practice which suggest that the recognition of “national authorities”, including 
the government of a State, may vary in cases involving RtoP crimes? To address these 
questions, this writer considers who was recognised as the “national authorities” of the State 
in cases where (i) national election results require verification (e.g. Kenya and Zimbabwe); 
(ii) the internationally recognised government cannot exercise power because the then 
existing government will not concede power (e.g. Cote d’Ivoire); and (iii) the government 
faces an armed insurrection due to its perpetration of RtoP crimes (e.g. Libya and Syria).
The chapter then discusses the Outcome Document’s reference to the “international 
community” as the entity which should discharge secondary RtoP. The chapter explores 
whether this concept delineates the entity which bears secondary RtoP or, rather, is 
shorthand for the range of actors who can discharge secondary RtoP. The present author 
considers which factors determine whether a particular actor will have a role in a particular 
RtoP case and the merits and demerits of this.
Part two of the chapter focuses on RtoP’s beneficiary concept,345 Consideration is given 
to the doctrinal, legal and policy significance of trends regarding the beneficiary concept 
which have emerged in State views on RtoP. This includes the broader significance of using
343 Surveyed State views are detailed in Annex I (g) (i).
344 It is commonly accepted that the criteria for statehood are reflected in Montevideo Convention on the Rights 
and Duties o f States (1933) (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 19 art 
1 (Montevideo Convention). The Article requires that a “State” have (i) a permanent population; (ii) defined 
territory; (iii) government; and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other States.
345 A version o f this chapter’s discussion o f RtoP’s beneficiary concept was presented at the European Science 
Foundation, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice’ conference, held in Linkoping, Sweden 
from 8 -12th June 2010. A version was subsequently published. See J D Halbert, “A Responsibility to Protect or 
Preclude? Examining the Beneficiaries o f the Responsibility to Protect” in A Nollkaemper and J Hoffmann (eds), 
The Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012) 273- 
289.
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an all-inclusive beneficiary concept like “populations”. For example, does this concept mean 
that all persons are RtoP beneficiaries by reason of their basic status as human beings? If so, 
does this mean that the international community should extend equivalent protection to those 
perpetrating RtoP crimes and the civilians sustaining harm therefrom when discharging 
secondary RtoP? The latter section examines the significance of the three differing 
approaches taken to the beneficiary concept in international practice to date. Do the varying 
approaches have a bearing upon the capacity to maintain a beneficiary concept like 
“populations” which spans the RtoP framework?
Throughout, the chapter evaluates the potential added value and implications of 
approaches to RtoP’s bearer and beneficiary concepts, with particular attention given to the 
field of minority protection. Could the approaches which have been adopted to the primary 
RtoP bearer in certain contexts assist a Kin State to consolidate its control and influence in 
part of the territory of another sovereign State in which a minority group is located? Could 
some of the trends regarding RtoP beneficiaries in State views exclude certain persons 
belonging to minorities because, for example, they lack the citizenship of the State in which 
they reside? Could they encourage secessionist tendencies on behalf of a minority group by 
impacting upon current understandings of the scope and nature of the right to self- 
determination?
1 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept
1.1 "State"
Neither an examination of the drafting history of the Outcome Document nor State views 
assist in determining whether the Outcome Document’s reference to “State” is used in its 
legal sense. Notwithstanding this, certain elements of the Outcome Document and wider 
international law can be usefully drawn upon to establish in which sense the term “State” is 
used.
First, the Outcome Document’s overall wording tends to suggest that “State” is used in its 
legal sense because several of the generally accepted criteria for statehood are used 
throughout, albeit implicitly. There is a clear reference to “populations”346 which, 
supplemented with the term ‘its’,347 tends to overlap with the requirement for a “State” to 
have a ‘permanent population’.348 The criterion of “government” is implicit to the reference
346 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
347 Outcome Document, ibid
348 Montevideo Convention (n 343), art 1.
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to “national authorities”.349 Furthermore, the reference to ‘[ejach individual State’350 tends to 
connect the primary RtoP bearer with the requirement for a State to have a ‘defined 
territory’.351 Finally, the provision that the objective of the international community’s 
provision of assistance is to ‘help’352 and ‘encourage’553 the “State” to ‘build capacity’354 to 
fulfil primary RtoP is redolent of the requirement that “States” possess the capacity to enter 
into international relations.355 In addition, it is notable that relevant international instruments 
have sometimes explicitly explained that the term “State” is not being used in its legal 
sense.356 The Outcome Document and wider international law therefore raise at least the 
possibility that the primary RtoP bearer concept is linked to the legal concept of statehood. 
Accordingly, it is useful to examine the way in which the primary RtoP bearer concept has 
been approached in territories which do not meet the requirements of statehood or, to put it 
another way, ‘in places that don’t exist’.357 To do so, consideration can be given to the 
primary RtoP bearer concept in (i) Occupied Territories, specifically the Israel-Gaza conflict 
(2008-2009);358 and (ii) secessionist enclaves, specifically the Russia-Georgia conflict over 
South Ossetia (2008).359
1.1.1 Occupied Territories: The Israel-Gaza Conflict 12008-20091
The UN Fact Finding Mission’s Report360 on the Israeli-Gaza conflict explicitly refers to the 
Outcome Document’s RtoP paragraphs and appears to identify two primary RtoP bearers for
349 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
350 Outcome Document, ibid, para 138.
351 Montevideo Convention (n 343), art 1.
352 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
353 Outcome Document, ibid.
354 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
355 Montevideo Convention (n 343), art 1.
356 For e.g. explanatory note to art 1 o f the UNGA Res on the Definition o f Aggression (1974) expressly 
provides: ‘In this Definition the term ‘State’: (a) is used without prejudice to questions o f  recognition or to 
whether a State is a member o f  the United Nations’. UNGA Res 3314 (XXIX), ‘Definition o f  Aggression’ (14 
December 1974) UN Doc A/RES/3314(XXIX).
357 This phrase is borrowed from the title o f Waters commentary on the role and effect o f legal obligations in 
secessionist enclaves and other territories with disputed status. See C Waters, ‘Law in Places that Don’t Exist’ 
(2006) 34 Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 401.
358 For facts on the conflict, including allegations o f RtoP crimes, see International Coalition on the 
Responsibility to Protect, ‘The Crisis in Gaza: An RtoP Situation?’
<http://responsibilitytoprotect.Org/index.php/crises/l 78-other-rtop-concems/2750-the-crisis-in-gaza> 12 
November 2012.
359 On this conflict see especially, International Crisis Group, ‘Russia vs. Georgia: The Fall Out’ (2008), Europe
Report No. 195 <http://www.crisisgr0up.0rg/~/.../195_russia_vs_georgia___ the_fallout.pdf> accessed 12
November 2012 and Report o f the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the conflict in Georgia, 
‘Volume I’ (September 2009) <http://www.ceiig.ch/Report.html> accessed 12 November 2012.
360 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (15 September 2009) UN Doc 
A/HRC/12/48. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’).
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the territory.361 Firstly, the domestic authorities of Gaza.362 Although the Report does not 
elaborate upon who the Mission consider these authorities to include, its direction that this 
responsibility extends so far as their ‘authority and means’363 allow, suggests that the 
Mission interpreted this responsibility to be qualified by their means. Secondly, the 
Occupying Power (the Israeli Government).364 The Report does not elaborate upon the nature 
of this responsibility nor does it qualify it. If one accepts that the Mission considered both 
Israeli and Gaza authorities as primary RtoP for Gaza’s populations, then it is contestable 
that primary RtoP may be a diffuse responsibility in contexts of Occupation, divided between 
bearers by their ‘authority and means’.365
1.1.2 Secessionist Enclaves: The Russia-Georgia Conflict (2008}
During the Russia-Georgia conflict, Russia’s Foreign Minister stated366 that Russia’s use of 
armed force against Georgia was part of its ‘responsibility to protect [...] Russian citizens'161 
residing in the secessionist enclave of South Ossetia. The explicit reference to ‘citizens’368 
resonates with the direct relationship between State and population inherent in primary RtoP, 
suggesting that Russia sought to act under primary RtoP (although their use of force directly 
contradicts the nature and scope of primary RtoP measures).369 This suggests that Russia did
361 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, ibid, 531 [citing the Outcome 
Document’s RtoP provisions] and 520 [outlining the protective responsibility o f the domestic authorities o f Gaza 
and Israel].
362 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, ibid.
363 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, ibid.
364 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, ibid.
365 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’, ibid.
366 ‘[U]nder the Constitution [the President] is obliged to protect the life and dignity o f Russian citizens, 
especially when they find themselves in the armed conflict. And today he reiterated that the peace enforcement 
operation enforcing peace on one o f the parties which violated its own obligations would continue until we 
achieve the results. According to our Constitution there is also responsibility to protect -  the term which is very 
widely used in the UN when people see some trouble in Africa or in any remote part o f other regions. But this is 
not Africa to us, this is next door. This is the area, where Russian citizens live. So the Constitution o f the Russian 
Federation, the laws o f the Russian Federation make it absolutely unavoidable to us to exercise responsibility to 
protect’. “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (Ministry 
o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 August 2008)
<www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574al0026259770penD  
ocument> accessed 11 May 2012 (“Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey 
Lavrov to BBC”). See also, Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952.
367 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC”, ibid, emphasis 
and ellipsis added.
368 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC”, ibid and 
Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ‘UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 
2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952.
369 Other commentators suggest that Russia sought to act under secondary RtoP. See e.g. G Evans, ‘Russia, 
Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 2 (1) Amsterdam Law Forum 25
<http://ojs.ubvu.vu.n1/alfrarticle/view/58/l 15> accessed 12 May 2012 and W Kemp, V Popovski and R Thakur 
(eds), Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f  the Kin-State (UN University Press, 
Tokyo 2011) 45, 58-60 and 236 See further, M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The
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not consider the fact that its ‘citizens’370 resided outside its territorial borders precluded it 
from acting as the primary RtoP bearer.
Examination of the UNSC’s responses371 to the conflict suggests that the international 
community did not accept Russia’s claim to bear primary RtoP for Russian citizens residing 
in South Ossetia. Admittedly, no State explicitly referred to who does bear primary RtoP on 
behalf of the South Ossetian population. However, primary RtoP is founded upon the 
concept of State “sovereignty as responsibility”,372 thereby suggesting that there should be 
some congruence between who bears primary RtoP and territorial sovereignty. There is 
therefore scope to argue that Russia was not recognised as the primary RtoP bearer by the 
number of States373 which affirmed that Russia’s actions violated Georgia’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.
Furthermore, the UK374 and the US375 argued that Russia only acquired a duty to protect 
the South Ossetian population following its use of armed force, specifically when it became 
an Occupying Force in the enclave. The logical corollary of this is that these two States did 
not recognise Russia to bear primary RtoP in relation to Russian citizens residing in South 
Ossetia prior to its use of armed force against Georgia. Nevertheless, it raises the possibility 
that Russian State actors acquired a duty to protect the enclave’s population, including 
ethnic Georgians, when they became an Occupying Force in the territory. It is unclear what
Concept o f the Responsibility to Protect within the Process o f  International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal 
o f Int’l L. 469, 508-516.
370 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (n 365); 
Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 
2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952.
371 See especially, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952; UNSC Verbatim Record (8 
August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5951; UNSC Verbatim Record (10 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5953; UNSC 
Verbatim Record (19 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5961 and UNSC Verbatim Record (28 August 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV.5969.
372 ICISS Report (n 331), 13. This has been endorsed as the basis o f primary RtoP by States from across the 
geopolitical spectrum. See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S.PV.5781; Statements o f the Representatives o f Sri Lanka, Tanzania and 
Papua New Guinea to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement o f  
the Representative o f France to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 and 
Statements o f the Representatives o f Japan and Nigeria to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.98. State views endorsing the principle are detailed in Annex II (A) (b).
373 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) 
UN Doc S/PV.5951; Statements o f the Representatives o f Belgium, Croatia and the United States to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952.
374 The United Kingdom argued that: ‘It is hard to see how Russian actions are consistent with Russia’s claimed 
justification for their military assault —  namely the protection o f its peacekeepers and civilians in South Ossetia 
and Abkhazia, even though most o f  those civilians have only recently been handed Russian passports and have 
not lived in Russia’. Furthermore, the United Kingdom stated: ‘Russian forces in Georgia are now, in effect, an 
army o f  occupation, and they will remain so until they withdraw to the positions held prior to 7 August and force 
levels return to those that prevailed then. We remain gravely concerned too by the humanitarian situation in 
Georgia. We are particularly disturbed by reports o f killings and ethnic cleansing perpetrated by South Ossetian 
and Abkhaz irregulars, in areas controlled by Russian forces. It goes without saying that Russia has a legal and 
moral obligation to prevent such acts, but, instead, what we have seen is the eviction o f  virtually all ethnic 
Georgians from South Ossetia’, emphasis added. Statement o f  the Representative o f  the United Kingdom to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 August 2008) UN Doc. S/PV.5969.
375 The United States urged Russia to fulfil its ‘responsibility to prevent’ such violations in areas where Russia 
exercises de facto effective control. Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (19 August 2008), ibid.
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underscored this decision but one issue which may have had some influence is that Georgia, 
by its own admission, did not have effective control over the secessionist enclave.376 
Accordingly, the Russia-Georgia conflict raises the possibility that the primary RtoP bearer 
concept can, in the specific context of secessionist enclaves, be determined on the basis of 
which “State” actors are in effective control of the territory.
1.1.3. The Primary RtoP bearer Concept in Non-State Territories
The two case studies suggest that the requisite relationship between the primary RtoP bearer 
and beneficiary is that both reside on the same territory?11 Admittedly, the Outcome 
Document does not expressly address primary RtoP’s territorial scope. However, 
examination of the drafting history suggests that the primary RtoP bearer concept was 
intended to be territorially defined. Originally, paragraph 138 read as ‘[e]ach individual
State, first and foremost,378 owes ‘populations’379 primary RtoP. This was later altered to
'1 0 1‘[e]ach individual State’ owes primary RtoP to 'its populations’. Arguably, ‘first and 
foremost’382 may have been erased because it could have suggested that third States were 
residual bearers of primary RtoP. Thus, by removing the terms ‘first and foremost’383 and 
inserting the term ‘its’,384 States indicated that the relationship between the primary RtoP 
bearer (State) and beneficiary (populations) should be territorially defined385 and not, as the
376 Application Instituting Proceedings, Case Concerning the Application o f  the International Convention on the 
Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination (Georgia vs. Russian Federation) 12th August 2008 and 
Application o f  the International Convention on the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination, Georgia 
vs. Russian Federation, 15th October 2008, ICJ Reports 5. On the effective control test in the context o f this 
conflict, see further S Talmon, ‘The Responsibility o f Outside Powers for Acts o f Secessionist Entities’ (2009) 58 
ICLQ413.
377 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
378 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the General 
Assembly o f September 2005’ (5 August 2005) UN Doc A/59/HLPM/CRP.l/Rev.2, 28. (UNGA President, 
‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the General Assembly o f  September 
2005’).
379 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f  the General 
Assembly o f September 2005’, ibid.
380 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
381 Outcome Document, ibid. Schabas is one o f few commentators to recognise the significance o f the term ‘its’ 
in relation to the Outcome Document’s primary RtoP provisions. In his view, the term reinforces the fact that the 
Outcome Document does not provide for third States to use armed force to protect populations o f third States and, 
therefore, for any new exception to the prohibition on armed force. See W A Schabas, Report: Preventing 
Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge fo r  the United Nations (Minority Rights Group International, London 
2006) 14.
382 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f  the General 
Assembly o f September 2005’ (n 377), 28.
383 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f  the General 
Assembly o f September 2005’, ibid.
384 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
385 Commentators have reasoned the removal o f the phrase ‘first and foremost’ differently. Bellamy has, for 
example, contended that the phrase was removed because it implied that the nature o f the responsibilities o f the 
State and international community were o f a similar character. See particularly A Bellamy, ‘Whither the
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Russian Foreign Minister suggested, to ‘citizens’386 residing within the territory of another 
“State”.
Arguably, a persuasive rationale underscores the State-centric and territorial character of 
the approaches taken to the primary RtoP bearer concept to date. Human rights, including 
minority rights, identify the “State” as the duty bearer.387 Additionally, State actors have a 
duty to respect the human rights of those who reside in territories under their effective 
control.388 Similarly, international humanitarian law provides that the Occupying Power has 
a duty to protect the population of the Occupied Territory from humanitarian law 
violations.389 Thus, recognising those State actors who are in a position of effective 
control/Occupation to bear primary RtoP, either partly or wholly, is consistent with the 
nature of the existing international humanitarian and human rights law duties to which 
primary RtoP relates.
Perhaps most significantly, a State-centric and territorially defined primary RtoP bearer 
concept helps to circumvent some of the implications inherent in recognising that the 
relationship between primary RtoP bearer and beneficiary can entail an extraterritorial 
character. An extraterritorial approach could blur the distinction between RtoP and 
controversial concepts such as the Protection of Nationals abroad390 and Humanitarian 
Intervention. The general implication of this would be that it undermines the very debate 
which RtoP was constructed to resolve, namely the legality and legitimacy of third States 
using unauthorised force to “protect” populations.391 The field of minority protection can 
also be drawn upon here. An extraterritorial primary RtoP bearer concept could encourage 
Kin States to interfere in the internal affairs of the State in which a territorially cohesive 
minority resides. This would contradict the principle that a Kin State’s ‘constitutionally
Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ (2006) 20 (2) Eth & Inti A ff 
143, 163-64.
386 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (n 365) and 
Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ‘UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 
2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952.
387 For example, the preamble to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights opens with reference to 
who undertakes the obligations therein, namely ‘[t]he States Parties to the present Covenant’. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171, premabular para 1. (ICCPR).
388 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.l3 (UN Human Rights 
Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the 
Covenant’); European Court o f Human Rights, Al Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2011, Application No. 
55721/07, para 74 [Al Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2011) and D Giercyz, “The Responsibility to 
Protect: A Legal and Rights-Based Perspective” in A Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), The 
Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 109-113.
389 In terms o f treaty law, the Fourth Geneva Convention outlines some o f the main humanitarian law duties o f  
the Occupying Power. See generally, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time 
o f War (1949) (adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. (Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War).
390 This has also been noted by T Ruys, ‘The “Protection o f Nationals” Doctrine Revisited’ (2008) 13 (2) Journal 
o f Conflict & Security Law 233, 267-68 and Evans, ‘Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 368).
391 See e.g. ICISS Report (n 331), 1-3.
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declared responsibility’392 to protect a minority group residing in another State’s territory 
‘does not imply, in any way, a right under international law to exercise jurisdiction over 
these persons on the territory of another State without that State’s consent’.393
Using factors like “effective control” to establish a territorial relationship between the 
primary RtoP bearer and beneficiary raises some significant questions, particularly whether 
this ensures populations protection in non-“State” territories adequately. The fundamental 
issue here is the difference between recognising and enforcing a duty. Practice to date 
suggests that religious and/or ethnic grievances may make the bearer unwilling to implement 
primary RtoP effectively. For example, Israel394 does not seem to accept that it partly bears 
the primary RtoP duty owed to the Gaza population but, instead, that its duty to protect the 
population residing within its territorial borders supersedes that which it partly owes the 
population under its Occupation.595 Another illustration is that when in a position of effective 
control, Russia reportedly failed to uphold the human rights of the ethnic Georgians residing 
in South Ossetia.396
1.2 “National Authorities”
The Outcome Document provides that secondary RtoP’ activation of secondary RtoP’s 
‘timely and decisive’397 response pillar is to be partly adjudged on the basis of ‘national 
authorities manifestly failing’595 to protect their populations from RtoP crimes. The logical 
implication of this is that it is States’ ‘national authorities’399 who are responsible for fulfiling 
primary RtoP. Thus, the ways in which the primary RtoP bearer concept has been 
approached in contexts where there are competing claims for recognition as a State’s 
“national authorities” merits further reflection. To do so, the actors identified or alluded to as 
the primary RtoP bearer in the case studies of Kenya, Zimbabwe, Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and
392 OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National 
Minorities and Inter-State Relations and Explanatory Note (OSCE HCNM, the Netherlands 2008) 5, para 4. 
(OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations).
393 OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations, ibid, 6, para 4.
394 Statement o f the Representative o f Israel to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 December 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV.6060.
395 The Israeli Representative stated: ‘Israel cannot, and will not, allow its citizens to be sitting ducks for terrorist 
attacks. Israel will continue to take all necessary measures to protect its citizens and stop terrorism. Members o f  
the Council must ask themselves what they would do in the same situation if their citizens were terrorized on a 
daily basis. Protecting the lives and well-being o f  on e’s  citizens is not only a right, but also a responsibility o f  
every sovereign State. With its military operation, the State o f Israel is fulfiling that responsibility’, emphasis 
added. Statement o f the Representative o f Israel to the UNSC, ibid.
396 Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 August 
2008) UN Doc S/PV.5969.
397 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
398 Outcome Document, ibid.
399 Outcome Document, ibid.
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Syria should be considered.
1.2.1 Contested National Election Results Require Verification: Kenva and Zimbabwe 
f200m
In Kenya and Zimbabwe, national elections led to mass human rights violations and the 
alleged perpetration of RtoP crimes. In both cases, national election results were disputed by 
one or more political parties. Relevant international actors400 took a relatively uniform 
position on who would bear primary RtoP whilst the election results were being reviewed. In 
Zimbabwe, the government which was in power before the national election and the 
paramilitary groups and security forces under its control were identified as primary RtoP 
bearers.401 Furthermore, ‘political leaders on both sides’402 were urged to ensure that their 
supporters did not incite or use violence against opposition supporters. In Kenya, the Special 
Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide [SAPG] urged ‘political and community leaders’403 
to fulfil primary RtoP, whilst the UNSC called upon ‘Kenya’s political leaders’404 to ensure 
populations’ protection. Thus, Kenya and Zimbabwe suggest that in cases of disputed 
national election results, primary RtoP may be owed by those (i) who are, by reason of then- 
previous governmental role, in a position of effective control; and (ii) who claim electoral 
victory and, if the election results are verified as being in their favour, may subsume 
effective control. This suggests that in contexts involving disputed national election results 
the primary RtoP bearer concept will essentially be shared by both political parties and, at 
least in the view of the SAPG, by those who exercise some influence over the population like 
‘community leaders’.405
400 Statement o f the UNSC President, ‘Situation in Kenya’ (6 February 2008) UN Doc S/PRST/2008/4 (Statement 
o f the UNSC President, ‘Situation in Kenya’); Statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in UN 
Press Release, ‘Alarmed by Violence in Zimbabwe Arbour Urges Restraint’ (27 April 2008) 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf7view01/BB073B7B294BC46FC1257438003A0672?opendocument 
> accessed 12 May 2012 (UN Press Release, ‘Alarmed by Violence in Zimbabwe Arbour Urges Restraint’); 
Statement by the UN Deputy Secretary General to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 July 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV.5929 (Statement by the UN Deputy Secretary General to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, 8 July 2008) 
and Statement o f the UN Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide, ‘The 
Situation in Kenya’ (28 January 2009) cited in UN Department o f  Public Information, ‘The United Nations and 
Kenya: Briefing Note’ (7 February 2008) 4 <
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Feb%202008%20Kenya%20UN%20briefing%20note.pdf> accessed 
12 November 2012. (Statement o f the SAPG cited in UNDPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’).
401 Statement by the UN Deputy Secretary General to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, 8 July 2008, ibid.
402 Statement o f the UNSC President, ‘Situation in Kenya’ (6 February 2008) (n 399) and UN Press Release, 
‘Alarmed by Violence in Zimbabwe Arbour Urges Restraint’ (n 399).
403 Statement o f the SAPG cited in UNDPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 399), 4.
404 Statement o f the UNSC President, ‘Situation in Kenya’ (n 399).
405 Statement o f the SAPG cited in UNDPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 399).
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1.2.2 The then Existing Government will not concede Power to the Internationally 
recognised Government: The Cote d'Ivoire f20101
Amidst ongoing dispute regarding the results of the 2010 Cote d’Ivoire national elections,406 
the UNSC determined that the President Elect (Ouattara) was the “legitimate”407 President of 
the Cote d’Ivoire and interlocutor with the international community. Ouattara was unable to 
assume effective control of the State because the then existing President (Laurent Gbagbo408) 
would not concede power, leading to further violent clashes between Gbagbo and Ouattara 
supporters.409 Despite this, the UNSC accepted Ouattara’s consent for the expansion of the 
peacekeeping force serving in the Cote d’Ivoire 410 Given that the UN Secretary-General’s 
[UNSG] 2009 RtoP Report provides that the deployment of peacekeepers depends upon the 
State (i.e. the primary RtoP bearer) providing consent,411 it is arguable that the UNSC 
recognised Ouattara to bear primary RtoP.
Other actors seemed to recognise the primary RtoP bearer more broadly. The UNSG and 
his Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and Responsibility to Protect called upon 
‘all parties in the Cote d’Ivoire’412 to fulfil primary RtoP and, furthermore, referred to the 
RtoP-type crimes being committed by the militia and armed group’s under the then existing 
President’s control (Laurent Gbagbo).413 Arguably, these non-State groups were considered 
to also bear primary RtoP by reason of presumably falling within the scope of ‘ all parties in 
the Cote d’Ivoire’.414 Accordingly, there is scope to argue that relevant actors considered that
406 See Bellamy and William’s discussion o f the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision that there had been 
vote rigging and, therefore, that Gbagbo was the rightful winner. A Bellamy and P D Williams, ‘The New Politics 
o f Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 (4) Int. Affairs 825, 832.
407 See e.g. UNSC Verbatim Record (7 December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6437.
408 For an interesting discussion o f the way in which the previous government o f the Cote d’Ivoire came to be 
recognised by the international community and the potential disadvantages o f this, see A Bellamy, Responsibility 
to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 148.
409 On the situation, see particularly Human Rights Watch News Release, ‘C6te d’Ivoire: Ouattara Forces Kill, 
Rape Civilians during Offensive’ (Human Rights Watch, 9 April 2011) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/09/c- 
te-d-ivoire-ouattara-forces-kill-rape-civilians-during-offensive> accessed 14 August 2011.
410 UNSC Verbatim Record (7 December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6437.
4,1 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 18. See also, UNHRC, ‘Report o f the Special Rapporteur on 
Contemporary Forms o f Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance’ (30 March 2010) 
UN Doc A/HRC/14/43, 18 and International Law Commission, ‘Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters’ 
(22 July 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3019, 3.
412 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’ (29 December 2010)
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Special%20Advisers’%20Statement%20on%20Cote%20d’Iv 
oire,%2029%20.12.2010.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012 ( ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the 
Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010). 
See further, UN Press Release, ‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the 
Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’ (19 January 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20 
Cote%20d’Ivoire,%2019%20Jan%20201 l.pdf.> accessed 12 May 2012. ( ‘Statement attributed to the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f  Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the 
Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 19 January 2011).
413 ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on 
the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010, ibid.
414 ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on 
the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010, ibid and ‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s
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both the internationally recognised President and the then existing President owed primary 
RtoP.
1.2.3 The Existing Government Faces an Armed Insurrection due to Perpetrating RtoP 
Crimes: Libva and Svria f2011-onwardl
In Libya and Syria, relevant actors recalled the ‘Libyan authorities’415 and ‘Syrian 
authorities’416 primary RtoP duty. There was a general consensus that the “government” of 
each State who were in a position of effective control when the RtoP crimes began being 
perpetrated (i.e. the Gaddafi and Al-Assad regime) fell within the scope of the “authorities” 
of Libya and Syria and, therefore, owed primary RtoP. To this effect, reference was made by 
a range of different actors to the Libyan/Syrian “government”417 owing primary RtoP. 
However, it appears that “national authorities” (and therefore the primary RtoP bearer 
concept) was construed in a wider sense than simply the requisite divisions of each States’ 
“government”. For example, the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and 
Responsibility to Protect explicitly stated that primary RtoP was owed in Syria by ‘both 
State and non-State actors’418, calling upon ‘all parties’419 to uphold human rights law. Some 
third States’ approaches to the political opposition groups which formed in Libya and Syria 
in response to the existing government’s perpetration of RtoP crimes may also be significant.
A number of third States and other relevant actors made declarations regarding the
Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote 
d’Ivoire’, 19 January 2011 (n411).
415 UNSC Res 1970 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, preambular para 9 (UNSC Res 1970) and UNSC Res 1973 
(2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, preambular para 4. (UNSC Res 1973).
416 See e.g. UNHRC Res S-16/1, ‘The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the 
Context o f Recent Events’ (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1 (UNHRC Res S-16/1) and 
UNHRC Res S-19/1, ‘The Deteriorating Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Recent 
Killings in El-Houleh’ (4 June 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, para 5.
417 In relation to Libya, see UNHRC Res S-15/1, ‘The Situation o f Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ 
(25 February 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-15/1, para 2 (UNHRC Res S-15/1). In relation to Syria, see e.g. Draft 
UNSC Resolution (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77, para 2 (Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 February 2012); 
Draft UNSC Resolution (4 October 2012) UN Doc S/2011/612, para 5 (Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 October 
2012); UN Press Release, ‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis 
Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’ (2 June 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 11 August 2012. See further, UN 
Press Release, ‘Marking a full year o f  violent suppression o f anti-government protests in Syria, the United 
Nations Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, release the following statement’ (15 March 2012) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 12 August 2012.
418 UN Press Release, ‘The UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis 
Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, urge immediate action to end violence in Syria’ (10 
February 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 12 August 2012. 
( ‘The UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, urge immediate action to end violence in Syria’, 10 Februaiy 2012).
419 ‘The UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, urge immediate action to end violence in Syria’, ibid.
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Libyan National Transitional Council420 [NTC] and Syrian National Council421 [SNC]. The 
substance of these declarations varied. Several States declared the NTC and/or SNC as the 
‘legitimate representatives’422 of the Libyan/Syrian people. A smaller number of 
declarations, including those of the UK,423 US,424 France425 and the EU,426 provided that the 
TNC and/or SNC are the most “legitimate” authority in the State(s). The TNC and/or SNC 
were also declared to be the ‘legitimate interlocutor with the international community’.427 
The significance of these declarations in terms of the primary RtoP bearer differs. Primarily, 
all of the declarations of the TNC and/or SNC’s legitimacy should not be conflated with 
statements regarding the recognition o f new governments. Some of these statements are 
considered to be politically significant, conferring a degree of legitimacy and standing upon 
the opposition group(s).428 Nevertheless, it is arguable that some of the declarations and/or
420 See especially, UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Libya Contact Group Meeting Concludes’ (15 July 2011) 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=631324382> accessed 14 August 2011 (UK FCO, 
‘Libya Contact Group Meeting Concludes’); National Transitional Council, ‘International Recognition’ 
<http://www.ntclibya.com/InnerPage.aspx?SSID=6&ParentID=3&LangID=l> accessed 14 August 2011.
421 See generally, Syrian National Council, ‘Syrian National Council Worldwide’ 
<http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/snc-worldwide/snc-map.html> accessed 12 May 2012.
422 With respect to Libya, see particularly the declarations o f the Maldives and Senegal in The President’s Office 
Republic o f Maldives, ‘Maldives Recognises Libyan National Council as Sole Representative o f the Libyan 
People’ (3 April 2011) <http://www.presidencymaldives.gov.mv/Index.aspx?lid=l l&dcid=5071> accessed 7 
August 2012 and ‘Senegal Grants Diplomatic Recognition to Libyan Rebels’ {Star Africa, 28 May 2011) 
<http://www.starafrica.com/en/news/detail-news/view/senegal-grants-diplomatic-recognition-to-168769.html> 
accessed 7 August 2012. In relation to the SNC, see especially the declarations o f Spain and the European Union 
at Local Coordination Committees o f Syria, ‘Spain Considers the SNC the Representative o f  the Syrian People’ 
(25 November 2011) <http://www.lccsyria.org/2807> accessed 7 August 2012 and ‘EU Ministers Recognise 
Syrian National Council as Legitimate Representatives’ (The Journal.ie, Dublin, 27 February 2012) 
<http://www.thejoumal.ie/eu-ministers-recognise-syrian-national-council-as-legitimate-representatives-367277- 
Feb2012/> accessed 7 August 2012.
423 Indeed, when recognising the SNC’s “legitimacy”, the UK Foreign Secretary noted that ‘they are not in 
control - the Syrian National Council - o f any part o f Syria’. UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign 
Secretary: “We Have to Intensify Pressure on Syria’” (24 February 2012) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest- 
news/?id=734211682&view=News> accessed 12 May 2012 (UK FCO, ‘Foreign Secretary: “We Have to 
Intensify Pressure on Syria’”). On Libya see UK FCO, ‘Libya Contact Group Meeting Concludes’ (n 419).
424 E Labott, ‘Clinton to Syrian Opposition: Ousting al-Assad is Only First Step in Transition’ (CAW, 6 December 
2011) <http://articIes.cnn.com/2011 -12-06/middleeast/world_meast_clinton-syrian-opposition_l_assad-syrian- 
opposition-syrian-national-council?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST> accessed 12 May 2012.
4 5 SNC, ‘The Syrian National Council Meets with the French Minister o f Foreign Affairs and the EU High 
Representative o f Foreign Affairs’ (24 November 2011) <http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/press- 
releases/item/546-the-syrian-national-council-meets-with-the-ffench-minister-of-foreign-afTairs-and-the-eu-high- 
representative-of-foreign-affairs.html> accessed: 12 May 2012.
42 On Syria, see SNC, ‘SNC Welcomes EU’s Recognition o f the SNC’ (28 February 2012)
<http://www.syri ancouncil.org/en/press-releases/item/588-snc-welcomes-eu’s-recognition-of-the-snc.html> 
accessed 12 May 2012.
427 With respect to the NTC see e.g. Italy’s declaration in Famesina Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, ‘Focus-Libya: 
Frattini, the NTC is Libya’s Only Interlocutor’ (4 April 2011)
<http://www.esteri.it/MAE/EN/Sala_Stampa/ArchivioNotizie/Approfondimenti/2011 /04/20110404_FocusLibia_f 
rattini_Cnt.htm> accessed 7 August 2012. In relation to Syria, see e.g. France’s declaration in A Rettman, ‘France 
Recognises Syrian Council, Proposes Military Intervention’ (EU Observer, 24 November 2011) 
<http://euobserver.eom/defence/l 14380> accessed 7 August 2012.
428 Talmon observes that similar declarations were made with respect to the Palestinian Liberation Organisation 
(PLO). Significantly, these declarations explicitly noted that they should not be construed as the formal 
recognition o f the PLO as the “government” o f Palestine. Talmon considers that this can help opposition groups 
to circumvent some o f the practical limitations which have been imposed upon their struggle for leadership by 
reason o f the international community’s response to the perpetration o f RtoP crimes. For example, such 
declarations are considered to legitimate the standing o f the opposition groups in third States, thereby enabling 
them to access, on behalf o f the people o f the State, the funds of the “government” which is implicated in the
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wider actions of third States are intended to be construed as the formal recognition of the 
TNC and/or SNC as the new government. First, declaring the TNC/SNC as the “legitimate 
authority” of the State or “legitimate interlocutor” with the international community can be 
legally significant because they ‘usually indicate some capacity of representing the State’.429 
Second, it is notable that the UK does not explicitly recognise new governments430 but, 
rather, leaves its recognition to be inferred through the ‘nature of the dealings’431 which it 
has with groups’ claiming governmental recognition. Arguably, the UK’s supply of police 
equipment to the TNC432 and practical assistance to the Syrian opposition433 may fall within 
this. Whilst it is important to note that no declaration explicitly recognised the opposition 
groups to bear primary RtoP, this should be offset with the fact that States’ governments are 
generally recognised to bear primary RtoP. Thus, if some of the declarations constitute 
government recognition then they may also, albeit indirectly, recognise the opposition 
groups as primary RtoP bearers. If so, the recognition of the “national authorities” which 
bear primary RtoP may sometimes be directly linked to the formal recognition of new
434governments.
Notwithstanding this, the February 2012435 and October 2011436 draft UNSC Resolutions 
on Syria recalled the primary RtoP duty of the Syrian “government”. The Resolutions make 
no comment on who they consider the “government” to be. However, the February Draft 
Resolution refers to the Syrian government’s duty to comply with its international legal 
obligations437 and the need for the Syrian government to cooperate with the Peace Plan 438 
Accordingly, the references to the “government” seem to be directed at the Al-Assad regime 
because it is this regime that continues to represent Syria in the UN Human Rights 
Council439 [UNHRC] and was charged with ensuring the effectiveness of the UN Observer
perpetration o f RtoP crimes which have been frozen by the third State. On these issues, see S Talmon, 
‘Recognition o f the Libyan Transitional Council’ (2011) 15 (16) Am. S. Int’l L. Insights 
<http://www.asil.org/insightsl 10616.cfm> accessed 7 August 2012.
429 Talmon, ‘Recognition o f the Libyan Transitional Council’, ibid.
430 Talmon, ‘Recognition o f the Libyan Transitional Council’, ibid. See further, C Warbrick, “States and 
Recognition in International Law” in M Evans (ed), International Law  (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 256.
431 Warbrick, ibid.
432 UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Provides Equipment to the National Transitional Council in Libya’ 
(30 June 2011) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=624285882> accessed 14 August
2011 .
433 The Foreign Secretary said that the practical assistance would be ‘non-lethal’ and would likely include 
measures such as the provision o f mobile phones and radio equipment to the opposition groups. United Kingdom 
Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary Statement on Syria’ (10 August 2012) 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?id=798971582&view=News> accessed 14 August 2012.
434 The rationale and significance o f this at a policy and legal level are discussed below.
435 Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 February 2012 (n 416), para 2.
436 Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 October 2012 (n 416), para 5.
437 Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 February 2012 (n 416), para 2.
438 Draft UNSC Resolution, ibid, para 5.
439 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, 
‘Human Rights Council Requests Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El 
Houleh’ (1 June 2012)
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Mission.440 Significantly, the February draft Resolution was sponsored by some of the States 
who appear, through their declarations or wider actions, to have recognised the Syrian 
opposition as the “government” before proposing the draft Resolution.441 This raises the 
possibility that where the “government” of a State is considered to have manifestly failed to 
protect its population and a “legitimate” political opposition group emerges, the primary 
RtoP bearer concept may be concurrent. Specifically, primary RtoP may be held by two 
“governments” when (i) one “government” has had international support for it explicitly 
withdrawn; and (ii) the other “government44 has not yet attained sufficient levels of formal 
recognition to be considered as the only “government’* of the State.
1.2.4 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept in States with Competing "National Authorities"
The primary RtoP bearer concept in States where there are competing claims to represent the 
“national authorities” will often be pursuant to existing international obligations. 
Recognising that all aspects of the “government’’ bear primary RtoP is consistent with the 
fact that existing human rights treaty obligations are owed by 4 [a] 11 branches of government 
(executive, legislative and judicial), and other public or governmental authorities, at 
whatever level - national, regional or local’.442
Wider existing obligations can also help us to understand why some actors have been 
identified as primary RtoP bearers. A key example is the Secretary-General’s Special 
Advisers reference to Syrian non-State actors also owing primary RtoP.443 Admittedly, this 
seems to differ from the concept of the duty-bearer in the field of human rights. Here, the 
State is considered to bear the duty and, as part of this duty, is required to ensure that the 
populations’ human rights are not violated by non-State actors.444 However, the crimes which 
primary RtoP covers are not only connected to human rights law. Genocide, war crimes and
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12215&LangID=E>  accessed 7 July
2012 .
440 UNSC Resolution 2042 (14 April 2012) UN Doc S/RES/2042, para 6.
441 France and the United Kingdom are prominent examples. See list o f sponsors o f Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 
February 2012 (n 416).
442 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (n 387), 2. In addition, the bearer o f the duty under Article 27 o f the 
International Covenant on Civil and political Rights has been outlined as ‘the State Party itself, whether through 
its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities’. UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 23: 
Article 27- Rights o f Minorities’ (Fiftieth Session, 1994), para 6.1. (UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General 
Comment 23: Article 27- Rights o f Minorities’).
443 ‘The UN Secretary-General's Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, urge immediate action to end violence in Syria’, 10 February 2012 (n 
417).
444 For e.g. the Human Rights Committee provides that Article 27 o f the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights requires that the rights are ‘protected against their denial and violation’ and therefore that the 
State party should not only protect the right from denial or violations by the ‘acts o f the State Party itself but also 
from denial or violation by ‘the acts o f other persons within the State Party’. UN Human Rights Committee, 
‘General Comment 23: Article 27- Rights o f Minorities’ (n 441), para 6.1.
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crimes against humanity are mass atrocity crimes for which international criminal law 
provides individual criminal responsibility.445 The reference to non-State actors as primary 
RtoP bearers may therefore have been made in order to recall the fact that, although State 
actors are mainly responsible for implementing primary RtoP, this does not mean that other 
actors have no responsibilities whatsoever. Whilst non-State actors cannot perform several 
positive primary RtoP duties (e.g. ratifying human rights law instruments, referring the 
situation to the ICC), they can help to fulfil primary RtoP by not perpetrating RtoP crimes 
and encouraging those under their control/influence (e.g. members of armed groups) not to 
do so. Moreover, recalling that non-State actors bear primary RtoP reiterates that an armed 
insurrectional movement which becomes the new government can engage the State’s 
responsibility for any violations of erga omnes obligations which were committed by forces 
under its authority during the struggle for political power.446
On the one hand, the fact that the primary RtoP bearer concept is not limited to the 
government suggests that determining the primary RtoP bearer in these contexts is not 
entirely synonymous with governmental recognition. Conversely, some of the declarations 
regarding recognition of the TNC and SNC as the legitimate authorities of Libya and Syria 
suggest that the scope of the primary RtoP bearer can at times be influenced by/linked to the 
process of government recognition. This interplay may be legally significant because it raises 
the possibility that the recognition of new governments in RtoP cases may be based upon the 
criteria of “legitimacy” and not the traditional test of “effective control”. It is too early to 
suggest that “legitimacy” has become a new basis for recognising governments. However, it 
is useful to draw by analogy on the way in which “legitimacy” has been used to regulate the 
process of “State” recognition in the field of minority protection. In response to the 
dissolution of the Balkans and former Soviet Bloc, the EU adopted a set of criteria which the 
newly emerging “States” should fulfil in order to gain external recognition of their 
statehood.447 A primary criterion was to put in place guarantees for minority protection 
within the new “State”.448 Admittedly, there is a clear difference between the recognition of 
new governments and that of States. Nevertheless, it is arguable that practice regarding the 
primary RtoP bearer reinforces the European Community’s connection of external
445 For e.g. Article 5 o f the Rome Statute provides that the ICC can have jurisdiction over genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. Article 25 provides for the principle o f individual criminal responsibility for 
the perpetration o f such crimes. Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered 
into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 art 5 (1) (a)-(c). (Rome Statute).
446 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (n 387), 2. This relates to the responsibility o f internationally wrongful acts 
perpetrated by insurrectional movements, see e.g. P Dumberry, ‘New State Responsibility for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts by an Insurrectional Movement’ (2006) 17 (3) EJIL 605.
447 European Community, ‘Declaration on the Recognition o f New States o f New States in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union’ (16 December 1991) reprinted in R Caplan, Europe and the Recognition o f  New States in 
Yugoslavia (CUP, Cambridge 2005) Appendix I, 187-188.
448 European Community Declaration on State Recognition, ibid reprinted in Caplan, ibid, 187.
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recognition (e.g. statehood/government), legitimacy and populations’ protection (i.e. through 
minority rights/protection from RtoP crimes).
The idea that primary RtoP can be held concurrently in States where there are competing 
claims for recognition as “national authorities” is not novel. States have sometimes 
recognised the existence of two “governments” within one State, usually by recognising the 
government who is in effective control as the “de jure government” and the opposition group 
as the “de facto government”.449 The rationale for this approach is clear. External 
declarations of the “legitimacy” of the “de facto government” can help the group to gain 
domestic legitimacy because they begin to appear to the people of the State as a group which 
acts internally, and is understood externally, as a legitimate government.450 However, this 
approach also entails implications for populations’ protection. Whilst Kosovo falls outside 
the scope of RtoP practice, it can be used as a practical example of this drawback. The de 
jure government acts in parallel to Serbian leadership groups in parts of the territory.451 In 
the sections of the territory where the Serbian leadership groups are operating, the population 
is effectively disassociated from the de jure government. For example, the Serbian leadership 
makes decisions regarding issues such as passports 452 Thus, the field of minority protection 
highlights that two “governments” within a State can polarise certain sections of the 
population, thereby further undermining the development of an ethnically, racially or 
religiously cohesive society.453
1.3 The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept: General Findings
There is limited practice regarding the way in which the primary RtoP bearer concept will be 
tailored, if at all, to instances of secession, occupation, disputed election results and armed 
insurrections. Accordingly, the approaches delineated above may change in the course of 
future practice and should therefore be deemed tentative conclusions. Nevertheless, 
examination of the primary RtoP bearer concept in practice to date suggests that it may be 
multifaceted, taking hold in different contexts upon competing actors to varying extents. The 
primary RtoP concept may become diffuse in Occupied Territories but, in secessionist 
enclaves, be held by State actors who are in effective control. Furthermore, although the 
traditional standard of effective control may endure in relation to the recognition of “national 
authorities” in cases involving disputed national election results, it may be substituted for a
449 Warbrick (n 429), 254.
450 Warbrick, ibid, 255.
451 Commission o f the European Communities, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Kosovo (under UNSC 
1244/99) 2008 Progress Report’ (5 November 2008) EU Doc SEC(2008)2697,12.
452 Commission o f the European Communities, ibid.
453 Chapter five critically examines the impact on minority groups o f external recognition o f  the TNC and SNC as 
the legitimate authorities in Libya and Syria.
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“legitimacy” approach by some relevant actors in cases where the democratically elected 
government cannot assume power or a government faces an armed insurrection for 
perpetrating RtoP crimes.
The primary RtoP bearer concept overlaps with the duty-bearer of some of the existing 
obligations to which it relates in several ways, including that (i) both are owed by ‘all 
branches of the government’;454 (ii) non-State actors should refrain from violating human 
rights and may incur individual criminal responsibility for some violations;455 and (iii) both 
primary RtoP and the duty to respect human rights/humanitarian law are owed by State 
actors in a position of effective control 456 These overlaps suggest that the primary RtoP 
bearer concept may be best understood at that which amalgamates who bears and/or can be 
held accountable for violating, the existing human rights, criminal and humanitarian 
obligations to which it relates. The table summarises the approaches taken to the primary 
RtoP bearer concept in practice to date.
Table A: The Primary RtoP Bearer Concept
Secessionist Enclaves A. The State Actors which 
exercise Effective Control 
in the Enclave
Effective Control Test Russia-
Georgia
Conflict
(2008)
Occupied Territories A. Occupying Power
and
B. Authorities of the 
Occupied Territory to the
extent that their means 
allow.
Primary RtoP can be Diffuse Israel-Gaza
Conflict
(2008-2009)
454 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (n 387), 2 and UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 23: Article 
27- Rights o f Minorities’ (n 441), para 6.1.
455 Rome Statute (n 444) art 5 (1) (a), (b), (c) and art 25.
456 With respect to human rights, see UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f  the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant’ (n 387); AI Skeini & Others v. The United 
Kingdom, 2011 (n 387) para 74 and Giercyz (n 387) 109-113. In relation to humanitarian law, see for e.g. Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War (n 388).
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Contested National 
Election Results
A. All Sections of the 
Government in Effective 
Control Before the National 
Elections
and
B. The Opposition Party 
who may assume Effective 
Control when the National 
Election Results are 
Verified
Primary RtoP can be a 
Shared Responsibility
Kenya
(2008),
Zimbabwe
(2009)
The Then Existing 
Government will not 
Concede Power to the 
Internationally 
Recognised 
Government
A. All Sections of the 
Government in Effective
Control Before the National 
Elections, including Armed 
Forces/Groups under their 
Control
and
B. All Sections of the 
Democratically Elected
Government
Primary RtoP can be a 
Diffuse Responsibility, owed 
by a variety of actors within 
the State.
Cote
d’Ivoire
(2010-2011)
The Existing 
Government faces 
claims to leadership 
because it has 
perpetrated RtoP 
Crimes
A. The De Jure 
Government that is in 
Effective Control
and
B. The Opposition 
Government that Claims 
Recognition as the 
“Legitimate Authorities”
and
C. Armed Groups (Non- 
State Actors)
Primary RtoP can be Owed 
Concurrently, owed by both 
the “De Jure” and “De 
Facto” Government;
Non-State Actors can Bear 
Primary RtoP to some extent, 
not least with respect to 
refraining from perpetrating 
RtoP crimes;
The primary RtoP Bearer 
Concept can Indirectly 
Relate to Third State 
Governmental Recognition;
Primary RtoP Reinforces the 
Link Between Protection and 
Recognition developed in the 
Context of State Recognition 
and the Field of Minority 
Protection.
Libya
(2011)
Syria (2011- 
to present 
day)
The table illustrates that some gaps in practice remain, such as who would bear primary RtoP 
in secessionist enclaves without an Occupying Power. Practical constraints would undermine 
the viability of recognising the enclave’s de facto authorities as the bearer. The non-State
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status of the territory could undermine the authorities’ ability to implement key primary RtoP 
measures, such as the ratification of human rights treaties.457 Third States may be reluctant to 
provide assistance in order to help the authorities to build the capacity to fulfil primary RtoP, 
apprehending that engagement with the authorities confers legitimacy upon them. Those 
States who leave government recognition to be inferred from their ‘dealings’458 may 
apprehend that engaging with the authorities could be construed as government 
recognition 459 Furthermore, providing assistance to the authorities contradicts that the field 
of minority protection discourages providing assistance to ‘political parties and movements 
abroad’460 because this undermines the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the sovereign 
State in which these movements are located. Perhaps most significantly, this approach could 
undermine the persuasive policy rationale inherent in a State-centric primary RtoP bearer 
concept. Again, we can draw by analogy on minority protection. No right to autonomy has 
been formulated because there is an apprehension that this could ‘spiral’461 toward 
secessionist claims.462 Recognising the de facto authorities of secessionist enclaves as 
primary RtoP bearers which can be assisted by the international community would suggest 
that RtoP can sometimes add legitimacy to secessionist movements. These tensions may 
have influenced responses to the Russia-Georgia conflict. Whilst Georgia463 reiterated its 
offer for South Ossetia to become an autonomous region which ‘shared sovereignty’464 with
457 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 11. See further, A Yannis, ‘The Concept o f Suspended 
Sovereignty in International Law and its Implications in International Politics’ (2002) 13 (5) EJIL 1037 and P 
Kolsto, ‘Living with Non-Recognition: State and Nation Building in South Caucasian Quasi-States (2008) 60 (3) 
Europe-Asia Studies 483.
458 Warbrick (n 429), 256.
459 Reservations may also arise because o f the fact that (i) recognition o f a “government” can have evidential 
value in assessing whether the Montevideo criteria for statehood are met; and/or (ii) conducting relations with 
States might suggest that the territory meets the statehood criterion o f capacity o f entering into relations with 
States.
460 ‘States may provide support to cultural, religious or other non-governmental organisations respecting the laws 
and with explicit or implied consent o f the country in which they are registered or operating. However, States 
should refrain from financing political parties o f an ethnic or religious character in a foreign country, as this may 
have destabilizing effects and undermine good inter-State relations’. OSCE: High Commissioner for National 
Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 391), 7, para 13.
461 D Wippman, ‘The Evolution and Implementation o f Minority Rights’ (1997-1998) 66 Fordham L. Rev 597, 
624.
462 See CSCE, ‘Document o f  the Moscow Meeting o f the Conference on the Human Dimension o f the CSCE’ 
(adopted 29 June 1990) para 35 <http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304> accessed 12 November 2012. For a 
good summation o f the policy fears surrounding the establishment o f autonomous arrangements, see especially L 
Thio, ‘Developing a “Peace and Security” Approach to Minorities Problems’ (2003) 52 (1) ICLQ 115, 119. See 
further, Wippman, ibid, 624; J. Jackson Preece, ‘Minority Rights in Europe: From Westphalia to Helsinki’
(1997) 23 Review o f International Studies 75, 88; On the way in which the fear of, and claims to, secession can 
negatively impact upon the development o f a robust and effective minority protection regime in general, see 
Human Rights Commission, Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, 
‘Protection o f  Minorities: Possible Ways and Means o f Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f  
Problems Involving Minorities’ (10 August 1993) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34. (Human Rights Commission, 
Sub-Commission on Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, ‘Protection o f Minorities: 
Possible Ways and Means o f Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f Problems Involving 
Minorities’).
463 Statement o f  the Representative o f Georgia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV. 5951.
464 Statement o f the Representative o f Georgia to the UNSC, ibid.
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Georgia, at no point did the UNSC refer to the authorities of the enclave, far less recognise 
that they owed any protective responsibility. Instead, the primary focus was engaging with 
the sovereign State in which the enclave is located,465 qualifying all references to the territory 
as ‘South Ossetia, Georgia,466/‘the South Ossetia region of Georgia’.467
The emphasis on Georgia’s sovereignty by members of the UNSC raises the possibility 
that the requisite territorial relationship between bearer and beneficiary could be determined 
on the basis of the internationally recognised territorial borders of States. Should the primary 
RtoP bearer of a secessionist enclave therefore be recognised as the national authorities of 
the sovereign State in which it is located? The Russia-Georgia conflict highlights that one 
impediment to this approach is that the national authorities of a sovereign State do not 
always have effective control over a secessionist enclave located in its territory,468 
undermining its capacity to practically implement primary RtoP. However, practice suggests 
that a sovereign State’s lack of effective control over newly established secessionist 
enclaves, or those in the process of being established, could be remedied in one of two ways. 
First, the UNSG’s 2009 RtoP provides that if a State cannot fulfil primaiy RtoP ‘because of 
capacity deficits or lack of territorial control’469 then ‘the international community should be 
prepared to support and assist the State in meeting this core responsibility’ 470 Thus, if the 
national authorities of a sovereign State are considered appropriate primary RtoP bearers, 
secondary RtoP’s assistance pillar may be applied to help the State overcome a lack of 
effective control. Second, the responses to the declaration of Northern Mali as the new “State 
of Azawad”471 can be drawn upon. The request of the Economic Community of West African
465 See UNSC Meeting Record, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952; UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5951; UNSC Verbatim Record (10 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5953; 
UNSC Verbatim Record (19 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5961 and UNSC Verbatim Record (28 August 2008) 
UN Doc S/PV.5969.
466 See e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f China, Indonesia and Belgium to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc. S/PV.5952.
467 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August
2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952.
468 See for example Georgia’s statement that it does not exercise effective control in South Ossetia, Application 
Instituting Proceedings, Case Concerning the Application o f  the International Convention on the Elimination o f  
All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination, 12 August 2008  (n 375) and Application o f  the International Convention on 
the Elimination o f  All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination, Georgia vs. Russian Federation, 15 October 2008 (n 375).
469 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 10.
470 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid.
471 Following a governmental coup, the Tuareg affiliated rebels used force to push out the national military and, 
ultimately, declared Northern Mali to be the new State o f Azawad, which is to be ruled under extreme notions o f  
Islamic Sharia law. For the rebel’s declaration o f independence, see Mouvement National de Liberation de
1’Azawad, ‘Declaration d’lndependance de 1’Azawad’ (Mouvement National de Liberation de I Azawad, 6 April 
2012 (in French) para 5 <http://www.mnlamov.net/component/content/article/169-declaration-dindependance-de- 
lazawad.html> accessed 6 July 2012 (Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad, ‘Declaration 
d’lndependance de l’Azawad’). On the situation in Mali more generally, including the RtoP-type crimes being 
committed there, see Amnesty International, ‘Mali’s Worst Human Rights Situation in Fifty Years’ (Amnesty 
International, 16 May 2012) <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/mali-s-worst-human-rights-situation-fifty-years- 
2012-05-15> accessed 6 July 2012; Amnesty International, ‘Mali: Five Months o f Crisis Armed Rebellion and 
Military Coup’ (Amnesty International Publications, London 2012) 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR37/001 /2012/en/f93abl97-dd94-45b5-8e42- 
a3375c7747c4/afr370012012en.pdf>  accessed 6 July 2012 and A M Slaughter, ‘Syrian Intervention is
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States [ECOWAS] for UNSC authority to use armed force in order to restore Mali’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity472 raises the possibility of using non-peaceful responsive 
measures in order to (i) restore the territorial integrity of the State in which the enclave is 
located; and (ii) facilitate the national authorities of the sovereign State to implement 
primary RtoP throughout the territory.473
The ambiguity over who bears primary RtoP in certain factual contexts illustrates that 
there is a need for relevant actors, like States and the UNSG, to begin a discussion on these 
more nuanced aspects of the RtoP framework which, notably, some Representatives’ have 
already raised concerns about. Whilst Syria ‘took issue’474 with the UNSG’s 2009 RtoP 
Report’s ‘failure to refer to the need for due protection for populations under foreign 
occupation’,475 the Representative of the Occupied Palestinian Territories argued that:
‘[D]espite the recognition that all populations are entitled to such protection, we 
find that relevant literature on the issue, including the Secretary-General’s 
important reports, to be selective, focusing on some situations while ignoring 
others’.476
The statement alludes to the need for further clarification of the role of the RtoP framework 
in non-traditional “State” contexts, and particularly situations of Occupation, in order to 
overcome the implication that RtoP may be invoked selectively.477 Beginning this discussion 
may be difficult. Despite the fact that Occupying Powers are the established duty bearers 
humanitarian and human rights law in the territories they occupy, only two States 
(Bangladesh478 and Swaziland479) have so far suggested that this means the Occupying Power
Justifiable, and Just’ The Washington Post (Washington D.C, 8 June 2012) < 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/syrian-intervention-is-justifiable-and- 
just/2012/06/08/gJQARHGjOV_story.html> accessed 6 July 2012.
472 UN News, ‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’ (18 June 2012) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42266&Cr=+mali+&Crl=> accessed 6 July 2012. (UN News, 
‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’).
473 UN News, ‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’, ibid.
474 Statement o f the Representative o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 
September 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 105.
475 Statement o f the Representative o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNGA, ibid.
476 Statement o f the Permanent Observer o f  the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the UNGA in UN Press 
Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes 
Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0850.doc.htm> 
accessed 2 January 2012. (UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect 
Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’).
477 The risk o f selectivity has been raised by States like Egypt and Venezuela. Statement o f the Representative o f  
Egypt to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res. 1) [‘[s]ome seek to 
apply’ RtoP ‘to specific countries, while bypassing others toiling under brutal occupation and confronting 
ferocious aggression without any international force to protect them’]; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 (Res. 1) [‘powerful 
countries are manipulating the concept o f  the responsibility to protect, when they are seeking solely to impose 
their strategic interests on the world’].
478 Statement o f the Representative o f Bangladesh to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN 
Doc S/PV.6066(Res. 1).
479 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100.
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should also bear primary RtoP. Whilst it is unclear why relevant actors have largely avoided 
discussing this issue, wider RtoP practice suggests that it may be being evaded for policy 
reasons. A good example is the US480 vote against the UN Human Rights Council’s 
[UNHRC] adoption of the Goldstone Report on the Israel-Gaza conflict. The US did not 
explicitly object to the suggestion that Israel owed primary RtoP to the Gaza population. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that the US was at least partly apprehensive over the implications 
of voting in favour of a Report which suggested this.481 Acknowledging that Occupying 
Powers bear primary RtoP is somewhat more significant than recognising that they must 
adhere to humanitarian law in the territory. The Outcome Document explicitly associates a 
failure to fulfil primary RtoP with the activation of secondary RtoP’s non-peaceful 
responsive component,482 thereby paving the way for armed force to be used against the State 
which is manifestly failing to fulfil primary RtoP. Thus, primary RtoP bearers can be the 
subject of more coercive consequences for violating primary RtoP than they can for violating 
human rights and humanitarian obligations per se.
A meaningful debate should also be held regarding the approaches that should be taken to 
the identification, and external recognition, of the primary RtoP bearer in cases involving 
competing claims for recognition as “national authorities”. Present guidance affirms only 
that States bear primary RtoP,483 leaving unanswered who should be considered to be the 
“national authorities” in cases involving competing claims to national leadership. Similarly, 
it remains unclear (i) whether third States should take a position on who are the “national 
authorities” of a State, including in the context of their recognition of new governments; and 
(ii) whether it is appropriate to recognise, even implicitly, that primary RtoP is held 
concurrently by two “governments” within one State. Beginning a discussion on this matter 
will be controversial because it requires discussions on the RtoP framework to delve into 
whether externally influenced regime change is an acceptable consequence of national 
authorities’ manifest failure to protect their populations.484 Hannum485 eloquently summates 
the significance of connecting issues of “recognition” with doctrines which encourage 
external actors to act to protect populations. He argues that the 2008 recognition of Kosovo’s 
statehood ‘confirms the worst fears of those who see theoretically “humanitarian 
intervention” as a first step to overthrowing governments and breaking up the territorial
480 Statement o f the United States to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Concludes 
Debate on Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc 
HRC/07/13
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsfrview01/1215DB0D2AE13E5CC12572A30079E53B7opendocume 
nt> accessed 11 May 2011.
481 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (n 359), 520.
482 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
483 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 8.
484 The interplay between secondary RtoP’s discharge and regime change is discussed at length in chapter five.
485 H Hannum, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Paradigm or Pastiche?’ (2009) 60 (2) NILQ 135.
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integrity and independence that many States won only a few decades ago’.486 Admittedly, 
assessing whether third States should recognise a new government in order to ensure 
populations protection from RtoP crimes differs from discussing whether a new State should 
be recognised in order to achieve this (e.g. Kosovo). However, this writer would suggest that 
the assessment could be perhaps even more controversial because the case studies of Libya, 
Syria and the Cote d’Ivoire raise the possibility that, in some RtoP cases, issues of external 
governmental recognition and/or withdrawal of recognition may emerge outside the context 
of armed force.487
2 The Concept of the Secondary RtoP "Bearer"
Examination of State views suggests that there is a general consensus regarding which actors 
constitute members of the “international community”. Reference has been made to the 
UNGA,488 UNSC,489 UNHRC,490 regional organisations,491 and the International Criminal 
Court [ICC].492 Furthermore, the role of fact-finding missions,493 international commissions
486 Hannum, ibid, 143.
487 Chapter five discusses the significance o f regime change arising in advance o f the use o f  armed force in more 
depth.
488 This includes, Statements o f the Representatives o f Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, Cameroon and Chile to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements o f the Representatives o f  
Iceland, Benin, to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100]; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Egypt (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 
July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statements o f the Representatives o f Lesotho and Azerbaijan to the UNGA in 
UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’ (n 475).
489 See particularly, Statements o f  the Representatives o f Cameroon and Benin to the UNGA, ibid; Statement o f  
the Representative o f Norway to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong 
Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 2009) UN 
Doc GA/10849 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0849.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012 (UN  
Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly 
Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’); Statements o f the Representatives o f South Africa and Pakistan 
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record General Assembly (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f  the 
Representative o f Azerbaijan to the UNGA, ibid; Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, UNGA  
Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
490 See e.g. for Statement o f the Representative o f Japan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative o f Norway to the UNGA, ibid; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Slovakia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc. A/63/PV.100 and 
Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan to the UNGA, ibid.
491 For e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Ghana and Nigeria to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98. Further State views affirming regional 
organisations as members o f the international community are detailed in see Annex II (A) (d).
492 For e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements o f the Representatives o f  Croatia and Bolivia to the UNGA in UN Press 
Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues 
Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 489); Statement o f  the Representative o f France to the UNGA, UNGA  
Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
493 These include UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (n 359) and UNHRC, 
‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab 
Republic’ (15 September 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/53. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’).
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of inquiry494 and UN observer missions495 in practice to date suggests that there is a general 
acceptance that a number of other actors can be called upon to help protect populations from 
RtoP crimes and, therefore, to discharge secondary RtoP on behalf of the “international 
community”. The fact that various actors are understood to be members of the “international 
community” suggests that the concept can be understood in an RtoP context to be 
heterogeneous. Nevertheless, there is the question of whether it then follows that each of 
these actors bear a direct responsibility to protect populations? Is the “international 
community” used to delineate the actual bearer o f secondary RtoP or simply as shorthand 
for the range o f  actors who can have a role in protecting populations from RtoP crimes? 
These questions merit further reflection.
2.1 A Direct Responsibility?
To determine whether those actors who are considered to be members of the “international 
community” bear secondary RtoP as a responsibility in its own right, consideration can be 
given to two of the actors which the Outcome Document explicitly refers to (i) the UNSC;496 
and (ii) regional organisations.497
2.1.1 The UNSC: Bearer or Actor?
The majority of State views,498 including those of three of the P5,499 suggest that the UNSC
494 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations o f 
International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (1 June 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/44.
(UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations of 
International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’).
495 UNSC Res 2043 (2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043, paras 7 and 8.
496 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
497 Outcome Document, ibid.
498 Statements o f the Representatives o f China and Argentina to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (June 2006) 
UN Doc. S/PV/5476; Statement o f the Representative o f Japan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(December 2006) UN Doc S/PV/5577; Statement o f the Representative o f the Philippines to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (June 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5209; Statements o f the Representatives o f  Jamaica (on behalf o f  
the Caribbean Community), Macedonia and Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100; Statements o f the Representatives o f Colombia, South Africa, China, Nigeria and Japan to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc. A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative o f New 
Zealand to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statements o f the 
Representatives o f Lesotho, Hungary and Qatar to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ 
(n 489); Statements o f the Representatives o f Holy See and Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, 
‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 
475).
499 China, France and the Russian Federation. Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 [‘When the occurrence o f such a crisis calls for the UN to 
respond, the Security Council has a role to play. But the Council must make its judgment and decisions in light of
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does not bear secondary RtoP as a distinct responsibility but, rather, that the UNSC can be 
utilised to discharge secondary RtoP. Thus, the majority of States seem to consider that the 
UNSC is an actor in the RtoP framework, not a direct bearer of secondary RtoP. 
Significantly, the Outcome Document and relevant practice suggest that whether the UNSC 
is an actor in a specific case depends upon certain variables.
The Outcome Document statement that the international community is ‘prepared’500 to 
undertake a ‘timely and decisive’501 response ‘through the UNSC, in accordance with the 
Charter, including Chapter VII’502 calls to mind that the UN Charter provides for Chapter VII 
enforcement measures to be applied to address threats to international peace and security.503 
Similarly, the explicit reference to Chapter VI of the UN Charter recalls the fact that the 
UNSC can be called upon for the pacific settlement of disputes, not least by States referring 
a situation for inclusion on the UNSC’s agenda.504 Accordingly, for the UNSC to discharge 
peaceful and non-peaceful responsive secondary RtoP measures,505 the RtoP case at issue 
must first either (i) be referred for inclusion on the UNSC’s agenda; 506 or (ii) be deemed to 
represent a threat to international peace and security.507
Over the last two decades, an expanded notion of what amounts to a threat to 
international peace and security has developed, specifically that threats can arise from events 
inside a State, such as the perpetration of the mass atrocity crimes to which RtoP relates.508 
However, the Outcome Document also provides that secondary RtoP’s discharge ‘through
specific circumstances, and must act prudently. It must be pointed out that the responsibility o f the Council 
entrusted by the UN Charter is the maintenance o f international peace and security. The prerequisite for its taking 
action is the existence o f “any threat to the peace, breach o f  the peace, or act o f aggression”. The Council must 
consider “RtoP” in the broader context o f  maintaining international peace and security, and must guard against 
abusing the concept’]; Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 [it ‘is essential’ to maintain the UNSC’s role to that ‘defined by the Charter’] and 
Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.100 [‘any intervention by the international community should be o f an exceptional nature and 
fully compliant with international law, in particular the United Nations Charter’].
500 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
501 Outcome Document, ibid.
502 Outcome Document, ibid.
503 United Nations, Charter o f  the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI art 39. (UN Charter).
504 Article 34 o f Chapter VI mandates the UNSC to consider/investigate any disputes. Article 35 (1 )-(2) regards a 
referral o f a situation to the UNSC by a Member State or Non-Member State. See UN Charter, ibid, arts 34 and 
35 (l)-(2).
505 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
506 UN Charter (n 503) art 35 (1) (2).
507 As the former President o f the UNGA advised, no Charter provision concerning the Security Council ‘would 
cover responsibility to protect unless the situation was a threat to international peace and security’. Office o f the 
President o f the General Assembly, ‘Concept Note on Responsibility to Protect Populations from Genocide, War 
Crimes, Crimes Against Humanity and Ethnic Cleansing’ (2009), 2
<http://www.un.org/ga/president/63/interactive/protect/conceptnote.pdf> accessed 12 November 2012.
508 On the development o f an expanded notion o f threats to international peace and security and its bearing on 
secondary RtoP’s discharge see e.g. A Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 (3) 
EJIL 513,538-539; A M Slaughter, ‘Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes o f UN Reform’ 
(2005) 99 (3) AJIL (2005) 619,626-627; Payandeh (n 368), 494-497 and, more generally, J Schott, ‘Chapter VII 
as Exception: Security Council Action and the Regulative Ideal o f Emergency’ (2007) 6 (1) Nw. Univ. J. Int’l 
Hum Rts. 24.
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the UNSC’509 will be on a ‘case-by-case basis’.510 This reinforces Article 39 of the UN 
Charter which provides that the UNSC has discretion regarding whether a situation 
represents a threat to international peace and security.511 For the UNSC to become a non­
peaceful responsive secondary RtoP actor, the UNSC must first agree that a situation does 
constitute a threat to international peace and security. This agreement has not always been 
reached in the cases in which RtoP has been invoked to date. For instance, China asserted 
that it is ‘preposterous’512 to deem ‘human rights, HIV and refugee matters’513 in Burma as 
threats to international peace and security which could activate the UNSC’s peace and 
security mandate.514 Furthermore, both Russia and China are argued to consider that the 
gross violations of human rights in Syria are ‘insufficiently egregious,515 to constitute threats 
to international peace and security.516
2.1.2 Regional Organisations: Bearer or Actor?
The Outcome Document’s reference to Chapter VIII of the Charter517 indicates that regional 
organisations may act pacifically, whilst its explicit reference to responsive measures being 
undertaken ‘in cooperation with relevant regional organisations, as appropriate’518 suggests 
that they can also undertake non-peaceful secondary RtoP responses. However, there is 
limited evidence that regional organisations bear secondary RtoP as a responsibility in its 
own right. Rather, the aforementioned Outcome Document provisions seem to simply 
reinforce the UN Charter provision for regional organisations to discharge peaceful 
measures519 and, furthermore, to address threats to international peace and security through 
non-peaceful measures with the prior authorisation of the UNSC.520 This suggests that 
regional organisations can discharge their existing mandates in RtoP cases and are therefore
509 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
510 Outcome Document, ibid.
511 UN Charter (n 503) art 39.
512 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (15 September 2006) UN 
Doc S/PV.5526. Contrast this view with the United States’ view which reminded the UNSC o f the expanded 
notion o f  threats to international peace and security that has developed in practice. See Letter o f the 
Representative o f the United States to the UNSC President, ‘The Situation in Myanmar’ (1 September 2006) UN 
Doc S/2006/742 and Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(15 September 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5526.
513 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, ibid.
514 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, ibid.
515 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6627, emphasis added. See further, Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation 
and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
516 The significance o f Russia and China’s standpoints here are discussed in chapter four in the context o f  
secondary RtoP’s activation.
517 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
518 Outcome Document, ibid.
519 UN Charter (n 503) art 52 (1).
520 UN Charter, ibid, art 53 (1).
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secondary RtoP actors.
Whether regional organisations do act in a particular RtoP case appears to depend on 
three variables. First, the Outcome Document’s explicit reference to regional organisations’ 
co-operation521 with the UNSC522 suggests that, in cases involving the application of non- 
peaceful responsive measures, they may only become actors when they have received the 
UNSC’s authorisation to do so. Second, only ‘relevant regional organisations’523 may act in 
a non-peaceful manner, suggesting that whether regional organisations are non-peaceful 
secondary RtoP actors is dependent upon the identity of the organisation. Neither State views 
nor the Outcome Document’s drafting history clarify the meaning of ‘relevant’.524 However, 
Pattison525 notes that a regional organisation’s resources could affect whether it acts in a 
particular case. For example, he notes that the EU ‘lacks the ability to deploy a large-scale 
force out of the area’.526 In addition, relevancy may be influenced by whether a regional 
organisation has committed itself to act in an RtoP-type way and the nature of this 
commitment.527 For example, the African Union reserves the right to forcibly respond to 
RtoP-type cases, whereas the EU committed to supporting ‘a strengthened role’ for 
regional organisations ‘in the process of enhancing international peace and security’.530 
Whether a regional organisation is considered ‘relevant’531 may therefore be influenced by 
its (i) capacity to act in a particular case (e.g. geographically) and the extent to which it is 
prepared to act (e.g. resources and organisational mandate for the use of armed force). 
Finally, the Outcome Document provides that such ‘co-operation with relevant regional
521 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139, emphasis added.
522 Outcome Document, ibid.
523 Outcome Document, ibid, emphasis added.
524 Outcome Document, ibid.
525 J Pattison, ‘Legitimacy and Humanitarian Intervention: Who Should Intervene?’ (2008) 12 (3) Int. J. Hum. 
Rts. 395.
526 Pattison, ibid, 409.
527 For a discussion o f the RtoP-type principles included in regional organisations mandates, see C Gray, ‘A 
Crisis o f Legitimacy for the UN Collective Security System?’ (2007) 56 (1) I.C.L.Q 157,168, fn 50; V Holt and 
T Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modern Peace 
Operations (The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington D.C 2006) 59-60; A Orford, ‘Jurisdiction without 
Territory: From the Holy Roman Empire to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008-2009) 30 Mich. J. Int’l L. 981, 
1007; E McClean, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Hie Role o f  International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 13(1) 
Journal o f  Conflict and Security Law 123, 138; Peters (n 508), 522; N Wheeler and F Egerton, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: ‘Precious Commitment’ or a Promise Unfulfilled?’ (2010) 1 GRtoP 114, 543; Bellamy, 
‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect?’ (n 384), 157-162; A Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan 
Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) 19 (2) Ethics and International 
Affairs 31, 35; A De Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure o f the Responsibility to Protect’ (2007) 83 (6) Ethics and 
International Affairs 1039,1042 and S Koko, ‘Whose Responsibility to Protect? Reflections on the Dynamics of 
an ‘Abandoned Disorder’ in Somalia’ (2007) 16 (3) African Security Review 2 ,9 .
528 Constitutive Act o f the African Union (adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001) 2158 UNTS 3 
art 4 (h).
529 Council o f Europe, ‘Joint Statement by the Council and the Representatives o f the Governments o f the 
Member States meeting within the Council, the European Parliament and the Commission on European Union 
Development Policy: “The European Consensus’” (22 November 2005) COE Doc. 14820/05, para 37.
530 Council o f Europe, ibid.
531 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
75
organisations’532 will be undertaken ‘as appropriate’.533 Thus, whether regional 
organisations are called upon as non-peaceful secondary RtoP actors is context-dependent, 
not least because their role in a particular RtoP case remains at the discretion of the UNSC.
2.1.3 The Secondary RtoP "Bearer” Concept: General Findings
Each of the actors identified as members of the “international community” have, by reason 
of the nature of their existing mandates, a vested interest in protecting populations from RtoP 
crimes. Table B outlines the range of actors that, due to their vested interest in protecting 
populations, have been delineated as members of the “international community” in relevant 
practice and, therefore, as actors who can discharge secondary RtoP. It also outlines the kind 
of variables that can influence whether a particular actor does act in a certain RtoP case.
Table B: The Secondary RtoP "Bearer" Concept
Examples of 
Members of 
the
'International
Community"
UN Security 
Council
Responsive: Actor 1. Peaceful 1. The
Response: international
1 .Peaceful community,
Response under - Situation has through the
Chapter VI; been referred to United Nations,
the Security also has the
2. Non-Peaceful Council for responsibility to
Response under Inclusion on its use appropriate
Chapter VII. Agenda; diplomatic,
humanitarian and
2. Non-Peaceful other peaceful
Response: means, in
accordance with
(a) Security Chapters VI and
Council VIII of the
Recognise that Charter, to help to
the Situation protect
represents a populations from’
Threat to RtoP crimes (para
International 139, emphasis
Peace and added);
Security;
2. ‘[W]e are
(b) There is prepared to take
Sufficient collective action,
Political Will to in a timely and
Apply Chapter decisive manner,
532 Outcome Document, ibid.
533 Outcome Document, ibid, emphasis added.
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VII Enforcement 
Measures;
(c) There is 
Sufficient 
Political Will 
among the P5 to 
Refrain from 
using the Veto to 
Prevent Chapter 
VII Enforcement 
Measures from 
being Authorised
through the 
Security Council, 
in accordance 
with the Charter, 
including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by- 
case basis and in 
cooperation with 
relevant regional 
organisations as 
appropriate’ (para 
139, emphasis 
added).
Regional
Organisations
Responsive:
1. Peaceful 
Response under 
Chapter VIII;
2. Non-Peaceful 
Response under 
Chapter VIII.
Actor 1. Peaceful 
Response:
Political Will and 
Capacity to 
Respond;
Invited to 
Respond by the 
State at issue or 
Situation
Referred to it by 
the Security 
Council
2. Non- Peaceful 
Response:
(a) Regional 
Organisation is
Authorised by the 
Security Council 
to Carry Out 
Chapter VII 
Enforcement 
Measures in 
Response to a 
Threat to 
International 
Peace and 
Security (Article 
53 (1), UN 
Charter);
(b) Regional 
Organisation is 
“Relevant” i.e. it 
has the Capacity,
Resources and 
Mandate to Carry 
Out Security 
Council 
Authorised 
Chapter VII 
Enforcement 
Measures.
1. The 
international 
community, 
through the 
United Nations, 
also has the 
responsibility to 
use appropriate 
diplomatic, 
humanitarian and 
other peaceful 
means, 
in accordance 
with Chapters VI 
and VIII o f the 
Charter, to help 
to protect 
populations from’ 
RtoP crimes (para 
139, emphasis 
added);
2. ‘[W]e are 
prepared to take 
collective action, 
in a timely and 
decisive manner, 
through the 
Security Council, 
in accordance 
with the Charter, 
including Chapter 
VII, on a case-by- 
case basis and in 
cooperation with 
relevant 
regional 
organisations as 
appropriate’ 
(para 139, 
emphasis added).
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Table B illustrates that the existing mandates of actors legitimates their role in discharging 
secondary RtoP but also negates the possibility that specific members of the international 
community bear secondary RtoP as a direct responsibility. In this line, some 
commentators534 discuss the possibility that providing for the “international community” to 
discharge secondary RtoP means that it cannot be characterised as a duty, not least because a 
duty should be assigned to a specific bearer and not a range of potential actors.535 This view 
seems to presume that the Outcome Document’s references to the “international community” 
were intended to delineate a concept of the secondary RtoP bearer. Orford536 alludes to a 
different explanation, arguing that linking secondary RtoP’s discharge to the existing 
mandates of the “international community’s” members reinforces the UN as the ‘primary 
authority for exercising jurisdiction in global matters’, 537 particularly situations entailing the 
mass atrocity crimes RtoP covers538. To the present author, this is a more persuasive view. It 
raises the possibility that the term “international community” was used simply as shorthand, 
an umbrella term, for the myriad of actors who, by reason of their existing mandates (ii) can 
have a vested interest in protecting populations from RtoP crimes; and (ii) should (not must) 
apply those mandates in order to protect populations from RtoP crimes. Using the 
“international community” in the sense of an umbrella term overlaps with its usage in wider 
international instruments, such as those in the context of State responsibility539 and minority 
protection.540 In these contexts, the “international community” is not identified as an 
independent entity which is to carry out various functions in its own right (i.e. in the sense of 
a bearer) but, rather, as an entity comprising of various members who hold an interest in the
534 See especially, L Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ 
(2008) 34 Review o f International Studies 445; S Rosenberg, “Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for 
Prevention” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 387), 191; M Kalkman, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Bow  
Without an Arrow?’ (2009) 5 Cambridge Student Law Review 75; E Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two 
in the Bush - On the Assumed Legal Nature o f the Responsibility to Protect” Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 
387), 51-54; P Akhavan, ‘Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does Not Happen’ (2011) 22 (1) 
Crim. L. F. 1, 13-16; C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm’ (2007) 101 
(1) AJIL 99; Payandeh (n 368), 499-501; Peters (n 508), 539 and H Nasu, Operationalising the Responsibility to 
Protect and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas o f Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 (2) Journal o f  
Conflict and Security Law 209, 216-234. See also J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect: Who Should Intervene? (OUP, Oxford 2010) 15-20.
535 For e.g. Cunliflfe argues that ‘not a single formulation o f the doctrine to date is able succinctly to express and 
logically to demonstrate that there is a single, identifiable agent formally obligated to act or intervene in a 
particular situation’. P Cunliffe (ed), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory 
and Practice (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 55. See also K Tan, “The Duty to Protect” in T Nardin and M 
Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (New York University Press, New York 2006) 95 and J Welsh and M 
Banda, “International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities” in 
Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 387), 217-226. Chapter six considers this strand o f present literature from the 
perspective o f secondary RtoP’s character.
36 A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, Cambridge 2011).
537 See generally, Orford, ibid and especially at 181-184.
538 Orford, ibid, 181-184.
539 On the concept in the context o f State Responsibility, see generally UN International Law Commission, 
‘Special Rapporteur on State Responsibility, James Crawford, Fourth Report on State Responsibility’ (Fifty-Third 
Session, 2001) UN Doc A /C N .4/517,14.
540 For e.g. the “international community” is invoked in OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The 
Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 391), 10-12.
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performance of certain actions by States (e.g. in the State responsibility context, the non­
violation of erga omnes obligations541 and, in the minority protection context, in States 
effective implementation of minority rights542).
On the one hand, Syria suggests that an “actors” approach can entail the same 
disadvantage of a “bearer” approach, specifically by enabling secondary RtoP’s discharge to 
be impeded by (i) a lack of political will on the part of the “actor” (e.g. the UNSC P5); and 
(ii) procedural obstacles (e.g. veto). This can encourage States to devise new ways of acting 
collectively in RtoP cases but outside of the RtoP framework. When Russia543 and China’s544 
vetoes inhibited the “international community” from channelling secondary RtoP through the 
UNSC, it became necessary to initiate action outside of the RtoP framework and the existing 
mandates to which it relates, not least by constructing a group of States who support more 
robust international involvement in Syria (the so-called “Friends of Syria” group545). 
Conversely, formulating secondary RtoP around a range of actors who can and should 
discharge can increase its flexibility. For example, the explicit reference to peaceful means 
being undertaken through Chapter VI and VIII of the UN Charter enables regional 
organisations to ensure that no vacuum in protection arises if the UNSC fails to accept a 
situation on its agenda.546 To this effect, the references to Chapter VI and VIII recognise that 
Member States, the UNSC and regional organisations can all act in order to ensure the 
application of appropriate peaceful means to ‘help to protect populations’.547 Flexibility is 
also strengthened by the fact that the Outcome Document does not exclude other organs 
from discharging secondary RtoP when a situation has, for example, activated the UNSC’s 
mandate. For instance, the fact that the situation in Syria is being managed by the UNSC has 
not excluded Member States from acting through the UNGA or UNHRC in order to help to 
protect the Syrian population from RtoP crimes.548
541 On the way in which erga omnes obligations interconnect with the RtoP framework and legitimate the role o f  
third States under secondary RtoP, see especially Peters (n 508), 526 and 540.
542 OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 391), 10-11.
543 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627. See further, Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 [vetoing Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 February 
2012 (n 416)].
544 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6627. See also, Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 
February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 [vetoing Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 February 2012, ibid].
545 See e.g. UK FCO, ‘Foreign Secretary: “We Have to Intensify Pressure on Syria’” (n 422).
546 Outcome Document (n 333), para 139.
547 Outcome Document, ibid.
548 Chapter five examines the significance o f this practice in terms o f the scope o f secondary RtoP and chapter six 
considers the importance o f this practice in terms o f  secondary RtoP’s legal status and development. For 
examples o f this practice, see e.g. ‘Human Rights Council Requests Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special 
Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’, 1 June 2012 (n 438); UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves 
Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’ (22 November 2011) UN Doc GA/SHC/4033 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 l/gashc4033.doc.htm> accessed 7 August 2012; UNGA Third 
Committee Voting Record, ‘Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 November 2011) UN 
Doc A/C.3/66/L.57/Rev.l; UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly Adopts more than Sixty Resolutions 
Recommended by Third Committee Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in
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An “actors” approach also helps to ensure that secondary RtoP’s discharge is pursuant to 
existing mandates and obligations. Providing that the “international community” were the 
bearers of secondary RtoP could have enabled it to be discharged by an indefinite range of 
actors claiming to be members of the “international community”. For example, groups of 
third States may have used their membership in the “international community” as a pretext 
for taking collective diplomatic action similar to the Friends of Syria meetings. If a group of 
States from a particular geopolitical bloc were able to legitimately channel the international 
community concept through such action, apprehensions that secondary RtoP will become a 
vehicle for the imposition of Western values (e.g. Liberal Peace theories549) would gain 
strength. Thus, an “actors” approach helps to maintain the ground gained at the World 
Summit between balancing non-interference and non-indifference (i.e. that protective action 
should be undertaken through the range of measures provided for in the existing mandates of 
regional and/or global organisations).550
3 The Beneficiary Concept
In the RtoP Reports preceding the Outcome Document, the RtoP beneficiary concept varied 
between ‘groups’,551 ‘civilians’,552 ‘citizens’,553 ‘people’554 and ‘civilian populations’.555 This 
inconsistent treatment of the beneficiary concept seemed to be remedied when, during the 
drafting of the Outcome Document,556 States narrowed the concept to a choice between 
“civilians” or “populations”. One group557 favoured a “civilians” approach, calling for the
Syria’ (19 December 2011) UN Doc GA/11198 <http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2011/gal 1198.doc.htm> 
accessed 5 January 2012; UNGA Res 66/176, ‘Situation o f  Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (23 
February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/176 and UNGA Res 66/253, ‘The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (21 
February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/253 and UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly, in Resolution, Demands All 
in Syria ‘Immediately and Visibly’ Commit to Ending Violence that Secretary-General says is Ripping Country 
Apart’ (3 August 2012) UN Doc GA/11266 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gal 1266.doc.htm> 
accessed 8 August 2012.
549 See especially, D Chandler, ‘The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the “Liberal Peace’” (2004) 11 (1) 
International Peacekeeping 59 and N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: A Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 
22 Canadian Journal o f Law & Jurisprudence 355, 367-380. See further, Nasu (n 534), 231.
550 D Capie, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: Framing, Resistance and the Localisation 
Myth’ (2012) 25 (1) Pacific Review 75, 88.
551ICISS Report (n 331), 75 [‘large groups’] and 24 [‘vulnerable groups’].
552 UNSG Report, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 331), 35 and HLP Report (n 331), 73.
553 HLP Report, ibid 66 [‘own citizens’] and ICISS Report (n 331), 13.
554 HLP Report, ibid, 1 ,9 , 31,61 [‘own peoples’] and ICISS Report, ibid 17.
555 UNSG Report, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 331), 35.
556 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138-139.
557 See the summary o f the 2005 Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba, Egypt, Russian Federation and Syria 
to the UNGA provided by World Federalist Movement, ‘State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect’ 
(11 August 2005) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/civil- 
society?view=fjrelated&id=2411> accessed 11 January 2011 (WFM Report). See also, Statement o f the 
Representative o f  Pakistan to the UNGA, ‘Informal Meeting o f the Plenary on the High Level Plenary Meeting o f
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section on RtoP to be re-entitled “The Responsibility to Protect Civilian Populations”.558 
This call was opposed by Rwanda559 and Sweden560 who argued that all members of States 
“populations” should be beneficiaries, irrespective of whether they have status as 
“civilians”.567 This argument succeeded, the final text of the Outcome Document clearly 
providing that “populations” benefit from RtoP.562 The rationale for formulating 
“populations” as RtoP beneficiaries therefore seems straightforward. A “populations” 
beneficiary concept is all-inclusive, not requiring its members to have a particular status or 
identity (e.g. as “civilians”). This rationale may explain why subsequent international and 
regional documents referring to RtoP have affirmed that “populations” are RtoP 
beneficiaries.563 Nevertheless, a “populations” beneficiary concept has not been consistently 
upheld in State views on RtoP or international practice. The alternative beneficiary concepts 
used, and the potential significance thereof, merit further consideration.
3.1 State Practice
Examination of two hundred and fifty seven State views564 on RtoP illustrates that only thirty 
per cent of statements565 affirm “populations” as beneficiaries. In contrast, one hundred and
the General Assembly o f September 2005’ (June 2005)
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 11 January 2011.
558 Or, alternatively, “The Protection o f Civilians”. Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan to the UNGA, 
ibid.
559 Statement o f the Representative o f Rwanda to the UNGA in WFM Report (n 557). See also Statement o f the 
Representative o f Rwanda to the UNGA ‘Proposed RtoP Language for September Outcome Document’ (29 July 
2005) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 11 January 2011. (Rwanda, ‘Proposed RtoP Language 
for September Outcome Document’).
560 Statement o f the Representative o f Sweden to the UNGA in WFM Report, ibid.
561 For example, Sweden argued that ‘RtoP should address the population as a whole, not just have text on the 
civilian population’. Statement o f the Representative o f Sweden to the UNGA, ibid.
562 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138-39.
563 See especially, UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), para 8; UNSC Res 1674 (2006) UN Doc 
S/RES/1674, preambular para 4 (UNSC Res 1674); UNHRC, ‘Prevention o f Genocide’ (25 March 2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/7/L.26, 4 (UNHRC, ‘Prevention o f Genocide’); African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Res 
‘Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa’ (28 November 2007) AU Doc. ACHPR/Res. 117 
(XXXXII) 07, para 5 (African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Res ‘Strengthening the Responsibility 
to Protect in Africa’); European Parliament Res ‘The Situation in Darfur’ (28 September 2006) EP Doc 
P6_TA(2006)0387, para E (EP Res ‘The Situation in Darfur’); European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Tragic 
Situation in Burma’ (22 May 2008) EP Doc. P6_TA(2008)0231, para 3 (EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in 
Burma’); UNSC Resolution 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014 (UNSC Res 2014), premabular para 5 
[regarding Yemen]; UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 415), para 1; UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 416), para 2; UNSC Res 1970 (n 
414), preambular para 9 and UNSC Res 1973 (n 414), preambular para 4.
564 State views surveyed for this chapter are detailed in Annex I (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g) (i) and (i).
565 This includes: Statement o f the Representative o f Sweden to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September
2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.2; Statement o f the Representative o f Rwanda to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record
(September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.4; Statement o f the Representative o f Guatemala to the UNGA, UNGA  
Meeting Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7; Statement o f the Representative o f the European 
Commission to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.8; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Argentina to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (December 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5319; 
Statement o f the Representative o f Austria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (June 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV/5476; Statement o f the Representative o f Liechtenstein to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (June 2006) 
UN Doc S/PV/5476; Statement o f the Representative o f Portugal to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record
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twenty three statements (seventy per cent of statements), delivered by seventy four States 
globally, delineate RtoP beneficiaries as either ‘civilians’,566 ‘citizens’567 or ‘people’.568 
Admittedly, States may have used these terms in their generic sense, not intending any 
significance to be attached thereto. However, examination of State views suggests that at 
least some States have used the terms in accordance with their legal meaning569 and, 
therefore, as new RtoP beneficiary concepts. As examples, it is notable that some o f the 
representatives who referred to “civilians” as beneficiaries come from territories which have 
a national experience of hostilities or conflict. Pertinent examples are Sri Lanka,570 Sierra 
Leone571 and the Occupied Palestinian Territories.572 A further example is that some o f the 
States who proposed “people” as beneficiaries also expressly considered the way in which 
RtoP interconnects with a people’s right to self-determination. Iceland573 is a useful example. 
Referring to “people” as RtoP beneficiaries, Iceland argued that the RtoP framework 
formulated at the World Summit would contribute to ‘redressing the imbalance’574 which 
exists in relation to ‘the key commitments to the peoples enshrined in the Charter’.575 
Notably, the principles and purposes of the UN Charter give particular consideration to the
(November 2007) UN Doc S/PV /5781(R es.l). All State views referring to “populations” are detailed in Annex II 
(B) (a).
566 This includes: Statement o f the Representative o f Armenia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September 
2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7; Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (June 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5209; Statement o f the Representative o f Nepal to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (December 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5319; Statement o f the Representative o f Ghana to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV/5476; Statement o f the Representative o f Canada to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f  the Representative o f Egypt 
(on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97. All State views referring to “civilians” are detailed in Annex II (B) (b).
567 This includes: Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (December 
2005) UN Doc S/PV/5319; Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(November 2007) UN Doc S/PV/578; Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (December 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6216(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative o f Myanmar to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100. All State views referring to “citizens” 
are detailed in Annex II (B) (c).
568 This includes: Statements o f the Representatives o f Estonia, Monaco and Iceland to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.6; Statement o f the Representative o f Indonesia to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Bangladesh to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (January 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6066(Res.l). All State views 
referring to “peoples” are detailed in Annex II (B) (d).
569 In international law a distinction is drawn between persons engaged in violence (for example, combatants) and 
those who are not (civilians). In international law, “people” is used to denote the beneficiaries of the right to self- 
determination. “Citizens” is typically used to refer to those persons who possess the formal nationality o f the 
State.
570 Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (December 2009) UN 
Doc S/PV/6216(Res.l); Statement o f  the Representative o f  Sri Lanka to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 
July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV/100.
571 Statement o f  the Representative o f Sierra Leone to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN  
Doc A/63/PV/100.
572 Statement o f the Permanent Observer o f  the Occupied Palestinian Territories in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates 
Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 475).
573 Statement o f the Representative o f Iceland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (15 September 2005) UN 
Doc A/60/PV/6.
574 Statement o f the Representative o f Iceland, ibid.
575 Statement o f the Representative o f Iceland ibid. See also Statement o f the Representative o f Poland to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (16 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV/7; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Estonia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (15 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV/6.
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importance of peoples’ right to self-determination.576
In view of the apparent use of “civilians”, “citizens” and “people” in their legal sense by 
some States, it is important to consider whether a “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” RtoP 
beneficiary concept could create conceptual difficulties and/or entail legal and policy 
implications for the effective implementation of RtoP and existing obligations to which it 
relates.
3.1.1 Implications for the RtoP Framework
A “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” beneficiary concept could entail largely four 
implications for the RtoP framework.
(i) Persons Protected from  RtoP Crimes
A “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” beneficiary concept could, in practice, serve to exclude 
certain members of States’ populations from being owed protection from war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, crimes against humanity and genocide that RtoP was formulated to ensure. 
“Civilians” and “citizens” are particularly useful illustrations.
A “civilians” approach would exclude those members of a States’ population who are 
actively participating in hostilities (e.g. members of armed groups and the States military). 
The potential effect of a “civilians” beneficiary concept would therefore be most prominent 
in cases where RtoP crimes are perpetrated in the midst of armed conflict. Examples of those 
potentially excluded are the anti-government rebel movements in Libya and Syria, the armed 
rebel groups in the disputed territories bordering Sudan and South Sudan and the Tamil 
Tigers in Sri Lanka.577
A “citizens” approach would exclude those members of a States’ population who ‘do not 
usually acquire the citizenship of the State in which they temporarily establish 
themselves’.578 This could preclude so-called ‘new minorities’,579 such as refugees and 
migrant workers,580 from benefiting from the protection provided under primary and 
secondary RtoP. Some support for this risk is provided by the fact that a mere handful of
576 UN Charter (n 503) art 1 (2).
577 For a review o f the possibility that the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers have been perpetrated in Sri 
Lanka, including against Tamil Tigers placed hors de combat, see D Kingsbury, Sri Lanka and the Responsibility 
to Protect: Politics, Ethnicity and Genocide (Routledge, Abingdon 2012) 82-93, especially 87-88.
578 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l, 10. (UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f  
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’).
579 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ibid.
580 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ibid.
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States581 have explicitly acknowledged ‘new minorities’582 as RtoP beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, Libya highlights the significant bearing that the exclusion of non-citizens could 
have in practice. Libyan anti-government rebels have reportedly perpetrated human rights 
violations mostly against the Sub-Saharan migrant workers whom they consider to support 
the Gaddafi regime.583 In addition, discriminatory national citizenship laws could mean that a 
“citizens” approach would exclude sections of a population which have been established in a 
State for generations. One example is the Rohingya minority.584 Omitted from the 1982 
Burmese Citizenship Laws,585 the Rohingya became ‘Stateless through exclusion’586 and the 
target of human rights violations.587 At the time of writing, these violations include those 
potentially of the nature of RtoP crimes.588
(ii] Primary RtoP's Territorial Scope
A “citizens” beneficiary concept could serve to widen primary RtoP’s territorial scope of 
primary RtoP. As noted earlier, the Russian Foreign Minister claimed to be able to ‘exercise 
the responsibility to protect’589 for ‘Russian citizens'1590 residing in South Ossetia. Arguably, 
the Foreign Minister’s statement suggests that Russia considers itself to owe its “citizens” a 
protective duty, both under the national constitution591 and RtoP itself,592 irrespective of 
whether its “citizens” reside outside its territorial borders. The Russia-Georgia conflict 
therefore raises the possibility that adopting a “citizens” beneficiary concept could encourage
581 Refugees have only been expressly detailed as RtoP beneficiaries by Greece. See Statement o f the 
Representative o f Greece to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV/5476. To date, 
only Chile and Swaziland have expressly accepted RtoP as encompassing protective obligations for non­
nationals. Swaziland most clearly committed to this undertaking, directing that RtoP clearly encompasses an 
‘obligation to protect immigrating populations’. Statement o f the Representative o f  Swaziland to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV/100. See also Statement o f the Representative o f Chile 
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV/98.
582 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’ (n 578), 10.
583 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations o f  
International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (n 494), 6, 7 and 8.
584 The Rohingya are commonly referred to as the ‘Roma o f Asia’. C Oberti, ‘Burma’s Rohingya Minority are the 
Roma o f Asia’ (France 24, 22 June 2012) <http://www.france24.com/en/20120622-burma-rohingya-ethnic- 
violence-muslim-buddhist-rahkine-aung-san-suu-kyi> accessed 2 August 2012.
585 Sections 42-44 Burmese Citizenship Law 1982 cited in Human Rights Watch, ‘Report: The Government 
Could Have Stopped This: Sectarian Violence and Ensuing Abuses in Burma’s Arakan State’ (2012) 46 
<http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0812webwcover_0.pdf> accessed 3 August 2012.
586 Human Rights Watch, ibid, 45.
587 Human Rights Watch, ibid.
588 For e.g. mass killings and the use o f excessive force against the Rohingya by State security forces. Human 
Rights Watch, ibid, 26-27 and 29-30.
589 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (n 365) and 
Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August
2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952.
590 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC”, ibid, emphasis 
added
591 The Foreign Minister may have been referring to the constitutional assurance that the ‘Russian Federation 
shall guarantee to its citizens protection and patronage abroad’, Constitution o f the Russian Federation 1993 
(adopted by referendum 12 December 1993, entered into force 25 December 1993) art 61 (2).
592 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (n 365).
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the RtoP framework to again be applied contrary to its territorial scope.
(iii) Scope o f the Harmful Acts which RtoP Covers
Formulating the beneficiary concept to cover solely “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” could 
undermine the Outcome Document’s provision for RtoP to be applied in relation to war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.593 A “civilians” beneficiary 
concept provides a particularly useful illustration of the way in which RtoP’s beneficiary 
concept can directly interconnect with the scope o f the harmful acts which it covers. 
Limiting beneficiaries to “civilians” could effectively exclude certain war crimes from 
falling within RtoP’s scope. For instance, a “civilians” approach would prevent the RtoP 
framework from being used in relation to war crimes perpetrated against persons actively 
participating in hostilities, including the conscription or recruitment of child soldiers594 and 
the treacherous killing or wounding of combatants.595 Indeed, calling for a “civilians” 
approach to be beneficiary concept during the Outcome Document drafting process, the US 
argued that the international community should discharge secondary RtoP in order to protect 
‘civilian populations’596 in situations ‘involving genocide, ethnic cleansing, crimes against 
humanity and other large-scale atrocities'.597 Accordingly, there is scope to argue that some 
State support for a “civilians” beneficiary concept is inextricably linked to views on the harm 
which populations should sustain before RtoP’s discharge becomes warranted, specifically 
war crimes which meet the laws of war ‘grave breaches’598 threshold.
There are three difficulties with limiting RtoP’s application to war crimes perpetrated 
against “civilians” only. Primarily, this undermines Outcome Document’s clear provision for 
RtoP to cover ‘war crimes’,599 not only heinous violations of the laws of war perpetrated 
against civilians. The approach could also undermine the intended deterrent effect of 
codifying RtoP at the World Summit. Whilst liability could still arise in international and 
national courts for the perpetration of war crimes against those without “civilians” status 
(e.g. combatants and child soldiers), excluding these crimes from RtoP’s reach weakens its 
capacity to deter their commission. This includes the provision for the international
593 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
594 Rome Statute (n 444) art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and art 8 (2) (e) (vii).
595 Rome Statute, ibid, art 8 (2) (b) (xi) and art 8 (2) (e) (ix).
596 Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’ (22 
June 2005) <http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 14 May 
2012. (Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN 
Reform’).
597 Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ibid.
598 On the acts which would be considered as such within the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute see Rome 
Statute (n 444) article 8 (2) (a) (i) - (viii).
599 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
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community to respond to their perpetration in a ‘timely and decisive’600 manner, including 
through the use of armed force.
Furthermore, restricting RtoP’s scope to heinous war crimes perpetrated against 
“civilians” challenges the objective underscoring RtoP’s formulation. That is, to provide a 
comprehensive framework through which the international community could apply a range 
of measures in response to internationally established crimes.601 After all, the implication 
inherent in a “civilians” approach is that war crimes perpetrated against those actively 
participating in hostilities cannot be sufficiently egregious to ‘warrant such international 
attention’.602 Indeed to some actors, RtoP’s connection with war crimes like the treacherous 
wounding of combatants is inconsistent with it being designed to cover ‘conscience- 
shocking’603 harm. To this writer, Libya and Syria call into question this standpoint. Is it 
appropriate to state that the shooting of Syrian soldiers from behind604 by the national 
military or pro-govemment militia because they refused to carry out a ‘shoot-to-kill 
policy’605 on unarmed civilians is not ‘conscience-shocking’?606 Is it suitable to rule out RtoP 
having a role in relation to the murder of forty four Syrian soldiers in order to prevent them 
from defecting from the national military?607 Similarly, would it be in the spirit of the RtoP 
framework to exclude its application in response to the Libyan national army’s conscription 
of child soldiers, including by detaining them in locked properties until they were “ready” to 
fight?608 Admittedly, such acts may not warrant applying the most non-peaceful responsive 
measures.609 However, as discussed below, excluding these crimes via a “civilians”
600 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
601 On this see particularly, ICISS Report (n 331), 1-11.
602 Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President (30 August 2005)
<http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid= 15&limit= 15&limitstart=0 
&order=date&dir=ASC&category=9&Itemid=240> accessed 14 May 2012. (Letter o f the US Ambassador John 
Bolton to the UNGA President).
603 ICISS Report (n 331), 33. Some o f the stakeholders interviewed on the RtoP framework by Rosenberg are 
reported to have ‘expressed concern that the broad definition o f war crimes included acts, which had little to do 
with the population suffering serious harm as described in the work o f the ICISS report, such as compelling 
prisoners o f war to serve in the forces o f a hostile power or the killing or wounding o f combatants who had 
surrendered’. S Rosenberg and E Strauss, “A Common Approach to the Application o f the Responsibility to 
Protect” in D Fiott et al, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar 
Approach (Brussels: The Madariaga College o f Europe Foundation, 2012), 59.
6 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f  Human Rights in the 
Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 493), 21.
605 UNHRC, ‘Report o f  the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the 
Syrian Arab Republic’, ibid.
606 ICISS Report (n 331), 33.
607 CNN Wire Staff, ‘Dozens o f Defecting Soldiers Executed, Activists Say’ (CNN, 3 March 2012) 
<http://edition.cnn.eom/2012/03/03/world/meast/syria-unrest/index.html> accessed 14 May 2012.
608 See further, ‘Gaddafi’s New Force o f  Child Soldiers Revealed’ The Scotsman (Edinburgh, 17 April 2011) 
<http://www.scotsman.com/news/gaddafi-s-new-force-of-child-soldiers-revealed-l-1588436> accessed 14 May 
2012 .
609 Scheffer takes a similar view, arguing that ‘[i]n reality, not all atrocity crimes, particularly some categories of 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, necessarily justify military intervention as the most extreme application 
o f RtoP’. However, he correctly warns that ‘[d]rawing the line between atrocity crimes that would merit and 
those that would lack justification for military intervention could become an extremely difficult task in world 
affairs’. D Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds),
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beneficiary concept could also undermine RtoP’s capacity to prevent mass atrocity crimes 
against “civilians” because it narrows the means through which RtoP can be discharged.
(iv] Scope o f Implementation Means
Limiting RtoP beneficiaries to “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” could curtail the scope of 
the means which can be used to implement RtoP in practice. A “civilians” beneficiary 
concept could exclude using means which are focused upon persons actively participating in 
hostilities, not least child soldiers. The UNSG’s 2009 RtoP Report recommends that the 
international community encourage States to release child soldiers from armed 
groups/militaries.610 This is a viable route through which to respond to RtoP crimes (i.e. the 
war crime of recruiting or conscripting child soldiers) and preventing further RtoP crimes 
from being perpetrated in the State (e.g. further RtoP crimes being committed against 
civilians by the military/armed group that the child soldier serves). Accordingly there is 
scope to argue that a “civilians” beneficiary concept could undermine the RtoP framework 
from being effectively applied to prevent and respond to some RtoP crimes.
A “citizens” beneficiary concept gives cause for concern over whether it could prevent 
the use of means to protect ‘new minorities’611 like refugees and migrant workers. On the 
one hand, restricting RtoP beneficiaries to “citizens” could undermine States implementation 
of certain means in order to comply with their responsibility to prevent RtoP crimes from 
arising, including the national authorities of non-State parties deciding to accede to ‘relevant 
international instruments on [...] refugee law’.612 In addition, we should be cautious over the 
way in which a “citizens” beneficiary concept could weaken primary RtoP’s capacity to 
protect some minority groups who are established in a State, particularly by undermining the 
way in which RtoP encourages States to more robustly implement human rights law in order 
to prevent RtoP crimes from arising. In the field of minority rights, it is documented that 
some States have implemented discriminatory national citizenship policies in order to 
exclude minorities from acquiring the right to participate in the public life of the State613 (e.g.
Responsibility to Protect The Global Moral Compact fo r  the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York
2009), 77.
610 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 16 and 17.
611 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’ (n 578), 10.
612 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 11.
613 UNHRC, ‘Report o f  the Independent Expert on Minority Issues’ (2 February 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/9 [ ‘The 
Independent Expert is required to identify best practices and possibilities for technical cooperation by OHCHR.
As a practical measure she has begun focusing on three priority areas o f work: policing and maintenance o f  
security in multi-ethnic societies (in collaboration with the Working Group on Minorities); the arbitrary denial or 
deprivation o f  citizenship to certain minority groups as a tool to exclude minorities from due benefits or 
reasonable participation ; and equal access to quality education and other education-related issues, including 
access to education in minority languages’, emphasis added, 6] and UN Commission on Human Rights, ‘Specific 
Groups and Individuals: Minorities, Report o f the Independent Expert on Minority Issues’ (6 January 2006) UN
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sitting a language exam in order to acquire citizenship614). The effective implementation of 
the right to participation in public life of persons belonging to a territorially cohesive 
minority can contribute to the prevention of RtoP crimes by (i) deterring Kin States from 
taking action against a State that they consider is discriminating against a minority group by 
subjecting it to more stringent citizenship requirements than other sections of its 
population;615 and (ii) reduce the risk of a minority feeling aggrieved by or disassociated 
from the State, thereby helping to diminish the development of centri-fugal tendencies which 
can, in some cases, encourage territorially cohesive minorities to claim a right to autonomy 
or secession.616 With regard to nomadic minorities (e.g. Roma), the effective implementation 
of participation rights can help to foster positive relations between disparate groups by 
giving all societal members a role in the public life of the State.617 This helps to prevent 
“populism”,618 including the incitement of RtoP crimes against the group that is denied 
national citizenship. Arguably, these potential implications suggest that we should be 
mindful to the possibility that some States may utilise a “citizens” beneficiary in order to (i) 
evade primary RtoP’s support for better implementation of human rights; and (ii) better 
accommodate their national political interests (e.g. tensions toward certain groups and 
national citizenship policies).
3.1.2 Implications for the Wider Obligations to which RtoP relates
A “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” beneficiary concept could equally contradict and/or
Doc E/CN.4/2006/74 [‘In some States, important debates about language, religion, social inclusion, political 
participation, citizenship, poverty and identity often assume a negative tone that is not conducive to social 
cohesion or harmony’, 15].
614 Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 368), 77.
615 For examples o f such action in practice see Kemp, Popovski and Thakur, ibid.
616 For a good account o f the significance, development and implications o f centri-fugal tendencies among 
minority groups see especially, H Quane, ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale and Implications o f Using Human 
Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 VA. J. Int’l L. 463,499.
617 As Eide explains: ‘Special problems arise when a part o f  the settled residents o f the country having an ethnic, 
linguistic or religious identity different from that o f the majority is denied citizenship. This effectively blocks that 
group from participating in the political processes and could be a strong indicator that the Government is not 
representative o f the whole people. In this situation also however, the primary effort should be to ensure that they 
obtain citizenship, rather than secession’. UN Human Rights Commission, Sub-Commission on Prevention o f  
Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, ‘Protection o f  Minorities: Possible Ways and Means o f  Facilitating 
the Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f Problems Involving Minorities’ (n 461), 18.
618 On this see OSCE HCNM, ‘The Rise o f Populism and its Implications for National Minorities’ (Keynote 
Speech by Knut Vollebaek OSCE HCNM at the ‘European Year o f Intercultural Dialogue: The Minority Agenda’ 
seminar hosted by the Socialist Group in the European Parliament (PSE Group), Belgium, 11 December 2008) 3- 
4 <http://www.osce.org/hcnm/62452> accessed 12 November 2012. The UNSG alludes to the way in which 
populist, rather than responsible politics, can underscore the perpetration o f RtoP crimes. He notes: ‘need to move 
from identity-based politics to the effective management, even encouragement, o f diversity through the principle 
o f non-discrimination and the equal enjoyment o f  rights. Responsible sovereignty is based on the politics o f  
inclusion, not exclusion. This entails the building o f institutions, capacities and practices for the constructive 
management o f  the tensions so often associated with the uneven growth or rapidly changing circumstances that 
appear to benefit some groups more than others’, emphasis added. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 
331), 10.
88
undermine present understanding of some of the human rights, humanitarian and criminal 
law obligations to which the RtoP framework relates. These potential implications merit 
further consideration.
(i) Human Rights
A “civilians”, “people” or “citizens” beneficiary concept generally undermine the fact that 
the majority of human rights to which the RtoP framework relates (e.g. right against torture, 
right to life) are formulated for the protection of all “individuals” in a States territory and 
under its effective control.
A “people” beneficiary concept could have some more specific implications. International 
human rights law recognises “people” as the holders of the right to self-determination.619 
This writer would argue that a “people” beneficiary concept could further complicate the role 
of the RtoP framework in contexts where a group seeks international recognition of their 
status as a “people” with a right to self-determination. It may be helpful to first outline what 
this role might be. The Outcome Document makes clear that RtoP should be implemented in 
relation to four specific crimes.620 Accordingly, the international community can apply 
secondary RtoP in cases where a group claiming recognition as a “people” are threatened by, 
or the victims of, the four crimes. The purpose of secondary RtoP in such cases would be to 
protect the group from the four crimes and not to help them gain self-determination. 
However, there is the possibility that, in order to protect a group from further RtoP crimes, 
the international community could be seen as recognising indirectly the group as a ‘people’ 
with a remedial right to self-determination.621 This would put RtoP in the centre of the 
debate over whether such a right exists.
The overlap between a “people” beneficiary concept and the right to self-determination 
could entail further policy implications. First, reference can be made to Russia’s actions in 
the immediate aftermath of its conflict with Georgia. Russia supplemented its invocation of 
RtoP to justify its use of armed force against Georgia by recognising the secessionist 
enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent “States”.622 Russia’s explanation for 
its recognition of the enclaves as “States” is largely resonant of recognising the secessionist
619ICCPR (n 386) art 1 (1) and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (adopted 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 art 1 (1). For a discussion o f international 
human rights law and ‘people’ as holders o f the right to self-determination, see generally J Rehman, International 
Human Rights Law (Pearson, Harlow 2010) 472-73.
620 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
621 The meaning o f a remedial right to self-determination was outlined in chapter one in the discussion o f present 
literature regarding the factors which motivate Kin States to intervene in the State in which the kin minority is 
located.
622 ‘Medvedev Announces Independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia’ (Russia Today, Moscow, 27 August 
2008) <http://www.rt.com/news/medvedev-announces-independence-for-south-ossetia-and-abkhazia/> accessed 
11 May 2012.
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movements as a “people” with a remedial right to self-determination. To this effect, Russia 
explained that its recognition was with respect to the need to protect the people of these 
secessionist enclaves from (the RtoP crime) genocide.623 At a general level, this example 
suggests that a “people” beneficiary concept could therefore create a tension between the 
scope of the right to self-determination (i) implemented generally (no remedial right to self- 
determination); and (ii) implemented in a specific RtoP context (remedial right to self- 
determination). In the specific context of RtoP cases involving a territorially cohesive 
minority, the Russian example illustrates the way in which the link between a “people” 
beneficiary concept and the right to self-determination could further encourage Kin States 
like Russia to invoke RtoP-type rhetoric to justify their recognition of a minority group’s 
remedial right to self-determination. This could compound fears that group rights can, in the 
context of minorities, create a “slippery-slope” to secession and, furthermore, that 
discharging secondary RtoP in contexts involving self-determination claims can sometimes 
lead to secession so as to ensure the group is protected from further RtoP crimes.
Second, there is the danger that a “people” beneficiary concept could encourage a group 
to deliberately cause the State to perpetrate mass atrocity crimes against it in order to compel 
the international community to intervene in order to protect them and to recognise them as a 
“people” with a remedial right to self-determination.624 Admittedly, there is limited empirical 
evidence to sustain the view that the RtoP framework will generally increase these so-called 
‘suicidal rebellions’.625 However, reference should be made to the recent declaration of 
Northern Mali as the new “State of Azawad” by Tuareg affiliated rebels.626 There are two 
significant aspects to this declaration. First, the rebels justify the creation of the “State” on
623 ‘Medvedev Announces Independence for South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, ibid. [Referring to risk o f  genocide 
emanating from Georgia and arguing that it is therefore “necessary to make a decision” regarding the status o f  
these territories].
624 Gray argues that the use o f force in response to mass atrocity crimes entails ‘clear dangers that this will 
encourage those seeking independence to use violence to provoke a repressive response’. C Gray, International 
Law and the Use o f  Force (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 64. Engle makes a similar observation, arguing that 
‘increasing support for forceful humanitarian intervention has pressed some warring factions and their advocates 
to argue that opponents are committing atrocities worthy o f intervention’. See K Engle, ‘Calling in the Troops: 
The Uneasy Relationship between Women’s Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention’ (2007) 20 
Harv HumRtsJ 189, 138.
625 On the concept o f “suicidal rebellions” see A J Kuperman, ‘Suicidal Rebellions and the Moral Hazard o f  
Humanitarian Intervention’ (2005) 4 (2) Ethnopolitics 149. Kuperman has subsequently suggested that RtoP 
could cause an increase in suicidal rebellions, stating that RtoP ‘creates a moral hazard that encourages the 
excessively risky behavior o f rebellion by members o f groups that are vulnerable to genocidal retaliation, but it 
cannot fully protect these groups against the backlash. The emerging norm thereby causes some genocidal 
violence that otherwise would not occur’. A J Kuperman, ‘Rethinking the Responsibility to Protect’ 
(Winter/Spring 2009) Whitehead Journal o f Diplomacy and International Relations 33, 36. See also A J 
Kuperman, ‘The Moral Hazard o f Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’ (2008) 52 International 
Studies Quarterly 49. Belloni endorses this to some extent, suggesting that RtoP can encourage rebel groups to 
continue their existing struggle in pursuit o f international support for their cause. R Belloni, ‘The Tragedy o f  
Darfur and the Limits o f the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006) 5 (4) EP 326, 331. These arguments are refuted by 
Bellamy and Williams who use empirical data to illustrate that there has been no measurable increase in new 
suicidal rebellions nor in the duration and escalation o f existing conflicts since RtoP’s construction. A J Bellamy 
and P D Williams, ‘On the Limits o f Moral Hazard: The ‘Responsibility to Protect’, Armed Conflict and Mass 
Atrocities’ (2012) 18 (3) EJIR 539, 544-550.
626 Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad, ‘Declaration d’Independance de l’Azawad’ (n 470), para 5.
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the perpetration of RtoP crimes against the Azawad people.627 Second, the rebels have 
repeatedly announced to the “international community” that RtoP-type crimes have been 
perpetrated by Malian State actors, calling for it to take action to protect the “Azawad” 
people.628 To date, no State has recognised “Azawad” as a State and ECOWAS has requested 
the UNSC to authorise it to use aimed force in order to overthrow the rebels and restore 
Mali’s internationally recognised borders.629 At the time of writing, the UNSC has not 
provided this authorisation.630 The case nevertheless illustrates the way in which the RtoP 
framework could form the basis of suicidal rebellions and reinforce secessionist tendencies 
more generally, especially if associated with a “people” beneficiary concept.
Admittedly, secession and suicidal rebellions have been apprehended as potential 
implications of wider national-international linked protection frameworks, including the 
minority rights regime proposed for adoption by the League of Nations.631 However, an 
explicit link between the international protection of a “people” when the State fails to do so 
and the RtoP framework, a framework encompassing the use of armed force, entails the 
further implication of debasing existing understandings of (i) the scope and character of the 
right to self-determination (i.e. remedial); and (ii) the extent to which States’ sovereignty and 
territorial integrity should be respected by the international community. These potential 
implications could strengthen existing reservations that RtoP’s implementation will 
challenge the right to self-determination as traditionally conceived. Cuba has, for example, 
stated that it:
‘Rejects the attempt to impose the acceptance of the so-called ‘responsibility to 
protect’, which in the current world situation will only facilitate interference, 
pressure and intervention in the domestic affairs of our States by the superpowers 
and their allies, openly and permanently threatening the full enjoyment of the 
right to self-determination of our peoples’.632
627 Mouvement National de Liberation de l’Azawad, ibid, paras 5. [‘Rappelant les massacres, les exactions et 
humiliations, spoliations et genocides de 1963,1990, 2006,2010 et 2012, qui ont vise exclusivement le peuple de 
1’AZAWAD jusqu’au ler avril 2012’].
628 Mouvement National de Liberation de 1’Azawad, ‘Des civils victimes des tirs de l ’armee malienne’ 
(Mouvement National de Liberation de I 'Azawad, 23 February 2012) (in French) 
<http://www.mnlamov.net/droits-de-lhomme.html> accessed 6 July 2012.
629 See UN News, ‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’ (n 471).
630 UN News, ‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’, ibid.
631 For e.g. Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary o f State argued that incorporating a self-determination provision in the 
Covenant o f  the League o f Nations was: ‘[LJoaded with dynamite. It will raise hopes which can never be realised. 
It will, I fear cost thousands o f lives. In the end it is bound to be discredited, to be called the dream o f  an idealist, 
who failed to realise the danger until too late’. Statement o f  R Lansing cited in P Thomberry, International Law  
and the Rights o f  Minorities (OUP, Oxford 1991) 31.
632 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, ‘Informal Meeting o f the Plenary on the High Level 
Plenary Meeting o f the General Assembly o f September 2005’ (June-July 2005)
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 12 May 2012. See 
also Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ 
(n 489).
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(ii) International Criminal and Humanitarian Law
International criminal and humanitarian law does not require that victims of mass atrocity 
crimes have formal citizenship of the State in which the crimes at issue were perpetrated. 
Moreover, they clearly state that persons not possessing the status of “civilians” are to be 
protected from war crimes, in certain circumstances.633 In view of this, it could be argued 
that recognising “citizens” and “civilians” as RtoP beneficiaries would directly contradict 
those who are recognised by international law as persons protected from mass atrocity 
crimes.
Perhaps the most significant effect on international humanitarian law of identifying 
“civilians” as RtoP beneficiaries is that it would undermine the established scope of war 
crimes. As noted earlier, the laws of war extend beyond grave breaches to ‘other serious 
violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts’,634 thereby providing some 
protection to those who do not have “civilians” status. Thus, a “civilians” beneficiary 
concept could lead to a conflict between those recognised as the protected persons of mass 
atrocity crimes (i) generally (as defined under existing obligations); and (ii) in a specific 
RtoP context (as defined according to the beneficiaries of RtoP). Moreover it could lead to 
variations between the scope of war crimes (i) under existing obligations (that is, grave and 
other breaches perpetrated against civilians and those actively engaged in hostilities); and (ii) 
under RtoP (that is, grave breaches perpetrated against “civilians”).
3.1.3 The Concept of the Beneficiary in State Practice: General Findings
The table summarises the varying approaches taken to RtoP beneficiaries in State views 
to date.
Table C: Trends in State Views on RtoP's Beneficiary Concept
B eneficiary R equ irem ents for G eneral f  i n d i n g s
C oncept B eneficia l ) S tatus
633 Prominent examples include members o f  armed forces or groups and child soldiers.
634 Rome Statute (n 444) art 8 (2) (b) and (e).
State Views
(D-
‘Civilians’
Civilians Status e.g. 
not actively 
participating in 
hostilities
Potentially Exclude those Actively Participating in 
Hostilities;
Potentially Narrows the Range of War Crimes which can 
Activate Secondary RtoP, creating a Tension Between 
the Scope of War Crimes under International Criminal 
Law and the RtoP Framework;
Potentially Undermines the Range of Measures which 
can be Used to Discharge Primary and Secondary RtoP 
e.g. Ensuring the Disarmament of Child Soldiers.
State Views 
(2)-
‘ Citizens’
National Citizenship 
of the Sovereign 
State in which they 
Reside
Potentially Excludes “New Minorities” e.g. Refugees, 
Migrant Workers;
Potentially Excludes Groups Established in the State for 
Some Time but who are Excluded from National 
Citizenship Laws e.g. Rohingya;
Undermines the Prospect for Primary RtoP to Encourage 
Better Implementation of Participation Rights and Non- 
Discriminatory National Citizenship Policies, thereby 
potentially weakening RtoP’s Contribution to Preventing 
the Perpetration of RtoP Crimes in the Course of Violent 
Claims to Secession by a Territorially Cohesive Minority.
State Views 
(3):
‘People(s)’
A Recognised Right 
to Self- 
Determination
Potentially Excludes those without a Recognised Right to 
Self-Determination;
Risk that it could Strengthen the Argument that there 
Exists a Remedial Right to Self-Determination, thereby 
Encouraging Secessionist Tendencies;
Potentially Encourages “Suicidal Rebellions”.
A “civilians”, “citizens” and “people” beneficiary concept could impact upon the RtoP 
framework and the existing obligations to which it relates. Either beneficiary concept could 
narrow who is to be protected from RtoP crimes, thereby undermining Rwanda635 and 
Sweden’s636 interventions at the World Summit in order to ensure that an all-inclusive 
beneficiary concept was formulated. Why then have these trends emerged in State views? As 
States have not explicitly explained their standpoint on the beneficiary concept no 
explanation for the trends can be given with any certainty. States may have simply drawn 
upon the protected persons of RtoP crimes. Notably, “civilians”637 are recognised to be the 
protected persons of certain war crimes, whilst the “civilian population”638 is to be protected 
from crimes against humanity. Accordingly, a “civilians” beneficiary concept may flow from 
the legal definitions of two of the crimes that RtoP covers. However, we have seen that
635 Statement o f  the Representative o f Rwanda to the UNGA in WFM Report (n 557) and Rwanda, ‘Proposed 
RtoP Language for September Outcome Document’ (n 559).
636 Statement o f  the Representative o f Sweden to the UNGA in WFM Report, ibid.
637 See for e.g. Rome Statute (n 444) art 8 (2) (b) (i) and (ii).
638 Rome Statute, ibid, art 7 (1), emphasis added.
93
“civilians” are not the sole beneficiaries of the laws of war and, furthermore, that the other 
mass atrocity crimes RtoP covers do not limit protection to those with citizenship or a 
recognised right to self-determination. Perhaps the most persuasive explanation of State 
views is that they may be underscored by the all-inclusive character of a ‘populations’639 
beneficiary concept, specifically that it requires all persons are to be protected from RtoP 
crimes. This could open up the possibility of certain persons effectively having concurrent 
status as an RtoP bearer and beneficiary.
There is some merit to this concurrence. If non-State actors began perpetrating RtoP 
crimes against State actors, the application of secondary RtoP to protect the primary RtoP 
bearer may be justified. However, concurrent bearer and beneficiary status can soon become 
complex and politically controversial. For example, what should happen when, as in the Cote 
d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria, State actors perpetrate RtoP crimes against the population and 
non-State actors armed responses involve the perpetration of RtoP crimes? In such contexts, 
national authorities would bear primary RtoP and be included among secondary RtoP’s 
beneficiaries, despite the fact that they began perpetrating RtoP crimes in the first place. This 
concurrent status could complicate the international community’s discharge of secondary 
RtoP by requiring it to ensure the protection of the primary RtoP bearer and the remainder of 
the population. If the international community is to protect the primary RtoP bearer from 
RtoP crimes then how could it, for instance, carry out robust military action to protect the 
remainder of the population from RtoP crimes perpetrated by national authorities? If equal 
protection is to be granted without distinction between bearers and beneficiaries, would it be 
legitimate for sanctions to be applied against individual members of the national authorities 
because they have perpetrated RtoP crimes but not against individual members of rebel 
groups who have perpetrated RtoP crimes, albeit on a lesser scale?
Whilst a “citizens” and “people” beneficiary concept would not overcome the issue of 
concurrent status (i.e. because primary RtoP bearers are likely to also have such status), a 
“civilians” concept helps to override the implication that the international community should 
protect national authorities actively participating in hostilities when they are using armed 
force to discharge secondary RtoP.640 This is particularly true when, as in Libya, the mandate 
for the use of force is explicitly limited to the ‘protection of civilians’.641 However, using a 
“civilians” beneficiary concept in order to circumvent the risk of concurrent 
bearer/beneficiary status could invite challenges over whether the RtoP framework 
adequately upholds existing international obligations. It is important to recall here that even
639 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
640 On the difficulty between ensuring that military activities can be conducted effectively and that war crimes are 
not committed as a result o f these activities see R Cryer (ed), An Introduction to International Criminal Law and 
Procedure (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 224-25.
641 UNSC Res 1973 (n 414), paras 4, 5 and 6.
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those who do owe primary RtoP and have failed to implement it are, by reason of their basic 
human identity, entitled to be protected from human rights and humanitarian law violations, 
including those committed by actors in the course of their discharge of secondary RtoP. To 
do otherwise, creates challenges to the legitimacy of the RtoP framework in both the eyes of 
the population of the State in which secondary RtoP is being applied and among members of 
the international community, particularly those who are cautious regarding the RtoP 
framework.642
Despite the significant implications of State views, there is limited discussion of RtoP’s 
beneficiary in the existing literature.643 Generally, commentators644 simply restate the fact 
that the Outcome Document provided that ‘populations’645 are beneficiaries. However, some 
of the arguments made above tend to reinforce those of Luck.646 First, this writer’s 
observation that a “citizens” beneficiary concept could serve to exclude non-citizens tends to 
add weight to Luck’s647 persuasive argument that the citizenship beneficiary concept used 
intermittently in the ICISS Report could have served to exclude those without citizenship of 
the State in which they reside. Notwithstanding this, State views tend to call into question 
Luck’s argument that the Outcome Document’s ‘populations’648 beneficiary concept was ‘a 
major step forward’,649 clarifying that RtoP protects ‘all [..] people’650 in a States territory ‘be 
they citizens, be they immigrants, legal or illegal’.651 Admittedly, ‘populations’652 is a more 
inclusive beneficiary concept and therefore an improvement on earlier Reports.653 However, 
Luck’s argument tends to presuppose that, because States accepted the Outcome Document, 
they have continued to recognise that ‘all people’654 are RtoP beneficiaries in subsequent
642 Pattison terms this dual notion o f “legitimacy” as ‘internal’ (i.e. legitimate to the people o f  the State) and 
‘external’ (i.e. to the broader international community). See generally, J Pattison, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, the 
Responsibility to Protect and Jus in Bello’ (2009) 1 GRtoP 364.
643 The varying positions on RtoP’s beneficiary concept in present literature were outlined at length in chapter 
one.
644 The majority o f commentators restate this. However, the following are useful examples: W Pace and N Deller, 
‘Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect’ (2005) 36 (4) World Order 15,26; N 
Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate Over where Authority should be 
Locatedfor the Use o f  Force (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo 2008) 16; Peters (n 508), 522 
and Wheeler and Egerton (n 527), 123.
645 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138-139.
646 E C Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (Keynote address at the European 
Science Foundation Conference: The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice, Linkoping, Sweden, 9 
June 2010).
647 Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’, ibid. See further, E C Luck, ‘The United 
Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (August 2008) The Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief, 6-8 
<http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/policyanalysis.cfm?id=345> accessed 8 October 2012 [‘In what was widely 
hailed as a historic breakthrough, the 2005 World Summit unanimously affirmed the primary and continuing legal 
obligations o f states to protect their populations— whether citizens or not—from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing, and crimes against humanity, and from their incitement’, emphasis added, 2].
648 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138-139.
649 Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (n 646).
650 Luck, ibid.
651 Luck, ibid.
652 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138-139.
653 ICISS Report (n 331); UNSG Report, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 331) and HLP Report (n 331).
654 Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (n 646).
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practice. The present author would suggest that the use of alternative beneficiary concepts in 
the overwhelming majority of State views challenges this opinion. Furthermore, the nature of 
the beneficiary concepts used in State views could undermine Luck’s view that specific 
groups like ‘immigrants’655 are protected by reason of their membership in States’ 
“populations”. On the contrary, this writer has argued that the implication inherent in the 
beneficiary concepts used in State views is that whole sections of “populations” could be 
excluded as beneficiaries because they lack particular status (e.g. civilians, citizenship, 
holders of a right to self-determination).
This relates to a wider theme in the literature, specifically the tendency of some 
commentators656 to argue that specific sections of a States’ population are beneficiaries of the 
RtoP framework. Key examples include (i) refugees657; and (ii) persons belonging to national 
and other minority groups658. Considering that such persons would be included is a logical 
and reasonable outcome of the Outcome Document’s all-inclusive ‘populations’659 
beneficiary concept. However, State views raise the possibility that the specific groups 
mentioned in present literature may, due to factors beyond their control like refugee status, 
be excluded from the ambit of the “citizens” beneficiary concept favoured by a number of 
States.660 Consequently, this writer would argue that it is perhaps too much to suggest, as 
Rimmer661 does, that ‘the real test o f 662 RtoP is whether it develops to focus upon the 
protection needs of particular sections of States populations, such as refugees.663 Instead, this 
writer would argue that some States preference for identifying beneficiaries as “citizens” 
might suggest that ‘the real test’664 of RtoP is whether refugees come to be recognised as 
RtoP beneficiaries at all.
Arguments in present literature regarding the basis on which the relationship between
655 Luck, ibid.
656 See for e.g. R Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 15; The Editors, ‘Special Issue 
for GRtoP: Protecting IDPs and Refugees’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 5, 7; E Mooney, ‘Something Old, Something New, 
Something Borrowed ... Something Blue? The Protection Potential o f a Marriage o f Concepts Between RtoP and 
IDP Protection’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 60; N Turner and N Otsuki, The Responsibility to Protect Minorities and the 
Problem o f  the Kin State (United Nations University, Tokyo 2010) and Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 368).
657 Cohen, Mooney and The Editors, ibid.
658 Turner and Otsuki (n 656) and Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 368).
659 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138-139.
660 For e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV/5319; Statement o f  the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(November 2007) UN Doc S/PV/578; Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (December 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6216(Res. 1); Statement o f the Representative o f Myanmar to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100. All State views referring to “citizens” 
are detailed in Annex II (B) (c). State views referring to “citizens” beneficiary concept are detailed in Annex II 
(B) (c).
661 S Rimmer, ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and the “Responsibility to Protect’” (March 2010) New  
Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No 185, UNHCR.
662 Rimmer, ibid, 16.
663 Rimmer, ibid.
664 Rimmer, ibid.
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RtoP bearer and beneficiary should be adjudged are also relevant here. Aba’s665 view is that 
RtoP establishes ‘a relationship between State and people which is in many ways the reverse 
of the old concept: a relationship built on notions of citizenship’.666 Stahn’s667 view is that 
the RtoP framework replicates the premises of Social Contractarian thought, namely that the 
State protects the population from RtoP crimes and in return the population adheres to its 
laws.668 The present author would argue that as a quarter of the surveyed State views refer to 
“citizens” as beneficiaries, we cannot conclusively accept Aba’s669 contention that RtoP has 
eradicated citizenship as the regulatory standard for a States protection of its population.
Stahn’s670 view does tend to better accommodate the citizenship beneficiary concept in 
State views. The implication of limiting beneficiaries to those with citizenship is that States 
will protect those who in turn protect the State by, for instance, obeying its domestic laws. 
However, formulating the relationship between RtoP bearer and beneficiary as per Social 
Contract theory has significant drawbacks which are overlooked in present literature. 
Doctrinally, the idea of a Social Contract as the basis of protection tends to undermine the 
Outcome Document provisions on primary RtoP. A Social Contract is by its very nature 
bilateral, whereas the Outcome Document provided only for the unilateral duty of the State 
to protect its population. The original intention then was not to predicate primary RtoP on 
the mutuality o f responsibility which is inherent in citizenship or Social Contract theory. At a 
policy level, there is limited attention given to the fact that basing the relationship between 
bearer and beneficiary around concepts of citizenship and Social Contract tends to reinforce 
the bond between State and national and, therefore, potentially encourage a return to civic 
nationalism which can (i) strengthen bonds between citizens and Kin States;671 and (ii) create
665 E Aba and M Hammer, Yes We Can? Options and Barriers to Broadening the Scope o f  the Responsibility to 
Protect to Include Case o f  Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Abuse (One World Trust, London 2009) 3.
666 Aba and Hammer, ibid.
667 Stahn, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 534).
668 On the concept o f “sovereignty as responsibility” inherent to the RtoP framework, Stahn notes that: ‘The 
understanding that the State exercises the functions o f an agent and trustee for the human beings who are affected 
by the consequences o f  State action is not a twentieth-century principle, but can be traced much further back. [...] 
A similar understanding o f the State is reflected in the work o f  contract theorists. John Locke viewed the 
relationship between the State and its citizens in terms o f “trust”’. Furthermore, Stahn argues that RtoP’s 
“sovereignty as responsibility” notion finds basis in the work o f Hugo Grotius, ‘whose conception o f law was 
based on the assumption that the rules governing the organisation and behaviour o f States exist ultimately for the 
benefit o f the actual subjects o f the rights and duties concerned, individual human beings’. Stahn, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid, 111, ellipsis added.
669 Aba and Hammer (n 665), 3.
670 Stahn, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 534), 111.
671 For e.g. between ethnic Germans residing abroad and Germany during World War Two. Eide directs that 
‘[djuring the Second World War Germany favoured the transfer o f ethnic Germans from isolated communities in 
Eastern Europe to the Reich’. A Eide, “Ethnic Conflicts and Minority Protection: Roles for the International 
Community” in K Rupesinghe and V Tishkov, Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World (UN University 
Press, Tokyo 1996)
<http://archive.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu 12ee/uu 12ee0q.htm# 14.%20ethnic%20conflicts%20and%20mino 
rity%20protection:%20roles%20for%20the%20intemational%20commun> accessed 6 July 2012.
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tensions against non-nationals within the State.672 These risks are wholly at odds with 
primary RtoP’s purpose. Whilst strengthening relationships between bearer and beneficiary 
on the basis of citizenship/nationality ties could culminate in violent clashes between States 
(as in Russia-Georgia), history shows that ‘reverse ethnic cleansing’673 may be one outcome 
of tensions against non-nationals who are implicated in the previous commission of RtoP 
crimes against nationals.
3.2 International Practice
Examination of international practice suggests that three competing approaches have been 
taken to the concept of the RtoP beneficiary. It is useful to consider the merits and potential 
drawbacks of these approaches respectively.
3.2.1 Approach One: "Populations"
In general international/regional instruments, RtoP’s beneficiary concept has been codified 
pursuant to the Outcome Document (i.e. as “populations”674). This has also been the 
approach taken in some international and regional instruments which have recalled the RtoP 
framework in relation to particular situations, such as Darfur and Burma.675 Notably, these 
extracts are affirmations of the Outcome Document RtoP provisions per se and, therefore, we 
would expect its beneficiary concept to be reiterated.
More recent international/regional instruments which recall RtoP in relation to specific 
situations have dealt with the beneficiaries of primary and secondary RtoP differently. For 
example, UNHRC and UNSC Resolutions on Libya and Syria recalled that national 
authorities owe primary RtoP to their ‘populations’.676 In contrast, secondary RtoP
672 As occurred in the post-World War Two settlements and underscored the Potsdam Protocols, for example. On 
this see, J Z Muller, ‘Us and them the Enduring Power o f Nationalism’ Foreign Affairs (2008) 
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87203/jerry-z-muller/us-and-them.html> accessed 6 July 2012 
and Thomberry, International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities (n 631), 114.
673 ICISS Report (n 331), 40-41. As Kymlicka further explains, ‘[I]n those cases where minorities seized territory 
and established their own autonomous governments, the results were often various forms o f discrimination and 
harassment— even ethnic cleansing— against anyone who did not belong to the minority’ and further ‘there is 
anxiety that such minorities are irredentist— that is, that they wish to redraw international boundaries so as to 
unite (or reunite) the territory where they live with their adjacent kin State. Indeed, it is often assumed that they 
would collaborate willingly with their kin State if  it militarily invaded the country in order to claim this territory.’ 
See W Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalisation o f Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 (1) ICON 1, 24 and 25 respectively.
674 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), para 8; UNSC Res 1674 (n 563) preambular para 4;
UNHRC, ‘Prevention o f Genocide’ (n 563), 4 and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Res 
‘Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa’ (n 563), para 5.
675 For e.g. EP Res ‘The Situation in Darfur’ (n 563), para E and EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 
563), para 3.
676 See particularly, UNSC Res 2014 (n 563), preambular para 5 [regarding Yemen]; UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 415), 
para 1; UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 416), para 2; UNSC Res 1970 (n 414), preambular para 9 and UNSC Res 1973 (n 
414), preambular para 4.
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beneficiaries have not been detailed in the spirit of the Outcome Document’s ‘populations’677 
beneficiary concept. Instead, reference has been made to secondary RtoP-type measures 
being authorised in order to protect ‘civilians’.678 This distinction raises some significant 
questions. On what basis is the international community to determine who requires the most 
protection from RtoP crimes? What drawbacks, if any, could this entail? The second 
approach taken to the concept of the beneficiary in international practice can be drawn upon 
here.
3.2.2 Approach Two: The Protected Persons of the RtoP Crimefs) Apprehended
In international practice, the international community has generally determined who 
specifically merits protection on a case-by-case basis, in accordance with the protected 
persons of the RtoP crime apprehended in each particular instance. For instance, States and 
other relevant actors identified RtoP beneficiaries as the “civilian population” (i.e. the 
protected persons of crimes against humanity) when this crime was perceived to be being 
committed in, for example, Kenya,679 Burma,680 Democratic Republic of Congo,681 Syria,682 
Libya683 and the Cote d’Ivoire.684 This approach appears both legitimate and reasonable. It 
tries to ensure that RtoP is implemented for the victims of the RtoP crimes being perpetrated 
in any given case. Furthermore, referring to the established protected persons of mass 
atrocity crimes under international law is not a new approach to determining the beneficiary 
of potential international protective action. Indeed, prior to the adoption of the Outcome 
Document, a number of States685 linked their discussion of the criminal context in Darfur to
677 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
678 See especially, UNSC Res 1973 (n 414) paras 4-6 [authorising measures in order to “protect civilians”].
679 Statement o f the SAPG cited in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 399), 4.
680 See for instance, E C Luck, ‘Testimony before Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign 
Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection’, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S 
Senate (17 June 2008) cited in Cohen (n 656), 25. (E C Luck, ‘Testimony before Subcommittee on International 
Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection’).
681 Statement by the Representative o f Belgium to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council 
Calls for the Immediate End to all Human Rights Violations in the Democratic Republic o f Congo’ (1 December
2008)
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsfiviewO 1 /E8CC AFBBA4481A 51C 12575120056D55E?opendocume 
nt> accessed 6 July 2012. (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Calls for the Immediate End to all Human 
Rights Violations in the Democratic Republic o f Congo’).
682 See particularly, ‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, 
and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011 (n 416).
683 See e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f France, Germany and Brazil to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; Statements o f  the Representatives o f France, Lebanon, India and 
the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
684 See e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Gabon, Colombia and the Cote d ’Ivoire to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (March 2011) UN Doc. S/PV.6508.
685 See especially, Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and Brazil to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (18 September 2004) UN Doc S/PV/5040 and Statement o f the Representative o f the 
Netherlands on behalf o f  the European Union to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 November 2004) UN 
Doc S/PV/5082.
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the protected persons of the crime at issue. Nevertheless, the approach raises significant 
questions regarding the extent to which RtoP’s criminal basis influences the international 
community’s responses to mass atrocity crimes. To some extent, a review of international 
practice suggests that RtoP’s criminal basis may dictate, not just influence, international 
responses to mass atrocity crimes. To give one example, the (now former) UN Special 
Adviser to the Secretary-General on RtoP advised that the application of secondary RtoP to 
the situation in Burma would require the existence of ‘murder or extermination committed as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack against the civilian population’.686 In short, the 
Special Adviser explicitly drew upon the legal elements of a crime against humanity in order 
to determine whether secondary RtoP could be applied to the situation and, if so, who its 
beneficiaries would be (i.e. the “civilian population”). The legal basis of the Special 
Adviser’s approach brings to mind the fact that international reaction to Rwanda is 
understood to have been partly hindered by debates over whether the legal elements of 
genocide were actually present.687 Admittedly there has been no debate in practice to date 
over whether the members of the population sustaining harm fall within legal understandings 
of the protected person of the mass atrocity crime apprehended. Nevertheless, relevant actors 
should perhaps be cautious over the potential for this approach to lead to such arguments in 
future practice, at least in cases where some actors do not want secondary RtoP to be applied 
for wider political reasons. Perhaps most significantly, drawing upon the protected person of 
the RtoP crime apprehended raises important questions about the extent to which secondary 
RtoP can be discharged to prevent these crimes arising in the first place688 and, furthermore, 
whether it is possible to maintain an overarching beneficiary concept like “populations”.
3.2.3 Approach Three: Detail the Specific Characteristics of RtoP Beneficiaries in 
Each Case
The third approach taken to the concept of the RtoP beneficiary in wider international 
practice comes through most clearly in the cases of Guinea and the Cote d’Ivoire. With 
regard to events in Guinea the UN Secretary-General reminded State authorities that they 
owe primary RtoP to ‘all Guineans, regardless of their ethnicity, religion or political
686 E C Luck, ‘Testimony before Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, Economic 
Affairs and International Environmental Protection’ (n 680).
687 See R Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure o f  Humanity in Rwanda (Arrow Books, London 
2004) 343 and 374; L van den Herik, “The Schism Between the Legal and the Social Concept o f Genocide in 
Light o f the Responsibility to Protect” in R Henham and P Behrens (eds), The Criminal Law o f  Genocide: 
International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects (Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot 2007) 76.
688 This question is discussed in relation to secondary RtoP’s activating threshold in chapter four.
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affiliation’.689 The Secretary-General’s Special Advisers adopted a similar approach in 
relation to Cote d’Ivoire, recalling that the authorities owe RtoP to ‘all populations in Cote 
d’Ivoire, irrespective of their ethnicity, nationality or religion’.690
It is unclear what underscored the emergence of this third approach to the beneficiary 
concept in these cases and at this phase in RtoP’s development. What is clear is that this 
approach to the beneficiary concept has some particularly notable merits. The approach takes 
into account the specifics of each context and adapts RtoP beneficiaries accordingly, thereby 
retaining the flexibility of the second (above) approach that has been taken in international 
practice to date. For example, the approach took into account the political basis to events in 
Guinea by specifying that populations should be protected regardless of their ‘political 
affiliation'69x Similarly, the ethnically motivated events in Cote d’Ivoire led to the Special 
Advisers specifying that populations should be protected irrespective of their i ethnicity'.692 
In doing so, this approach tailors the concept of the RtoP beneficiary to the specific members 
of the population who are most at risk of RtoP crimes.
In addition, the approach seems to circumvent some of the tensions which have arose 
with respect to the formulation of a beneficiary concept in the field of minority protection. 
The debates surrounding the formulation and enforcement of Article 27 of the ICCPR can be 
drawn upon here. The Article provides that it is to apply ‘[i]n those States in which ethnic, 
religious or linguistic minorities exist’.693 This has served to act as an invitation to States to 
demonstrate that they do not in fact have such groups within their territories694. France for 
example has argued that it does not have “minorities” because it affords equality to all 
members of its society695 and is, therefore, culturally homogenous.696 Thus, specifying that 
protection should be given to groups which have particular characteristics essentially leaves
689 UN Press Release, ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Guinea’ (3 November
2010) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/185-crisis-in-guinea/3046-secretary-general-ban- 
ki-moon-statement-attributableto-the-spokesperson-for-secretary-general-on-guinea-> accessed 12 May 2012. 
(‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Guinea’).
690 ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on 
the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010 (n 411) and ‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary- 
General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in 
Cote d’Ivoire’, 19 January 2011 (n 411).
691 ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Guinea’ (n 689).
692 ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on 
the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010 (n 411), emphasis added and ‘Statement attributed to the UN 
Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the 
Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 19 January 2011 (n 411).
693 ICCPR (n 386) art 27.
694 On this issue, see especially P Thomberry, ‘Is There A Phoenix In The Ashes? International Law and Minority 
Rights’ (1980) 15 Tex Int‘l L. J 421,448.
695 Shelton argues that ‘[i]n effect, such reservations amount to a denial that minority groups exist because all 
individual are treated with equal rights and freedom. No allowance is made for cultural diversity and the right to 
be different’. D Shelton, ‘The UN Human Rights Committee’s Decisions’ (2004-2005) 12 (2) Human Rights 
Dialogue <http://www.camegiecouncil.Org/resources/publications/dialogue/212/section_3/5151 .html> accessed 
14 May 2012.
696 H Hannum “The Concept and Definition o f Minorities” in M Weller (ed), Universal Minority Rights (OUP, 
Oxford 2007) 50-51.
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States with the discretion over who those groups are in their territory and, indeed, whether it 
has the groups in its territory at all. Arguably, the approach taken to the concept of the RtoP 
beneficiary avoids similar implications arising because it specifies that protection should be 
granted to all sections of the population in the State,697 merely including those groups which 
have particular characteristics. The presumption that such groups exist within the State is 
therefore made by relevant international actors, irrespective of whether the State recognises 
such groups or not.
3.2.4 The Concept of the Beneficiary in International Practice: General Findings
The varying approaches taken to the beneficiary concept in international practice call into 
question whether it is possible to maintain a general term for RtoP beneficiaries, such as 
“populations”. For example, the tendency in international practice to distinguish between the 
beneficiaries of primary RtoP and secondary RtoP is interesting because no such distinction 
was made in the Outcome Document. The merits of not doing so are relatively clear. At a 
conceptual level, providing for an overarching beneficiary concept which spans the range of 
the RtoP framework ensures consistency and clarity for a decision over who the beneficiaries 
should be. At a policy level, an overarching beneficiary concept is consistent with the 
Outcome Document providing for States698 and the international community to apply 
primary and secondary RtoP in order to prevent RtoP crimes from arising.699 After all, a 
“populations” beneficiary concept represents a suitable guideline for who should be able to 
access the benefits of preventive strategies because it would be difficult to determine who 
would be most need of protection in cases where RtoP crimes had not yet become apparent 
and, therefore, no immediately recognisable ‘victims’700 to identify as RtoP beneficiaries.
Notwithstanding this, the suitability of an overarching beneficiary concept becomes less 
compelling when we consider that secondary RtoP also requires the UNSC to authorise non­
peaceful responsive measures when RtoP crimes are being, or are about to be, committed. In 
cases where the international community are applying secondary RtoP in response to harm 
already sustained and, therefore, where it has become apparent who is most need of 
protection, there is the question of whether it would be more suitable to delineate the
697 For e.g. ‘all Guineans’ and ‘all populations in the Cote d’Ivoire’, ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson 
for Secretary-General on Guinea’ (n 689). See also, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention 
o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 29 December 2010 (n 411) and 
‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’, 19 January 2011 (n 411).
698 Outcome Document (n 333), para 138.
699 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
700 EP Res, ‘Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 563), para ‘K’.
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beneficiaries of secondary RtoP in a more specific manner than the ‘populations’701 
beneficiary concept permits. In turn, relevant actors may recognise beneficiaries under the 
more comprehensive term of “populations” in cases where the criminal context has not yet 
become apparent.
Conclusion
Through a comprehensive examination of the meanings which have been given to the terms 
“State”, “national authorities”, “international community” and “populations” in relevant 
practice, the chapter argued that RtoP’s bearer and beneficiary concepts may yet be evolving 
and more nuanced and complex than we perhaps expected following their consensus 
acceptance by States seven years ago.702
Whilst contouring the primary RtoP bearer concept as that owed by “States” and 
“national authorities” is consistent with a variety of existing international instruments, the 
legal meaning of these terms can mean that the primary RtoP bearer is context dependent. In 
territories which have not been recognised to meet the requirements of statehood, the 
concept of the bearer becomes less clear. In situations of Occupation, the Israel-Gaza 
conflict703 raises the possibility that the primary RtoP bearer concept may become diffuse, 
falling on both the Occupying Power and the authorities in effective control of the Occupied 
Territory. In cases of secessionist enclaves, the Russia-Georgia conflict suggests that a third 
State cannot claim to be the primary RtoP bearer in the enclave until they are in a position of 
effective control in the territory.704 The territorial link between bearer and beneficiary in 
these cases reinforces this writer’s argument that a review of the Outcome Document’s 
drafting history suggests that the primary RtoP bearer concept was intended to be territorially 
defined.
On the one hand, the variations in practice suggest that the primary RtoP bearer concept 
has shown in practice that it is versatile and capable of meeting political realities, in spite of 
the potential vacuum in protection that could have emerged as a result of the Outcome 
Document’s use of legally defined terms like “State” and “national authorities”. Conversely, 
the way in which the concept has stood up to demands for it to be adapted pursuant to a 
variety of different territorial arrangements could be controversial. This includes the 
possibility that, whilst the recognition of a State’s “national authorities” has not been entirely
701 Outcome Document (n 333), paras 138 and 139.
702 Outcome Document, ibid.
703 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (n 359), 520.
704 Statements o f the Representatives o f the United Kingdom and United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (19 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5969.
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synonymous with government recognition, the two can be indirectly concurrent in some 
instances. This could serve to reinforce a link between the RtoP framework and externally 
influenced regime change.
Examination of State views on the scope of the “international community” concept used 
in the Outcome Document suggests that a wide range of actors are considered be integral 
members of the “international community” and, therefore, those who have a fundamental 
role in discharging secondary RtoP.705 As there is limited support for the possibility that any 
member of the “international community” bears secondary RtoP as a responsibility in its 
own right, the chapter proposed that the “international community” concept may not have 
been formulated as an absolute bearer concept but, instead, may be better understood as 
shorthand for the range of actors who can discharge secondary RtoP. This writer argued that 
an “actors” approach to secondary RtoP may entail the drawback of reinforcing the UNSC’s 
discretion over whether a situation represents a threat to international peace and security and, 
therefore, warrants the application of Chapter VII enforcement measures. However, the 
approach also allows for secondary RtoP to be discharged with greater flexibility.
Examination of the beneficiary concept in State views suggests that there may be a 
preference among some States to limit RtoP beneficiaries to particular sections of States’ 
populations, specifically those with citizenship,706 civilians status707 or a recognised right to 
self-determination.708 Arguably, significant implications could arise, should either of these 
beneficiary concepts take hold in practice. Primarily, a “citizens”, “civilians” or “people”
705 Statements o f the Representatives o f Japan, Switzerland, Singapore, Cameroon, South Africa, Pakistan and 
Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements o f the 
Representatives o f Iceland, Cameroon, Benin and Slovakia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV. 100; Statement o f the Representative o f  Egypt (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f the Representative o f Lesotho 
and Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f  Responsibility to Protect 
Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 475); Statement o f the Representative o f Norway to the 
UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General 
Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 489); Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
706 For e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (December 2005)
UN Doc S/PV/5319; Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(November 2007) UN Doc S/PV/578; Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (December 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6216(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative o f Myanmar to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100. All State views referring to “citizens” 
are detailed in Annex II (B) (c).
707 For e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f Armenia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September 2005) 
UN Doc A/60/PV.7; Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(June 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5209; Statement o f the Representative o f Nepal to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (December 2005) UN Doc S/PV/5319; Statement o f the Representative o f Ghana to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV/5476; Statement o f the Representative o f  Canada to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative o f Egypt (on behalf 
o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97. All 
State views referring to “civilians” are detailed in Annex II (B) (b).
708 For e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Estonia, Monaco and Iceland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.6; Statement o f the Representative o f Indonesia to the UNGA,
UNGA Meeting Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7; Statement o f the Representative o f Bangladesh to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (January 2009) UN Doc S/PV/6066(Res. 1). All State views referring to 
“peoples” are detailed in Annex II (B) (d).
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beneficiary concept could unduly narrow or widen the RtoP framework. With regard to the 
former, the chapter argued that the adoption of, for example, a “civilians” beneficiary 
concept could hinder (i) RtoP’s discharge through means which focus upon persons engaged 
in hostilities (e.g. child soldiers709); and (ii) limit RtoP’s application to grave breaches of the 
laws of war, not war crimes per se.710 In relation to the potentially expansive effect of the 
proposed beneficiary concepts, reference was made to the risk that a “citizens” concept could 
encourage some States, particularly Kin States like Russia, to invoke the RtoP framework to 
justify action in order to “protect” their citizens residing in the territory of another State.711 
Moreover, a “civilians”, “citizens” or “people” beneficiary concept could create conflicts 
between the RtoP framework and some of the fundamental existing obligations to which it 
relates. A principal example is the potential for a “people” beneficiary concept to potentially 
impinge upon the general consensus in the human rights context that no remedial right to 
self-determination exists.712
Although the Outcome Document “populations” beneficiary concept has been upheld in 
international instruments which affirm the RtoP framework generally,713 in country-specific 
practice the international community has typically identified the beneficiaries of secondary 
RtoP measures pursuant to the protected persons of the international crimes that RtoP 
covers.714 On the one hand, this can facilitate the beneficiary concept to be tailored to the 
specific sections of the population who are at most risk in each case and legitimise the action 
taken by certain actors (e.g. the UNSC). On the other hand, we should perhaps be cautious 
over the prospect for this approach to cause legalistic debates over whether the population 
sustaining harm falls within the protected person of the mass atrocity crime apprehended, at 
least in cases where secondary RtoP’s application would impact upon the broader political 
interests of some States. In light of this, the chapter proposed that the approach to the 
beneficiary concept which has been adopted in more recent practice could be a more viable 
approach. By specifying that all sections of States’ populations are protected, irrespective of
709 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), 16 and 17.
710 Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’ (n 
596) and Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President (n 602).
711 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (n 365). See 
generally, Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 368).
712 Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (n 624), 64.
7,3 See especially: UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 331), para 8; UNSC Res 1674 (n 563), preambular 
para 4; UNHRC, ‘Prevention o f Genocide’ (n 563), 4 and African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Res ‘Strengthening the Responsibility to Protect in Africa’ (n 563), para 5.
714 See for e.g. Statement o f the SAPG cited in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 399), 
4; Statement by the Representative o f Belgium to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Calls 
for the Immediate End to all Human Rights Violations in the Democratic Republic o f Congo’ (n 681); ‘Statement 
by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011 (n 416); Statements o f the Representatives o f 
France, Germany and Brazil to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; 
Statement o f the Representatives o f  France, Lebanon, Russian Federation, India and Colombia to the UNSC,
‘The Situation in Libya’ March 2011, UN Doc S/PV.6498; Statements o f the Representatives o f Gabon,
Colombia and the Cote d’Ivoire to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6508.
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objective factors like ethnicity and political affiliation, this approach does not appear to 
entail the same difficulties which arose in relation to the overly specific beneficiary concept 
used in Article 27 of the ICCPR.715
In conclusion, the chapter has illustrated the extent to which RtoP was designed to fit 
within the existing international framework. The bearer concept reinforces the territorial and 
State-centric bearer concepts used in existing human rights and humanitarian law 
instruments.716 An “actors” approach reinforces the vested interest which a range of actors 
have in protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes and, furthermore, the UNSC’s 
discretion over whether or not to recognise that a situation warrants the application of 
Chapter VII measures. Perhaps to the detriment of its maintenance in subsequent practice, 
the beneficiary concept formulated at the World Summit upholds the understanding that, 
irrespective of the way in which a human being behaves toward others, human rights are 
universal. Furthermore, practice regarding the concepts has served to strengthen trends in 
wider practice, including the fact that there can be concurrent governments in one State and 
that legitimacy, protection and external recognition are often considered to be mutually 
dependent.
Whilst the concepts of bearer and beneficiary may be considered to be issues which 
pertain solely to the merits of a doctrine on paper, they can have a significant impact in 
practice at both a policy and legal level.717 Their potential impact reinforces the need for 
commentators and relevant actors, like States and the UNSG, to more deeply engage with the 
finer aspects of the RtoP framework like its bearer and beneficiary concept. In the interim, 
the chapter raises significant questions which merit close reflection in the next chapter. What 
is the scope and character of “States” duties under primary RtoP? What value, if any, does 
primary RtoP add to the existing obligations to which it relates? In what ways, if at all, can 
“States” compliance with the primary RtoP duty be monitored and enforced?
715 ICCPR (n 386) art 27. See further, Hannum “The Concept and Definition o f Minorities” (n 696), 50-51 and 
Thomberry, ‘Is There A Phoenix In The Ashes?’ (n 694), 448.
716 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (n 387); Al Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2011 (n 387) para 74 and 
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Time o f War (n 388).
717 The question o f how to move forward from present approaches to RtoP’s bearer and beneficiary concepts is 
discussed at length in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER III 
PRIMARY RtoP: OLD POLICIES, NEW PACKAGE?
Introduction
This chapter examines primary RtoP’s substance and enforcement,718 drawing particularly 
upon the way in which primary RtoP has been approached in State719 and international 
practice to date. Particular emphasis is placed upon the UN Secretary-General’s [UNSG] 
2009 Report on Implementing RtoP720 which provides perhaps the most detailed guidance on 
primary RtoP’s scope and character to date. Where appropriate, the chapter draws upon 
wider international law, particularly the field of minority protection, to provide a possible 
rationale for primary RtoP’s development in practice or suggest possible implications 
thereof.
Parts one and two consider primary RtoP’s substance. Part one draws upon the way in 
which primary RtoP has been addressed in practice to date in order to chart the principal 
means through which States can implement primary RtoP and, furthermore, identify 
potential impediments to the use of particular means in some cases. Part two outlines and 
examines general findings regarding primary RtoP’s substance. A number of significant 
questions are addressed, including what rationale underscores providing for primary RtoP 
implementation means to vary from context to context'? What is the duration of the primary 
RtoP duty? Does primary RtoP endure or suspend at particular stages in a crisis? Does 
secondary RtoP’s activation mean that a State’s primary RtoP duties become obsolete? Or, 
alternatively, can primary and secondary RtoP be implemented concurrently? The complex 
relationship between primary RtoP and the existing obligations which it subsumes is also 
discussed, including whether primary RtoP adds value to States’ existing protective 
obligations. For example, does primary RtoP add value by clarifying the specific 
requirements of rights/obligations in an RtoP context? Is there therefore scope to argue that 
primary RtoP has the same utility as instruments which developed upon the fundamental 
human rights provided by the International Bill of Rights721 in specific contexts, such as the
718 To recall, chapter one outlined that the provisional lines o f the Outcome Document relate to primary RtoP, 
providing: ‘[e]ach individual State’ owes primary RtoP to has its populations from’ RtoP crimes; and (ii) that this 
‘responsibility entails the prevention o f such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and 
necessary means’. UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para 138. (Outcome Document).
719 This includes a review o f over four hundred State views on RtoP. Surveyed States views are detailed in Annex 
I (a)-(i).
720 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc. A/63/677. 
(UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP).
721 That is: (i) UNGA Res 217A (III), ‘Universal Declaration o f Human Rights’ (1948) UN Doc A/810; (ii) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23
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Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and the Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples?
Part three reviews the merits and demerits of existing proposals for monitoring and 
enforcing State compliance with primary RtoP. This writer outlines the potential 
implications of some of these proposals, ranging from a lack of support among States to the 
more profound policy implications of specific proposals, such as the risk of further 
politicisation of the UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC].
1 The Scope of Primary RtoP
Two Outcome Document provisions relate to primary RtoP’s scope, specifically that (i) 
primary RtoP requires States to prevent RtoP crimes;722 and (ii) States can discharge primary 
RtoP through ‘appropriate and necessary means’.723 These provisions suggest that primary 
RtoP formulates both negative and positive duties. After all, a responsibility to prevent RtoP 
crimes from arising would lack meaning if States were not obligated to refrain from inciting, 
ordering, soliciting, aiding or abetting RtoP crimes.724 Equally, a preventive responsibility 
would lack meaning if States were not obligated to take steps to protect populations from the 
perpetration of RtoP crimes by State or non-State actors. This quite likely underscores why 
the Outcome Document also provides for States primary RtoP duties to have a positive 
character, requiring States to implement primary RtoP through ‘appropriate and necessary 
means’.725 Notably, the Outcome Document does not explain which means are ‘appropriate 
and necessary’.726 However, subsequent practice has helped to clarity the kind of means 
which States can use in order to comply with their negative and positive primary RtoP 
duties.
1.1 The Negative Duty
A recurrent theme in relevant practice at the international and regional level is that primary 
RtoP’s fulfilment requires State actors to refrain from perpetrating, or further perpetrating,
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR); and (iii) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR). On the 
formulation o f the International Bill o f Rights and the debates surrounding this, see e.g. T D Musgrave, Self- 
Determination and National Minorities (OUP, Oxford 1997) 66-68.
722 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
723 Outcome Document, ibid.
724 The modes o f liability for the type o f mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers are detailed in Rome Statute o f the 
International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90 art 25 (3). 
(Rome Statute).
725 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
726 Outcome Document, ibid.
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RtoP crimes. A principal way in which to fulfil primary RtoP is therefore for State actors to 
‘first do no harm’.727 At the international level, this element of primary RtoP comes through 
in a range of the country-specific contexts in which primary RtoP has been invoked.
70 fi 70QLibya, Syria and Yemen are particularly useful illustrations.
In Libya, the UNHRC expressed ‘deep concern with the situation in Libya’731 and, noting 
that some of the human rights violations ‘may also amount to crimes against humanity’,732 
urged ‘the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population, to 
immediately put an end to all human rights violations’733 and ‘to stop any attacks against 
civilians’.734 The UNHRC adopted a similar approach to Syrian national authorities’ primary 
RtoP duty when establishing a fact-finding mission to examine the ‘violations and crimes 
committed’735 in the State. Condemning the Syrian authorities ‘use of lethal violence against 
peaceful protestors and hindrance to access of medical treatment’,736 the UNHRC urged the 
Syrian authorities to ‘immediately put an end to all human rights violations, protect its 
population and respect fully all human rights and fundamental freedoms’.737 In Yemen, the 
UN Security Council [UNSC] expressly recalled the Yemeni authorities’ primary RtoP 
duty.738 The UNSC also alluded to the possibility that the authorities may be perpetrating 
war crimes and, therefore, failing to comply with the negative primary RtoP duty. To this 
end, the UNSC demanded that the Yemeni authorities immediately ‘ensure their actions 
comply with obligations under applicable international humanitarian and human rights 
law’739 and ‘take action to end attacks against civilians and civilian targets by security 
forces’.740
727 This phrase was used by the ICISS to refer to one o f the basis obligations o f those using armed force in 
response to RtoP crimes but, in the view o f this writer, it bears equal relevance in the context o f the primary RtoP 
duty. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 31. (ICISS Report).
728 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ‘The Situation o f Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (25 February 2011) UN 
Doc A/HRC/S-15/1, para 2 (UNHRC Res S-15/1); UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, 
preambular para 9 (UNSC Res 1970) and UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, preambular 
para 4 (UNSC Res 1973).
729 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ‘The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the Context o f  
Recent Events’ (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1. (UNHRC Res S-16/1).
730 UNSC Res 2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014. (UNSC Res 2014).
731 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 1.
732 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ibid.
733 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ibid, para 2.
734 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ibid.
735 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 729), para 7.
736 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid, para 1.
737 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid.
738 UNSC Res 2014 (n 730), preambular para 14.
739 UNSC Res 2014, ibid, para 5.
740 UNSC Res 2014, ibid.
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1.2 Positive Duties
Relevant UN guidance741 and State views742 suggest that primary RtoP’s fulfilment can 
require national authorities to take a variety of steps in order to protect their populations 
from the incitement or perpetration of RtoP crimes by State or non-State actors. The practice 
in this area can be divided into two categories. The first category regards the most general 
measures which national authorities can apply in order to comply with primary RtoP. 
General implementation measures can be largely understood as those which involve States 
taking steps to give effect to the three broad categories of obligations which primary RtoP 
interconnects with, namely human rights, humanitarian and criminal law. The second 
category develops upon the former, including recommendations which help to clarify the 
steps that national authorities can take in order to give effect to existing humanitarian, human 
rights and criminal law obligations for the specific purpose of preventing and protecting 
populations from RtoP crimes. Each category merits reflection.
1.2.1 General Implementation Measures
To date, the main recommendation which has been made regarding this category of 
implementation measures is for States to ratify relevant international instruments, such as 
those relating to international humanitarian743 and criminal744 law. With the exception of 
encouraging States to cooperate with the International Criminal Court [ICC],745 relevant 
actors have generally not specified the particular instruments that States should consider 
ratifying. However, the present author would argue that States should consider adopting
741 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11 and 12.
742 Surveyed State views are detailed in Annex I (a)-(i).
743 For e.g. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11; Statements o f the Representatives o f France and 
the Republic o f  Korea to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f  
the Representative o f Argentina to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits of 
Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0850.doc.htm> accessed 16 June 2012 and Statements o f the 
Representatives o f the Czech Republic and Canada to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.98.
744 See e.g. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 10. The following statements welcomed this 
suggestion: Statements o f the Representatives o f Bolivia, Norway, Slovenia, Croatia and Turkey to the UNGA in 
UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly 
Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10849
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0849.doc.htm> accessed 17 June 2012 (UN Press Release, ‘More 
than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on 
Responsibility to Protect’); Statements o f the Representatives o f Kenya, Argentina and Azerbaijan to the UNGA 
in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’, ibid; Statements o f the Representatives o f France, Italy, Bosnia & Herzegovina and the Joint 
Statement o f the Representatives o f Costa Rica and Denmark to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statements o f the Representatives o f Japan and Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 and Statements o f  the Representatives o f  Slovakia and 
Botswana to the UN General Assembly, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
745 See particularly, UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11-12.
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those instruments which most directly interact with the nature of the four crimes that primary 
RtoP requires States to prevent. This writer considers that some of the most obvious 
instruments for State ratification include the Genocide Convention,746 Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute.747 State ratification of some perhaps less 
obvious instruments could add substance and depth to State efforts to prevent RtoP crimes. 
Consideration could be given to strengthening the implementation of minority rights, not 
least because of the overlap between the crime of genocide and minorities’ right to 
existence748 and, furthermore, the interplay between cultural minority rights and the fact that 
humanitarian law prohibits damage to cultural property.749 Given that torture can amount to a 
crime against humanity, the Torture Convention is another example.750 In view of the 
interplay between discrimination and the recognition of persecution, extermination and the 
forcible transfer or deportation of a population as crimes against humanity,751 consideration 
may also be given to ratifying instruments regarding the right to non-discrimination, such as 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,752 Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination753 and the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women.754 States may also consider strengthening their commitment, 
or acceding to, instruments for the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons,755
746 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277.
747 Rome Statute (n 724).
748 On minorities right to existence see UNGA Res 47/135, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities’ (18 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/135 art 1 (1) 
(UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities’). For a discussion o f the nexus between the right to existence and/or life and the crime o f genocide, 
see generally W A Schabas, Genocide in International law  (CUP, Cambridge 2000) 107 and J Rehman, 
International Human Rights Law  (Pearson, Harlow 2003) 438-452.
749 See respectively, ICCPR (n 721) art 27; UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities’, ibid; Convention for the Protection o f Cultural Property in the 
Event o f Armed Conflict (1954) (adopted 14 May 1954, entered into force 7 August 1956) 249 UNTS 240 and 
Rome Statute (n 724) arts 8 (2) (b), (ix) and (e) (iv).
750 See respectively: Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984) (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 and Rome 
Statute, ibid, art 7 (f).
751 See respectively, Rome Statute, ibid, arts 7 (h), (b) and (d); UNGA Res 2106 (XX), ‘International Convention 
on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination’ (21 December 1965) UN Doc A/RES/2106(XX). 
(Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Racial Discrimination).
752 ICCPR (n 721).
753 Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f  Racial Discrimination (n 751).
754 Convention on the Elimination o f All Forms o f Discrimination against Women (1979) (adopted 18 December 
1979, entered into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13. (CEDAW).
755 These include the Convention Relating to the Status o f Refugees (1951) (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into 
force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 150 and the UN ESCOR Human Rights Committee, ‘Guiding Principles on 
Internal Displacement’ (1998) UN Doc E/CN.4 /1998/53/Add.2. On these instruments and their effectiveness, see 
generally A Guterres, ‘Millions Uprooted: Saving Refugees and the Displaced’ (2008) 87 (5) Foreign Aff. 90 and 
N Geissler, ‘The International Protection o f Internally Displaced Persons’ (1999) 11 (3) International Journal o f  
Refugee Law 451. For a discussion o f these instruments, their role in RtoP contexts and proposals on the way in 
which the RtoP framework could develop to strengthen their implementation, see especially R Cohen, 
Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 15; The Editors, ‘Special Issue for GRtoP: Protecting 
IDPs and Refugees’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 5, 7 and E Mooney, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed 
... Something Blue? The Protection Potential o f a Marriage o f  Concepts Between RtoP and IDP Protection’ 
(2010) 2 GRtoP 60.
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not least because (i) a State should take into account its duty to prevent RtoP crimes under 
the principle of non-refoulement by reason of the fact that primary RtoP extends to all 
members of a State’s population, including refugees at risk of RtoP crimes in a third State;756 
and (ii) internally displaced persons can easily become the victims of RtoP crimes due to 
their dependency on national authorities for permitting and regulating their safe access to 
food, water and medicine.757 The latter point suggests that consideration should also be given 
to ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights758
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which provides for the right to adequate food and water and healthcare.
1.2.2 Specific Implementation Measures
The specific means of implementing primary RtoP are essentially of a humanitarian,761 
human rights762 and criminal law763 character. Each merits reflection.
(i) Human Rights Measures
A significant question regarding human rights measures is whether all human rights bear 
equal significance under primary RtoP implementation strategies or, alternatively, whether 
some carry more importance when seeking to protect a population from RtoP crimes? A
756 This was explored in chapter two in relation to the concept o f the beneficiary o f RtoP.
757 On the particularly vulnerable position o f internally displaced persons, including relevant statistics, see 
particularly Mooney (n 755), 60-64.
758 ICESCR (721).
759 This is provided under the right to and adequate standard o f living. ICESCR, ibid, art 11.
760 ICESCR, ibid, art 12.
761 This comes through in, for example, EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’ (12 March 2009) EP Doc 
P6_TA(2009)0145 at paras 3 and F (EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’) and EP Res, ‘The Tragic 
Situation in Burma’ (22 May 2008) EP Doc P6_TA(2008)0231 at paras 5 and K (EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation 
in Burma’).
762 See generally, UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 5, 6 and 11; See also the Statement o f the 
Representative o f Mali to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements of 
the Representatives o f France, Sweden (on behalf o f  the European Union) and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Hungary to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full 
Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 744); Statement o f the 
Representative o f Jamaica (on behalf o f  CARICOM) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV. 100.
763 See generally, UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 12 [speaking mainly o f States becoming 
parties to the Rome Statute as one way o f helping to ensure that there is not impunity for mass atrocity crimes]. 
See also, Statement o f the Representative o f Japan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN  
Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative o f Tanzania to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statements o f the Representatives o f Turkey and Slovenia to the UNGA in UN 
Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly 
Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’, ibid [examples o f  States speaking o f fulfilling primary RtoP by 
taking steps to establish the rule o f law domestically]; Statement o f  the Representative o f Colombia to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 and Joint Statement o f Denmark and Costa 
Rica to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 [examples o f  States speaking o f  
fulfilling primary RtoP by taking steps to ensure the proper functioning o f domestic law enforcement, judicial 
systems and security sectors].
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number of States are on record as stating that States should implement the rights of 
women,764 refugees765 and minorities766 in order to comply with primary RtoP. In addition, 
other relevant actors have attached particular importance, albeit sometimes indirectly, to 
States implementing the right to non-discrimination,767 women’s rights768 and children’s 
rights769 effectively. Reference to the aforementioned specific rights suggests, if only 
implicitly, that certain rights may have particular bearing within an RtoP context. This writer 
would argue that certain rights have been given particular importance because they 
interconnect with the nature o f  the acts which can constitute RtoP crimes.710 Accordingly, 
implementing certain rights effectively may help national authorities to comply with their 
primary responsibility to prevent RtoP crimes from arising. Indeed, the Outcome Document 
of the Durban Review Conference provides that:
‘[R]acism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance are still among 
the root causes of armed conflict and very often one of its consequences and 
deplores the occurrences of armed conflicts as well as ethnic or religious violence, 
and notes relevant provisions of the 2005 World Summit outcome, in particular 
paragraphs 138 and 139’.771
The above provision associates primary and secondary RtoP with the right to non­
discrimination by reason of the fact that violations of this right can often underscore the 
emergence of RtoP crimes. The rights of children and women are also particularly good 
illustrations of this rationale.
State compliance with children’s rights is a recurrent theme throughout the UNSG’s 
proposals for primary RtoP’s implementation. Reference is made to a number of steps which
764 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV. 100.
765 Refugees have only been expressly detailed as RtoP beneficiaries by the Representative o f  Greece. Statement 
o f the Representative o f Greece to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV/5476. 
However, the Representative o f Swaziland directed that RtoP clearly encompasses an ‘obligation to protect 
immigrating populations’. Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, ibid. Furthermore, Chile 
expressed a willingness to provide RtoP benefits to so-called “foreigners”. See Statement o f the Representative o f  
Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
766 Statement o f the Representative o f Holy See to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 744); Statements o f the 
Representatives o f Slovenia and Croatia to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express 
Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 743); 
Joint Statement o f the Representatives o f  Denmark and Costa Rica to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 
July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 and Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, ibid.
767 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 10.
768 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11,12 and 14.
769 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11 and 14.
770 On the use o f international human rights law to prevent RtoP crimes, see for instance P Akhavan, ‘Preventing 
Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does Not Happen’ (2011) 22 (1) Crim. L. F. 1, 12. On the connection 
between the effective implementation o f international human rights law and the prevention o f  the mass atrocity 
crimes that RtoP relates to, see B Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks o f Genocide 
and Mass Murder since 1955’ (2003) 97 (1) A. P. S. Rev. 57, 72.
771 UN OHCHR, ‘Outcome Document o f the Durban Review Conference’ (24 April 2009), para 14 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/49f584682.html> accessed 17 June 2012.
113
national authorities could take, either independently or with the assistance of a relevant 
organisation/third State, to either (i) safeguard the child from RtoP crimes; or (ii) to protect 
the population from RtoP crimes perpetrated by children. In light of this, the steps tend to 
focus on protecting children who have participated in hostilities in the State or on preventing 
children from re/participating in hostilities in the State.
Notably, the UNSG’s proposals on children’s rights are largely framed as examples of 
global best practice, thereby suggesting that relevant States should consider drawing upon 
existing practice when developing strategies for compliance with primary RtoP. The 
examples given include (i) Sierra Leone’s rehabilitation and reintegration programmes for 
child soldiers;772 (ii) the way in which strengthening Colombia’s national institutions (e.g. 
the Office of the Ombudsman) has helped to address both child recruitment and the 
demobilisation of child soldiers;775 (iii) the Ugandan military’s code of conduct which 
prohibits the sexual exploitation of girls (and women);774 (iv) the publication on child 
protection for parliamentarians by the Inter-Parliamentary Union and the UN Children’s 
Fund;775 and (v) ECOWAS and Save the Children’s joint training initiative on children’s 
rights for armed forces in the West African region.776 The latter recommendation gives us 
some indication as to why the proposals for addressing children’s participation in hostilities 
interconnect with those regarding children who have already participated in hostilities. The 
training initiative focused on children’s rights and protection ‘before, during and after armed 
conflict’.777 This suggests that the effective implementation of children’s rights has been 
given priority for two reasons. First, the recruitment and conscription of child soldiers can 
constitute a war crime,778 whilst sexual violence against children in conflict zones can 
constitute a crime against humanity.779 Accordingly, the protection of children’s rights can 
directly relate to the prevention of RtoP crimes within a State. Second, it is recognised that 
RtoP crimes are more likely to arise in a State which has a history of mass atrocities and/or 
armed conflict.780 As a result, the protection of children’s rights following their cessation of 
participation in hostilities is an important factor in implementing primary RtoP in order to 
prevent RtoP crimes from re-arising in the State, not least because this can help to reduce the 
prospect that the child will rejoin the armed factions perpetrating RtoP crimes.
772 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 14. For a discussion o f the way in which the RtoP 
framework established in the 2001 ICISS Report could be used to protect child soldiers, see S Whitman, “The 
Responsibility to Protect and Child Soldiers” in W Knight and F Egerton (eds), The Routledge Handbook o f  the 
Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, Abingdon 2012) 152-166.
773 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid
774 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid.
775 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid
776 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid.
777 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid
778 Rome Statute (n 724) arts 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and (e) (vii).
779 This includes ‘rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation, or any 
other form o f sexual violence o f comparable gravity’. Rome Statute, ibid, art 7 (1) (g).
780 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 10-11.
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A similar rationale seems to underscore the prioritisation of the rights of women. The 
UNSG makes several recommendations regarding the ways in which national authorities 
may safeguard the position of women within their respective societies in an RtoP context. 
The recommendations range from (i) training the military on gender related issues;781 to (ii) 
supporting the networks of victims of mass atrocity crimes, including those with a specific 
focus on sexual violence against women;782 and (iii) ensuring that access to justice is equal, 
free from gender discrimination and sensitive to the specific issues of women.783 Again, the 
cross-cutting theme throughout the proposals regarding the rights of women is that women 
are often the victims of RtoP crimes, not least sexually-orientated crimes against humanity 
and, as such, deserve particular attention within strategies for preventing RtoP crimes at the 
national level.784
This writer would argue that there is a second rationale behind the citation of specific 
human rights in practice to date. That is, the specific circumstances on the ground in each 
State will ultimately influence which human rights that the national authorities should give 
particular attention to. Arguably, this can be seen in relation to the selection of the rights 
specified in the UNSG’s Report. Clearly not all States will have national experience with 
child soldiers. Accordingly, the specific attention given to the use of children’s rights seems 
to be largely directed at those States who have encountered, or are likely to encounter, the 
use of child soldiers within their territory.
The way in which the facts of a specific case will influence which rights are focused upon 
also comes through in the case studies of particular RtoP situations. Violations of freedom of 
expression underscored the violent responses to protests in Libya and Syria and the RtoP 
crimes which thereby emerged.785 Accordingly, the international community urged the
781 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 12.
782 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 14.
783 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11-12.
784 On the merits o f adopting a gender analysis to the RtoP framework more generally, see particularly H
Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 232; J Bond and L Sherret, 
‘Mapping Gender and the Responsibility to Protect: Seeking Intersections, Finding Parallels’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 
133; I Skjelsbaek, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Prevent? Victims and Perpetrators o f Sexual Violence Crimes in 
Armed Conflicts’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 154; E Stamnes, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Integrating Gender 
Perspectives into Policies and Practices’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 172; S E Davies and S Teitt, ‘Engendering the 
Responsibility to Protect: Women and the Prevention o f Mass Atrocities’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 198; J Karlsrud and 
R Solhjell, ‘Gender-Sensitive Protection and the Responsibility to Prevent: Lessons from Chad’ (2012) 4 (2) 
GRtoP 223; S Dharmapuri, ‘Implementing UN Security Resolution 1325: Putting the Responsibility to Protect 
into Practice’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 241 and J Bond and L Sherret, “Securing Consistency for Consistent Security: 
Gender and the Responsibility to Protect” in Knight and Egerton (n 772), 166-181
785 With regard to Libya see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All 
Alleged Violations o f International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (1 June 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/17/44,49-54 (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged 
Violations o f International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’). In relation to Syria see the UN 
Press Release, ‘Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to 
Protect, Edward Luck, release Statement Marking a Full Year o f Violent Suppression o f Anti-Government 
Protests in Syria’ (15 March 2012) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 
17 June 2012 (UN Press Release, ‘Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, release Statement Marking a Full Year o f Violent Suppression o f Anti-
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Libyan786 and Syrian787 national authorities to uphold their populations’ right to freedom of 
expression. In contrast, the international community focused upon the right to non­
discrimination in the cases of Kenya and Kyrgyzstan. Discrimination among ethnic groups 
underpinned the largely ethnically divided post-election violence in Kenya. Indeed, a 
recurrent finding in the Report of the fact-finding mission on the situation of human rights in 
Kenya was that the post-election violence was at least partly influenced by certain groups 
being discriminated against in terms of employment opportunities788 and the allocation of 
land/resources.789 In Kyrgyzstan, the UNSG’s Special Adviser’s on RtoP and the prevention 
of genocide790 urged the national authorities to ‘ensure protection of minorities’.797 Whilst 
the implementation of specific minority rights was not explicitly mentioned, it is likely that 
the Special Advisers envisaged that minorities would be protected through the effective 
implementation of individual human rights and specific minority rights. The overarching 
theme in practice to date is therefore that certain rights may bear increased importance under 
primary RtoP when they directly relate to the RtoP crime that is apprehended in each case.
[ii] Criminal Law Measures
Criminal law measures are the second form of the more specific implementation measures 
that have been proposed in practice to date. The first proposal is for States to criminalise 
RtoP crimes in their national legislation.792 This recommendation is essentially designed to 
develop upon the more general recommendation for States to ratify relevant international 
instruments. In this line, the UNSG argued that:
‘States should become parties to the relevant international instruments on human 
rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law, as well as to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court. But this is just a first step towards fu ll 
implementation in practice. These core international standards need to be faithfully 
embodied in national legislation, so that the four specified crimes and violations and 
their incitement are criminalised under domestic law and practice’.793
Government Protests in Syria’); UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 September 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/53, 8. 
(UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the 
Syrian Arab Republic’).
786 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 2.
787 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 729), preambular para 6 and para 1.
788 UNHCHR, ‘Report from the OCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya (6-28 February 2008)’, 3, 6 and 7.
789 UNHCHR, ibid, 5-6 and 9-10.
790 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (15 June 2010) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 17 June 2012.
791 ‘UN Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to 
Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’, ibid.
792 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11.
793 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP, ibid.
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One advantage to criminalising RtoP crimes in national legislation relates to the nature of 
RtoP crimes, specifically the fact that they may entail ethnic cleansing.794 There is a 
possibility that domestically criminalising RtoP crimes may, at least in some States, include 
codification of ethnic cleansing in a manner and form which goes beyond its current 
formulation within international law. As yet, there is limited guidance concerning this 
prospect within RtoP practice. However, at least one State Representative, Swaziland,795 has 
treated the act as something separate from crimes against humanity. Swaziland stated that 
‘systematic substitution of certain peculiar populations may amount to a special form of 
ethnic cleansing’795 and called upon the UNSG ‘to have a closer look at ethnic cleansing and 
find means to broaden or deepen it to include such considerations’.797 This suggests that 
Swaziland considered that the steady replacement of populations by a State should be 
recognised as an act of ethnic cleansing. This seems to exceed the scope of ethnic cleansing 
as that presently recognised to fall within the criminal elements of crimes against humanity. 
Outside forcible transfer of populations,798 crimes against humanity do not appear to cover 
instances in which the demographics of a State are considerably altered through occupation, 
for example. Accordingly, Swaziland’s approach raises at least the possibility that the 
domestic criminalisation of RtoP crimes could involve them being codified in a novel way.
The UNSG clarified that the criminalisation of RtoP crimes should be propped up with 
appropriate national mechanisms to hold perpetrators accountable.799 The rationale for this is 
two-fold. First, the prosecution of RtoP crimes enables national authorities to react to those 
RtoP crimes which have already been committed.800 Second, the prosecution of RtoP crimes 
has a deterrent value because it sends out a clear message that mass atrocity crimes will not
OA1 OAA
be met with impunity. State views give some suggestions as to the nature of the 
mechanisms which would achieve these purposes.
Generally, those States803 who have proposed the national prosecution of perpetrators of
794 Outcome Document (n 718), paras 138-39.
795 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100.
796 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland, ibid.
797 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland, ibid.
798 Rome Statute (n 724) art 7 (1) (d).
799 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11-12.
800 On the retributive element o f criminal prosecution for mass atrocity crimes, see R Cryer (ed), An Introduction 
to International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 19-20.
801 On the deterrent value o f criminal prosecution for mass atrocity crimes, see Cryer, ibid, 20-22.
802 This was recommended as a means o f implementation by the following States: Statement o f the 
Representative o f Canada to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement 
o f the Representative o f Botswana to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; 
Statement o f the Representative o f Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits 
on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743).
803 Statements o f the Representatives o f Canada, Botswana and Azerbaijan to the UNGA, ibid.
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RtoP crimes have largely referred to traditional judicial means. For example, Canada804 cited 
its successful prosecution of a Rwandan genocidaire in the Supreme Court of Quebec to 
illustrate the way in which domestic prosecution could be an effective way for States to 
discharge primary RtoP. In contrast, Kenya805 indicated that a more ad hoc mechanism could 
also be used to take redress against perpetrators of RtoP crimes. In the aftermath of the 
violence, the Kenyan authorities established the Kenyan Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.806 The Commission’s objectives are wide ranging. In terms of holding the 
perpetrators of RtoP crimes to account, the Commission is mandated to act in conjunction 
with the criminal prosecution of perpetrators.807 Whilst it may grant conditional amnesty to 
the perpetrators of some crimes, it is not mandated to do so in relation to acts that ‘qualify as 
gross human rights violations’.505 More broadly, the Commission aims to prevent gross 
human rights violations from re-arising by helping to repair the victims of the crimes 
committed, making recommendations for appropriate policy and legislative changes and 
helping to overcoming the tensions and healing process between different ethnic groups.809
We should offset the potential merits and demerits of prosecuting the perpetrators of RtoP 
crimes. First, it should be borne in mind that prosecuting perpetrators will not always be a 
straightforward way of complying with primary RtoP. Both international and national 
prosecutions of mass atrocity crimes can be problematic in cases where the crimes were 
perpetrated in conflict. Strauss810 makes some interesting observations on this issue. He 
contends that evidence exists to suggest that ethnic cleansing in the Former Republic of 
Yugoslavia increased after the ICTY was established to investigate and prosecute 
perpetrators of mass atrocity crimes.811 This relates to a wider debate in international law, 
namely the long-standing tension between (i) prosecuting those who have committed mass 
atrocity crimes; and (ii) preventing further mass atrocity crimes by negotiating peace in the 
State.812 As one author813 has explained, peace agreements will often try to get parties to 
accept that they should co-operate with criminal prosecution. However, the parties’ rejection 
of the prosecution provisions could be less significant than a breakdown in their commitment
804 Statement o f the Representative o f Canada to the UNGA, ibid.
805 Statement o f the Representative o f Kenya to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits 
on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743).
806 See statement o f the Representative o f Kenya to the UNGA, ibid referring to the Truth and Reconciliation Bill 
2008 in the context o f the authorities’ steps to implement primary RtoP. The Bill was subsequently adopted as the 
Truth and Reconciliation Act 2008.
807 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission o f Kenya, ‘Mandate and Activities’
<http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=94&Itemid=124> accessed 16 June 
2012 .
808 The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission o f Kenya, ibid
809 See generally, The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission o f Kenya, ‘Goals and Objectives’, ibid.
810 E Strauss, The Em peror’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation o f  the Responsibility to 
Protect (Nomos, Baden Baden, 2009) 29.
811 Strauss, ibid.
812 See Anonymous, ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’ (1996) 18 Hum. Rts. Q. 249 and P Akhavan, ‘The 
Yugoslav Tribunal at a Crossroads: The Dayton Peace Agreement and Beyond’ (1996) 18 Hum. Rts. Q. 259.
813 See generally, Anonymous, ‘Human Rights in Peace Negotiations’, ibid.
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to reach peaceful settlement because it is peace, not the prospect of prosecution, which will 
most effectively prevent further crimes from being committed.814 Conversely, it is important 
to recall that, irrespective of the potential impact upon achieving peace, international human 
rights law does not accept that amnesties can be granted for gross violations of human rights, 
including RtoP crimes.815 Accordingly, the flipside of incorporating a provision for the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of RtoP crimes in peace agreements is that it represents a 
further route through which States can fulfil its human rights obligations and comply with 
primary RtoP.
In general the prosecution of the perpetrators of RtoP crimes is regarded as being most 
effective when undertaken nationally, not internationally.816 Notwithstanding this, some 
States may be opposed to international prosecution over national prosecution for quite 
controversial reasons. The debate surrounding whether or not Gaddafi’s son (Saif Al-Islam 
Gaddafi) should be prosecuted internationally or nationally is a particularly good illustration. 
The situation in Libya was referred to the ICC by the UNSC for investigation.817 As a result, 
Libya’s claim for the right to hold a national prosecution should be considered within the 
context of the principle of complementarity818 which provides that the ICC should consider 
exercising jurisdiction a State’s national authorities are either unable or unwilling to 
prosecute the perpetrators of RtoP crimes.819 Whilst there seems to be a willingness to 
prosecute the aforesaid member of the old regime, it remains unclear if Libya will show that 
it has the requisite ability to conduct a national prosecution.820 This requirement takes into 
factors like whether the national authorities have the appropriate institutions and fair trial 
provisions in place in order to carry out the prosecution.821 At present, Libya appears to lack
814 The author stated: ‘[tjargeting violators o f human rights and bringing them to justice is essential. Accusation, 
however, comes more easily than making peace. The quest for justice for yesterday’s victims o f atrocities should 
not be pursued in such a manner that it makes today’s living the dead o f tomorrow’. Anonymous, ‘Human Rights 
in Peace Negotiations’, ibid, 258. One example which is referred to as illustrative o f the tension between securing 
justice and peace is the fact that the Head o f the Lord’s Resistance Army (Joseph Kony) failed to participate in 
peace negotiations following the ICC’s issue o f a warrant for his arrest. On this issue see M Page, “Dealing with 
Atrocities in Northern Uganda” in in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral 
Compact fo r  the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009) 136-137.
815 On this issue see for e.g. Cryer (n 800), 50-52 and further at 130-132.
816 On this and the potential weaknesses o f international criminal trials see Cryer, ibid, 17-36. See further, C 
Bassiouni, “Advancing the Responsibility to Protect Through International Criminal Justice” in Cooper and 
Kohler (n 814) 31-43 [examining the theoretical underpinnings o f international justice and its objectives in 
relation to ensuring accountability for the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers].
817 Rome Statute (n 724) art 27.
818 For a more detailed analysis o f the ICC’s role in relation to Libya, including the significance o f the principle 
o f complementarity, see C Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for 
‘Shared Responsibility’ (2012) 10 (2) J Int Crim Justice 325 and C Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ 
{The Hague Justice Portal, 24 November 2011) <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12998> 
accessed 12 May 2012 [examining the specific issues arising from the application o f  RtoP in Libya and the ICC’s 
arrest warrants, with a particular emphasis on the way in which both appear to give effect to a notion of 
complementarity for responses to mass atrocity crimes].
819 Rome Statute (n 724) art 27.
820 H A1 Schalchi, ‘Fighters Want to Try Gaddafi Son: Libyan Lawyer’ {Reuters, Tripoli, 11 April 2012) 
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/ll/us-libya-icc-idUSBRE83AlBL20120411> accessed 16 June 2012.
821 Rome Statute, (724) art 27.
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the capacity to fulfil either of these requirements. To this effect, it is notable that Libya lacks 
national legislation to fully address the perpetrators of international crimes822 and, 
furthermore, Libyan national legislation provides for the use of corporal punishment.823 
Accordingly, we should always bear in mind that although international prosecution may not 
always be the preferred option, it can sometimes be necessary for ensuring that the individual 
criminal responsibility of the perpetrators of RtoP crimes is upheld.824
(iii) Humanitarian Measures
States can also use a range of humanitarian measures in order to comply with primary RtoP. 
One suggestion which has been made to date is that national authorities should permit the 
delivery of humanitarian aid to their populations and ensure that humanitarian personnel can 
access the populations within the territory.825 This writer would argue that the European 
Parliament’s (EP) responses to the situations in Burma and Darfur can help to explain this 
recommendation. In both cases, the EP826 recalled RtoP827 and raised concern over the 
populations inability to access humanitarian aid due to the State’s inaction (not permitting 
access to aid agencies) and actions (expelling aid agencies).828
With regard to Burma, the EP proposed that Burma be referred to the ICC for possible 
crimes against humanity if the authorities continued to deny access to humanitarian 
agencies.829 This suggests that the EP did not consider that the authorities’ actions were 
tantamount to a crime against humanity but, rather, that their actions could develop into a 
crime against humanity. Accordingly, the case study of Burma appears to suggest that 
national authorities should permit access to humanitarian agencies not only to comply with 
their duties regarding the right to adequate food830 but, also, in order to comply with their
822 On the gaps in Libya’s national legislation see Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared Responsibility” (n 818), 338-339.
823 Stahn, ibid, 346-347. See also, A1 Schalchi (n 820).
824 But see M Mamdani, “Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?” in P Cunliffe (ed), Critical Perspectives 
on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory and Practice (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 125-139 which 
examines in some detail the way in which the RtoP framework and the grounds for the ICC’s jurisdiction 
interconnect with the notion o f State sovereignty as responsibility and, further, the broader enforcement and 
policy questions which can arise from the ICC exercising its jurisdiction in relation to the mass atrocity crimes 
that RtoP covers. See also, Bassiouni (n 816), 31-43.
825 Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6151(Res.l). Statement o f the Representative o f Congo to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 
November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781.
826 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761) and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur (n 761).
827 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’, ibid, paras 5 and K and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’,
ibid, para F.
828 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’, ibid and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur, ibid, para 3.
829 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’, ibid, para 11.
830 Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ 
(FAO Legislative Study No. 77, Rome 2002) 29
<http://www.fao.Org/DOCREP/005/Y4430E/y4430e04.htm#TopOfPage> accessed 13 June 2012 (Food and 
Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’) and UN
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responsibility to prevent RtoP crimes from arising.831 Admittedly, it is not immediately clear 
as to why a denial of access to humanitarian agencies would constitute a ‘widespread and 
systematic attack against the civilian population’.832 The explanation for this stems from the 
development of extermination as a crime against humanity, specifically the fact that this is 
understood as that which can be perpetrated by the denial o f  food  to a ‘civilian 
population’.833
In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the EP specifically referred to the longstanding 
discrimination against the Karen ethnic minority group and noted that they were 
disproportionately affected by the ineffective distribution of aid among the population.834 
This alludes to the possibility that the Burmese authorities were distributing food on a 
discriminatory basis, perhaps in light of the general understanding that denying food to a 
particular national, ethnic, racial or religious group can constitute genocide and a violation of 
the duty to respect the right to adequate food.835
The EP’s position on Darfur was slightly different. The Sudanese government was 
condemned for expelling aid agencies, not for failing to permit them access in the first place. 
The EP noted with concern several direct consequences of the expulsion, with particular 
emphasis on the way in which the expulsion could prevent populations from accessing the 
food and medicine that they had come to rely on.836 The EP therefore reiterated that the 
Outcome Document provides for the international community to take action when national 
authorities manifestly fail to comply with their primary RtoP duty837 and, furthermore, 
requested that the Resolution be forwarded to the ICC.838 Given that a “manifest failure” is 
linked to national authorities’ failure to protect populations from RtoP crimes839 and that the 
ICC focuses upon mass atrocity crimes,840 there is scope to argue that the EP considered that 
the expulsion of aid agencies constituted an RtoP crime. Here, we should bear in mind that
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation o f the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food’ (12 May 1999) UN Doc E/C. 12/1999/5, para 18. (UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation o f the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food’).
831 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
832 As per the requirements for the commission o f a crime against humanity. Rome Statute (n 724) art 7 (1).
833 Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (n 
830), 29.
834 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761), para G.
835 Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (n 
830), 29. On the way in which the discriminatory distribution o f food on the basis o f national, ethnical, racial, 
religious or other factors can violate States’ duty to respect the right o f individuals to adequate food see, UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the Implementation o f the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 12: The Right to 
Adequate Food’ (n 830), para 18.
836 EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’ (n 761), paras C-E.
837 EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’, ibid, para F.
838 EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’, ibid, para 6. See further paras H and 1.
839 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
840 Rome Statute (n 724) art 5.
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the situation in Darfur was an armed conflict and, therefore, fell under the reach of 
international humanitarian law. Accordingly, the denial of food and water in this case could 
constitute not only a crime against humanity but also a war crime.841 Consequently, the EP 
seems to consider that compliance with primary RtoP requires national authorities to take 
care not to ‘wilfully impede relief supplies’842 that are intended for the population.
The explanation for why the access to humanitarian agencies has been detailed as a way 
of complying with primary RtoP therefore appears to be one of result. That is, RtoP crimes 
can be the result o f  a failure to permit access to/expulsion of aid agencies by undermining 
population’s access to food, water and medicine. This relates to Wong’s843 argument 
regarding the actus reus of RtoP crimes. He argues that ‘RtoP applies not just to a 
government’s failure to protect its people from affirmatively perpetrated mass atrocities, but 
also from harm based an omission where the government’s failure to act also constitutes a 
crime against humanity under international law’.844 Following this view, it can be argued 
that compliance with primary RtoP requires that national authorities neither (i) commit RtoP 
crimes (e.g. expelling aid agencies and thereby ‘wilfully impeding relief supplies’845); nor
(ii) fail to effectively act whenever RtoP crimes could arise from inaction on their part (e.g. 
to provide aid agencies with permission to enter their territory in order to prevent crimes 
against humanity from arising from a lack of food).
2 The Substance of Primary RtoP: General Findings
The above discussion of primary RtoP’s scope and its implementation in practice enables 
some general findings to be made with regard to the duty, including (i) the nature and 
character of States obligations under primary RtoP; (ii) the significance of the variable 
means of implementing primary RtoP; (iii) primary RtoP’s duration; (iv) primary RtoP’s 
interplay with secondary RtoP’s discharge; and (v) the significance and potential 
implications of primary RtoP’s connection with existing obligations/practice. These findings 
merit individual consideration.
841 Food and Agriculture Organisation o f the United Nations, ‘The Right to Adequate Food in Emergencies’ (n 
830), 28 and 29.
842 Rome Statute (n 724) art 8 (2) (b) (xxv) [providing that ‘[i]ntentionally using starvation o f  civilians as a 
method o f warfare by depriving them o f objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief 
supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions’ represents a war crime for which can incur individual 
criminal responsibility].
843 J Wong, ‘Reconstructing the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake o f  Cyclones and Separatism’ (2009) 84 (2) 
Tulane Law Review 219.
844 Wong, ibid, 222-23, emphasis original. For a similar argument on the way in which an omission to act could 
amount to one o f the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers, see particularly A McLachlan-Bent and J Langmore, 
‘A Crime Against Humanity? Implications and Prospects o f the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake o f Cyclone 
Nargis’ (2011) 3 GRtoP 37, 40 and 45.
845 Rome Statute (n 724) art 8 (2) (b) (xxv).
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2.1 States Obligations under Primary RtoP
Practice regarding primary RtoP lends some support to Hollenbach’s846 argument that the 
obligations inherent to the RtoP framework are both positive and negative in character. 
Hollenbach asserts that the positive obligations can be deduced from the requirement that 
States or the international community act in order to ensure that populations are protected 
from RtoP crimes.847 This seems to correspond with the Outcome Document provision for 
national authorities to use ‘appropriate and necessary means’848 to fulfil primary RtoP and, 
furthermore, the trend in practice toward compliance with primary RtoP requiring that States 
take steps to prevent RtoP crimes from arising. For example, by (i) ratifying relevant human 
rights, humanitarian and criminal law instruments;849 (ii) educating the future generation 
about the RtoP framework and/or the legal obligations which underpin it;850 and (iii) 
ensuring that those who incite or otherwise perpetrate RtoP crimes are prosecuted.851 
Furthermore, the fact that relevant actors have reminded national authorities that they are 
obligated to not incite or otherwise perpetrate RtoP crimes when recalling primary RtoP, 
tends to support Hollenbach’s852 argument that primary RtoP also entails the negative 
obligation for national authorities to refrain from committing RtoP crimes.
We should also consider McClean’s853 argument that the “responsibility to prevent” 
formulated in the 2001 ICISS Report correlates with the “respect, protect, fulfil”854
846 D Hollenbach, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Why, When and How?’ Commonweal Magazine (New York, 3 
November 2010) <http://www.commonwealmagazine.org/humanitarian-intervention-0> accessed: 6 November 
2010 .
847 Hollenbach, ibid.
848 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
849 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 5 ,6  and 11. See also the Statement o f the Representative o f  
Mali to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements o f the 
Representatives o f France, Sweden (on behalf o f  the European Union) and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Hungary to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full 
Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 744) and Statement o f Jamaica 
(on behalf o f  CARICOM) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
850 Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect ‘Meeting Summary -  Fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect: 
Strengthening our Capacities to Halt and Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (24 September 2010), 3 
<http://globalr2p.org/advocacy/index.php> accessed 17 June 2012 and Statement o f  the Representative o f Congo 
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781.
851 Statement o f the Representative o f Canada to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative o f Botswana to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement o f the Representative o f Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, 
‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 
743).
852 Hollenbach (n 846).
853 E McClean, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Role o f International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 13 (1) 
Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 123, 144-45.
854 For a discussion o f the way in which these obligations form the roots o f primary RtoP, see D Giercyz, “The 
Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-Based Perspective” in A Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville 
(eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 104-110 and E Aba 
and M Hammer, Yes We Can? Options and Barriers to Broadening the Scope o f  the Responsibility to Protect to 
include Cases o f  Economic Social and Cultural Rights Abuses (One World Trust, London, 2009) 6-7.
123
trichotomy of States existing human rights obligations.855 Article 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights regarding minority rights is a good example of this 
trichotomy in practice. Although this was formulated in negative terms in order to increase 
the prospect of it being adopted universally, it is generally accepted that its effective 
implementation requires State parties to also act positively.856 Accordingly, State parties are 
obligated to refrain from interfering in the enjoyment of the rights contained therein 
(“respect”), to take steps to protect minorities from the rights being breached by ‘other 
persons within the State party’857 (“protect”) and to ensure that the rights can be enjoyed 
within the State858 (“fulfil”). The present author would therefore argue that elements of 
practice appear to reinforce McClean’s859 argument because primary RtoP similarly requires 
that national authorities (i) refrain from perpetrating RtoP crimes;860 (ii) take action to help 
protect the population from RtoP crimes perpetrated by non-State actors, such as by 
prosecuting perpetrators;861 and (iii) ensure that populations can enjoy their protection from 
RtoP crimes within the State, such as by training the police and military on RtoP and the 
obligations which underscore it.862
2.2 Variable Means of Implementation
A recurrent theme throughout the discussion of primary RtoP’s scope, and in practice more 
generally, is that primary RtoP’s implementation can vary from State to State in three ways. 
First, implementation can be tapered to the specific problems of each RtoP case. For 
example, when seeking to prevent RtoP crimes from being perpetrated in the State again, 
national authorities may choose to focus upon the rehabilitation of child soldiers in order to 
counter the risk that their rejection in the community may lead them to rejoin the 
military/armed group.863 In cases where RtoP crimes have been perpetrated outside the 
context o f armed conflict, national authorities may choose to focus on addressing the ethnic, 
economic or religious tensions which underscored the previous commission of RtoP crimes 
in the State. In cases where national policies on issues like land rights are considered to
855 McClean (n 853), 144-45.
856 This interpretation was given by the UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 23: Article 27- Rights 
o f Minorities’ (Fiftieth Session, 1994) para 5. For a good overview o f the debates regarding the character o f  
States duties under Article 27 o f the ICCPR, see generally R Cholewinski, ‘State Duty Towards Ethnic 
Minorities: Positive or Negative?’ (1988) 10 (3) Hum. Rts. Q 344.
857 Human Rights Committee, ibid.
858 Human Rights Committee, ibid.
859 McClean (n 853), 144-45.
860 See e.g. UNSC Res 2014 (n 730), preambular para 14; UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 2 and UNHRC Res 
S-16/1 (n 729), para 7.
861 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11.
862 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 12.
863 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 14.
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benefit some ethnic groups over others, as was the case in Kenya,864 national authorities may 
choose to focus on developing appropriate policies to overcome such perceptions of 
discrimination. When a particular minority group has been specifically targeted in previous 
violence, such as the Uzbek’s in Kyrgyzstan, national authorities may select to handle their 
ethnic diversity more positively by implementing specific minority rights.865 When national 
authorities are concerned with preventing RtoP crimes from emerging for the first time in the 
State, consideration can be given to strengthening national guarantees for human rights, for 
example. In doing so, any potential risk factors may be focused upon, such as improving the 
perception of women within the society and encouraging cultural, linguistic and religious 
diversity through the effective enforcement of minority rights and rights to freedom of 
expression and non-discrimination.
Second, implementation can vary in terms of whether the State is to act or omit to act. 
The above examples would entail the State taking positive steps to comply with primary 
RtoP, whereas in cases like Darfur866 and Burma867 the requirement was for the State to not 
act in a particular manner again (e.g. by expelling aid agencies, refusing to permit the aid 
agencies access). Sometimes, this can vary in accordance with the way in which a particular 
RtoP case evolves. Originally in Libya and Syria the emphasis was on national authorities 
refraining from  shooting at peaceful protesters868 but, as these cases progressed, the national 
authorities were urged to also take positive steps. For instance, to put in place mechanisms to 
ensure that the delivery of aid was not impeded869 and that UN observers could safely carry 
out their mandate.870
Third, different national authorities can use the same means of implementing primary 
RtoP in alternate ways. Whilst one State may domestically criminalise ethnic cleansing in 
accordance with its traditional understanding as a crime against humanity, it was noted 
above that there is some scope to suggest that Swaziland871 may codify ethnic cleansing in a 
wider sense. A further illustration of this is the prosecution of those who perpetrate RtoP 
crimes. One State may choose to prosecute the perpetrators of RtoP crimes through a 
traditional judicial trial, whereas another may select to supplement this with a truth and
864 UNHCHR, ‘Report from the OCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya (6-28 February 2008)’ (n 788), 5-6 and 9- 
10.
865 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f  Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 790). On the ethnic divisions in this region and its 
contribution to the violence that has emerged within respective States, see J Claes, ‘Preventing Conflict in the 
“Stans’” (2010) United States Institute o f Peace: Peace Brief No. 21, 3 
<http://www.usip.org/publications/preventing-conflict-in-the-stans> accessed 17 June 2012.
866 EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’ (n 761), paras 3 and F.
867 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761), paras 5 and K.
868 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 1 and UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 729), para 1.
869 UNSC Res 1973 (n 728), para 3.
870 UNSC Res 2043 (2012) UN Doc S/RES/2043, paras 7 and 8. (UNSC Res 2043).
871 Statement o f  the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100.
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reconciliation commission.
This writer would therefore argue that enabling primary RtoP to be implemented through 
variable means suggests that States have a margin o f appreciation regarding which means 
that they use in order to comply with it. At a practical level, this enables States to tailor-fit 
primary RtoP to the protection needs of the population in the factual context at issue. At a 
policy level, this approach can ease concerns that primary RtoP’s discharge will impact upon 
States particular national interests.872 This is because the approach essentially leaves States 
with discretion over the specific measures that they choose to utilise in order to implement 
primary RtoP, as opposed to being required to implement particular measures by the 
international community. This discretion comes through in the Outcome Document and 
subsequent UN guidance on RtoP’s implementation. The Outcome Document provides that 
primary RtoP should be implemented through ‘appropriate and necessary’873 means. A 
review of its drafting history illustrates that this phrase was not included within preliminary 
drafts,874 thereby suggesting that it was included as the result of State negotiations. However, 
neither the statements delivered during the drafting process nor those delivered in subsequent 
practice clarify why it was added. There is therefore the possibility that ‘appropriate’875 was 
included in the Outcome Document in order to denote that the specific means States use to 
implement primary RtoP are not mandatory but, rather, discretionary in accordance with the 
specific circumstances on the ground in each case. With regard to UN guidance, it is notable 
that the UNSG’s Report suggests that primary RtoP bearers ‘could’876 or ‘should’877 
implement specific means internally, as opposed to “must”. The qualified language used to 
outline the means of implementation tends to support the view that primary RtoP was 
formulated to entail a margin of appreciation.
With regard to the effectiveness and significance of the variable approach taken to the 
means of implementing primary RtoP, we can draw upon international human rights 
mechanisms. The approach seems to overlap with that adopted in the field of minority
872 The United States’ reservations regarding ratification o f  the Rome Statute are but one example. Groves has 
argued that the US should reject the RtoP framework because it encourages the State to take particular courses of 
action, namely the ratification o f international instruments that it considers to be detrimental to its wider national 
political interests, such as the way in which ratification o f the Rome Statute entails the implication that US 
nationals may be prosecuted for crimes carried out in a State party’s territoiy. S Groves, ‘The US should Reject 
the U.N “Responsibility to Protect” Doctrine’ (The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Executive Summary No. 
2130, 2008) 3-4 < http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2008/05/the-us-should-reject-the-un-responsibility- 
to-protect-doctrine> 17 June 2012. The US position on the ICC and its rationale for this position has been noted
in RtoP discourse, notably by Feinstein and Thakur. See respectively L Feinstein, ‘Darfur and Beyond: What is
Needed to Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (2007) 22 Council on Foreign Relations 1, 36 and R Thakur, ‘Behind the 
Headlines: Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2004) 62 (1) Canadian Institute o f International Affairs 1, 5.
873 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
874 See e.g. UNGA President, ‘Draft Outcome Document’ (22 July 2005) UN Doc A/59/HLPM/CRP. 1/Rev. 1, 
paras 113-114.
75 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
876 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 10, 12.
877 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11 and 12.
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protection on the basis that international,878 regional879 and bilateral880 minority protection 
instruments also use qualifying terms, such as “appropriate”, to enable their means of 
implementation to accommodate each State’s specific context. Such phrases have been 
generally understood to recognise a margin of appreciation for duty bearers881 and thereby 
allow States flexibility concerning how they domestically implement the rights therein.882 
The rationale for the formulation of a margin of appreciation in a minority protection 
context is interesting. The early efforts of external organs to obligate States to protect their 
minorities were considered by some States to violate their sovereignty because they sought 
to impose specific protection duties upon them.883 In short, the formulation of specific 
protection duties upon States was considered to be an attempt of ‘the greater Powers, to 
impose their will upon the smaller States’.884 The RtoP framework asks States to accept that 
they can be the subject of international action, including through armed force, should RtoP 
crimes occur or threaten to occur in the territory.885 Accordingly, it is arguable that 
formulating primary RtoP to entail a margin of appreciation may have helped to make the 
framework more palatable to States, not least because it helps to guard against external 
interference in States internal affairs until the need to protect populations from RtoP crimes
878 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Linguistic or Religious 
Minorities’ (n 748) art 1 (2) provides that ‘States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures’ to give 
effect to the rights o f persons belonging to national, ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities provided by the 
Declaration.
879 For e.g. Article 12 (1) o f the Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities provides that 
‘[t]he Parties shall, where appropriate, take measures in the fields o f education and research to foster knowledge 
o f the culture, history, language and religion o f their national minorities and o f the majority’, emphasis added. 
Framework Convention for the Protection o f National Minorities (1995) 34 ILM 351 art 12(1).
880 The following agreements incorporated a similar approach into the right o f minorities to effective 
participation in national and regional decision-making on matters concerning minorities: Germany and Poland 
(1991); Poland and Belarus (1992); Russia-Kazakhstan (1992); Poland and Lithuania (1994); Hungary and 
Slovakia (1995); Hungary and Romania (1996). Bilateral agreements detailed in K Gal, ‘Bilateral Agreements in 
Central and Eastern Europe: A New Inter-State Framework for Minority Protection?’ (1999) ECMI Working 
Paper No. 4, 22 <http://www.ecmi.de/publications/detail/04-bilateral-agreements-in-central-and-eastem-europe- 
a-new-inter-state-framework-for-minority-protection-191/> accessed 14 October 2012.
881 Pentassuglia explains that the phrase provides some discretion to State Parties in their domestic 
implementation o f minority rights. G Pentassuglia, “Minority Rights, Human Rights: A Review o f  Basic 
Concepts, Entitlements and Implementation Procedures under International Law” in M Weller and A Morowa 
(eds), Mechanisms fo r  the Implementation o f  Minority Rights (Council o f Europe Press, Strasbourg 2005) 16.
882 Nasic explains the effect o f the phrase in its usage in the Framework Convention. She directs that 
‘[pjrogrammatic provisions often contain qualifying phrases such as “substantial numbers”, “a real need”, “where 
appropriate”, and “as far as possible,” giving the state parties certain flexibility when they implement the 
Framework Convention through national legislation and appropriate governmental policies’. H Nasic, ‘Minority 
Rights Instruments and Mechanisms: Minority Protection along the Conflict Continuum’ (2007) EURAC 
Research, European Academy, 40.
883 These debates were aired at the Paris Peace Conference which established the Treaty o f Versailles, and 
thereby the League o f Nations. On the Paris Peace Conference 1919 generally, see e.g. P Thomberry, 
International Law and the Rights o f  Minorities (OUP, Oxford 1991) 26. On the specific debates regarding the 
imposition of specific duties on States to protect their minorities, see H V Temperley, A History o f  the Peace 
Conference o f  Paris, Vol. V (OUP, London 1921) 121-131 and H J Steiner, P Alston and R Goodman, 
International Human Rights In Context (3rd edition OUP, Oxford 2007) 96.
884 Temperley, ibid, 129.
885 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
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Finally, there is the question of whether a margin of appreciation can be reconciled with 
primary RtoP as a duty of universal application. Here, we can draw by analogy on the 
development of States’ duties under broader human rights mechanisms, specifically those in 
relation to socio-economic rights. Although all State parties are obligated to implement these 
rights, their implementation can be of a programmatic, progressive nature.887 This is in view 
of the fact that it may be difficult for a State to immediately put in place the necessary 
guarantees for the enjoyment of the right in the territory or, indeed, that some mechanisms 
for the enjoyment of the right may be more relevant to some States than others.888 
Accordingly, States are given considerable discretion over the specific means that they use to 
implement the right. This approach may help to explain why the Outcome Document 
provides that the means used to implement primary RtoP should be ‘appropriate and 
necessary’.889 Arguably, the inclusion of ‘necessary’590 was intended to enable States’ to 
implement primary RtoP programmatically and, therefore, permitting States to disregard 
those means of implementation which are irrelevant to their specific factual context. An 
illustration which seems to support this interpretation is the fact that the UK government has 
not referred to using means to implement primary RtoP.891 There is scope to argue that this is 
because the UK has implemented most, if not all, of those measures which are relevant to 
safeguarding populations from RtoP crimes within its specific factual context (e.g. human 
rights legislation, membership of the ICC).
Whilst States’ implementation of socio-economic rights can be programmatic, each State 
is under ‘a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum
RQO o n jessential levels of each of the’ socio-economic rights. The ‘minimum core obligation’ 
typically requires that the State refrain from violating the basic protection which the rights 
aim to provide. If we draw by analogy upon this, there is scope to argue that the primary 
RtoP duty entails certain minimum standards which all States are required to comply with, 
irrespective of their factual context, not least that national authorities should not perpetrate
886 With regard to this threshold in terms o f providing international assistance under secondary RtoP, see para 138 
o f the Outcome Document. In terms o f the threshold in relation to the provision o f peaceful means or the 
implementation o f a ‘timely and decisive response’ under secondary RtoP, see Outcome Document, ibid.
887 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘The Nature o f States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, 
par.l) CESCR General Comment No. 3 ’ (14 December 1990), para 9. (UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, ‘The Nature o f States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, par. 1) CESCR General Comment No. 3 ’).
888 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ibid.
889 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138, emphasis added.
890 Outcome Document, ibid.
891 In 2009 Lord Jay o f Ewelme contended that ‘shamefully, little has happened to put’ RtoP ‘into effect’ and 
asked what the UK government was doing to ‘give effect to the UN doctrine o f the Responsibility to Protect’. 
Notably, the government’s responses focused on the implementation o f secondary RtoP. ‘UN: Responsibility to 
Protect’ HL Debate 30 June 2009, vol 712, cols 192-195.
892 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘The Nature o f States Parties Obligations (Art. 2, 
par.l) CESCR General Comment No. 3 ’ (n 887), para 10.
93 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ibid.
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RtoP crimes. This seems consistent with the fact that the Outcome Document explicitly 
commits ‘each individual State’894 to ‘act in accordance,895 with the duty, not only States 
which are most at risk of RtoP crimes. As the UNSG notes, ‘even relatively stable, 
developed and progressive’896 States should reassess the measures that they have in place for 
preventing RtoP crimes.897
2.3 The Duration of the Primary RtoP Duty
A significant trend in practice regarding primary RtoP is that national authorities have been 
reminded of their duty, or have implemented it, at different stages of RtoP cases. In Libya, 
the UNHRC and UNSC reiterated the primary RtoP duty of Libyan national authorities when 
RtoP crimes were apprehended as being perpetrated within the State.898 In contrast, the 
Kenyan authorities suggested that they had implemented the duty through legislative means 
after the cessation of the post-election violence in which RtoP crimes had been committed.899 
In Kyrgyzstan, the Joint Statement of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention of 
Genocide and RtoP900 called for the national authorities to (i) effectively implement their 
primary RtoP duty in order to stop the violence;901 and (ii) to put in place measures which 
reduced the prospect of RtoP crimes arising again.902 Furthermore, the Joint Statement of the 
aforementioned Special Advisers on Libya903 also recalled the primary RtoP duty of the 
national authorities of all States ‘facing large-scale popular protests’.904 These variations in 
practice have a bearing on the duration of the primary RtoP duty. Essentially, the variations 
indicate that the primary RtoP duty continues before (e.g. Arab States in general), during 
(e.g. Libya, Kyrgyzstan) and after (e.g. Kyrgyzstan, Kenya) the perpetration of RtoP crimes 
within a State. The ongoing nature of primary RtoP also comes through in the means
894 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138, emphasis added.
895 Outcome Document, ibid, emphasis added.
896 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 12.
897 The UNSG advises that all States should ‘ask themselves whether they are vulnerable to such events; whether 
the seeds o f intolerance, bigotry and exclusion could take root and grow into something horrific and self­
destructive; and whether their social, economic and political systems have self-correcting mechanisms in place to 
discourage and derail such impulses. Candid self-reflection, searching dialogue among groups and institutions, 
both domestically and internationally, and periodic risk assessment are needed in both fragile and seemingly 
healthy societies in all regions o f the world’. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid.
898 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 2; UNSC Res 1970 (n 728), preambular para 9 and UNSC Res 1973 (n
728), preambular para 4. The UNHRC also took this approach in relation to Syria, see UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n
729), para 1.
899 See Statement o f the Representative o f Kenya to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743).
900 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 790).
901 UN Press Release, ibid.
902 UN Press Release, ibid.
903 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Adviser on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and Special Adviser on 
the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Libya’ (22 February 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 17 June 2012.
904 UN Press Release, ibid.
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proposed for its implementation. For example, training the military and police on human 
rights and humanitarian law may be a useful step to take before RtoP crimes emerge,905 
permitting access to humanitarian agencies can be helpful during the crises,906 whilst 
rehabilitating child soldiers and prosecuting the offenders of RtoP crimes are useful ways of 
implementing primary RtoP after RtoP crimes have been committed in the State.907
Primary RtoP as an ongoing duty also has more general significance because it raises the 
possibility that primary and secondary RtoP can be implemented concurrently. In terms of 
secondary RtoP’s international assistance component, reference can be made to the fact that, 
when encouraging the Kyrgyzstan authorities to implement primary RtoP, the UNSG’s 
Special Advisers on RtoP and the prevention of genocide urged the international community 
‘to operationalise its “responsibility to protect” by providing coordinated and timely 
assistance to stop the violence and its incitement’.908 With regard to secondary RtoP’s non­
peaceful responsive component909, reference can be made to the fact that UNSC Resolutions 
1970 and 1973 both (i) recalled the primary RtoP duty of the Libyan national authorities;910 
and (ii) authorised the application of measures which can be used to discharge secondary 
RtoP, not least collective sanctions911 and the use of armed force to protect civilians.912 
Accordingly, practice to date suggests that one impact of framing primary RtoP as an 
ongoing duty is that it enables primary and secondary RtoP to be implemented concurrently.
Concurrent implementation of primary RtoP and secondary RtoP undermines the 
argument in present literature that primary and secondary RtoP are to be implemented 
independently of one another and, therefore, that the State’s primary RtoP duty suspends 
once secondary RtoP is applied.913 This view comes through in the use of terminology which 
suggests a strict divide between primary and secondary RtoP’s implementation. For example 
(i) that the international community bears a ‘fallback responsibility’;914 (ii) that the duty to 
protect populations will ‘shift’915 from the State to the international community; and (iii) that
905 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 12.
906 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761) and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’ (n 761).
907 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11 and 14.
908 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 790), emphasis added.
909 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
910 UNSC Res 1970 (n 728), preambular para 9 and UNSC Res 1973 (n 728), preambular para 4.
911 UNSC Res 1970, ibid, paras 9 to 25.
912 UNSC Res 1973 (n 728), paras 4 to 12.
913 See e.g. A Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 (3) EJIL 513; R Cohen, 
‘Strengthening Protection o f IDP’s: The UN’s Role’ (2006) 7 (1) Georgetown Journal o f International Affairs 
101; H Nasu, ‘Operationalising the “Responsibility to Protect” and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas o f Civilian 
Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 (2) Journal o f Conflict & Security Law 209; M Kalkman,
‘Responsibility to Protect: A Bow Without an Arrow’ (2009) 5 Cambridge Student L. Rev 75; V Holt and T 
Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modem Peace 
Operations (The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington D.C. 2006); McClean (n 853), 123-152 and N Turner and 
N Otsuki, The Responsibility to Protect Minorities and the Problem o f  the Kin State (United Nations University, 
Tokyo 2010).
914 Peters, ibid, 513.
915 Cohen, ‘Strengthening Protection o f IDP’s: The UN’s Role’ (n 913), 102 and Nasu (n 913), 215.
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the responsibility to protect populations will devolve,916 ‘fall on’917 or ‘fall to’918 the 
international community. Conversely, the argument that primary RtoP is an ongoing duty 
capable of being implemented concurrently with secondary RtoP reinforces the assertions of 
Bellamy919 and Luck.920 Whilst Bellamy argues that the primary RtoP duty is ‘enduring’,921 
Luck922 argues that a crucial distinction between RtoP and the wider concept of humanitarian 
intervention is that the former enables collaboration between the State and international 
community on protection issues. Examination of practice regarding primary RtoP can 
develop these arguments somewhat. The discussion of the duration of the primary RtoP duty 
can add precision to Bellamy’s923 argument by explaining the extent to which the primary 
RtoP duty can be said to “endure”. That is, that the primary RtoP duty has been approached 
in practice as that which holds before, during and after RtoP crimes arise in a State.
Arguments made more generally within RtoP literature suggest that the concurrent 
implementation of primary and secondary RtoP could entail implications, however. A 
continuing duty may suggest that the international community and the State can act as dual 
bearers. Some commentators924 argue that this could lead to protection being undermined by 
debates over which bearer has the responsibility to act in any given case. Stahn,925
0*%/ 077
Payandeh and Bellamy note that the Outcome Document provides for secondary RtoP to
916 Kalkman (n913), 84.
917 Holt and Berkman (n 913), 2.
918 McClean (n 853), 127 and Turner and Otsuki (n 913), 3.
919 A Bellamy, ‘The Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect’ (e-International Relations, 1 May 
2009) <http://www.e-ir.info/2009/05Z01 /the-conflict-in-sri-lanka-and-the-responsibility-to-protect/> accessed 10 
October 2010. For a similar viewpoint see also, A Bellamy and T Hunt, ‘Mainstreaming the Responsibility to 
Protect in Peace Operations’ (2010) Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Programme on the 
Protection o f Civilians, Working Paper No. 3, 8.
920 E C Luck, ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (August 2008) The Stanley Foundation 
Policy Analysis Brief, 5 <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/policyanalysis.cffn2idK345> accessed 8 October 
2012 .
921 Bellamy, ‘The Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 919) and Bellamy and Hunt (n 919), 
8. The UNSG also seems to take the view that primary RtoP is ongoing, referring to primary RtoP as an ‘enduring 
responsibility’. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 26.
922 Luck, ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 920), 5.
923 Bellamy, ‘The Conflict in Sri Lanka and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 919) and Bellamy and Hunt (n 919), 
8 .
924 See particularly, A Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and 
Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) 19 Ethics & International Affairs 31; C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ 101 (1) AJIL 99; Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan 
Arrests’ (n 818); Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared 
Responsibility” (n 818); M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept o f the 
Responsibility to Protect within the Process o f International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal o f Int’l L. 469 
and N Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 2005 World Summit’ 
(Paper presented at ‘The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?’ conference, University o f Toronto, Canada, 6-7 
October 2005), 8
<http://cadair.aber.ac.Uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1971 /l/a%20victory%20for%20common%20humanity%20Whee 
ler.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012.
925 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid, 166-117.
926 Payandeh (n 924), 498. Payandeh goes as far as to argue that it is the potential ambiguity over where 
protective responsibility lies in each case which could arise from the concept o f a dual bearer that led States to 
accept the RtoP framework at the World Summit. Payandeh, 498.
927 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after 
Iraq’ (n 924), 43.
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be discharged through a ‘timely and decisive response’928 when (i) national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations; and (ii) peaceful means would be inadequate 
to ensure their protection.929 These commentators930 consider that these criteria will lead to 
disagreement over whether the protection of a population from RtoP crimes falls within the 
remit of the State or international community’s RtoP. As Stahn931 puts the issue, the 
Outcome Document criteria create a ‘complementarity trap’.932 Bellamy,933 Stahn934 and 
Wheeler935 ground this argument in the way in which the UNSC responded to the crisis in 
Darfur in 2004. They argue that the responses of UNSC members suggest that there was a 
lack of consensus on where RtoP lies in each case, specifically whether the situation should 
be handled by the State under primary RtoP or the international community under secondary 
RtoP.936 The present author does not find this argument compelling for two reasons. First, 
there is a need to exercise sufficient caution when drawing lessons about the duration of 
RtoP from the UNSC’s approach to the situation in Darfur in 2004. This took place a full 
year prior to States’ adoption of the Outcome Document937 and, therefore, any references to 
RtoP made in the course of the situation were pursuant to the way in which RtoP was 
formulated in the 2001 ICISS Report. The ICISS Report suggested some form of dividing 
line between the responsibilities of the State and international community, providing that 
when the ‘State is unable or unwilling’938 to protect ‘it becomes the responsibility of the 
international community to act in its place’.939 In contrast, the Outcome Document 
establishes a factual threshold940 for when the most coercive measures should be used, not 
the point at which the State’s role in protecting populations effectively suspends. Using the 
situation in Darfur in 2004 as a case study can therefore undermine the evolving nature of 
RtoP in both principle and practice, including significant differences in the formulation of
928 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
929 Outcome Document, ibid.
930 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after 
Iraq’ (n 924); Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 924); Stahn, 
‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ (n 818); Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared Responsibility”  (n 818); Payandeh (n 924) and Wheeler, ‘A Victory for 
Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 2005 World Summit’ (n 924).
931 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’, ibid.
932 Stahn, ibid, 116.
933 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after 
Iraq’ (n 924).
934 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm’ (n 924), 117.
935 Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 2005 World Summit’ (n 
924), 8.
936 Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after 
Iraq’ (n 924), 43; Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm’ (n 924), 117 and 
Wheeler, ibid, 9.
937 They specifically refer to State positions on UNSC Res 1556 (30 July 2004) UN Doc S/RES/1556(2004) 
which are available in the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 July 2004) UN Doc. S/PV.5015.
938 ICISS Report (n 727), 17.
939 ICISS Report, ibid.
940 That is, the Outcome Document provides that the international community can take collective action if  
national authorities are manifestly failing  to protect their populations from RtoP crimes and peaceful means would 
be inadequate to ensure the populations protection. Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
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primary RtoP’s duration.
Second, the argument tends to overlook that primary RtoP has developed as an ongoing 
duty which is capable of being implemented concurrently with secondary RtoP. Overlooking 
this development tends to undermine the multifaceted and persuasive rationale for why 
primary RtoP has developed in this way. At a legal level, it helps to ensure that primary RtoP 
is consistent with the continuity of existing legal obligations and, therefore, the way in 
primary RtoP interacts with the existing international legal order. If primary RtoP suspended 
upon secondary RtoP’s activation then the primary RtoP duty would weaken States existing 
obligations, including those which primary RtoP seeks to strengthen the implementation of 
(e.g. human rights law). The UNSG941 and Switzerland942 have alluded to this implication, 
arguing that:
‘[I]t is important to stress that the obligations of States with regard to international 
law exist regardless of the emergence of a situation in which the concept of 
responsibility to protect may come into play. These obligations cannot and must not 
be diluted. It should also be emphasised that although the concept contains numerous 
existing international law obligations, it remains a political concept and does not in 
itself constitute a new norm. Nor does it have the effect of dispensing States from 
their conventional and customary law obligations with regard to human rights law, 
international humanitarian law and refugee law’.943
At a practical and policy level, formulating primary RtoP as a non-continuing duty would 
have suggested that, once secondary RtoP is activated, States are discharged from the 
protective duties they owe to their populations under existing international law. This could 
undermine the practical discharge of secondary RtoP which can rely on the State permitting 
international efforts to protect the population. For example, States can be required to permit 
access to humanitarian agencies as part of their duty to respect populations’ right to adequate 
food.944 Similarly, UN observer missions largely depend upon the cooperation of national 
authorities for certain issues,945 such as providing them with security whilst they travel in the 
State.946 Formulating primary RtoP as an ongoing duty which can be implemented 
concurrently with secondary RtoP can therefore help to make the RtoP framework more
941 The UNSG notes that ‘[t]he Summit’s enunciation o f the responsibility to protect was not intended to detract 
in any way from the much broader range o f obligations existing under international humanitarian law, 
international human rights law, refugee law and international criminal law’. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing 
RtoP (n 720), 5.
942 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
943 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland, ibid.
944 On this see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation o f the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
12: The Right to Adequate Food’ (n 830), para 19.
945 The UNSC authorisation to deploy a UN Observer Mission to Syria is a principal example. See UNSC Res 
2043 (n 870), paras 7-9 and 11.
946 Not least because it is States who are required to guarantee the security and safety o f UN personnel. See 
particularly, UNSC Res 2043, ibid, para 11.
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politically palatable to States, not least because it provides for the State to retain some role 
regarding the way in which certain secondary RtoP measures are discharged. At the same 
time, the concept of concurrent responsibility reduces the prospect of secondary RtoP’s 
discharge being hindered by a refusal of States to cooperate with the measures put in place 
by the international community.
2.4 The Value Added of Primary RtoP
Present practice upholds the view that States can implement primary RtoP through 
obligations under human rights, criminal and humanitarian law.947 However, this writer 
would argue that practice equally suggests that primary RtoP does not just restate States 
existing human rights, criminal and humanitarian law obligations948 but, rather, could add 
value to these obligations in four ways. Each way merits individual reflection.
2.4.1 Strengthens and/or Clarifies the Requirements of Existing Rights/Obligations in 
an RtoP Context
Primary RtoP appears to add value to the existing mechanisms to which it relates by 
strengthening and/or clarifying the specific requirements of existing rights/obligations in an 
RtoP context. In so doing, primary RtoP can be compared to the collection of human rights 
instruments which have clarified the requirements of the fundamental rights/obligations 
contained in the International Bill of Rights in more specific contexts. Examples include the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,949 the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child950 and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons
947 D Miller, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Human Rights’ (Memo for the Workshop on Global Governance, 
Princeton University, February 2006) <http://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/.../Session6_Miller.pdf> 
accessed 10 October 2010; Groves (n 872); McClean (n 853); L Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty 
o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (2008) 34 Review o f International Studies 445,448; Mooney (n 755), 
84; Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 755), 26 and H Slim, ‘Value versus Power: Responsible 
Sovereignty as Struggle in Zimbabwe’ (2010) 2 GRtoP 150. It also supports the view that primary RtoP is based 
upon the existing legal obligations o f States under international human rights, humanitarian and criminal law. On 
this view, see e.g. E Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush - On the Assumed Legal Nature o f  
the Responsibility to Protect” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 854) 48-51; A Bellamy and R Reike “The 
Responsibility to Protect and International Law” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 854) 89-94 and Stahn, 
‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 924), 118.
948 This view is taken by a number o f commentators, including A Hehir, The Responsibility to Protect: Rhetoric, 
Reality and the Future o f  Humanitarian Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke 2012) 74; Strauss, ibid, 
48-51; Bellamy and Reike, ibid, 89-94 and Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging 
Legal Norm?’, ibid.
949 CEDAW (n 754).
950 UNGA Res 44/25, ‘Convention on the Rights o f the Child’ (1989) UN Doc A/44/49. (Convention on the 
Rights o f the Child).
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Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities.951 To illustrate the way 
in which primary RtoP achieves this, reference can be made to the right to adequate food and 
water, non-discrimination, children’s rights and freedom of expression.
Primary RtoP strengthens States’ duties with regard to rights to adequate food and water 
because it subsumes these duties into the specific context of preventing and protecting 
populations from RtoP crimes. One example is that of national authorities permitting access 
to humanitarian personnel/aid as a means of implementing primary RtoP. The case study of 
Burma suggests that States duty to respect populations’ right to adequate food by ensuring 
that humanitarian aid is equally distributed amongst all sections of the population, 
irrespective of ethnicity or other feature,952 bears increased significance under primary RtoP. 
To this end, it will be recalled that the Burmese authorities’ refusal of entry to humanitarian 
agencies and their inequitable distribution of humanitarian aid among the population, was 
considered to be an act which could amount to a crime against humanity.953 Thus, in an RtoP 
context States obligation to distribute humanitarian aid on a non-discriminatory basis is 
necessary to effectively fulfil their obligation to respect the rights to adequate food and water 
and prevent the perpetration of RtoP crimes on their territory.
The right to non-discrimination is the second example. Primary RtoP appears to 
supplement the way in which this right has been tailored in practice following the adoption 
of the International Bill of Rights to meet the needs of particular individuals by contouring, 
albeit implicitly, the specific requirements of the right to non-discrimination in an RtoP 
context. A cross-cutting theme in the UNSG’s 2009 Report on Implementing RtoP is the way 
in which adequate protection of the right to non-discrimination can help to prevent RtoP 
crimes from arising or re-arising. A case in point is the recommendation that national 
authorities ensure that the judiciary is free from gender discrimination,954 This helps to 
define the key requirements of women’s right to non-discrimination in an RtoP context by 
encouraging national authorities to ensure that gender bias does not inhibit holding the 
perpetrators of all forms of RtoP crimes to account.
A further example is the proposal for States to take steps to rehabilitate and reintegrate 
child soldiers within the community.955 The effective implementation of children’s rights 
bear increased significance in an RtoP context, not least because of the interplay between
951 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Linguistic or Religious 
Minorities’ (n 748).
952 See e.g. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation o f the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.
12: The Right to Adequate Food’ (n 830), para 18.
953 See e.g. E C Luck, Testimony before Subcommittee on International Development, Foreign Assistance, 
Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection Committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, 17 
June 2008 cited in Cohen, ‘Reconciling RtoP with IDP Protection’ (n 755), 25 and EP Res, ‘Tragic Situation in 
Burma’ (n 761), para K.
954 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 12.
955 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 11 and 14.
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using children in armed hostilities and the perpetration of RtoP crimes. The proposals for 
national authorities to rehabilitate and reintegrate children returning from participation in 
hostilities is therefore not only important for upholding a child’s rights to be protected from 
violence956 and to be protected in times of war,957 but also for preventing RtoP crimes being 
committed by, and against, the child soldier. Rehabilitating and reintegrating child soldiers 
can help to overcome the risk that they will return to the armed group/military and commit 
further RtoP crimes against the general population. At the same time, taking the said steps 
can help to prevent the perpetuation of a specific RtoP crime within the State, namely the use 
of child soldiers.
Primary RtoP also reinforces, perhaps further clarifies, the requirements for the legitimate 
curtailment o f  rights by the State. A useful example is the right to freedom of expression. 
The UNSG praised the Kenyan authorities for banning live media broadcasts during the 
election violence in order to prevent any further inflammatory hate speech being used within 
political broadcasts.958 This suggests that primary RtoP reinforces that the enjoyment of the 
right carries ‘special duties and responsibilities’959 because it should not undermine respect 
of the rights of others,960 specifically by suggesting that inflammatory expression could incite 
the perpetration of RtoP crimes.961 Furthermore, it strengthens the requirement for the 
curtailment of the right to adhere to the test of necessity and proportionality.962 To this effect, 
Kenya’s ban on broadcasts in order to prevent further RtoP crimes being incited by political 
officials was restricted to live broadcasts only.963
In contrast, the case studies of Libya and Syria serve to remind national authorities that, 
wherever possible, they should take steps to ensure that the right to freedom of expression 
can be fully enjoyed within the State in order to ‘reduce the likelihood of crimes relating to 
the responsibility to protect being planned and carried out’.964 The heightened significance of 
the right to freedom of expression in an RtoP context stems the fact that some States may (i) 
curtail enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression by perpetrating RtoP crimes against 
the population; and/or (ii) interfere with the right in order to prevent the population from 
alerting the international community that RtoP crimes are being committed within the 
territory by State or non-State actors. To this effect, we should recall that it was the 
population’s exercise of the right to freedom of expression that partly triggered the
956 Convention on the Rights o f  the Child 1989 (n 950) art 19.
957 ibid, arts 38 and 39.
958 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 24.
959 ICCPR (n 721) art 19(3).
960 ibid, art 19 (3) (a).
961 The Outcome Document expressly provides that States should prevent RtoP crimes ‘including their 
incitement’. Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
962 ICCPR (n 721) art 19 (3). See further, Committee on Civil and Political Rights, ‘Article 19: Freedoms o f  
Opinion and Expression, General Comment No.34’ (12 September 2011), 8.
96 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 24.
964 Report o f the UN Secretary-General, ibid at 11.
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commission of RtoP crimes by the Libyan and Syrian national authorities.965 Furthermore, 
we should bear in mind that it was in response to the population’s efforts to inform the 
international community of the commission of RtoP crimes that these authorities violated the 
right to freedom of expression (e.g. efforts to shut down telephone lines and/or internet 
connections).966
2.4.2 Extending Obligations to Cover States who are Not Parties to all Relevant Treaties
Primary RtoP may also add value by extending protective obligations to cover States who 
are not parties to all the relevant treaties. Whilst there has undoubtedly been a high take-up 
of relevant treaties among States, ratification has not been entirely universal. One example is 
Kenya which has not ratified the Genocide Convention967 but, nevertheless, has acted in 
accordance with primary RtoP to some extent. As noted earlier, Kenya took steps to prevent 
RtoP crimes from re-arising by criminalising genocide in national law in the International 
Crimes Act.968 A further example is the US which is not a State party to the Rome Statute 
but, nevertheless, supported the UNSC’s referral of the situation in Libya to the ICC.969
To some extent acting in accordance with primary RtoP may be due to the fact that 
certain treaty obligations, like the prevention of genocide, have become part of customary 
international law. However, this does not mean that primary RtoP’s expansion of these 
obligations to non-State parties has no significance. Interaction with primary RtoP by States 
who are not parties to all the relevant treaties like Kenya can, in the longer term, provide 
evidence of supportive State practice for primary RtoP’s development as new customary 
international law.970 In the interim, acting in accordance with primary RtoP reinforces the 
prevention of, and protection against, RtoP crimes as at least universal moral and/or political 
obligations. Furthermore, the above examples tend to reinforce Luck’s argument that, despite 
being ‘largely based on existing obligations’,971 the Outcome Document represents a ‘major
965 With regard to Libya see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All 
Alleged Violations o f International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (n 785), 49-54. In relation 
to Syria see UN Press Release, ‘Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, release Statement Marking a Full Year o f Violent Suppression o f  Anti- 
Government Protests in Syria’ (n 785).
966 On Libya see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged 
Violations o f International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’, ibid, 49-50. On Syria see 
UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the 
Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 785), 8.
967 UN Treaty Series, ‘Status o f the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide 
1948’ <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-l&chaptei=4&lang=en> accessed 
16 June 2012.
968 International Crimes Act 2008 (Act No. 16 o f 2008, entry into force 9 January 2009) art 5 (1) (a) and (6).
969 UNSC Res 1970 (n 728), paras 4-8 and Statement o f the Representative o f  the United States to the UN 
Security Council, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491.
970 Primary RtoP’s legal status is discussed in chapter six.
971 Luck, ‘The United Nations and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 920), 3.
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step forward in the protection of fundamental human rights’972 because it was accepted by ‘a 
number of countries that had not been State parties to the relevant human rights, 
humanitarian and refugee conventions’.973
2.4.3 Broadens Reach of Relevant Obligations to Go Bevond States to the International 
Community
A further significant way in which primary RtoP can represent added value is by broadening 
the reach of relevant obligations beyond States to the international community. A good 
example of this relates to the capacity for primary and secondary RtoP to be implemented 
concurrently. This seems to go further than the co-operation that occurs between the State 
and international community within existing practice, such as in inter-ethnic conflicts.974 
Here, co-operation between the State and international community toward protection may 
occur during and after the harm at issue has arisen. For example, during the conflict the 
State and international community may co-operate to negotiate an end to the conflict and, 
post-conflict, States may co-operate with the international community to prosecute relevant 
persons and return internally displaced persons/refugees.975 Accordingly, it would appear 
that RtoP and wider minority protection practice somewhat overlap by both entailing the 
State and international community co-operating to amend the situation.
However, the duty under existing minority protection obligations is placed only upon the 
State. The international community has therefore not cooperated with the State in instances 
of inter-ethnic conflict because the international community bears an individual 
responsibility to do so. In contrast, cooperation between the State and the international 
community under RtoP is by reason of the State and the international community each 
having a responsibility to protect populations.976 Consequently, the concurrent 
implementation of primary and secondary RtoP can be distinguished from existing practice 
because RtoP is unique in allowing for a dual bearer of protection. Consequently, concurrent
972 Luck, ibid.
973 Luck, ibid.
974 For a comprehensive account o f the subsistent nature o f minority protection standards in inter-ethnic conflict, 
see e.g. Nasic, ‘Minority Rights Instruments and Mechanisms: Minority Protection along the Conflict 
Continuum’ (n 882), 40.
975 Nasic discusses these stages o f conflict in a minority protection context in a similar manner. Nasic, ibid.
976 Outcome Document (n 718), paras 138 and 139. Stahn would argue that the international community having a 
positive duty to cooperate to protect populations could represent value added to third States duty to cooperate 
under the law on State responsibility because the ILC Articles on State Responsibility ‘subjected the entire 
concept o f an obligation to cooperate to an express caveat’, noting that ‘it is open to question whether general 
international law at present prescribes a positive duty o f cooperation and conceded in that respect that’ the 
provision on this ‘may represent the progressive development o f international law’. Stahn, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 924), 115 and 116. On this see also Payandeh (n 924), 
510-513.
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implementation of R2P can be seen to represent value added because the international 
community acts under its own responsibility to protect, not just to help the State implement 
its duty to protect.
2.4.4 Primary RtoP mav develop to Create New Rights/Obligations
Primary RtoP could also be distinguished from the existing obligations it subsumes and 
provide value added if it were to develop to entail a corresponding collective right of 
populations to protection from RtoP crimes. A proposal made within the UNSG’s 2009 
Report provides some basis for this suggestion. The UNSG recommended that:
‘States could also assist the Human Rights Council in sharpening its focus as a 
forum for considering ways to encourage States to meet their obligations relating to 
the responsibility to protect and to monitor, on a universal and apolitical basis, their 
performance in this regard. To that end, the Council’s universal periodic review 
mechanism could be an important instrument for advancing human rights and, 
indirectly, goals relating to the responsibility to protect’.977
The italicised terms seem to suggest that, were this recommendation to be implemented, the 
UNHRC would not be used to directly assess State implementation of RtoP. However, even 
indirectly bringing RtoP within the UNHRC’s mandate provides its members with the 
opportunity to examine whether a State has implemented primary RtoP effectively. In view 
of the human rights mandate of the UNHRC, this writer would suggest that the 
recommendation therefore raises the possibility that, were it to be implemented, primary 
RtoP could develop into a collective right of populations to be protected from RtoP crimes. 
To this end, it is important to recall that the UNHRC is charged with examining how States 
have implemented their human rights obligations, not whether they have implemented 
measures to protect their populations from RtoP crimes™  Furthermore, the possibility that 
primary RtoP could develop to entail a collective right to protection appears to have been 
contemplated by at least Monaco979 and Nicaragua.980 On the one hand, Monaco’s argument 
that RtoP ‘should become a right as soon as possible’981 suggests that it is open to primary 
RtoP developing in this manner. On the other hand, Nicaragua questioned RtoP’s
977 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11, emphasis added.
978 UNGA Res 60/251, ‘Human Rights Council’ (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251, paras 2 and 3. (UNGA 
Res 60/251).
979 Statement o f the Representative o f Monaco to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 
743).
980 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100.
981 Statement o f the Representative o f Monaco to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 
743).
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acceptability because of its potential correspondence to a collective right to protection.982 
Nicaragua recalled that secondary RtoP ‘allows for the possibility of the use of force’ and 
that this could result in it being discharged contrary to ‘well-established principles in the 
Charter, such as non-intervention in the internal affairs of States’.984
The development of the field of minority protection provides a useful framework under 
which to consider the potential impediments to, and implications of, primary RtoP 
developing to entail a collective right to protection. Chapter one noted that minority rights 
are typically conferred upon individual persons belonging to a minority985 because of a 
concern that conferring the rights upon the minority group could encourage territorially 
cohesive minorities to move from (i) claims for their identity to be protected on a par with 
that of the majority; (ii) to claims for the establishment of some form of autonomous 
arrangement in the territory of the State; and ultimately (iii) to claims for the right to secede 
from the existing State.986 The field of minority protection therefore suggests that whether 
States would accept primary RtoP to entail a corresponding collective right to protection 
could be influenced by who are identified as the beneficiaries of the collective right.
On the one hand, the collective right could be conferred on and enforced by distinct 
groups within a State. The principal policy reservation regarding to this approach in the 
context of minority protection is that it can create “centrifugal tendencies”.987 To this effect, 
collective rights which are conferred on and enforced by distinct groups are considered to 
strengthen the group’s individual member’s sense of loyalty and commitment to the group.988 
This can lead to the group being seen as an entity which is distinct from broader society and 
the State as a whole.989 The requirement for the group to enforce the right can effectively 
encourage the group’s individual members to depend upon the group, rather than the State, 
for the protection that the right aims to provide.990 Formulating a collective right to
982 The Representative has stated: ‘The concept, which allows for the possibility o f the use o f force, could run 
counter to well-established principles in the Charter, such as non-intervention in the internal affairs o f States and 
the non-use o f force in international relations. We wonder how to view the claim that there is a right to the 
responsibility to protect and to delegate the authority o f implementing it to the Security Council —  in other 
words, to the five permanent member States’. Statement o f  the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA,
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
983 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, ibid.
984 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, ibid.
985 As an exception, see the right to existence which is conferred on the minority as a collectivity under UNGA,
‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (n 748)
art 2(1).
986 On this issue see M Weller (ed), The Rights o f  Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework 
Convention fo r  the Protection o f  National Minorities (OUP, Oxford 2005) 623. See further, W Kymlicka, ‘The 
Internationalisation o f Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 (1 ) ICON 1 and H Quane, ‘Rights in Conflict? The Rationale 
and Implications o f Using Human Rights in Conflict Prevention Strategies’ (2007) 47 VA. J. Int’l L. 463, 499.
987 Quane, ibid, 499.
988 Quane, ibid.
989 Quane, ibid.
990 As Quane explains ‘[t]he fact that the individual is dependent on the group for the exercise and enforcement o f  
these rights can have significant implications. It can reinforce the sense o f the allegiance to the group which can, 
in turn, heighten inter-communal differences and impede the development o f  a sense of common citizenship. It 
can also encourage members to look to the group to protect their interests rather than to the State’. Quane, ibid.
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protection in this way could be particularly controversial due to the interplay between 
primary and secondary RtoP. A collective right to protection in the RtoP framework could 
effectively have two bearers. The State would have the responsibility to comply with the 
duties associated with the collective right (primary RtoP) but, if the primary RtoP duty was 
not complied with, the international community would have the responsibility to take action 
to ensure that the population benefit from the protection provided by the collective right 
(secondary RtoP). In view of this interplay, a collective right to protection conferred on and 
enforced by a distinct group within the State would likely only compound States reservations 
that this formulation of collective rights could lead to challenges to their sovereignty and 
territorial integrity (e.g. claims to secession). Indeed, Nicaragua’s991 argument seems to 
overlap, albeit implicitly, with the general perception that collective rights which are 
conferred on and enforced by distinct groups can create ‘centrifugal tendencies’992 and 
thereby lead to challenges to a State’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is especially 
true when the States duty is expressly propped up by a protective responsibility of external 
actors, like secondary RtoP.993 To this end, a collective right to protection in the RtoP 
framework would not only entail the risk of distancing a group from the State as a whole, it 
would actively encourage them to look beyond the State and to the international community. 
This is due to primary RtoP being backed up by secondary RtoP which can involve the use 
of armed force to protect populations.994 Furthermore, this formulation of a collective right to 
protection would also entail the more general difficulty of determining which particular 
groups should be recognised as beneficiaries of the right. This would be a complex task, 
requiring that a judgment be made concerning which groups are most in need of protection 
from RtoP crimes.
On the other hand, a collective right to protection could be conferred upon individual 
members of the population and enforced by the population as a whole. States could be 
apprehensive over this approach because it raises questions with regard to who the 
population would look to for protection when the State failed to comply with the collective 
right. Admittedly, this would not be ambiguous in an RtoP context. The clear interplay 
between primary and secondary RtoP suggests that the population could and should look to 
the international community for protection. However, research into the formulation of 
collective rights more generally suggests that this would not appease all States concerns. As
991 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV. 100. This view was outlined above.
992 Quane (n 986), 499.
993 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
994 Outcome Document, ibid [referring to Chapter VII o f the UN Charter, Article 42 o f which permit’s the UNSC 
to authorise the use o f armed force].
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Donnelly995 explains, ‘[i]n the case of a right held by a people, or by society as a whole, the 
most plausible ‘person’ to exercise the right is, unfortunately, the State’.996 This is a 
reasonable outcome of rights enforced by the population as a whole because it is the State 
who would naturally be looked upon to represent its population. However, the effectiveness 
of a collective right to protection from RtoP crimes could be undermined if it was formulated 
in this way because of the fact that State actors can often be implicated in the perpetration of 
RtoP crimes and, therefore, violations of the collective right.
3 Monitoring Compliance with Primary RtoP
Primary RtoP’s interplay with States existing legal obligations, such as the prevention of 
genocide and international humanitarian law, means that there can be consequences for a 
failure to comply with the duty. A principal example is that individual criminal responsibility 
can arise when State actors incite or otherwise perpetrate RtoP crimes. This was made clear 
by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (SAPG) in Kenya. Recalling the 
Kenyan authorities primary RtoP duty, the SAPG ‘noted that political and community 
leaders may be held accountable for violations of international law committed at their
•  997instigation .
However, there is the question of whether there can be accountability for a failure to 
enforce the primary RtoP duty itself. What, for example, is to happen in the event that 
national authorities fail to prevent RtoP crimes by taking relevant steps to guard against their 
commission? Are there any mechanisms which can be used to monitor State compliance with 
primary RtoP as a duty for preventing and protecting against mass atrocity crimes outside the 
context of the existing obligations that it subsumes? Few recommendations have so far been 
made concerning how to ensure that States comply with primary RtoP as a duty in its own 
right. However, four developments should be considered.
995 J Donnelly, ‘In Search o f the Unicom: The Jurisprudence and Politics o f  the Right to Development’ (1985) 15 
Calif. Western Int. L. J. 473, 482 reprinted in Steiner (n 883) 1449-50.
996 Donnelly writes: ‘A further problem with collective human rights is determining who is to exercise the right; 
the right-holder is not a physical person, and thus an institutional ‘person’ must exercise it. In the case o f a right 
held by a people, or by society as a whole, the most plausible ‘person’ to exercise the right is, unfortunately, the 
State. Again this represents a radical reconceptualisation o f  human rights -  and an especially dangerous one’. 
Donnelly, ibid in Steiner, ibid, 1450.
997 Statement o f the UN Special Adviser to the UNSG on the Prevention o f Genocide, ‘The Situation in Kenya’ 
(28 January 2009) cited in UN Department of Public Information, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing 
Note’ (7 February 2008) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-kenya> accessed 17 
June 2012.
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3.1 National RtoP Advisers
The first development that we should consider is the 2010 proposal of twenty one States to 
appoint senior officials to serve as national advisers on RtoP998 and the commitment to create 
a ‘standing network of officials dedicated to improve global efforts to prevent atrocities’.999 
Both initiatives entail the potential to act as enforcement mechanisms for RtoP but we 
cannot yet be certain that either will contribute effectively to the implementation of primary 
RtoP. Admittedly, national RtoP advisers have been appointed by Denmark and Ghana and, 
at the time of writing, thereafter appointed by another fifteen States. Whilst the national 
RtoP adviser mandates encompass the development of national mechanisms and bodies for 
preventing RtoP crimes, it remains unclear whether this relates to bolstering national 
strategies to prevent RtoP crimes in (i) third States, under secondary RtoP; or (ii) nationally, 
through the discharge of primary RtoP.
3.2 The UN Human Rights Council
The preceding section discussed at length the recommendation to use the UNHRC, 
particularly its Universal Periodic Review mechanism, as a forum for examining States 
compliance with primary RtoP.1000 This writer would suggest that mandating the UNHRC 
with this task would effectively enable it to be used as a mechanism for monitoring State 
compliance with primary RtoP. There are reasons to approach the implementation of this 
recommendation cautiously in order to avoid undermining both the RtoP framework and the 
UNHRC, however. Reference can be made here to Morocco’s response to the 
recommendation. The representative argued that using the UNHRC to monitor State 
compliance with primary RtoP could diminish the ‘credibility’1001 and ‘viability’7002 of the 
UNHRC’s Universal Periodic Review mechanism. This alludes to the view that the UNHRC
998 The decision to introduce this position arose from the September 2010 meeting o f twenty-one Heads o f State 
on the issue o f “Fulfilling the responsibility to protect: Strengthening our capacities to halt and prevent mass 
atrocities”. This was led by Denmark and Ghana in co-operation with the Global Centre on the Responsibility to 
Protect. The ministerial meeting was attended by seven African States, seven European States, four from the 
Americas and three from the Asia-Pacific. For these and other details about the meeting see the Global Centre for 
the Responsibility to Protect ‘Meeting Summary -  Fulfilling the Responsibility to Protect: Strengthening our 
Capacities to Halt and Prevent Mass Atrocities’ (n 850) and Joint Press Statement by the Ministers o f Foreign 
Affairs o f Ghana and Denmark (27 September 2010)
<http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Nyheder/ForsideNyheder/PRESSEMEDDELELSEO> accessed 20 
November 2010. (Joint Press Statement by the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs o f Ghana and Denmark).
999 Joint Press Statement by the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs o f Ghana and Denmark, ibid
1000 u n s g  Report directed that: ‘States could also assist the Human Rights Council in sharpening its focus as 
a forum for considering ways to encourage States to meet their obligations relating to the responsibility to protect 
and to monitor, on a universal and apolitical basis, their performance in this regard. To that end, the Council’s 
universal periodic review mechanism could be an important instrument for advancing human rights and, 
indirectly, goals relating to the responsibility to protect’. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11.
1001 Statement o f the Representative o f Morocco to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
1002 Statement o f the Representative o f Morocco to the UNGA, ibid.
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is too politicised to be efficient because it can often prioritise politics over the effective 
discharge of its human rights mandate, an issue considered to be facilitated by the UNHRC’s 
bloc voting structure.1003 The most pertinent example of the politicisation of the UNHRC is 
the way in which it prioritises the matter of Israel-Palestine over other States of concern, 
such as the situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo which is estimated to have 
‘claimed 1,000 more victims’.1004
To a certain extent, the politicisation of the UNHRC comes through in its practice on 
RtoP to date. Admittedly, the UNHRC has shown some willingness to recall the primary 
RtoP duty of States, not least in the case studies of Libya1005 and Syria.1006 However, in other 
case studies issues of realpolitik have influenced the UNHRC’s role under the RtoP 
framework. A useful comparison is the UNHRC’s role in the case studies of Darfur and the 
Israel-Gaza conflict. In the former case, prominent regional organisations like the Arab 
League7007 and the OIC700* criticised the UNHRC’s decision to use the RtoP framework as a 
tool for assessing the situation of human rights in Darfur.1009 In contrast, there was no dissent 
over the specific references to RtoP in the final Report of the fact-finding mission on the 
Israel-Gaza conflict.1010 Accordingly, mandating the UNHRC to monitor State compliance 
with primary RtoP could serve to further politicise its working methods. To this effect, the 
mandate could in practice lead the UNHRC to examine whether particular States are 
complying with primary RtoP (e.g. Israel), whilst overlooking other States of concern. It 
could be injudicious, perhaps even dangerous, to mandate such a politicised body with a role 
in monitoring primary RtoP compliance, given that a finding that a State has breached 
primary RtoP is linked to secondary RtoP’s activation (including through the use of armed 
force).1011
Arguably, this risk could explain why there is a divide in State views regarding the role
1003 On this issue, see e.g. E Heinze, “The Reality and Hyper-Reality o f Human Rights: Public Consciousness and 
the Mass Media” in R Dickinson, E Katselli, C Murray and O W Pederson (eds), Examining Critical Perspectives 
on Human Rights (CUP, Cambridge 2012) 202-208. Giercyz also discusses the practical functioning o f the 
Human Rights Council, including its Universal Periodic Review mechanism. See Giercyz (n 854), 115-117.
1004 Heinze, ibid, 202.
1005 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 2.
1006 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 729), para 1.
1007 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC in UN Press 
Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in 
Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc HRC/07/12
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsFviewO 1 /E6DF2E2811EABFA3C12572A000717B7E?opendocume 
nt> accessed 12 November 2011. (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f High-Level 
Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’).
1008 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC, ibid.
1009 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (9 March 2007)
UN Doc A/HRC/4/80. ( ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’).
1010 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict: Conclusions and Recommendations’ 
(15 September 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, 531. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the 
Gaza Conflict: Conclusions and Recommendations’).
1011 Outcome Document (n 718), para 139.
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that the UNHRC should have with regard to primary RtoP. Notably, the divide is along 
geopolitical lines. At one side stand European States and the US.1012 The standpoint taken by 
these States is that the UNHRC should be used only to “promote”1013 or “advance”1014 
primary RtoP. This suggests that these States consider that the UNHRC’s role should be one 
of endorsement, encouraging States to comply with primary RtoP when considering States’ 
implementation of human rights. At the other side stand Latin American and Asian 
States.1015 This group welcomes using the UNHRC to enforce primary RtoP. For example, 
Panama argues that the UNHRC should be used as a forum through which ‘to monitor’1016 
how States ‘comply with their obligations under the responsibility to protect’.1017 This latter 
reference seems to suggest that these States may support primary RtoP developing to entail a 
collective right to protection. Primary RtoP does not exclusively relate to States’ 
implementation of international human rights law but, rather, requires that States comply 
with humanitarian law and ensure individual criminal responsibility for breaches of 
international criminal law. Accordingly, this group of States seem to invite the UNHRC to 
police compliance with the range of obligations to which primary RtoP relates, rather than 
encouraging it to use its human rights mandate to examine the way in which States’ 
implementation of human rights can help it to comply with primary RtoP.
Arguably, the divide in State views could be the result of the position that the respective 
States have in the UNHRC’s present bloc voting structure and, therefore, the way in which 
this has led some States to consider that the UNHRC is too politicised to be effective. The 
cautious approach of the first group of States could possibly be explained by the fact that 
these States know that they would often be out voted under the UNHRC’s present block 
voting structure. In the opinion of this writer, the UNSG’s call for primary RtoP compliance 
to be examined by the UNHRC on a ‘ universal and apolitical basis,1018 would be unlikely to 
overcome these implications.
In addition, a parallel can be drawn between the divide in State views regarding the role
1012 Statements of the Representatives o f Norway and Luxembourg to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than 
Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on 
Responsibility to Protect’ (n 744); Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 100; Statements o f the Representatives o f the United States, France and 
Italy to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
1013 Statement of the Representative o f Norway to the UNGA, ibid.
1014 Statement o f the Representative o f Italy to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97.
1015 Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743) and Statements o f  
the Representatives o f Uruguay, Ecuador, Japan and Pakistan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
1016 Statement of the Representative o f Panama to the UNGA, ibid.
1017 Statement of the Representative o f Panama to the UNGA, ibid, emphasis added.
1018 The Report directed that: ‘States could also assist the Human Rights Council in sharpening its focus as a 
forum for considering ways to encourage States to meet their obligations relating to the responsibility to protect 
and to monitor, on a universal and apolitical basis, their performance in this regard. To that end, the Council’s 
universal periodic review mechanism could be an important instrument for advancing human rights and, 
indirectly, goals relating to the responsibility to protect’. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11.
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of the UNHRC in relation to primary RtoP and the similarly geopolitical divide regarding 
whether there exists a collective right to development. Whilst Latin American and Asian 
States seem to generally accept that this collective right exists, European and North 
American States argue that development activities should follow a rights-based approach to 
development.1019 In turn, the substantive debate over the right to development could provide 
a framework for grounding the divide in State views over the UNHRC’s role in the RtoP 
framework. To this effect, one group of States seems to recognise that primary RtoP might 
entail a collective right to protection which could be enforced through the UNHRC (i.e. a 
right to protection).1020 In contrast, another group seems to recognise that States can 
cooperate with the UNHRC concerning their implementation of existing rights to fulfil 
primary RtoP (i.e. a rights-based approach to protection).1021
3.3 Periodic Review
The UNSG’s 2009 Report also recommends establishing a specific review mechanism to 
assess what States have done to implement RtoP.1022 Although no States1023 have expressly 
rejected or criticised this proposal, there is no express support for it either. Accordingly, in 
recent times it seems to have disappeared from RtoP discourse. Arguably, had it been 
accepted by States, it could have been a mechanism through which compliance with primary 
RtoP could have been monitored and perhaps enforced.
1019 On the debate over whether there exists a right to development or whether rights-based approaches should be 
taken to development, see generally P Uvin, ‘From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach:
How Human Rights Entered Development’ (2007) 17 (4/5) Development in Practice 597, especially 598-599 [at 
which Uvin respectively explains why a right to development appeals to States from the so-called “third world” 
and, furthermore, alludes to a rights-based approach appealing to other States due to its interplay with democracy 
as a principle o f governance]. On the merits and implications o f the proposed approaches, see Minority Rights 
Group International, ‘Minority Rights and Development: Overcoming Exclusion, Discrimination and Poverty’ 
(Paper Submitted to the UN Working Group on Minorities, 29 May 2002)
<http://www.minorityrights.org/810/intemational-statements/minority-rights-and-development-overcoming- 
exclusion-discrimination-and-poverty.html> accessed 12 May 2012. For details o f the efforts made to standardise 
the approaches taken among relevant institutions, see UNHRC, ‘The Human Rights Based Approach to 
Development Cooperation Towards a Common Understanding among the UN Agencies’
<http://www.undg.org/archive_docs/6959The_Human_Rights_Based_Approach_to_Development_Cooperation_ 
Towards a Common Understanding among UN.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012.
1020 Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743) and Statements o f 
the Representatives o f Uruguay, Ecuador, Japan and Pakistan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
1021 Statements o f the Representatives o f Norway and Luxembourg to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than 
Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on 
Responsibility to Protect’ (n 744); Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statements o f  the Representatives o f  the United States, France and 
Italy to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
1022 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 30.
1023 However, Indonesia did contend that ‘this issue needs a clear and practical modality before a discussion on it 
takes place in order to ensure a true value added o f such exercise’. Statement o f the Representative o f Indonesia 
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
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3.4 Security Council Committee /  Global Strategy
Finally, the African States of Ghana and Gambia made their own suggestions regarding how 
to enforce primary RtoP at the UNGA 2009 thematic debate on implementing RtoP. 
Ghana1024 proposed that the UNSG devise a Global Strategy/Action Plan for RtoP’s 
implementation. Although the Strategy could reasonably have included consideration of a 
primary RtoP enforcement mechanism, Ghana did not make any proposals on this. 
Gambia1025 made a similar suggestion, recommending the establishment of an RtoP 
Committee ‘mandated to make non-binding recommendations to the General Assembly, the 
Security Council and regional organisations’.1026 It is unclear from the statement what the 
Committee’s focus would be but, arguably, it would require the Committee to assess whether 
the State at issue has complied with primary RtoP and communicate that finding to the 
appropriate UN or regional organisation. However, neither proposal was discussed further 
amongst State Representatives and, so far, they have not been explicitly considered for 
adoption or further development as primary RtoP enforcement mechanisms by any 
institutional personnel.
There is limited discussion in present RtoP literature of the ways through which to ensure 
that States comply with primary RtoP as a duty in its own right. Dastoor1027 does propose a 
novel enforcement model for the RtoP framework, recommending the establishment of an 
RtoP UNSC Committee whose members represent all regions1028 and, to avoid any delay in 
protection, would not grant members a veto power.1029 Dastoor’s argument generally 
concerns how the international community should respond to RtoP cases and, therefore, 
seems focused upon secondary RtoP’s enforcement. However, Dastoor does state that 
‘[b]roadly, the RtoP-SCC would be tasked with monitoring situations to which the RtoP 
doctrine might apply and making specific recommendations to the Security Council 
regarding appropriate action’.1030 The present author considers that this raises the possibility 
that the Committee could be used to police State compliance with primary RtoP. In instances 
where the State fails to comply, the Committee could make recommendations concerning 
how the international community may encourage States to fulfil primary RtoP or, indeed,
1024 Statement of the Representative o f Ghana to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
1025 Statement o f the Representative o f Gambia to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits on Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 743).
1026 Statement o f the Representative of Gambia to the UNGA, ibid. For a discussion o f this recommendation from 
the perspective o f determining when secondary RtoP has been activated, see N Deller, “Challenges and 
Controversies” in J Genser and I Cotier (eds), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise o f  Stopping Mass 
Atrocities in Our Time (OUP, Oxford 2012) 82.
1027 N Dastoor, ‘The Responsibility to Refine: The Need for a Security Council Committee on the Responsibility 
to Protect’ (2009) 22 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 25.
1028 Dastoor, ibid, 50.
1029 Dastoor, ibid.
1030 Dastoor, ibid, 49.
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invoke measures against the State to enforce such compliance. However, one could question 
the viability of establishing the committee. Although Dastoor devotes some time to 
addressing potential criticisms of the proposal1031 he overlooks other important matters, not 
least whether such re-structuring of the UNSC would ever be accepted in practice.
Conclusion
The chapter’s starting point was to highlight that the Outcome Document clearly identifies 
that ‘[e]ach individual State’1032 has a responsibility to protect ‘its populations’.7053 However, 
whilst the Outcome Document informs us that primary RtoP is to be implemented through 
‘appropriate and necessary means’,1034 it remains unclear which means States should 
implement in order to fulfil the duty. It was further argued that although the Outcome 
Document states that the duty entails the ‘prevention’7035 of RtoP crimes, it does not outline 
what States are required to do in order to prevent crimes and, therefore, fails to clarify in an 
exhaustive manner the scope and character of States duties under primary RtoP. In addition, 
this writer argued that there is some ambiguity regarding the duration of the primary RtoP 
duty, not least because the Outcome Document does not specify whether it continues or 
suspends when secondary RtoP is being applied. These issues formed the general framework 
of the chapter.
A recurrent theme throughout the chapter was the manner in which primary RtoP has 
been interpreted and implemented within relevant practice post-World Summit. In doing so, 
the chapter has shown that primary RtoP has altered substantially from the way in which it 
was formulated by the ICISS in 2001. One profound change which appears to have occurred 
concerns the means of implementing primary RtoP. Some of the means proposed by the 
ICISS1036 do not appear to be still regarded as central to the discharge of primary RtoP. This 
is quite likely the result of the substantial difference between the way that the scope of the 
RtoP framework was outlined within the ICISS Report and the Outcome Document.1037 The 
ICISS Report considered RtoP to be a mechanism for protecting populations who had 
suffered harm from a broad range of acts,1038 whereas the Outcome Document explicitly 
focused RtoP upon protecting populations from war crimes, genocide, crimes against
1031 These include: the Committee producing ‘No New Results’; being ‘Too Similar to the General Assembly’ 
and that it is ‘An Unrealistic Proposal’. See respectively, Dastoor, ibid, 56-60.
1032 Outcome Document (n 718), para 138.
1033 Outcome Document, ibid.
1034 Outcome Document, ibid.
1035 Outcome Document, ibid.
1036 For e.g. establishing non-discriminatory property laws. ICISS Report (n 727), 42.
1037 The evolution o f RtoP’s scope was outlined in chapter one.
1038 ICISS Report (n 727), 32-34.
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humanity and ethnic cleansing.1039 As a result, subsequent practice suggests that States 
should implement means which are directly relevant to protecting populations from RtoP 
crimes ( e.g. domestic criminalisation of RtoP crimes), as opposed to protecting populations 
more generally ( e.g. establishing non-discriminatory property laws to ensure that people can 
reclaim their property in the event that they are displaced by RtoP crimes1040).
The primary objective of the chapter was to examine how States could fulfil their primary 
RtoP duty. It was suggested that States and relevant international actors have proposed that 
primary RtoP be generally discharged through the implementation of human rights,1041 
criminal law1042 and humanitarian1043 obligations. Identifying which means can be used is 
helpful for both determining how primary RtoP can be implemented and how existing 
obligations can be most effectively implemented within an RtoP context. For example, the 
chapter argued that, where appropriate, RtoP practice has called upon States to ensure that 
they enable populations to have access to humanitarian personnel and aid.1044 This suggests 
that the right to adequate food may be most efficiently implemented within an RtoP context 
by States (i) permitting humanitarian agencies within their territory (Darfur);1045 and (ii) 
ensuring that they do not negatively interfere in the distribution of aid (Myanmar).1046
Throughout, consideration was given to outlining where present consensus on primary 
RtoP lies, including the implementation means which have been approved by States. 
However, we must take care not to place too much emphasis upon consensus alone. 
Ultimately, so many means have been proposed that it would be near impossible for each 
State to approve each measure and, furthermore, we can question the utility of formulating 
what would essentially be a “chart” of implementation mechanisms. At a conceptual level, 
this would seem inconsistent with the finding that States enjoy a margin o f  appreciation over 
which means they use to implement primary RtoP and the way in which this can enable the
1039 Outcome Document (n 718), paras 138 and 139.
1040 ICISS Report (n 727), 40-41.
1041 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 5, 6 and 11. See also: Statement o f the Representative of 
Mali to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statements o f the 
Representatives o f France, Sweden (on behalf o f  the European Union) and Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f  the Representative o f 
Hungary to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full 
Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 744) and Statement o f the 
Representative o f Jamaica (on behalf o f  CAR1COM) to the to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
1042 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 12; Statements o f the Representatives o f Japan and Colombia 
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representative of 
Tanzania to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statements o f the 
Representatives o f Turkey and Slovenia to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express 
Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’, ibid and 
Joint Statement o f Denmark and Costa Rica to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97.
1043 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761) and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’ (n 761).
1044 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ and EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’, ibid.
1045 EP Res, ‘Expulsions o f NGOs from Darfur’, ibid, paras 3 and F.
1046 EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 761), paras 5 and K.
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duty to be flexibly implemented in order to meet populations’ protection needs in any given 
situation. Furthermore, there is scope to argue that flexible implementation need not 
necessarily undermine the level of protection that populations receive. Primary RtoP appears 
to represent a duty of universal application which entails certain minimum standards, not 
least that all national authorities should not incite or otherwise perpetrate RtoP crimes.
A cross-cutting theme throughout the chapter was the way in which we can draw upon the 
field of minority protection to provide possible explanations for why primary RtoP has 
evolved in a particular way and the potential implications thereof. On the one hand, there 
appears to be substantial overlap between the scope and character of States duties in both 
areas. For example, both appear to entail a margin of appreciation and confer ongoing duties 
of a positive and negative character. Similarly, both areas have attached importance to States 
effective implementation of the human rights of individual members of the population.1047
This relates to one of the ways in which the field of minority protection can be drawn 
upon to map out potential impediments to the further development of primary RtoP and, 
furthermore, the way in which primary RtoP could come to represent value added to the 
existing obligations it subsumes. In addition to the value added that primary RtoP can bring 
by clarifying the specific requirements of rights/obligations in an RtoP context and extending 
obligations beyond States to the international community, it was argued that primary RtoP 
entailed the potential to create new rights/obligations. To date, primary RtoP has not been 
detailed as a distinct “right”. Charging the UNHRC with monitoring State compliance with 
primary RtoP1048 therefore seems to exceed its human rights mandate,1049 not least because 
primary RtoP also relates to humanitarian and criminal law obligations. Accordingly, this 
could open the way for primary RtoP to be perceived to entail a collective right o f  
populations to protection from RtoP crimes. Drawing upon the development of minority 
rights, this writer argued that the prospects for this to gain traction among States may be 
influenced by whether the right is formulated for (i) the benefit of, and enforced by, specific 
groups; or (ii) the benefit of the population as a whole, and enforced by the State on the 
populations’ behalf. Both can be contentious at a policy level. For example, the explicit 
interplay between the State and the international community in protecting populations, 
including through armed force, could exacerbate fears that groups will enforce the right to 
the detriment of State sovereignty and territorial integrity.1050
Primary RtoP could also constructively evolve by building upon the present 
recommendations for ensuring State compliance with the duty. It will be interesting to
1047 For a discussion o f  the use o f individual human rights in the context o f minority protection see e.g. S Ratner, 
‘Does International Law Matter in Preventing Ethnic Conflict?’ (2000) 32 N.Y.U.J Int’l L & Pol 591, 600.
1048 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 720), 11.
1049 UNGA Res 60/251 (n 978), paras 2 and 3.
1050 Weller, The Rights o f  Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention fo r  the Protection 
o f  National Minorities (n 986), 623; Kymlicka (n 986) and Quane (n 986), 499.
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monitor which States follow the lead of Denmark and Ghana1051 and appoint a national RtoP 
adviser, in order to assess if and how the advisers mandates alter from State to State and, 
perhaps most significantly, whether this mandate will incorporate an advisory duty on 
national implementation of primary RtoP. Additionally, we should closely monitor the ways 
in which the UNHRC incorporates RtoP into its work. To date its incorporation has been an 
assortment of political will and tension. On the one hand, the controversy surrounding the 
use of the RtoP framework as a model for assessing human rights in Darfur7052 suggests that 
it may still be a step too far to see the UNHRC as an outlet which its members will 
consistently permit to be used to examine State compliance with primary RtoP. Conversely, 
the UNHRC has recalled the primary RtoP duty of certain national authorities,1053 urged the 
international community to take action in accordance with secondary RtoP,1054 and expressly 
referred to the possibility that RtoP crimes are being committed in specific cases.1055 In 
principle, the UNHRC could help enforce primary RtoP because they will often be amongst 
the first to see potential RtoP crimes emerging.1056 In practice, the UNHRC has been 
criticised for allowing politics to influence, and at times dictate, its general functioning.1057 
There is a very real risk that this will endure in RtoP cases, with the UNHRC either failing to 
take up the mandate proposed, or enforcing it for political rather than protective reasons.
In conclusion, the chapter has argued that practice suggests that primary RtoP is a 
universal duty which attaches both negative and positive duties to States. The duty can be 
implemented through a wide range of means but these should be appropriate to the factual 
context at hand. The duty can be implemented independently or, alternatively, alongside 
secondary RtoP’s assistance or responsive components. These findings raise questions over 
the broader nature of primary RtoP and secondary RtoP’s interplay and, more specifically, 
the way in which secondary RtoP’s practical discharge comes into effect. Is it necessary for 
RtoP crimes to have fully  emerged in a State? Or, alternatively, can secondary RtoP be 
discharged when RtoP crimes are imminent? If so, on what basis is the imminence of RtoP 
crimes to be determined? To what extent, if any, does the activation of secondary RtoP’s 
discharge represent value added to the international community’s role in protecting 
populations pre-RtoP? These and other questions are examined in the following chapter.
1051 Joint Press Statement by the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs o f Ghana and Denmark (n 998).
1052 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1009). See 
particularly: Statements o f the Representatives o f Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) and Pakistan (on behalf 
o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report of 
High-Level Mission on Situation o f  Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1007).
105 For e.g. UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 2 and UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 729), para 1.
1054 See e.g. UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’(n 1010), 531.
1055 For e.g. it noted that there was the possibility o f crimes against humanity being committed in Libya and in 
Syria referred to ‘crimes and violations’. See UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 728), para 1 and UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 
729), para 7.
1056 Giercyz makes a similar point. Giercyz (n 854), 115.
1057 Heinze (n 1003), 202-208.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ACTIVATION OF SECONDARY RtoP 
UNIFORM STANDARD OR SLIDING SCALE?
Introduction
The Outcome Document provides that the international community should ‘help’1058 and 
‘encourage’7059 States to fulfil their primary R2P duty and commits the international 
community to providing assistance to States ‘before crises and conflicts break out’1060. 
Furthermore, it provides that the international community have a ‘responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters 
VI and VII of the Charter, to help to protect populations’1061 from RtoP crimes. When 
national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations and peaceful means are 
inadequate1062 to ensure populations protection, the Outcome Document provides that the 
international community should undertake a ‘timely and decisive’1063 response, in a 
‘collective’1064 manner, ‘in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII’1065. This 
chapter analyses the way in which the aforementioned components of secondary R2P have 
been activated in practice to date.1066
The way in which this writer uses the term “activation” should first be explained. As the 
preceding chapter argued, primary RtoP is an ongoing duty which can be implemented 
concurrently with secondary RtoP. Accordingly, secondary RtoP’s activation is not a matter 
of when a State loses its duty to protect and the international community gains its 
responsibility to protect1067 but, instead, of considering when the international community’s
1058 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para 138. (Outcome Document).
1059 Outcome Document, ibid.
1060 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
1061 Outcome Document, ibid.
1062 Outcome Document, ibid.
1063 Outcome Document, ibid.
1064 Outcome Document, ibid.
1065 Outcome Document, ibid.
1066 Chapter one outlined the relevant Outcome Document provisions on secondary RtoP and the way in which 
these provisions were interpreted by the UN Secretary-General to provide for secondary RtoP to entail two 
pillars: (i) International Assistance and Capacity Building; and (ii) Timely and Decisive Response (entailing 
peaceful and non-peaceful measures. Report o f the UNSG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 
UN Doc. A/63/677, 9-10 and 22. (UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP).
1067 Chapters one and three outlined that this view is taken by several commentators, such as A Bellamy, 
‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq’ (2005) 
19 Ethics & International Affairs 31; C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal 
Norm?’ (2007) 101 (1) AJIL99;C Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ (The Hague Justice Portal, 24 
November 2011) <http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=12998> accessed 12 May 2012; M Payandeh, 
‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept o f the Responsibility to Protect within the Process
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practical application of secondary RtoP’s components comes into effect. Accordingly, this 
chapter’s main objective is to explain the basis on which the international community 
determines that a State’s national authorities no longer have the sole responsibility for 
discharging protective measures and should instead (i) be assisted in this endeavour by the 
international community;1068 and/or (iii) the international community should undertake a 
‘timely and decisive’1069 response through peaceful or non-peaceful protective measures. To 
achieve this objective, the chapter considers several significant questions regarding the 
substantive and institutional aspects of secondary RtoP’s activation in practice to date.
Part one considers the substantive aspects of secondary RtoP’s activation. This section 
explains that secondary RtoP’s activation can raise issues of a substantive nature. For 
example, is it necessary for RtoP crimes to be perpetrated in full before activation can occur? 
Are the legal elements of RtoP crimes drawn upon when determining secondary RtoP’s 
activation? If so, is consideration given to both the actus reus and mens rea elements of an 
RtoP crime? Drawing upon trends in practice to date, this writer outlines that secondary 
RtoP’s activation results in a test which can give rise to specific concerns of an evidential 
nature. Consideration is also given to the character of the activating threshold. Is activation 
based upon a uniform standard which spans each of secondary RtoP’s respective 
components? Or, are secondary RtoP’s respective components activated on the basis of a 
sliding scale? Do the factors that have been taken into account when determining activation 
in practice suggest that the Outcome Document effectively codified a tipping point when, at 
least in principle, the international community should take ‘appropriate and necessary’1070 
action to protect populations from RtoP crimes?
Part two explores the institutional aspects of secondary RtoP’s activation process, not 
least the issue of who decides that activation has occurred in a specific case. Does practice 
suggest that a variety of bodies can make this decision? If so, what potential implications 
could this entail? For example, could this lead to variable approaches being taken to 
secondary RtoP’s activation? Can the existing mandates of relevant actors be fully 
reconciled with their role in determining secondary RtoP’s activation?
The field of minority protection is drawn upon at appropriate junctures throughout the 
chapter in order to assess whether secondary RtoP’s activation overlaps with, or adds value
o f International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal o f Int’l L. 469; N Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common 
Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 2005 World Summit’ (Paper presented at ‘The UN at Sixty: 
Celebration or Wake?’ conference, University o f Toronto, 6-7 October 2005) 8
<http://cadair.aber.ac.Uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1971/l/a%20victory%20for%20common%20humanity%20Whee 
ler.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012; S Rosenberg and E Strauss, “A Common Approach to the Application o f the 
Responsibility to Protect” in D Fiott et al, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the 
Third Pillar Approach (The Madariaga College o f Europe Foundation, Brussels 2012) 72.
1068 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138 and 139.
1069 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
1070 Outcome Document, ibid.
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to, the international community’s role in a minority protection context. Does the activation of 
non-peaceful responsive measures overcome some of the drawbacks of the use of armed 
force for human protection purposes, including minorities, in earlier practice? For example, 
does secondary RtoP help to clarify what harm should be sustained by a population in order 
to warrant armed force? Does secondary RtoP provide a new way of balancing the need to 
take international action to protect populations with State concerns over the way in which 
such action could undermine their sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in 
their internal affairs? Are there any safeguards in place in order to diminish the prospect of 
States justifying inaction on the basis that the legal elements of mass atrocity crimes are not 
conclusively established in a particular case (i.e. the Rwanda problem1071)?
1 The Substantive Aspects of Secondary RtoP's Activation in 
Practice
Notwithstanding the Outcome Document provision for assistance to be provided to States 
‘before crises and conflicts break out’,1072 practice suggests that a population must sustain 
some harm before secondary RtoP is activated, even in respect of its assistance component. 
To this effect, the activation of secondary RtoP’s assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful 
components in practice to date appears to have been based upon the legal elements of RtoP 
crimes arising within a State.1073 In terms of assistance measures, reference can be made to 
the case studies of Kenya, Cote d’Ivoire and Kyrgyzstan. In these cases assistance was (i) 
provided (diplomatic in Kenya1074 / military in Cote d’Ivoire1075) or (ii) recommended for
1071 The debate over whether the legal elements o f the crime o f genocide were established in Rwanda was 
discussed in chapter two. On this debate, see R Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure o f  Humanity in 
Rwanda (Arrow Books, London 2004) 343 and 374. See further, L van den Herik, “The Schism between the 
Legal and the Social Concept o f Genocide in Light o f the Responsibility to Protect” in R Henham and P Behrens 
(eds), The Criminal Law o f  Genocide: International, Comparative and Contextual Aspects (Ashgate Publishing, 
Aldershot 2007) 76.
1072 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1073 See for e.g. Statement o f  the UN Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention o f  
Genocide, ‘The Situation in Kenya’ (28 January 2009) cited in UN Department o f Public Information, ‘The 
United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (7 February 2008) 4 <
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/Feb%202008%20Kenya%20UN%20briefing%20note.pdf> accessed 
12 November 2012 (Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’); UNSC 
Res 1962 (2010) UN Doc S/RES/1962, para 9 (UNSC Res 1962); UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s 
Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ 
(15 June 2010) <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012 (UN 
Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’); UNHRC Res S-15/1, ‘Situation o f Human Rights in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (25 February 2011) UN Doc A/UNHRC/RES/ S-15/1, para 2 (UNHRC Res S-15/1); 
UNHRC Res S-16/1, ‘The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the Context o f Recent 
Events’ (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/UNHRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1 (UNHRC Res S-16/1); UNSC Res 1970 (2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/1970, preambular para 6 (UNSC Res 1970); UNSC Res 1975 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1975, 
preambular para 13 (UNSC Res 1975); UNSC Res 1973 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, preambular para 7 (UNSC 
Res 1973).
1074 Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’, ibid.
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provision (Kyrgyzstan1076). The activation of assistance measures in these cases seems to 
have exceeded requiring that the recipient State has requested assistance or consented to its 
provision. Rather, reference was made to the possibility that the legal elements of RtoP 
crimes were arising within the recipient State before assistance was provided or 
recommended.1077 For example, the statement of the UN Special Advisers on the Prevention 
of Genocide and RtoP on the situation in Kyrgyzstan called for the international community 
to provide assistance under secondary RtoP, because ‘[t]he pattern and scale of the violence 
[...] could amount to ethnic cleansing’.1078
In terms of the activation of peaceful responsive measures, the UN Human Rights 
Council’s (UNHRC) deployment of fact-finding missions to Libya1079 and Syria1080 are 
useful illustrations. In Libya, the UNHRC recalled the Libyan authorities’ primary RtoP 
duty1081 and noted that some of the human rights violations being committed ‘may also 
amount to crimes against humanity’.1082 Similarly, when requesting that a mission be 
dispatched to Syria, the UNHRC recalled the authorities’ primary RtoP duty,1083 calling for 
the Mission to determine the ‘facts and circumstances’1084 of both the ‘violations and crimes 
committed’.1085
In relation to the activation of secondary RtoP’s non-peaceful responsive measures, such 
as collective sanctions and the use of armed force, it is notable that relevant actors have 
expressly referred to the specific RtoP crimes which may be being committed in a State. For 
example, when authorising the use of collective sanctions in Libya1086 and Cote d’Ivoire,1087 
the UNSC explicitly stated that the situations ‘could’1088 and ‘may’1089 entail crimes against
1075 UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 3 [renewing the mandate o f the UNOCI mission],
1076 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 1073).
1077 Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 1073), 4 [‘political 
and community leaders may be held accountable for violations o f  international law  committed at their instigation 
and urged them to meet their responsibility to protect the civilian population and prevent violence’, emphasis 
added]. On the C6te d’Ivoire see UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 9 [referring to ‘sexual violence’ and 
‘humanitarian law violations’].On Kyrgyzstan see UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary- 
General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’, ibid 
[referring to the ‘pattern and scale o f the violence, which has resulted in the mass displacement o f Uzbeks from 
South Kyrgyzstan, could amount to ethnic cleansing’].
1078 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’, ibid.
1079 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073).
1080 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1073).
1081 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), para 2.
1082 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ibid, para 1.
1083 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1073), para 1.
1084 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid, para 7.
1085 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid.
1086 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), paras 9-14 [authorising the application o f an arms embargo], paras 15-16 (d) 
[authorising the application o f a travel ban on those persons detailed in Annex I o f  the Resolution] and paras 17- 
21 [authorising the freezing o f the assets o f  those persons detailed in Annex II o f the Resolution],
1087 UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), para 12 (authorising the application o f targeted sanctions against those persons 
detailed in Annex I o f the Resolution).
1088 UNSC Res 1975, ibid, preambular para 13.
1089 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), para 6.
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humanity. This was also expressly stated in UNSC Resolution 19731090 which authorised the 
use of armed force to protect civilians in Libya and strengthened the collective sanctions.1091
Basing secondary RtoP’s activation on the emergence of the legal elements of RtoP 
crimes within a State raises some significant questions. Primarily, there is the question of 
what this approach suggests about the general nature of secondary RtoP’s activating 
threshold. Does the threshold rest upon RtoP crimes being perceived to be imminent? 
Alternatively, does the threshold depend upon the existence of clear evidence that RtoP 
crimes are being perpetrated?
1.1 The General Nature of the Activating Threshold
There are two notable themes in relevant practice. First, secondary RtoP’s activation has not 
depended upon the existence of evidence which indicates that RtoP crimes have been 
perpetrated in full. Reference has been made to the (i) actus reus of the RtoP crime(s) 
apprehended in a particular case (e.g. “widespread and systematic”); and/or (ii) protected 
persons of the RtoP crime(s) apprehended in a particular case (e.g. “civilian population”). 
However, there has been no explicit consideration of whether these acts have been carried 
out with the requisite mens rea. For instance, UNSC Resolution 1973 on the situation in 
Libya notes that the facts on the ground were such as to suggest that crimes against humanity 
may be being, or about to be, committed.1092 Whilst reference was made to factors which go 
toward establishing the actus reus of crimes against humanity (e.g. ‘the widespread and 
systematic attacks’ occurring ‘against the civilian population’1093), there was no obvious 
consideration of whether these acts were accompanied by the requisite mens rea. Second, it 
appears to have been sufficient that the acts occurring in the State are such as to suggest that 
RtoP crimes “may” be being, or be about to be, perpetrated. This comes through in practice 
at the international level in, for example, the UNSC Resolutions authorising targeted 
sanctions in the case studies of Libya1094 and Cote d’Ivoire1095 and for the use of armed force 
in Libya.1096 Each of the authorising UNSC Resolution’s noted that the acts in the respective 
States ‘may’1097 or ‘could’1098 amount to crimes against humanity.
Together, the two themes in practice suggest that relevant actors consider that secondary
1090 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular para 7.
1091 UNSC Res 1973, ibid, paras 4-5 [authorising the “use o f all necessary means” to protect civilians], paras 6-12 
[establishing a No Fly Zone], paras 13-16 [regarding the enforcement o f the arms embargo], paras 17-18 
[regarding the ban on flights] and paras 19-21 [regarding the freezing o f assets o f those detailed in Annex II].
1092 UNSC Res 1973, ibid, preambular para 7.
1093 UNSC Res 1973, ibid.
1094 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), paras 9-25.
1095 UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), para 12.
1096 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), paras 4-12.
1097 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular para 6 and UNSC Res 1973, ibid, preambular para 7.
1098 UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), preambular para 13.
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RtoP’s activating threshold can generally be explained as one of imminence. This is 
significant because an imminence based threshold enables secondary RtoP’s respective 
components to be discharged for preventive purposes. As noted in chapter one, the Outcome 
Document does not explicitly state that each of secondary RtoP’s components entails a 
preventive dimension. Instead, a preventive dimension is merely implied through the 
Outcome Document’s provision for secondary RtoP to be discharged to protect populations 
‘from’1099 (not ‘in the event o f 1100) RtoP crimes. This writer would argue that the overlap 
between an imminence threshold and a prevention component is valuable because it enables 
the spectrum of secondary RtoP measures to be discharged prior to the actual perpetration of 
RtoP crimes. This strengthens, at least in principle, the international community’s role in 
protecting populations from RtoP crimes. To this effect, it will be recalled that an effective 
international response to the situation in Rwanda was partly impeded by debates over 
whether the legal elements of genocide had actually arisen, specifically whether “genocide” 
was actually being committed in a legal sense.1101 An imminence threshold provides for the 
international community to take protective action when it is considered that an RtoP crime 
“may”1102 be occurring, however. This could help to diminish the prospect that legalistic 
debates regarding the nature of the harm sustained by a population will undermine the 
international community’s capacity to discharge secondary RtoP.
This relates to Oman’s1103 critique of the 2001 ICISS Report for failing to outline any 
criteria to guide decision making over when to apply measures to prevent the perpetration of 
RtoP crimes, thereby creating ambiguity over when the “responsibility to prevent” becomes 
activated.1104 Despite writing in 2009, Oman does not expressly consider whether this issue 
was in any way resolved by the Outcome Document’s 2005 adoption. The present author 
considers that an imminence threshold could help to overcome this omission. As discussed 
above, the application of assistance measures have also required that RtoP crimes appear 
imminent. Accordingly, practice following the Outcome Document’s adoption appears to 
have clarified secondary RtoP’s activation more effectively than earlier Reports, specifically
1099 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138-139.
1100 The High-Level Panel stated that they ‘endorse the emerging norm that there is a collective international 
responsibility to protect, exercisable by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in 
the event o f  genocide and other large-scale killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations o f  international 
humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to prevent’, emphasis 
added. Report o f the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility’ (2004) UN Doc A/59/562, 66. (HLP Report).
1101 See e.g. Dallaire (n 1071), 343 and 373 and L van den Herik (n 1071), 76 [noting the reluctance o f some 
States to use, as she writes, ‘the G-word’ in relation to Rwanda].
1102 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular para 6; UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular para 7 and UNSC Res 
1975 (n 1073), preambular para 13.
1103 N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: A Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 22 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 
355.
1104 Oman argues: ‘But while the authors rightly identify preventive responsibility as the foundational aspect o f  
the responsibility to protect, they fail to define the parameters o f acceptable pre-crisis intervention in similar 
detail’. Oman, ibid, 365.
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by providing that the decision to take action in advance of the actual perpetration of RtoP 
crimes should be based on an apprehension that, if assistance is not given, RtoP crimes will 
be perpetrated in the near future.
Notwithstanding this, basing secondary RtoP’s activation on the fact that RtoP crimes 
‘may’1105 be perpetrated imminently can require decision makers to conduct a ‘forward- 
looking assessment’1106 of the situation which, Rosenberg correctly argues, ‘is by its nature a 
very different enquiry than the assessment of the evidence to determine whether a fact has 
been proven about a past event’1107 (i.e. a ‘backward-looking assessment’1108 of a particular 
situation). To Rosenberg, the need to consider ‘the likelihood of prospective conduct’1109 
within a State (i.e. the imminence of RtoP crimes) can lead relevant actors to determine 
secondary RtoP’s activation in specific cases based upon their own ‘gut reactions or 
feelings’.1110 In Rosenberg’s view, it is necessary to introduce a more objective formula into 
international decision making on secondary RtoP’s activation, requiring relevant actors to 
apply a:
‘[Sjtandard of reasonable suspicion [...] which is met when a reliable body of 
evidence indicates the occurrence of a particular incident or event. Relevant facts 
cannot be established solely on the basis of reports in mass or social media and must 
be corroborated’.1111
The main thrust of Rosenberg’s argument here is that an imminence threshold can raise 
issues of an evidential nature because it requires relevant actors to determine that RtoP 
crimes are likely to arise, thereby making decision making on secondary RtoP’s activation 
somewhat subjective. Rosenberg appears to be concerned that, absent a ‘standard of 
reasonable suspicion’,1112 decisions regarding secondary RtoP’s activation could be 
inappropriately made because relevant actors have either underestimated or overestimated 
the (i) level o f harm sustained by a population; and (ii) likelihood that RtoP crimes will be 
perpetrated in each situation. This argument merits reflection.
On the one hand, the present author would argue that we should avoid potentially 
underrating (i) the existing techniques which are used by relevant bodies to establish the
1105 See for example, UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular para 7.
1106 Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 58.
1107 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
1108 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
1109 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
1110 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 56. Scheffer also makes this point, arguing that applying secondary RtoP in 
response to the ‘threat’ o f RtoP crimes can require the international community to ‘make political decisions about 
whether and how to take action while gambling on the nature o f the crime threatening the civilian population and 
how, if left unchallenged, that crime may unfold on the ground, including its likely severity’. D Scheffer, 
“Atrocity Crimes Framing the Responsibility to Protect” in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds), Responsibility to 
Protect: The Global Moral Compact fo r  the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009) 78-98, 80 and 
93.
1111 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 71, ellipsis added.
1112 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
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nature, gravity and scale of the harm sustained by a population; and (ii) the utility of an 
imminence threshold for guiding decision making on secondary RtoP’s activation. With 
regard to the former, it is notable that the existing mechanisms to which RtoP relates already 
employ a variety of techniques to guard against the risk of unreliable evidence of human 
rights violations. For example, the UNHRC and UNSC can authorise human rights personnel 
to investigate the situation inside the State. If national authorities do not permit the personnel 
entry into the State’s territory, the personnel will, for example, conduct interviews with 
refugees fleeing the territory (as in Darfur1113 and Syria1114). Through cross-referring the 
testimony given, a basic picture of the human rights situation in the territory of the State can 
be developed and reported on.
With regard to the latter, it is noteworthy that the concept of “imminence” is not unique to 
the RtoP framework but, rather, that which is used more widely in international law and 
relations. For example, the 2004 High Level Panel Report1115 clearly demarcates 
“imminence” as a criterion for guiding decisions on the legitimacy and necessity of using 
armed force for self-defence purposes or, alternatively, as part of an enforcement action 
under Chapter VII.1116 Furthermore, it is clear in this Report that “imminence” is generally 
accepted as a workable and relatively controlled concept which generally requires 
consideration of the issue of time. For example, the Report highlights that if the threat to a 
State from an “armed attack” is not in the ‘distant future’1117 then it may be considered to be 
“imminent”.1118 Arguably, the influence of time on decisions of “imminence” in a secondary 
RtoP context comes through in relevant practice, not least the UNSC’s authorisation of 
armed force in Libya.1119 Resolution 1973 explicitly refers to the need to protect populations 
in Benghazi1120 which, at the time of the UNSC’s meeting on this Resolution,1121 was where 
Gaddafi threatened to “cleanse” the population.1122 Thus, an imminence concept seems to 
essentially require decision makers to evaluate whether RtoP crimes are likely to be
1113 On the methodology o f the High-Level Mission and the Sudanese government’s lack o f cooperation with the 
mission, see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (9 March 
2007) UN Doc A/UNHRC/4/80, 7-9. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human 
Rights in Darfur’).
1114 On the methodology o f the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Syrian 
government’s lack o f cooperation with the High Commissioner, see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 September 
2011) UN Doc A/UNHRC/18/53, 3-5.
1115 HLP Report (n 1100).
1116 HLP Report, ibid, 63 [on the invocation o f Article 51 o f the UN Charter regarding the right to self-defence] 
and 64 [regarding Chapter VII authorised armed force].
1117 HLP Report, ibid, 64.
1118 HLP Report, ibid.
1119 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), para 4.
1120 UNSC Res 1973, ibid.
1121 UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
1122 ‘No Let-Up in Gaddafi Offensive’ (A1 Jazeera, 17 March 2011)
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/afnca/2011/03/2011317645549498.html> accessed 16 August 2012.
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perpetrated against a population from RtoP crimes in the immediate or near future,1123
Nevertheless, some challenges to the credibility and objectivity of decision making on 
secondary RtoP’s activation are likely to arise in practice, irrespective of the specific 
approaches taken by relevant actors to “evidence” regarding the imminence of RtoP crimes. 
The UNHRC debate on the situation in Libya1124 is one illustration. Addressing the UNHRC, 
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights1125 (i) asserted that the Libyan authorities 
were perpetrating human rights violations and that these could amount to crimes against 
humanity;1126 and (ii) recalled that the Outcome Document provides for the application of 
secondary RtoP measures when such crimes emerge.1127 To support this standpoint, reference 
was made to reports made to the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
regarding human rights violations inside Libya1128 and that these allegations were supported 
by corroborating testimony from ‘witnesses in and out of Libya’,1129 including doctors who 
were treating the wounded.1130 Nevertheless, some States claimed that secondary RtoP’s 
activation was being determined on the basis of unreliable evidence and that calls for its 
application were politically motivated.]m For example, Cuba1132 argued that media reports 
on the situation were contradictory and that Western States were exploiting this in order to 
‘incite violence, military aggression and intervention’1133 against the Libyan regime. 
Nicaragua1134 suggested that Western media were perhaps wrongly reporting on the situation 
so as to legitimise intervention in the State and enable them to gain control of Libya’s natural 
resources. Arguably, this suggests that some States may claim that there is a lack of credible 
evidence that RtoP crimes are imminent in a particular case, irrespective of what approaches 
are taken to relevant evidence, because they are apprehensive over the way in which 
secondary RtoP’s activation could impact upon their own policy interests. For Cuba1135 and 
Nicaragua,1136 policy interests in Libya included the possibility that an intervention led by
1123 The specific factors which can be taken into account in order to establish the prospect o f the perpetration o f  
RtoP crimes are discussed in the section below.
1124 UN Press Release, ‘UN Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ 
(22 August 2011)
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=l 1324&LangID=E> accessed 14 
November 2011. (UN Press Release, ‘UN Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian 
Arab Republic’).
1125 UNHRC, ‘Situation o f Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay, 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights’ (25 February 2011)
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/.../A.HRC.17.44_AUV.pdf> accessed 14 November 2011.
1126 ‘Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay’, ibid, 4.
1127 ‘Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay’, ibid, 2.
1128 ‘Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay’, ibid, 4.
1129 ‘Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay’, ibid.
1130 ‘Statement o f Ms. Navanethem Pillay’, ibid.
1131 Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba and Nicaragua to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘UNHRC 
Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 1124).
1132 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, ibid.
1133 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, ibid.
1134 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua, ibid.
1135 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, ibid.
1136 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua, ibid.
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Western States could reinvigorate neo-colonial policies and undermine the principle of non­
interference in States internal affairs. This raises the possibility that secondary RtoP’s 
activation may become politicised in practice. That is, States may challenge whether RtoP 
crimes are actually imminent in order to avoid secondary RtoP’s activation for their own 
political reasons. This raises the question of whether there are any safeguards in place to 
avoid secondary RtoP’s activation being undermined by States wider policy concerns, not 
least whether there are certain factors which can be taken into account in order to objectively 
establish that RtoP crimes are imminent.
1.2.1 Establishing Imminence
Examination of practice suggests that two factors have informed determinations of the 
imminence of RtoP crimes and, therefore, secondary RtoP’s activation. The first factor is the 
nature, gravity and scale o f  the particular acts being perpetrated against the population. 
Particular attention has been given to the specific kind of harm sustained by the population 
and whether this overlaps with the legally defined nature of the mass atrocity crimes that 
RtoP covers. For example, whether the acts suggest that a ‘widespread and systematic 
attack’1137 against the population is imminent. Consideration has also been given to whether 
the gravity and scale of the acts being perpetrated meets the standard of the mass atrocity 
crimes covered by RtoP. For instance, reference has been made to whether the acts being 
committed are being carried out on a ‘widespread’1138 basis and, therefore, that they could 
suggest that crimes against humanity are imminent.
The second factor is who the acts have been perpetrated against. Relevant actors seem to 
have examined whether the harm is being perpetrated against the protected persons of the 
RtoP crime(s) that is considered to be imminent. For instance, reference has been made to 
the harm sustained by the ‘civilian population’1139 (i.e. crimes against humanity) or a specific
1137 See for example UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular para 7; UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular para 6; 
UN Press Release, ‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, 
and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’ (2 June 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 11 August 2012 (‘Statement by the 
Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, 
Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011) and Statement o f the Representative o f  Germany to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc. S/PV.6498.
1138 See for example, UNSC Res 1973, ibid; UNSC Res 1970, ibid; Statement o f the UN Special Advisers, ibid 
and Statement o f the Representative o f Germany to the UNSC, ibid.
1139 For e.g. UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), preambular para 13 and para 6; Statements o f the Representatives o f 
Gabon, Colombia and Cote d ’Ivoire to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) UN Doc. 
S/PV.6508; UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 5; Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and 
Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 1073), 4; UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), para 4; UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular 
paras 7 and 14; Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation, France, Germany and Brazil to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; Statements o f the Representatives of 
France, Lebanon, India, Colombia and the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498; UNSC Res 1970, ibid, preambular paras 2 and 6; European Parliament Res, ‘The 
Situation in Darfur’ (2006) EP Doc P6_TA(2006)0387, paras D and 10 (EP Res, ‘The Situation in Darfur’) and
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ethnic group like the Kyrgyzstan Uzbek minority1140 (i.e. ethnic cleansing). This trend in 
practice may have a wider significance. The focus on protecting large groups o f individuals 
(e.g. “civilian population”) from RtoP crimes, as opposed to an individual, may explain why 
certain terms were used in the Outcome Document. Each draft of the Outcome Document 
proposed providing for the protection of the ‘civilian population’1141 or ‘populations’,1142 not 
“individuals”. This raises the possibility that the Outcome Document’s references to 
‘populations’1143 is significant not only in terms of the beneficiary concept,1144 but also 
regarding the gravity o f  harm that States consider is necessary before human rights violations 
can activate secondary RtoP. Here, it should be recalled that human rights law provides that 
individuals can be the victims of torture. Accordingly, the Outcome Document’s use of 
‘populations’1145 suggests that States consider that an “act of torture” against an individual 
would be insufficient to activate secondary RtoP. Instead, for human rights violations to 
activate secondary RtoP, they should be of the scale to require the protection of populations 
within the State more generally.
Syria is one illustration of secondary RtoP’s activation requiring that human rights 
violations be of the nature, gravity and scale to suggest that RtoP crimes are imminent. 
Originally international actors condemned the situation from the viewpoint of violations of 
international human rights law.1146 It was not until the violence escalated that some relevant 
actors began to invoke the language of RtoP to condemn the situation.1147 A similar approach
‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, and on the 
Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011 (n 1137).
1140 UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 1073).
1141 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the UNGA o f  
September 2005’ (3 June 2005), para 72 and UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High- 
Level Plenary Meeting o f the UNGA o f September 2005’ (22 July 2005) reprinted in World Federalist 
Movement, ‘State-by-State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect’ (11 August 2005), 11-12 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/civil-society?view=fjrelated&id=2411 > 
accessed 11 August 2012.
1142 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the UNGA o f  
September 2005’ (5 August 2005) UN Doc A/59/HLPM/CRP. l/Rev.2, 28.
114 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138 and 139.
1144 Chapter two discussed the significance and implications o f a “populations” beneficiary concept at length.
1145 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138 and 139.
1146 For e.g. Spokesperson for the UNSG, ‘Secretary-General Condemns Syria Killings, Calls for an End to 
Violence’ (25 April 2011) UN Doc SG/SM/13521; UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Pillay 
Denounces Escalation o f Government Crackdown in Syria, Calls for Immediate End to Killings’ (25 April 2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10958&LangID=E> accessed 14 
November 2011; Council Regulation (EU) No 442/2011 concerning restrictive measures in view o f the situation 
in Syria (9 May 2011) OJL 121 10 May 2011 and Council Regulation (EU) No 504/2011 implementing 
Regulation (EU) 442/2011 concerning restrictive measures in view o f the situation in Syria (23 May 2011) OJL 
136 24 May 2011.
1147 For e.g. ‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General, Francis Deng, and on 
the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011 (n 1137); UN Press Release, 
‘Statement by Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide, Francis 
Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’ (21 July 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 14 November 2011; European 
Union, ‘Statement o f the High Representative on the extension o f restrictive measures against Syrian individuals 
responsible for and associated with repression’ (1 August 2011) EP Doc A 306/11 and European Parliament 
Resolution, ‘Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North
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has been adopted at the regional (European) level. Whilst the European Parliament [EP] 
adopted a Resolution denouncing the gross violations of human rights in Bahrain, Yemen 
and Syria, 1148 RtoP was only referred to with respect to Syria.1149 This suggests that a 
distinction has been made in practice between (i) all human rights violations which can 
engage the interest of the international community generally, and (ii) human rights 
violations which can, due to their nature, gravity and scale, suggest that RtoP crimes may be 
imminent and, therefore, can activate international action through the spectrum of measures 
covered by secondary RtoP. These factors can be determined by reason of the (i) general 
nature of the violations (e.g. right against torture and crimes against humanity1150); (ii) the 
gravity of the violations (e.g. “widespread and systematic attack”,1151 not isolated instances 
of violations against individuals); and (iii) the scale of the violations (e.g. against 
“populations”, not violations against “individuals”). Arguably, secondary RtoP therefore 
codifies a tipping point for when the international community should, in principle, discharge 
assistance, peaceful or non-peaceful responsive measures to protect populations from RtoP 
crimes.
A “tipping point” helps to create an objective standard regarding the gravity, nature and 
scale of the harm that a population should sustain to warrant secondary RtoP’s activation. 
This is significant at a policy level because it helps to guard against States invoking 
secondary RtoP to justify the use of unauthorised armed force for debatable human 
protection purposes. This helps to further distinguish secondary RtoP from the wider concept 
of humanitarian intervention. One difficulty with humanitarian intervention is that it does not 
clearly demarcate the nature, gravity and scale of the human rights violations which can 
legitimately activate the use of armed force. This leaves ambiguity over (i) when 
humanitarian intervention is legitimate;1152 (ii) the range of human rights violations that it
Africa’ (7 July 2011) EP Doc P7_TA(2011)0333, para 10. (EP Res, Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the 
Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North Africa’).
1148 EP Res, Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North 
Africa’, ibid paras (i) J [on human rights violations in Yemen]; (ii) O, P, R, 1 and 21, 23 [on human rights 
violations in Bahrain] and (iii) 4-8 [on human rights violations in Syria].
1149 EP Res, Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North 
Africa’, ibid, para 10.
1150 The overlap between certain human rights violations and the legal elements o f  RtoP crimes was noted in the 
preceding chapter. See respectively, an individual’s right against torture in the UN Convention against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 1984 (adopted 10 December 1984, entered into 
force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 85 and torture as an act which can constitute a crime against humanity in, for 
example, Rome Statute o f  the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 
2187 UNTS 90 art 7 (f) (Rome Statute). See also, the way in which condemnations o f the violations o f the right 
against torture were accompanied by the express reiteration o f the Syrian authorities primary RtoP duty in EP 
Res, ‘The Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North 
Africa’, ibid, paras D and 10 and, further, paras C, D and 4.
1151 Rome Statute (n 1150), art 7 (1).
1152 Or as Gareth Evans has put the question - ‘[w]hen exactly did individual sovereignty claims take primacy 
over State sovereignty? How does one identify the point at which the former should override the latter?’ G Evans, 
‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006-2007) 24 Wis. Int’l L.J 703,707.
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covers; and (iii) the specific gravity that the violations should have.1153 In short, secondary 
RtoP’s activation seems to add value to that of humanitarian intervention because it more 
clearly clarifies the factual threshold which should be met in order to justifiably use armed 
force to protect populations. At the same time, secondary RtoP’s “tipping point” makes the 
argument that the international community should give unconditional respect to the principle 
of non-intervention in internal affairs seem less legitimate.
1.2.2 The Scope of Decision Making on the Imminence of RtoP Crimes
The factors used to establish that RtoP crimes are imminent in practice to date relate to 
arguments in present literature regarding the scope of decision making on secondaiy RtoP’s 
activation. First, the factors used to establish that RtoP crimes may be imminently 
perpetrated add weight to Strauss’s1154 view on why the criteria of “manifest failure”1155 and 
“inadequacy of peaceful means”1156 feature in the final text of the Outcome Document. 
Strauss argues that the aforementioned criteria are used in the final text because they require 
relevant actors to base decisions on secondary RtoP’s activation on more objective factors 
than the ‘unable or unwilling’1157 threshold used in the ICISS Report and earlier drafts of the 
Outcome Document.1158 To the present author, the merit of this argument lies in the fact that 
establishing that the legally defined crimes that RtoP covers are imminent is less subjective 
and open to interpretation than trying to determine whether a State is prepared (i.e. 
‘willing’1159) to protect its population.
The factors on which to establish the imminence of RtoP crimes challenge some of the 
arguments in the present literature regarding the interplay between the legal elements of 
RtoP crimes and secondary RtoP’s activation.1160 For example, Wong1161 argues that
1153 On the debate surrounding Humanitarian Intervention see for e.g. C Gray, International Law and the Use o f  
Force (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 31-52.
1154 E Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush -  On the Assumed Legal Nature o f the 
Responsibility to Protect” in A J Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 33.
1155 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1,56 Outcome Document, ibid.
1157 Report o f  the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect 
(International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 17. (ICISS Report).
1158 UNGA President, ‘Revised Draft Outcome Document o f the High-Level Plenary Meeting o f the UNGA o f  
September 2005’ (22 July 2005) UN Doc A/59/HPLM/CRP.l/Rev.l, para. 113. This change is also discussed 
briefly by Rosenberg and Strauss. See Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 60.
1159 ICISS Report (n 1157).
1160 See especially, J Wong, ‘Reconstructing the Responsibility to Protect in the Wake o f Cyclones and 
Separatism’ (2009) 84 (2) Tulane Law Review 219; Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 55-72; J Kleffner, “The 
Scope o f  the Crimes Triggering the Responsibility to Protect” in J Hoffman and A Nollkaemper (eds), 
Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012) 85-93 and 
Scheffer (n 1110), 78-98.
1161 Wong, ibid.
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deciding whether to apply secondary RtoP should be informed by the way in which the legal 
elements of RtoP crimes have been explained ‘in prevailing international criminal
1 1 (f) 1 1 f\“Xjurisprudence’, including mens rea issues. This tends to contradict practice which has 
so far only reviewed whether the actus reus elements of an RtoP crime appear to have 
emerged, quite likely to help avoid inhibiting secondary RtoP’s activation by legalistic 
debates over whether the harm sustained by populations is accompanied with the requisite 
criminal intent.
Furthermore, the factors for determining imminence relate to the argument in present 
literature that secondary RtoP’s activation overlaps with the international criminal law 
“substantiality test”.1164 Scheffer1165 is a useful example of this line of argument. Drawing 
upon the way in which international criminal tribunals have outlined the requisite gravity and 
scale of the mass atrocity crimes to which RtoP relates, Scheffer argues that secondary 
RtoP’s ‘legitimate’1166 activation depends upon each case meeting ‘the substantiality test 
developed by the international and hybrid criminal tribunals’.1167 As both require that the 
acts at issue be of certain gravity,1168 the present author considers that connecting secondary 
RtoP’s activation to the “substantiality test” is useful, even if only to distinguish the subset 
of acts which it can be activated by from those human rights violations which, due to their 
nature, gravity and scale, fall outside secondary RtoP’s reach. Nevertheless, it is also 
necessary to avoid overly conflating the substance of secondary RtoP’s activating threshold 
and the “substantiality test”. Although there may be some congruence in the factors taken 
into account under both (e.g. the nature and scale of the acts committed), practice suggests 
that there are also differences. One variation is that questions of mens rea have not been 
explicitly examined in relation to secondary RtoP, whereas they have sometimes been 
referred to in relation to the “substantiality test”.1169
1162 Wong, ibid, 263.
1163 Wong, ibid, 252-256.
1164 See especially, Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 58-61 [reviewing the merits o f stakeholders tendency to 
conflate the threshold o f harm necessary for the activation o f secondary RtoP with that used to determine whether 
a case should be prosecuted by the ICC] and 61-62 [reviewing the extent to which domestic criminal legal 
standards o f evidence could clarify the threshold for secondary RtoP’s activation]; Scheffer (n 1110), 83-84. For a 
discussion o f the gravity/substantiality o f  mass atrocity crimes that is necessary for a case to be prosecuted by the 
ICC, see generally R Rastan, ‘What is a Case for the Purpose o f the Rome Statute?’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law 
Forum 435; W A Schabas, ‘State Policy as an Element o f  International Crimes’ (2008) 98 (3) Journal o f Criminal 
Law and Criminology 953, 979-981; M El Zeidy, ‘The Gravity Threshold under the Statute o f the International 
Criminal Court’ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 35 and W A Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial 
Activism at the International Criminal Court’ (2008) 6 J Int Crim Justice 731,736-748.
1,65 Scheffer, ibid, 78-98.
1166 Scheffer, ibid, 83.
1167 Scheffer, ibid, 82.
1168 As Scheffer explains, ‘[t]he crime must be o f significant magnitude, meaning that its commission is 
widespread or systematic or occurs as part o f a large-scale commission o f such crimes’. Scheffer, ibid.
1169 For e.g. in what Schabas describes as ‘the most elaborate discussion to date o f  the issue o f gravity in 
documents emanating from the Office o f  the Prosecutor’, the ICC Prosecutor referred to the ‘ intentional and 
large-scale sexual violence and abductions’ in Northern Uganda, DRC and Darfur. The statement related to why 
the ICC would investigate the aforementioned situations and not proceed with investigation o f the actions o f  
British troops during the intervention in Iraq. ‘Statement on communications concerning Iraq’, The Hague, 9
165
Furthermore, secondary RtoP’s activation may actually require a higher threshold of 
“substantiality” than the Rome Statute. War crimes are a useful illustration. The recruitment 
and conscription of child soldiers is sufficiently grave to fall within the jurisdiction of the 
ICC.1170 However, it is questionable as to whether this war crime would, in itself, be deemed 
to be so egregious to activate secondary RtoP. The scope of the crimes which activate 
secondary RtoP was not a controversial issue among the majority of States during drafting of 
the Outcome Document. However, the US argued that that the reference to “war crimes” be 
replaced with a reference to ‘other large-scale atrocities’1171 in order to clarify that secondary 
RtoP cannot be activated by ‘all war crimes, but only those that are of sufficient scale to 
warrant such international attention’.1172 To the US, this proposal was wholly ‘in keeping 
with the approach in the Geneva Conventions’ which ‘distinguish between ‘grave breaches’ 
of the Convention, and other violations.’1173 Accordingly, the US seemed to consider that the 
war crimes which can activate secondary RtoP should be of the gravity to meet the laws of 
war ‘grave breaches’1174 threshold. In subsequent practice, the (now former) UN Special 
Adviser on RtoP1175 has acknowledged that it may be necessary to discuss curtailing the 
scope of RtoP in order to increase the level of harm which can activate secondary RtoP.1176 
These expressions of concern raise the significant question of whether all of secondary 
RtoP’s components can be activated in the same way or, instead, on the basis of a sliding 
scale.
February 2006, 8-9 reprinted in Schabas, ‘Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International 
Criminal Court’ (n 1164), 740.
1170 Rome Statute (n 1150) art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi) and (e) (vii).
1171 Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President (30 August 2005) 
<http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid= 15&limit= 15&limitstart=0 
&order=date&dir=ASC&category=9&Itemid=240> accessed 14 May 2012. (Letter o f the US Ambassador John 
Bolton to the UNGA President).
1172 Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President, ibid. See also, Statement o f the Acting 
Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’ (22 June 2005) 
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 14 May 2012 [again 
recommending that the reference to ‘war crimes’ be replaced with a reference to ‘other large-scale atrocities’]. 
(Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’).
1173 Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President, ibid.
1174 On the acts which would be considered as such within the Geneva Conventions and Rome Statute see Rome 
Statute (n 1150) art 8 (2) (a) (i) - (viii).
1175 E C Luck, ‘Conceptual, Institutional and Political Challenges’ (Forward Looking Session at the European 
Science Foundation ‘The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice’ Conference, Linkoping, Sweden,
11 June 2010).
1176 Rosenberg and Strauss note that relevant actors have ‘expressed concern that the broad definition of war 
crimes included acts, which had little to do with the population suffering serious harm as described in the work of 
the ICISS report, such as compelling prisoners o f war to serve in the forces o f a hostile power or the killing or 
wounding o f combatants who had surrendered’. Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 59. For a similar argument 
regarding war crimes, see Kleffher (n 1160) 88-89 and D Hubert and A Blatter, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as 
International Crimes Prevention’ (2012) 4 (1 ) GRtoP 33, 54-60.
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1.2 The Character of Activation: Uniform Standard or Sliding Scale?
The activation of secondary RtoP’s assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful responsive 
components seems to have been approached on the basis of a sliding scale. To this effect, the 
activation of non-peaceful responsive measures appears to require that the situation at issue 
entail additional factors than that required for the activation of assistance or peaceful 
responsive measures. One example of this in international practice are the contrasting 
approaches adopted to the authorisation of armed force in Libya and the deployment of 
UNHRC fact-finding missions in Libya and Syria. UNSC Resolution 1973 outlined that the 
earlier measures applied by the UNSC (e.g. targeted sanctions) had failed to resolve the 
situation and protect the Libyan population.1177 Furthermore, reference to the possibility that 
the situation may entail crimes against humanity1178 was supplemented with statements 
regarding the Libyan authorities’ direct involvement in harming the population.1179 In 
contrast, the UNHRC Resolutions regarding the deployment of fact-finding missions to 
Libya1180 and Syria1181 did not comment on the ineffectiveness of previous measures but, 
instead, simply recalled the earlier steps taken to resolve the situation (e.g. international 
condemnation1182). Similarly, the aforementioned UNHRC Resolution on Syria requested 
verification of the commission of ‘violations and crimes’,1183 as opposed to specifying that a 
particular RtoP crime may be occurring.
A similar approach has been adopted in relevant practice at the regional (European) level. 
Significantly, secondary RtoP’s activation has been handled variably in EP country-specific 
Resolutions referring to RtoP.1184 In Burma, the EP recalled the Outcome Document RtoP 
provisions and highlighted that the legal elements of RtoP crimes appear to be emerging in 
the State.1185 However, when recommending the use of non-peaceful responsive measures in
1177 For e.g. the Security Council was keen to establish prior to authorising the use o f force that less coercive 
means applied under Resolution 1970 (2011), such as wide ranging sanctions and referral to the ICC, had been 
ineffective. To this end, Resolution 1973 deplores non-compliance with Res 1970 (2011). UNSC Res 1973 (n
1073), preambular para 2.
1178 UNSC Res 1973, ibid, preambular para 7.
1179 See for example UNSC Res 1973, ibid, para 17 [deploring the Libyan authorities ‘use o f mercenaries’].
1180 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), para 11.
1181 UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1073), para 7.
1182 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), paras 8-10 and UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid, paras 5-6.
1183 UNHRC Res S-16/1, ibid, para 7.
1184 The Resolution’s include: European Parliament Resolution, ‘On the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya in 
particular’ (10 March 2011) EP Doc P7_TA(2011)0095 (EP Res, ‘On the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya in 
particular’); European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Situation in Zimbabwe’ (18 December 2008) EP Doc 
RSP/2008/2695 (EP Res, ‘The Situation in Zimbabwe’); EP Res, Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the 
Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North Africa’ (n 1147); European Parliament Resolution,
‘Expulsion o f NGO’s from Darfur’ (12 March 2009) EP Doc. P6_TA(2009)0145 (EP Res, ‘Expulsion o f NGO’s
from Darfur’) and European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (22 May 2008) EP Doc. 
P6_TA(2008)0231. (EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’).
1185 For e.g. EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’, ibid, paras 3, K and 11 [ recalling that ‘UNGA Resolution 
60/1 o f 24 October 2005 on the World Summit Outcome, paragraph 139 o f which endorsed the possibility o f  
collective cohesive action against individual states where "national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
their populations from genocide, war crime, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity"’; ‘whereas several
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Darfur1186 the EP (i) referred to the legal elements of RtoP crimes, such as the fact that 
‘violence is often directed against the civilian population’;1187 and (ii) expressly stated that 
‘Sudan has failed in its ‘responsibility to protect’ its own people ’.1188
Not all relevant actors consider peaceful and non-peaceful responsive measures to be 
subject to different activating thresholds. The UNSG’s 2009 Report suggests that both forms 
of responsive measures will be activated when the Outcome Document criteria of “manifest 
failure” and “inadequacy of peaceful means” are established.1189 This is possibly because the 
Outcome Document appears to connect peaceful and non-peaceful responsive measures 
through its conjoining statement of ‘[i]n this context’.1190 However, the present author 
considers that the approach adopted in practice is more consistent with the fact that the 
Outcome Document bases the application of non-peaceful measures on the ‘inadequacy’1191 
of peaceful means. This suggests that the activation of non-peaceful measures requires 
peaceful means should have been, or are likely to be, unable to protect the populations.
Furthermore, a sliding scale approach better corresponds with the different objectives of 
discharging secondary RtoP’s respective components, specifically that (i) assistance 
measures aim to help relevant actors to build the requisite capacity to protect their own
governments, including those o f EU Member States, have called for the principle of'responsibility to protect', 
established by the UN to rescue the victims o f  genocide and crimes against humanity, to be applied in the case o f 
Burma’ and ‘[t]akes the view that, if  the Burmese authorities continue to prevent aid from reaching those in 
danger, they should be held accountable for crimes against humanity before the ICC’].
1186 For e.g. when recommending that the Security Council ‘bring pressure to bear on the Sudanese authorities to 
accept the deployment o f the already authorised UN Mission to Darfur, with a clear Chapter VII mandate’. EP 
Res, ‘The Situation in Darfur’ (n 1139), para 2.
1187 EP Res, ‘The Situation in Darfur’, ibid, para D [noting the ‘violence often directed against the civilian 
population’ and stating that ‘the UN 'Responsibility to Protect' provides that, where 'national authorities 
manifestly fa il to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity,' the UN Security Council can agree to a Chapter VII military force’].
1188 EP Res, ‘The Situation in Darfur’, ibid, para E [noting that ‘Sudan has fa iled  in its 'responsibility to protect' 
its own people and is therefore obliged to accept a UN force in line with UN Security Council Resolution 1706; 
calls on the UN Security Council to bring pressure to bear on the Sudanese authorities to accept the deployment 
o f the already authorised UN Mission to Darfur, with a clear Chapter VII mandate and enhanced capacities given 
to such a mission through UN Security Council Resolution 1706’, emphasis added]. Another e.g. is EP Res, 
‘Expulsion o f NGO’s from Darfur’ (n 1184), paras A, G, H and F [these paragraphs respectively (i) refer to the 
ICC arrest warrants for the suspected commission o f crimes against humanity; (ii) condemn the Sudanese 
government for failing to cooperate with the ICC; (iii) condemn the authorities for expelling aid agencies in 
response to the arrest warrants; and (iv) recall that ‘the U N ’s ‘Responsibility to Protect’ doctrine provides that 
where national authorities manifestly fa il to protect their populations, others have a responsibility to provide the 
protection needed’].
189 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 1066), 22 [‘The threshold for prevention, capacity-building or 
rebuilding efforts under pillar two would certainly be lower than the threshold for a response under p illar three, 
namely that “national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations’” , emphasis added].
1190 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139. [‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII o f the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate 
and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity’, emphasis added].
1191 Outcome Document, ibid.
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populations;1192 (ii) peaceful responsive measures are designed to ‘help’1193 to protect 
populations; and (iii) non-peaceful responsive measures involve the international community 
responding to national authorities manifest failure to protect populations.1194 These varying 
objectives suggest that a persuasive rationale underscores the sliding scale approach, namely 
that this approach enables assistance and peaceful responsive measures to be activated at an 
earlier stage than non-peaceful responsive measures.
1.2.1 The Significance and Value Added of a Sliding Scale Approach
A sliding scale approach is significant at a doctrinal level because it suggests that secondary 
RtoP’s activation occurs largely along a continuum which entails distinct “tipping points” for 
each respective component. Where along the continuum the three “tipping points” are 
located depends on whether the international community envisages providing assistance 
and/or applying peaceful or non-peaceful responsive measures. If relevant actors lack the 
capacity to protect the population and, as a result the population is deemed to be at risk of 
RtoP crimes, the international community can offer to provide assistance.1195 Provided that 
the relevant actors1196 consent to the provision of the assistance offered,1197 the international 
community’s assistance commitment is activated. If consent is not provided and the 
population remains at risk of RtoP crimes, or the situation escalates and assistance measures 
would therefore be an inappropriate response,1198 peaceful responsive measures are activated. 
Non-peaceful responsive measures are activated when (i) the threat to populations from RtoP 
crimes becomes more immediate;1199 and/or (ii) RtoP crimes are considered to have already
1192 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 1066), 15.
1193 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1194 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 1066), 22-23.
1195 For e.g. providing mediation and military assistance in Kenya and the C6te d’Ivoire and, furthermore, 
requesting the provision o f assistance to help build the capacity to handle ethnic tensions in Kyrgyzstan. See 
respectively, Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 1073), 4; 
UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 3 and UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention o f  Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 1073).
1196 The issue o f to whom assistance should be provided is discussed at length in the next chapter.
1197 On the requirement o f consent for the provision o f assistance see for e.g. UNSG Report 2009, Implementing 
RtoP (n 1066), 18; UNHRC, ‘Report o f the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms o f  racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (30 March 2010) UN Doc A/UNHRC/14/43, 18 and 
International Law Commission, ‘Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters’ (22 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/CN.4/SR.3019, 3.
1198 Notably, the international community did not focus upon providing assistance in Syria but, instead, on the 
deployment o f a fact-finding mission to try and verify the harm to the population which had already been 
perpetrated. See UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1073), para 7.
199 For e.g. at the adoption o f UNSC Res 1973 France argued: ‘We do not have much time left. It is a matter of 
days, perhaps even hours. Every hour and day that goes by means a further clampdown and repression for the 
freedom-loving civilian population, in particular the people o f Benghazi. Every hour and day that goes by 
increases the burden o f responsibility on our shoulders’. Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498. Protecting the population o f Benghazi was also 
expressly referred to in UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), para 4.
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possibly been perpetrated;1200 and (iii) peaceful responsive measures have been or would be 
inadequate.1201
This continuum is also important at a policy level. The differing “tipping points” for 
activation seem to correspond with where the international community considers that, at least 
in principle, a balance can be struck between (i) ensuring that secondary RtoP is effective; 
and (ii) the specific concerns of States which the potential discharge of secondary RtoP’s 
assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful responsive measures prompt. In terms of assistance 
measures, requiring the population to sustain some harm before the international community 
initiates their offers to “help” and “encourage” States to protect their population, and that 
consent is provided to the assistance offered, can help overcome some of the policy concerns 
that exist over discharging secondary RtoP for preventive purposes. States like 
Bangladesh,1202 Viet Nam1203 and Iran1204 have all raised concern that secondary RtoP’s 
assistance component could be used as a pretext for interfering in a State’s internal affairs 
before any signs emerge to suggest that a population may sustain RtoP-type harm. Similarly, 
States like Ireland,1205 Brazil1206 and Mexico1207 have urged that secondary RtoP’s assistance 
component should be discharged in exceptional circumstances. Admittedly, providing 
assistance after the population sustains RtoP-type harm seems to undermine the commitment 
to provide assistance ‘before crises and conflicts break out’.1208 However, it is important to 
recall that this provision (i) was separated from the Outcome Document’s other international 
assistance provisions; and (ii) has not been explicitly invoked to justify protective action in 
practice to date. Thus, there is scope to argue that this provision simply affirms that, in any 
event, the international community can provide assistance to States through a range of 
mechanisms, such as development assistance.
Segregating the “tipping point” for the use of peaceful and non-peaceful responsive
1200 For example, the Security Council referred to the fact that crimes against humanity “may” be occurring when 
authorising sanctions and the use o f armed force in Libya. See UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular para 6 and 
UNSC Res 1973, ibid, preambular para 7.
1201 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1202 Statement o f the Representative o f Bangladesh to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100.
1203 Statement o f the Representative o f Viet Nam to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
1204 Statement o f the Representative o f Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100.
1205 Statement o f the Representative o f Ireland to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ 
(24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10849 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0849.doc.htm> accessed 2 
January 2012. (UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as 
General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’).
1206 Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97.
1207 Statement o f the Representative o f Mexico to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates 
Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ 
(n 1205).
1208 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
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measures helps to make the framework more politically palatable to States. Providing that 
peaceful responsive measures should be discharged to ‘help to protect’1209 populations 
denotes that the international community will not take sole responsibility for protection at 
this stage. This reflects the understanding that, whilst the protection of human rights is not an 
‘exclusive affair’1210 of States, the international community should typically first seek to 
resolve the situation peacefully under Chapter VI of the UN Charter or through the 
application of pacific measures by regional organisations.1211 Furthermore, the additional 
criteria of “manifest failure” and “inadequacy of peaceful means” for the activation of 
non-peaceful responsive measures helps to codify the factual threshold for when the 
international community’s ‘concern’1214 in protecting human rights can legitimately evolve 
to non-peaceful action against a State, such as through the application of Chapter VII 
enforcement measures.
Admittedly, a sliding scale/continuum approach to the international community’s role in 
internal protection matters is not entirely novel. Indeed, the role of the international 
community in minority protection issues also has an ascending character which loosely 
operates along a continuum.1215 Prior to harm being sustained by minorities, the role of the 
international community’s role is the more general function of encouraging and promoting 
respect for human rights by all States.1216 When minorities have sustained isolated instances 
of harm, the role of external actors has been typically supervisory, advising national 
authorities on the steps that they could take to avoid a recurrence of such harm in the future 
(e.g. recommending changes to national policies).1217 Finally, it has been long since 
recognised that widespread harm to minorities, such as that perpetrated inside the context of
1209 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139, emphasis added.
1210 CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’ (1991), section 3, para 3 
<http://www.osce.org/hcnm/14588> accessed 14 November 2012 (CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting of  
Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’). OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, The 
Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities and Inter-State Relations and Explanatory Note (OSCE 
HCNM, the Netherlands 2008) 11-12. (OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations).
1211 The UNSG notes that the Outcome Document wording on peaceful responsive measures ‘suggests that the 
intent is for this to be an ongoing, generic responsibility that employs the kind o f  peaceful, pacific measures 
specified in Chapter VI and in Article 52, Chapter VIII’. Furthermore, although the UNSG notes that ‘there is no 
room for a rigidly sequenced strategy or for tightly defined “triggers” for action’, the activating ‘threshold for 
Chapter VI measures would be lower than the threshold for enforcement action under Chapter VII’. UNSG 
Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 1066), 22.
1212 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1213 Outcome Document, ibid.
1214 CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’ (n 1210), section 3, para 3 
and OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1210), 11-12.
1215 The fact that the international community’s role in the field o f minority protection can be considered to form 
a continuum is outlined in detail by Nasic. See generally, H Nasic, ‘Minority Rights Instruments and 
Mechanisms: Minority Protection along the Conflict Continuum’, EURAC Research, European Academy (2007).
1216 United Nations, Charier o f  the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI art 1 (3).
1217 A primary example would be the monitoring and reporting functions o f the Committee on the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly in relation to the implementation o f Article 27. International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 
UNTS 171 art 27.
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ethnic conflict, may constitute a threat to stability, peace and security.1218 In such instances, 
the role of external actors is more robust and direct, involving the collective security 
mandates of the UNSC and/or regional organisations.
Notwithstanding these overlaps, secondary RtoP’s “sliding scale” approach appears to 
represent value added by better coordinating and structuring the international community’s 
specific roles at each “tipping point”. The sliding scale approach to the activation of the 
international community’s involvement in minority protection issues is approached in a 
somewhat disjointed manner. Relevant instruments fail to explicitly link the varying roles 
that the international community can have in a minority protection context. For example,
there is no express clarification of the point at which the international community’s
1 0 1 0  1 0 0 0  ‘concern’ in the protection of minorities should shift to the ‘important role’ that it has
‘to play’7227 in ensuring this protection. In contrast, the Outcome Document places the
international community’s varying roles in RtoP cases, and the triggers for these respective
roles, into a coherent framework. It clarifies that the general basis for the international
community’s role under secondary RtoP is linked to protecting populations from RtoP
crimes'222 (i.e. imminence). It defines the overarching purpose of each of the means available
(i.e. assistance to national authorities,7222 help in protecting populations,1224 and response to a
failure to protect7225). In doing so, the Outcome Document helps to contour the kind of cases
in which the international community should take a particular role. For example, that (i)
assistance should be given when relevant authorities lack the capacity to protect the
population and these authorities request, or consent to, the provision of assistance; and (ii)
non-peaceful responsive measures should be discharged when the harm sustained by a
population is of the gravest form;1226 assistance or peaceful responsive measures would be
inadequate routes1227 through which to ensure populations’ protection.
Arguably, added value to the international community’s role in the field of minority 
protection may also arise by reason of constructing secondary RtoP’s activation around a 
continuum of competing “tipping points”. As noted above, dividing the “tipping points”
12,8 As Temperley explains the rationale which partly underscored the Paris Peace Conference was the threat to 
peace and stability which emanated from the minorities within the new States: ‘Nothing would be so likely to 
produce war in the future as justifiable discontent among the transferred populations’. H V Temperley, A History 
o f  the Peace Conference o f  Paris: Vol V (OUP, London 1921) 121.
1219 CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’ (n 1210), section 3, para 3 
and OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1210), 11-12.
1220 UNGA Res 47/135, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities’ (18 December 1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/135, preambular para 7. (UNGA, ‘Declaration on 
the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities’).
1221 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities’, ibid.
1222 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138-139.
1223 Outcome Document, ibid.
1224 Outcome Document, ibid, para 139.
1225 Outcome Document, ibid.
1226 This stems from the criteria o f ‘manifest failure’. Outcome Document, ibid.
1227 This stems from the requirement that ‘peaceful means would be inadequate’. Outcome Document, ibid.
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essentially regulates when the international community’s ‘legitimate concern’1228 in 
protection issues takes precedence (and the extent to which it takes precedence) over respect 
for State sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-intervention in internal affairs. To this 
effect, a fundamental difference between protecting populations under secondary RtoP and 
protecting minority rights is that it is only in the latter case that there is an explicit 
requirement for enforcement to be in full respect for State sovereignty and territorial 
integrity.1229 The provision is designed to safeguard against the implication that the minority 
rights provided therein can be used in a manner contrary to a State’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. These provisions help to alleviate concerns that a minority group may 
claim some form of autonomous arrangement within the State or to secede from it.1230 They 
also help to mitigate the risk that members of the international community will invoke their 
‘concern’1231 and ‘important role’1232 in minority protection, in particular Kin States, as a 
pretext for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the third State in which a 
particular minority group resides.1233 Omitting a similar qualification to secondary RtoP’s 
discharge is therefore a novel approach to balancing the international community’s ability to 
take protective action and the State’s ability to have respect for its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and non-interference.
1.2.2 Present Literature
Some commentators1234 allude to the possibility that the activating thresholds for secondary 
RtoP’s components are segregated. Whilst Bellamy argues that there would need to be 
'‘compelling evidence of genocide or mass atrocities’1235 in order to activate a ‘timely and 
decisive’1236 response, Scheffer1237 observes that not all situations entailing RtoP crimes
1228 CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’ (n 1210), section 3, para 3 
and OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1210), 11-12.
1229 For e.g. the UNGA Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Linguistic or 
Religious Minorities provides that ‘[njothing in the present Declaration may be construed as permitting any 
activity contrary to the purposes and principles o f the United Nations, including sovereign equality, territorial 
integrity and political independence o f States’. UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities’ (n 1220), art 8 (4).
1230 On this see e.g. W Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalisation o f Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 (1) ICON 1, 6-7 and P 
Thomberry, ‘Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review o f  International Instruments’ (1989) 38 
(4) ICLQ 867, 874.
1231 CSCE, ‘Report o f the CSCE Meeting o f Experts on National Minorities in Geneva’ (n 1210), section 3, para 
3. See further, OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1210), 11-12.
1232 UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities’ (n 1220), preambular para 7.
1233 OSCE HCNM, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1210), 11-12. See further, Venice Commission, 
‘Report o f the Preferential Treatment o f National Minorities by their Kin State’ (2001) Doc. CDL/INF, 21-23 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(201 l)019-e.pdf> accessed 18 June 2012.
1234 See especially, A Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds 
(Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 69 and Scheffer (n 1110), 77.
1235 Bellamy, ibid, emphasis added.
1236 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1237 Scheffer (n 1110), 77.
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would activate non-peaceful responsive measures. Recognising that the activation of non- 
peaceful responsive measures would require more ‘compelling’1238 evidence of RtoP crimes 
and that such measures may not apply to all RtoP situations1239 acknowledges, albeit 
indirectly, that secondary RtoP’s activation may not be approached in a standard manner but, 
rather, on the basis of a sliding scale.
Wider arguments in the literature1240 have a bearing on the potential implications of 
segregating secondary RtoP’s activating thresholds. Scheffer1241 warns that ‘[d]rawing the 
line between atrocity crimes that would merit and those that would lack justification for 
military intervention could become an extremely difficult task in world affairs’.1242 On the 
one hand, the present author considers that this potential implication can be circumvented. 
To this effect, practice appears to have taken into account not only the nature of the RtoP 
crimes at issue but whether they threaten a large section of the population. Thus, assessing 
the scale of the threat of harm to a population seems to represent one basis on which to 
distinguish those cases which activate non-peaceful responses from those which do not. 
Conversely, determining which component of secondary RtoP is activated on the basis of the 
nature, gravity and scale of harm sustained by a population can mean that relevant actors 
would have to rely more upon the legal definition of RtoP crimes when making decisions on 
activation. Rosenberg1243 argues that drawing upon these definitions would ‘ensure the 
immediate demise of the normative concerns embedded within the RtoP — most of all its 
ability to proactively attempt to prevent imminent or on-going forms of mass atrocities based 
on existing legal obligations’.1244 Admittedly, basing activation on the emergence of the legal 
elements of RtoP crimes tends to undermine secondary RtoP’s application for the purpose of 
preventing a population sustaining any RtoP-type harm. However, it is important to 
distinguish the RtoP framework as it stands from what we would ideally like it to be.1245 In 
this line, we should recall that the Outcome Document’s repeated references to protecting the 
population ‘from’1246 four specific crimes, not human rights violations per se, suggests that 
States did not want to formulate secondary RtoP as that which could be activated at a very 
early stage. Indeed, Rosenberg herself notes that the drafting of the Outcome Document 
suggests that the decision to formulate RtoP around the four crimes was made ‘in order to 
limit the application of the RtoP to exceptional grave situations, where international law had
1238 A Bellamy, Global Politics and The Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (n 1234), 69.
1239 Scheffer (n 1110), 77.
1240 Scheffer, ibid and Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 55-72.
1241 Scheffer, ibid.
1242 Scheffer, ibid.
1243 Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 55-72.
1244 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 55.
1245 This was a point made by the (now former) UN Special Adviser on RtoP. E C Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: 
The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (Keynote address at the European Science Foundation ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect from Principle to Practice’ Conference, Linkoping, Sweden, 9 June 2010).
1246 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
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already defined limitations to the principle of sovereignty’.1247 As noted earlier, a sliding 
scale approach to activation may actually help to further clarify where ‘international law’1248 
has ‘already defined limitations to the principle of sovereignty’1249 and the specific ways in 
which the international community should respond to those limitations (i.e. assistance, 
peaceful or non-peaceful responses). This helps to diminish the prospect, or at least the 
legitimacy, of invoking secondary RtoP as a pretext for interfering in the internal affairs of a 
State wherein no RtoP-type harm to the population has occurred, thereby making the RtoP 
framework politically palatable to States. Furthermore, it does not necessarily follow from 
segregating secondary RtoP’s activating thresholds that secondary RtoP cannot be applied 
for preventive purposes, not least because practice to date suggests that there is no 
requirement for all legal elements of RtoP crimes to be established.
Constructing secondary RtoP’s activation as a continuum with separate “tipping points” 
also tends to call into question some commentators1250 views on the significance of the 
Outcome Document “manifest failure”1251 and “inadequacy of peaceful means”7252 criteria. 
Stahn1253 is a good example. He argues that the Outcome Document creates a 
‘complementarity trap’1254 by enabling the international community to argue that the 
aforementioned criteria have not been met in a particular case and, therefore, that the 
protection of populations remains the task of the State under primary RtoP. The present 
author does not find this view compelling because it tends to overlook the heterogeneous 
nature of the measures available under secondary RtoP and their individual tipping points. 
To this effect, we should recall that in practice the abovementioned criteria appear to have 
been considered to only regulate the activation of non-peaceful responsive measures and, 
therefore, to not inhibit the activation of assistance or peaceful responsive measures.1255 
Furthermore, we should acknowledge that no formula will be effective if there is not the 
political will to undertake the measure activated. To this end, a general difficulty in 
international relations is the fact that there is a fundamental difference between declaring a 
responsibility to take a particular course of action in specific circumstances and discharging 
that responsibility when those circumstances arise. Here, reference can be made to the 
persuasive argument that international inaction to mass atrocity crimes has never been the
1247 Rosenberg and Strauss (n 1067), 59.
1248 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
1249 Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid.
1250 See particularly, Bellamy, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?’ (n 1067); Stahn, ‘Responsibility to 
Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 1067); Stahn, ‘RtoP, the ICC and the Libyan Arrests’ (n 
1067); Payandeh (n 1067); Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect After the 
2005 World Summit’ (n 1067) and Rosenberg and Strauss, ibid, 72.
1251 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1252 Outcome Document, ibid.
1253 Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (n 1067).
1254 Stahn, ibid, 116.
1255 Contrast for instance, EP Res, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 1184), paras 3, K and para 11 and EP Res, 
‘The Situation in Darfur’ (n 1139), para E.
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result of ignorance to the commission of RtoP crimes or a lack of means through which to 
respond to them but, rather, a disinclination to set aside all other interests ‘in the name of 
humanity’.1256 Consideration should therefore be given to the institutional aspects of the 
activation process and the possible implications thereof, not least the role of political will.
2 Institutional Aspects of the Activation Process
In practice, secondary RtoP’s activation has not been determined by a single authority but, 
rather, by whichever body happens to be considering the RtoP situation at issue. This 
includes the UNSC,1257 UNHRC1258 and regional organisations.1259 This is consistent with the 
UNSG’s recommendation to adopt an ‘inter-agency’1260 approach to secondary RtoP’s 
discharge. Nevertheless, the UNSC appear to have a primary, if not exclusive, role regarding 
the activation of non-peaceful responsive measures like those under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. To this effect, the Outcome Document clearly states that non-peaceful responses 
will be undertaken ‘through the UNSC’.1261 The role of relevant bodies in secondary RtoP’s 
activation merits further reflection. Two particularly interesting bodies to consider are the 
UNSC and the UNHRC.
2.1 The UN Security Council
The Syria case study is a particularly good example of the UNSC’s role in secondary RtoP’s 
activation to date, not least because of the widespread controversies which have surrounded 
the international community’s involvement in this specific situation. On the one hand, some 
actors explicitly outlined that there was a need to protect the Syrian population from RtoP 
crimes and, therefore, that secondary RtoP be activated. However, other States played
1256 See for e.g. A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Regime Change’ (27 September 
2011) <www.e-ir.info/201 l/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/> accessed 12 
July 2012 and L Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in International Law and Practice’ 
(2008) 34 Review o f International Studies 445,456.
1257 For e.g. UNSC Res 1755 (2007) UN Doc S/RES/1755; UNSC Res 1706 (2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706; UN 
UNSC Res 1769 (2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769; UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073); UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073) and UNSC 
Res 1975 (n 1073).
1258 For e.g. UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), para 2 and UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the 
Situation o f  Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1113).
1259 For e.g. EP Res, ‘On the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya in particular’ (n 1184); EP Res, ‘The Situation 
in Zimbabwe’ (n 1184); EP Res, Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in the Context o f the Situation in the 
Arab World and North Africa’ (n 1147); EP Res, ‘Expulsion o f NGO’s from Darfur’ (n 1184) and EP Res, ‘The 
Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 1184).
1260 UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP (n 1066), 32.
1261 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139, emphasis added.
1262 See particularly: Statements o f the Representative o f Germany and Colombia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627; Statements o f the Representatives o f Portugal and the United 
Kingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 April 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6524; Statement o f the
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down the possibility that RtoP crimes are imminent in a State and therefore that it would be 
appropriate to apply secondary RtoP. For instance, Russia1264 and China1265 vetoed a draft 
Resolution which condemned the situation in Syria, recalled the Syrian authorities’ 
primary RtoP duty1268 and outlined the UNSC’s preparedness to authorise further measures, 
as appropriate.1269 Neither of these States suggested that the situation entailed RtoP crimes 
but, instead, commented that there was ‘violence’1270 inside Syria. Similarly, it is notable that 
Russia did not join other States in describing the killings at Houla1271 as a “massacre” but, 
rather, as an ‘incident which left civilians dead’.1272 In addition, both States pushed for the 
UNSC to refrain from blaming the Syrian authorities for the harm to the population and to 
instead, refrain from violating the principle of non-interference in internal affairs1273 by 
condemning all violence equally.1274 To Lebanon1275 and India,1276 it was important to 
acknowledge that Syrian national authorities have a right to take whatever action necessary
Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6711; Draft UN Security Council Resolution (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77, para 5 (a) (Draft 
Resolution vetoed by Russia and China, see voting record in UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6711. (Draft UNSC Res, 4 February 2012).
1263 Primary examples are Russia and China. See for e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian 
Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
1264 Statement o f  the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid.
1265 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, ibid.
1266 Draft UN Security Council Resolution (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612 (Draft UNSC Res, 4 October 
2011). Russia and China also vetoed a draft Resolution proposed in February 2012 which: (i) recalled the Syrian 
authorities primary RtoP duty (preambular para 2); (ii) called on the regime to ensure the free and unhindered 
access to humanitarian agencies and the UNHRC Commission o f Inquiry (paras 12 and 11); (iii) condemned the 
situation inside Syria (paras 2 and 3); (iv) called for full compliance with the Arab League’s November 2011 
Plan o f Action and January 2012 decision which, inter alia, required protection o f  the population (para 5); and (v) 
affirmed that the draft Resolution did not provide for measures under Article 42 o f  the UN Charter i.e. for the 
UNSC to authorise the use o f armed force (para 10). See the aforementioned paragraphs o f Draft UNSC Res, 4 
February 2012 (n 1262).
1267 Draft UNSC Res, 4 October 2011, ibid, preambular paras 2, 9 and para 1.
1268 Draft UNSC Res, 4 October 2011, ibid, para 5.
1269 Draft UNSC Res, 4 October 2011, ibid, para 11 ['Expresses its intention to review Syria’s implementation of
this resolution within 30 days and to consider its options, including measures under Article 41 o f the Charter of
the United Nations’, emphasis original].
1270 Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim record 
(4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
1271 Statement o f the Foreign Minister o f the United Kingdom at a press conference in Moscow cited in ‘Both 
Parties Guilty in Houla Massacre - Lavrov’ (Russia Today, 28 May 2012) <http://www.rt.com/news/peace-plan- 
syria-regime-374/> accessed 30 May 2012.
1272 Statement o f the Foreign Minister o f the Russian Federation, ibid.
1273 Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV. 6627.
1274 Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, ibid.
1275 Lebanon stated: ‘Permit me once again to say that, given the events unfolding in Syria, Lebanon would like to 
defend that brotherly Arab country and its right to sovereignty and the integrity o f  its people and land, including 
the right to ensure the security and safety o f  all its citizens'. Statement o f the Representative o f Lebanon to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid, emphasis added.
1276 India argued: ‘While the right o f people to protest peacefully is to be respected, States cannot but take 
appropriate action when militant groups —  heavily armed —  resort to violence against State authority and 
infrastructure [...] The international community should give time and space for the Syrian Government to 
implement the far-reaching reform measures they have announced. For this, it is also necessary that the 
opposition forces in Syria give up the path o f armed insurrection and engage constructively with the authorities. 
We firmly believe that the actions o f the international community should facilitate engagement o f the Syrian 
Government and the opposition in a Syrian-led inclusive political process, and not complicate the situation by 
threats o f  sanctions, regime change, et cetera'. Statement o f the Representative o f India to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record, ibid, emphasis and ellipsis added.
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to protect their population from “terrorists”. These views tend to suggest that some UNSC 
members distinguish Syria from situations involving RtoP crimes whereby one side is 
considered to be undertaking, for example, a ‘widespread and systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population’.1277 Rather, it connects Syria more to the context of a civil 
war in which the international community should abide by the principles of impartiality and 
neutrality. To the United States,1278 Russia and China’s vetoes were the outcome of these 
States considering that the human rights violations being committed in Syria were not 
sufficiently grave to represent a threat to international peace and security. Accordingly, there 
is scope to argue that one effect of coupling the perpetration of mass atrocity crimes with an 
international protective “responsibility” is that it can, at least in some cases, lead some States 
to deliberately avoid recognising that RtoP crimes are imminent.
Other policy issues underscored the standpoints of Russia and China, however. Both 
States1279 cautioned against the UNSC interfering in the internal affairs of a State. 
Furthermore, alluding to the application of secondary RtoP in Libya, Russia raised concerns 
over the international community using RtoP as a means of standardising its approach to 
cases such as this, including the risk of harm to civilians when armed force is used.1280 To 
this effect, Russia urged that ‘these types of models’ for protecting populations ‘should be 
excluded from global practices once and for all’.1281 The possibility that international action 
could actually encourage the opposition groups to continue their struggle against the regime 
was also referred to.1282 Indeed, Russia appeared to consider that international action which 
appears to support the rebels over the regime could threaten regional peace and security by 
creating a civil war.1283
The reference to wider policy issues is interesting. The Outcome Document provides that 
non-peaceful responsive measures will be undertaken ‘through the Security Council, on a 
case-by-case basis’.1284 There are two possible interpretations of the phrase ‘case-by-case 
basis’.1285 The first is that it means that the UNSC should establish whether the criteria of 
manifest failure and inadequacy of peaceful means have been met on the basis of the specific 
circumstances o f each case. The second is that the UNSC will retain discretion over whether
1277 Rome Statute (n 1150), art 7 (1).
1278 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6627.
1279 Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, Ibid.
1280 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid.
1281 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid.
1282 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid. [‘Recent events convincingly 
show that the radical opposition no longer hides its extremist bent and is relying on terrorist tactics, hoping fo r  
foreign sponsors and acting outside o f the law’, emphasis added].
1283 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid. [‘Given the basis o f statements 
by some Western politicians on President A l-Assad’s loss o f  legitimacy, such an approach could trigger a full- 
fledged conflict in Syria and destabilisation in the region as a whole’, emphasis added].
1284 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1285 Outcome Document, ibid.
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to apply non-peaceful responsive measures even when the criteria are met in a case because 
of a whole host of wider considerations that the Outcome Document does not discuss. There 
is limited guidance in State views with regard to the meaning of this provision. However, the 
US and China both seem to interpret the provision in accordance with the second 
meaning.1286 Whilst the US recalled that the UNSC has never been under a legal obligation 
to authorise enforcement measures,1287 China stresses that the UNSC will ‘try its very best to 
use peaceful means’1288 and make its decision over the application of non-peaceful measures 
on a ‘cautious basis’1289 and with account of ‘conditions on the ground’.1290 Whilst this is 
only two States, their views carry increased significance because both are members of the 
P5. This writer would therefore suggest that the language of the Outcome Document may 
actually legitimate some of the wider political considerations that have been taken into 
account in the Syrian case study, such as the risk of international action encouraging the 
rebels to continue with their struggle. This tends to undermine the capacity for secondary 
RtoP to add value by helping to contour the circumstances in which the UNSC should 
generally determine that an RtoP situation represents a threat to international peace and 
security and, therefore, the activation of its existing Charter mandate.1291
Payandeh1292 would question whether the development of a specific “tipping point” for 
the UNSC to recognise secondary RtoP’s activation is necessary. She argues that the 
Outcome Document criteria would have limited bearing on UNSC practice because ‘it is 
hardly conceivable that the Security Council could acknowledge a case of massive human 
rights violations without recognising a manifest failure of the State’.1293 The present writer 
does not find this view compelling for a number of reasons. First, the argument tends to 
presume that the UNSC will acknowledge that RtoP cases entail ‘massive human rights 
violations’.1294 As noted earlier, some States1295 may avoid acknowledging that the level of
1286 Brunnee also seems to favour this interpretation. She argued that the Outcome Document provided for a non- 
peaceful response to be considered on a ‘case-by-case basis’ in order to ensure that the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII mandate is not activated in every case where there is scope to argue that (i) RtoP crimes are 
imminent; (ii) peaceful means would be inadequate; and (iii) national authorities are manifestly failing to protect 
the population. J Brunnee and S Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use o f Force: Building Legality” 
in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 1154) 76.
1287 Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President (n 1171).
1288 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, ‘Informal Meeting o f the UNGA on the Draft 
Outcome Document o f the September Summit’ (21 June 2005)
<http://old.reform theun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012.
1289 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, ibid.
1290 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, ibid.
1291 Payandeh makes a similar argument: Unlike Article 24 (1) o f the UN Charter, which refers only to the 
responsibility o f the Security Council for peace and security, the responsibility to protect links the power o f the 
Security Council explicitly to the humanitarian responsibility for the well-being o f individuals’. Payandeh (n 
1067), 501.
1292 Payandeh, ibid.
1293 Payandeh, ibid, 498.
1294 Payandeh, ibid.
1295 Primary examples are Russia, China, Lebanon and India in relation to the situation in Syria. See Statements 
o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation, Lebanon, India and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.662.
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harm sustained by a population suggests that RtoP crimes are imminent in order to evade the 
activation of secondary RtoP. Accordingly, ‘massive human rights violations’1296 may not be 
recognised for the very reason that this denotes the ‘manifest failure of the State’1297 and, 
therefore, creates the requisite ‘nexus’1298 between the situation at issue and secondary 
RtoP’s activation. Second, the argument undermines the logic behind basing secondary 
RtoP’s activation on four specific crimes, namely that there are many cases of ‘massive 
human rights violations’1299 which will not necessarily overlap with the kind of crimes 
covered by RtoP. For instance, a State may perpetrate numerous violations of certain socio­
economic rights without necessarily suggesting that RtoP crimes are imminent and, 
therefore, activating secondary RtoP. Finally, the argument tends to undermine the value of 
establishing that a State’s failure to protect its population from RtoP crimes should be 
“manifest”. If applied correctly in practice, this could help the UNSC to determine the 
precise point at which they should apply specific enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
However, a review of the UNSC’s role in decisions regarding secondary RtoP’s 
activation to date also suggests that the factors taken into account in order to determine the 
manifest failure of the State can also be controversial. The link between secondary RtoP’s 
activation and the imminence of the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers has led the UNSC 
to draw increasingly upon international law. This has led to the view that the UNSC is being 
required to act, to all intents and purposes, like a court. This opinion came through in 
India’s1300 statement regarding the UNSC’s response to the situation in the Cote d’Ivoire. 
India1301 argued that:
‘The Council has heard various allegations of serious crimes committed against 
civilians in Cote d’Ivoire. There should be no a priori presumption about the nature o f  
these alleged crimes. Each allegation has to be investigated on a case-by-case basis by 
the competent national bodies, and further action taken pursuant to relevant laws’.1302
On the one hand, practice preceding RtoP’s 2005 adoption suggests that there could be some 
merit to India’s argument. In relation to the situation in Darfur in 2004, Algeria1303 argued 
that the UNSC has:
1296 Payandeh (n 1067), 498.
1297 Payandeh, ibid.
1298 As Stahn notes, the reference to crimes against humanity occurring in Libya in UNSC Res 1973 ‘may have 
been used to establish a nexus to the R2P doctrine’. C Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and 
Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared Responsibility’ (2012) 10 (2) J Int Crim Justice 325,329.
1299 Payandeh (n 1067).
1300 Statement o f the Representative o f India to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6508.
1301 Statement o f the Representative o f India to the UNSC, ibid.
1302 Statement o f the Representative o f India to the UNSC, ibid, emphasis added.
1303 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (18 September 2004) UN 
Doc S/PV.5040.
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‘[W]isely set aside, at least for the time being, the question of whether or not 
genocide had been committed, so as not to disrupt or jeopardise the delivery of 
humanitarian assistance and the ongoing African Union efforts aimed at reaching a 
political settlement’.1304
Algeria’s statement highlights that referring to the possible crimes being perpetrated in a 
specific situation could be problematic in cases where the international community envisages 
discharging secondary RtoP through assistance measures. Reference to the possible 
perpetration of mass atrocity crimes can appear to the State at issue that it is being prejudged 
by the international community. This could potentially undermine the prospect of the 
national authorities cooperating with the international community by providing consent for 
the provision of assistance. Thus, in some cases it may be difficult to fully reconcile the dual 
requirements for the activation of secondary RtoP’s assistance component (i.e. consent and 
imminence). Furthermore, referring to legally defined mass atrocity crimes in political 
decision making can, in cases involving the UNSC’s authorisation of the use of armed force, 
entail the implication of further blurring the line between ‘military and judicial 
intervention’.1305 To this effect, Stahn1306 observes that the UNSC’s reference to crimes 
against humanity in Resolution 1973 underscored the International Criminal Court’s decision 
to release a statement outlining ‘its commitment to the preservation o f  independence and 
impartiality' .’307 Thus, there is a need for political bodies to exercise sufficient caution when 
referring to the possible perpetration of specific mass atrocity crimes, if only to ensure that 
this does not compromise or undermine the existing mandates of other actors who are also 
working in relation to the situation at hand.
Conversely, explicitly referring to the fact that an RtoP crime may be being perpetrated 
illustrates that the international community considers that the State is not complying with 
primary RtoP.1308 Thus, the approach signals to the State concerned that the potentially 
‘slippery slope’1309 toward the use of armed force has commenced.
2.2 The UN Human Rights Council
The main issue to be explored with regard to the UNHRC is whether its role in decision 
making on the activation of peaceful responsive measures in practice to date can be
1304 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria to the UNSC, ibid.
1305 Stahn, ‘Libya, the International Criminal Court and Complementarity: A Test for ‘Shared Responsibility’ (n 
1298), 329.
1306 Stahn, ibid.
1307 Stahn, ibid.
1308 Stahn, ibid.
1309 J E Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (Panel presentation at the ‘Hague Joint Conference on 
Contemporary Issues o f  International Law: Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years After the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference’, The Hague, 30 June 2007).
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reconciled with its existing mandate. Admittedly, there are solid reasons for permitting the 
UNHRC to make determinations that RtoP crimes are imminent and, therefore, that 
secondary RtoP has been activated. The UNHRC is mandated to assess State compliance 
with human rights law obligations, including through its Special Procedures.1310 This can 
mean that the UNHRC will often be in an unparalleled position to ascertain that RtoP crimes 
are potentially imminent.1311 Accordingly, permitting the UNHRC to have a role in 
determining secondary RtoP’s activation can be entirely legitimate and effective in (i) 
preventing human rights violations from developing into RtoP crimes; and/or (ii) putting the 
international community on notice, through the UNHRC’s fact-finding missions and other 
monitoring mechanisms, that the human rights violations are of the gravity and scale to 
suggest that RtoP crimes are imminent and, therefore, those which warrant its response.
Notwithstanding this, it is unclear whether conferring the UNHRC a role in secondary 
RtoP’s activation is entirely consistent with the fact that it is mandated to monitor human 
rights violations, not the emergence of international mass atrocity crimes per se. Whilst there 
can be a clear overlap between the two, such as widespread violations of the right against 
torture and crimes against humanity, there may also be a point of departure. For example, 
certain violations of humanitarian law may fall outside the reach of human rights law and be 
solely limited to the scope of RtoP. In such instances, the UNHRC would be deprived of a 
legitimate basis on which to act under secondary RtoP by reason of their existing mandate. 
Indeed, this matter was alluded to by Pakistan (on behalf of the Organisation of the Islamic 
Conference7572) and Algeria (on behalf of the Arab League1313) in response to the UNHRC’s 
determination that the situation in Darfur entailed a manifest failure of the Sudanese 
government to protect populations and, therefore, that the situation had activated secondary 
RtoP.1314 Pakistan stated:
1310 UNGA Resolution 60/251 (3 April 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/251, paras 2 and 3.
1311 This has been noted by several commentators. See especially: D Giercyz, “The Responsibility to Protect: A 
Legal and Rights-Based Perspective” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 1154) 115-117; Arbour (n 1256), 456; 
P O’Brien, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 20 I.J.R.L. 710, 712 and N Turner and N Otsuki, The Responsibility 
to Protect Minorities and the Problem o f  the Kin State (United Nations University, Tokyo 2010) 7.
1312 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘UNHRC Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights 
in Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc UNHRC/07/12
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsEviewO 1 /E6DF2E2811EABFA3C12572A000717B7E?opendocume 
nt > accessed 12 November 2011. (UN Press Release, ‘UNHRC Discusses Report of High-Level Mission on 
Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’).
1313 Statement o f  the Representative o f Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC in UN Press 
Release, ‘UNHRC Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f  Human Rights in Darfur’, ibid.
1314 The Report stated that the ‘Mission further concludes that the Government o f the Sudan has manifestly failed 
to protect the population o f Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and 
participated in these crimes. As such, the solemn obligation o f the international community to exercise its 
responsibility to protect has become evident and urgent’, emphasis original. UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level 
Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1113), 25. On the “manifest failure” o f the Sudanese 
authorities, see further at 25, para 77 (a). On the activation o f secondary RtoP and the Mission’s proposals for the 
practical discharge o f secondary RtoP, see also 25 at para 77 (a) and 27.
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‘The mandate adopted for the mission [...] clearly stated that the mission was to 
assess the human rights situation in Darfur and the needs of Sudan in this regard. At 
no place was the concept of the “responsibility to protect” reflected in the Council’s 
decision. This concept, as Member States of the Council knew, had multiple political 
and security dimensions that went beyond the mandate given to the mission’ .1315
The essence of Pakistan’s statement seems to be that the scope, and consequences for the 
breach, under the RtoP framework exceed both the substantive focus of the UNHRC and, 
moreover, the mechanisms available to it in relation to promoting accountability for the 
violation of human rights (e.g. encouraging the UNSC to ensure the application of collective 
sanctions against Sudan1316). Although this argument may have been made because of wider 
political reasons,1317 it nevertheless highlights that concerns may be raised over the 
possibility that the UNHRC’s role in determining secondary RtoP’s activation could 
sometimes overstep its existing human rights mandate and, therefore, that it may be required 
to simply acknowledge that it lacks a legitimate basis on which to have a role in secondary 
RtoP’s activation in certain cases.
Conclusion
By assessing trends in practice to date, the chapter outlined the potential value added and 
implications o f the substantive and institutional aspects o f secondary RtoP’s activation. 
Noting that secondary RtoP’s activation has been linked to the emergence o f some o f the 
legal elements o f the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers,1318 the chapter argued that 
the general nature of the activating threshold is one of imminence. To support this finding, 
this writer highlighted that in practice (i) there has been no requirement for all legal elements 
of RtoP crimes to be established, not least issues of mens rea; and (ii) it has been sufficient 
that the RtoP crime apprehended ‘may’1319 be being committed. It was argued that the merit 
of an imminence threshold is that it enables secondary RtoP’s requisite components to entail
1315 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘UNHRC Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights 
in Darfur’ (n 1312).
1316 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f  Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1113), 27.
1317 The potential policy and geopolitical reasons for the viewpoints o f the OIC and the Arab League in this case 
are outlined in part in the preceding chapter and, furthermore, are discussed in terms o f their legal significance in 
chapter six.
1318 See for e.g. Statement o f  the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 1073), 4; 
UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 9; UN Press Release, ‘UN Special Advisors o f the Secretary-General on the 
Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (n 1073); UNHRC Res 
S-15/1 (n 1073), para 2; UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1073), para 1; UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular para 6; 
UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), preambular para 13 and UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular para 7.
1319 For instance, UNSC Res 1970, ibid; UNSC Res 1973, ibid; UNSC Res 1975, ibid and UNHRC Res S-15/1, 
ibid, para 1.
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a preventive dimension, not explicitly provided for in the Outcome Document.1320 
Examination of relevant practice suggests that the imminence of RtoP crimes may be 
established by taking into account objective factors, such as whether (i) the members of the 
population sustaining the harm have the requisite identity of the protected person of the RtoP 
crime apprehended;1321 and (ii) whether the acts at issue overlap with the actus reus of the 
RtoP crime apprehended.1322
Furthermore, it was noted secondary RtoP’s activation appears to have occurred as per a 
sliding scale. For example, the activation of non-peaceful responsive measures, such as the 
use of armed force, has also taken into account whether previous measures applied have been 
effective in protecting the population. This writer argued that secondary RtoP’s activation 
may therefore be best explained as a continuum of differing tipping points; each reflecting 
the stage at which the international community considers it is possible to reconcile the need 
to protect populations from RtoP crimes with the policy considerations which arise regarding 
secondary RtoP’s varying components.
An implicit theme throughout the chapter was the extent to which secondary RtoP’s 
activation overlaps with existing obligations and/or practice. A number of overlaps were 
noted, illustrating the extent to which secondary RtoP’s activation fits within the existing 
international framework. Examples include that (i) secondary RtoP’s activation as per a 
sliding scale tends to reflect the similarly ascending approach adopted to the international 
community’s role in a minority protection context; (ii) the requirement for human rights 
violations to be of a certain gravity and scale before secondary RtoP can be activated 
interconnects with the requirement for harmful acts to be sufficiently substantial in order to 
warrant the invocation of the ICC’s jurisdiction; (iii) the overlap between certain human 
rights violations and the actus reus of the mass atrocity crimes which RtoP covers can mean 
that the UNHRC can often have a legitimate role in determining secondary RtoP’s 
activation; and (iv) an imminence concept is not unique to secondary RtoP’s activation but, 
instead, that which is used in wider practice regarding decisions on the use of armed
1320 Outcome Document (n 1058), paras 138-139.
1321 See for instance UNSC Res 1975 (n 1073), preambular para 13 and para 6; Statements o f the Representatives 
o f Gabon, Cote d ’Ivoire and Colombia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) UN Doc. 
S/PV.6508; UNSC Res 1962 (n 1073), para 5; Statement o f the SAPG in UN DPI, ‘The United Nations and 
Kenya: Briefing Note’ (n 1073), 4; UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1073), para 4; UNSC Res 1973 (n 1073), preambular 
paras 7 and 14; Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation, France, Germany and Brazil to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; Statements o f the Representatives o f  
France, Lebanon, India, Colombia and the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498; UNSC Res 1970 (n 1073), preambular paras 2 and 6; EP Res, ‘The Situation in 
Darfur’ (n 1139), paras D and 10 and ‘Statement by the Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary- 
General, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in Syria’, 2 June 2011 
(n 1137).
1322 For e.g. UNSC Res 1973, ibid, preambular para 7; UNSC Res 1970, ibid, para 6; Statement o f the UN Special 
Advisers, ibid and Statement o f the Representative o f Germany to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March
2011) UN Doc. S/PV.6498.
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force.1323 At times, the chapter highlighted the way in which existing practice can be utilised 
in the course of decisions on secondary RtoP’s activation. For example, techniques used in 
the human rights context could represent one route by which to ensure that relevant actors do 
not overrate or underrate the nature, character, gravity and scale of the harm sustained by a 
population. Similarly, by drawing by analogy on the use of imminence in the context of 
decision making on the use of armed force, it is possible to explain the minimum 
requirement for secondary RtoP’s activation as an apprehension that a population may 
sustain RtoP-type harm in anything other than the ‘distant future’.1324
Casting secondary RtoP’s activation against the backdrop of existing obligations/practice 
enables an assessment of whether secondary RtoP’s activation represents value added. At a 
general level, value added can arise from the fact that secondary RtoP’s activation does not 
entail the same ambiguity as humanitarian intervention. Unlike the lack of clarity that 
surrounded when it would be acceptable to invoke humanitarian intervention,1325 secondary 
RtoP’s activation rests upon a population sustaining, or possibly going to sustain, harm from 
acts which are associated with specific and legally defined mass atrocity crimes. This helps 
to guard against secondary RtoP following humanitarian intervention by, at least 
legitimately, being claimed to be activated in an indeterminate range of cases.
In the specific context of minority protection, value added mainly arises from the fact that 
secondary RtoP’s activation clearly delineates when the international community’s varying 
roles should move from one to another. Perhaps most significantly, secondary RtoP’s 
activation seeks to reconcile the tension between ensuring that the international community 
can act to protect populations, that the principle of non-interference and territorial integrity 
are not unduly violated (e.g. by providing assistance to States without consent and where no 
harm to a population has occurred) and that these principles do not inhibit international 
action from being taken when RtoP crimes are imminent, a population does require ‘help’1326 
and/or the harm sustained by a population is so grave as to suggest that national authorities 
have manifestly failed to fulfil primary RtoP. This contradicts existing minority protection 
instruments which instead qualify protective efforts upon respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the State.1327
A cross-cutting theme in the chapter is the range of steps which have been taken in order 
to help ensure that secondary RtoP’s activation is effective. Notable examples include the 
fact that relevant actors have avoided delving into issues of mens rea when assessing the
1323 HLP Report (n 1100), 63 and 64.
1324 HLP Report, ibid, 64.
1325 Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1152), 707 and Gray (n 1153), 
31-52.
1326 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1327 For e.g. UNGA, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or 
Linguistic Minorities’ (n 1220), art 8 (4).
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criminal context of a particular situation, thereby helping to diminish the prospect of States 
arguing that secondary RtoP cannot be deemed to have been activated because it remains 
unclear whether all of the legal elements of an RtoP crime have emerged in a particular 
situation (i.e. the Rwanda problem1328). Formulating secondary RtoP’s activation on the basis 
of a sliding scale helps reconcile the concerns of some States, most notably the US,1329 that 
every act which falls within the scope of the mass atrocity crimes that RtoP covers can 
legitimately activate secondary RtoP. For example, that the recruitment or conscription of 
child soldiers can warrant the use of armed force against the State. Instead, secondary RtoP’s 
activation may actually rest on a higher threshold than the substantiality test used in 
international criminal law, thereby suggesting that some of the acts which can fall within the 
legal reach of the crimes that RtoP covers will not necessarily fall within the reach of 
international action under secondary RtoP, particularly its non-peaceful component.
Notwithstanding the above steps, it seems unrealistic to expect that secondary RtoP’s 
activation will always lead to its effective application. Whilst imminence is a workable 
concept elsewhere,1330 some States'331 arguments over whether RtoP crimes are actually 
imminent highlight its openness to subjectivity. In cases where international protective 
action is prejudicial to a States’ national interests, claims that RtoP crimes are not imminent 
may be made in order to avoid activating the corresponding responsibility to protect for 
political reasons. Accordingly, there is also a risk that secondary RtoP’s activation can be 
easily politicised. The interplay between secondary RtoP’s activation and the legal elements 
of RtoP crimes may also create arguments over the way in which secondary RtoP requires 
political bodies, like the UNSC, to draw increasingly upon international law in their decision 
making processes.1332
Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind that the difference between declaring a 
responsibility to act in particular circumstances and giving effect to that responsibility when 
those circumstances arise is not unique to the RtoP framework but, indeed, a general 
difficulty in practice. Furthermore, there is scope to suggest that there was no intention to 
formulate a definitive link between activation and application. The wider policy 
considerations taken into account by UNSC members when deciding whether to respond to 
Syria may have a bearing on the Outcome Document’s provision for the UNSC to act on a
1328 On this debate, see e.g. Dallaire (n 1071), 343 and 374 and L van den Herik (n 1071), 76.
1329 Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’ (n 
1172) and Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA President (n 1171).
1330 HLP Report (n 1100), 63 and 64.
1331 For examples o f the varying ways in which States have contested the imminence o f RtoP crimes and, 
therefore, secondary RtoP’s activation, see e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba and Nicaragua to the 
UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘UNHRC Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 1124) 
and Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record Security Council, ‘The Situation in the Middle East’ (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
1332 Statement o f the Representative o f India to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6508.
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‘case-by-case basis’.1333 Arguably, this phrase may mean that it is wholly legitimate to not 
simply determine secondary RtoP’s activation (and application) on the basis of the harm to 
the population but, instead, on a whole host of other policy considerations which the 
Outcome Document does not refer to (e.g. encouraging a civil war, violating the principle of 
non-interference). Whilst this undermines secondary RtoP’s capacity to standardise decision­
making on when the UNSC should authorise the application of Chapter VII enforcement 
measures, it also avoids impacting on the UNSC’s existing discretion on this matter and may 
have therefore helped to gain the P5’s acceptance of secondary RtoP in 2005.1334
In conclusion, this chapter has highlighted that secondary RtoP’s activation is relatively 
fluid, segregating the specific tipping points for the activation of assistance, peaceful and 
non-peaceful responsive measures. However, the wide array of policy considerations that can 
arise regarding secondary RtoP’s application can influence the approaches taken to its 
activation in a particular case. In addition, secondary RtoP’s activation raises some 
significant questions regarding the scope of the measures which can be used when its 
activation and application are effective. Are any mechanisms in place in order to determine 
the prospect for RtoP crimes to arise in a State before we reach the stage where these crimes 
are imminently apprehended and decisions turn to whether secondary RtoP’s assistance, 
peaceful or non-peaceful responsive components have been activated? Which actors should 
provide consent to the provision of international assistance measures? What forms of 
assistance can be given? What steps, if any, can be taken if consent is not immediately 
forthcoming? In what way should we understand “peaceful” responsive measures? Does 
practice suggest that decision making on the use of armed force should meet any 
requirements other than that RtoP crimes be imminent? These and other equally important 
questions are addressed in the next chapter.
1333 Outcome Document (n 1058), para 139.
1334 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement o f  the Representative o f China to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 and Letter o f the US Ambassador John Bolton to the UNGA 
President (n 1171).
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CHAPTER V 
SECONDARY RtoP: STATUS NOVUS OR STATUS QUO?
Introduction
The Outcome Document provides that the international community1335 can discharge 
secondary RtoP by (i) helping,1336 encouraging1337 and/or assisting1338 States to protect their 
populations from RtoP crimes; (ii) using appropriate peaceful means to ‘help’1339 achieve this 
protection;1340 and (iii) using ‘collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate’.1341 In his 2009 
Report on Implementing RtoP, the UN Secretary-General [UNSG] interprets these 
provisions to contour secondary RtoP as entailing two “pillars”,1342 specifically (i) the 
International Assistance and Capacity Building Pillar;1343 and (ii) the Timely and Decisive 
Response Pillar.1344 At the 2009 UNGA thematic debate on RtoP’s implementation, the 
overwhelming majority of States1345 affirmed this two-pillar formulation of secondary RtoP. 
In 2010,1346 the UNSG developed upon his earlier recommendations1347 regarding States’ 
fulfilment of their additional Outcome Document commitments to support the UN’s 
establishment of an early warning capacity for RtoP crimes1348 and Office of the Special
1335 As discussed in chapter two, the concept o f the “international community” under secondary RtoP is 
heterogeneous, capable o f being discharged to varying extents and different stages by a wide range o f  actors (e.g. 
third States, regional/sub-regional organisations and international organisations).
1336 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, para 138. (Outcome Document).
1337 ibid.
1338 ibid, para 139.
1339 ibid.
1340 ibid. [‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate 
diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII o f the Charter, to 
help to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’].
1341 ibid.
1342 Report of the UNSG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677, 7- 
10. (UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP).
1343 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP, ibid, 15-22.
1344 ibid, 22-28.
1345 This was affirmed by States from across the geopolitical spectrum. See for e.g. Statements o f the 
Representatives o f Sweden (on behalf o f  the European Union), Indonesia, France, Guatemala, the United States, 
Australia and the Joint Statement o f the Representatives o f Costa Rica and Denmark to the UNGA, UNGA  
Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 and Statements o f the Representatives o f Austria, Algeria, 
Singapore, Chile, Colombia and South Africa to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
1346 Report of the UN Secretary-General, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (14 July 
2010) UN Doc A/64/864. (UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and Assessment).
1347 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342 ), 29 [discussing the need to “bolster” the Office o f the 
SAPG with regard to its role and contribution to preventing RtoP crimes] and 31-33 [discussing preliminary 
proposals for a Joint Office to serve in the UN Secretariat as an early warning and assessment mechanism for 
RtoP crimes].
1348 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 138.
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Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide [SAPG].1349
This chapter examines the scope of secondary RtoP’s early warning, assistance and 
responsive components in light of relevant practice which, notably, entails a similar 
character to primary RtoP practice. Whilst one layer outlines the general aspects of 
discharging secondary RtoP’s components, another layer of practice develops this by 
defining the more intricate elements of the discharge process.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. Part one outlines that the UNSG construes the early 
warning system as a means o f  discharging secondary RtoP, not merely as that which will 
sometimes inform secondary RtoP’s activation. To this effect, the UNSG has explained that 
‘identification and assessment’1350 of RtoP cases are a crucial ‘stage of the implementation 
process’,1351 particularly to secondary RtoP’s preventive dimension and fulfilment of the 
Outcome Document commitment to assist States ‘before crises and conflicts break out’.1352 
This underscores why this system is reviewed in depth as part of a discussion of secondary 
RtoP’s scope rather than in the preceding chapter’s analysis of secondary RtoP’s activation. 
The chapter evaluates whether the system adds value to existing early warning systems, 
including those in a minority protection context.
Part two considers secondary RtoP’s International Assistance and Capacity Building 
Pillar, including the character, nature and types of assistance measures. This includes 
significant issues, such as (i) the character of assistance measures; (ii) to whom assistance 
should be provided; (iii) the nature of international assistance measures; and (iv) the types of 
assistance means which can be used.
Part three examines secondary RtoP’s Timely and Decisive Response Pillar. Drawing 
upon themes in relevant practice, the chapter explores whether the meaning of “peaceful” is 
settled among States and the varying utility of peaceful measures within the RtoP 
framework. Consideration then turns to fundamental issues surrounding secondary RtoP’s 
non-peaceful responsive component. For example, does the use of armed force in RtoP cases 
require prior UNSC authorisation? What factors have informed international decision 
making on the use of non-peaceful measures in practice to date? What routes, if  any, can be 
taken when the UNSC fails to undertake a “timely and decisive”1353 response to protect 
populations from RtoP crimes?
The interplay between secondary RtoP and existing mechanisms is an overarching theme 
in the chapter. Particular emphasis is placed on whether secondary RtoP represent value 
added to (i) existing obligations, not least the UN Charter; and (ii) wider practice, such as
1349 ibid, para 139.
1350 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response’ (25 July 2012) UN Doc 
A/66/874 -  S /2012/578,14. (UNSG Report 2012, ‘Timely and Decisive Response’).
1351 UNSG Report, ibid.
1352 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139 and UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and Assessment (n 1346), 2.
1353 Outcome Document, ibid.
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humanitarian intervention. Does secondary RtoP exceed the scope of humanitarian 
intervention? Is secondary RtoP’s discharge pursuant to the non-incremental approach 
through Chapter VII measures can be applied? Secondary RtoP’s capacity to impact upon 
wider principles is also considered, including its relationship with the principle of neutrality 
in civil wars. Throughout, consideration is given to the extent to which secondary RtoP 
contributes to minorities’ protection and, furthermore, the specific implications which 
present approaches to secondary RtoP may have in RtoP cases involving minorities.
Throughout, particular attention is given to aspects of secondary RtoP which, although 
significant at a practical and policy level, receive limited attention by policymakers, 
particularly in the UNSG’s annual RtoP Reports. This includes the important issues of to 
whom assistance should be provided and whether regime change can be anything but an 
inevitable outcome of secondary RtoP’s discharge when, as in cases like Libya and Syria, 
RtoP crimes are being perpetrated by a State’s national authorities.
1 Early Warning and Assessment
In 2010 the Joint Office of the Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention of 
Genocide and RtoP was authorised to act as an instrument of early warning and assessment 
of RtoP crimes.1354 The Office is mandated to monitor States for indications that RtoP crimes 
could be emerging. When ‘crimes and violations relating to’1355 RtoP appear imminent, the 
Office can issue an early warning to the international community. This writer is concerned 
with the sources of information regarding RtoP crimes that the Office can use and whether 
the Office represents value added to existing early warning systems.
1.1 Sources of Information: A Double-Edge Sword?
The Office can receive and interpret intelligence about the possibility of RtoP crimes 
emerging from a wide variety of sources.1356 Significantly, the governments of third States 
are identified as particularly valuable sources of information.1357 Arguably, even partly
1354 For details o f the establishment o f the Joint Office see generally UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and 
Assessment (n 1346). See further, State voting records on the funding for additional staff to serve in this Office 
in Annexes III-V, UN Press Release, ‘Harmonising Staff Working Conditions, Strengthening UN Information 
Technology Among Issues, As Budget Committee Approves 18 Texts, Concludes Session’ (23 December 2010) 
UN Doc GA/AB/3980 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/gaab3980.doc.htm> accessed 24 October 
2011 .
1355 UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and Assessment, ibid, 2.
1356 ibid, 5.
1357 ibid.
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relying on intelligence provided by national governments could be a double-edge sword.
On the one hand, the variability of national intelligence capacities could lead the Office to 
disproportionately depend on intelligence provided by the most developed States. 1358 The 
ICISS cautioned against this, stating that ‘one should not over-estimate the intelligence 
gathering and analytical capacities of major powers, particularly in parts of the world where 
they no longer perceive strategic interests’.1359 This suggests that we should approach 
particularly developed States’ national intelligence capacities cautiously because their 
preoccupation with national security interests1360 may mean that they do not provide adequate 
information about potential RtoP situations. At the very least, this could delay secondary 
RtoP’s discharge.
Providing for national governments’ input can also compound concerns about the 
politicisation of the early warning system. Examination of State views suggests that a 
particular concern is that information providers will inadvertently lead the Office to inspect 
events in some States and overlook others.1361 Pakistan is a good illustration of States’ fears 
about politicisation and selectivity infiltrating the system. Pakistan argued that the system’s 
effectiveness largely depended on its capacity to overcome the:
‘[Historical trust deficit both in the form of experience of colonialism and 
unresolved historical disputes. While no warning or assessment is required in the 
case of internationally recognised disputes, the world and the UN system has 
consistently failed to address this issue’.1362
We should offset the potential implications noted by Pakistan against recent developments. 
The US is often given as an example of States whose domestic intelligence agencies
1359 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 35. (ICISS Report).
1360 Weiss makes a similar observation. He alludes to the possibility that RtoP’s early warning system could be 
compromised by relying upon the national security capacities o f a handful o f States. He argues that some States 
could prioritise national security interests, such as the prevention o f terrorism, so far above those related to RtoP 
that, ultimately, RtoP concerns could become obsolete. N S MacFarlane, C J Thielking and T G Weiss, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?’ (2004) 25 (5) Third World 
Quarterly 977, 981. Grono makes a similar observation. He suggests that one reason that the United States did not 
push for more decisive action against Sudan concerning Darfur is because the Sudanese authorities have become 
a major ally to the United States in their war on terror. N  Grono, ‘Briefing - Darfur: The International 
Community’s Failure to Protect’ (2006) 105 (421) African Affairs 621,628. Alvarez has also noted that 
presently States such as the US perceive the greatest threat to its populations as terrorism. J E Alvarez, ‘The 
Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (Panel presentation at the ‘Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary Issues o f 
International Law: Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years After the 1907 Hague Peace Conference’, The Hague, 30 
June 2007).
1361 Statements o f the Representatives o f Pakistan, the Netherlands and the Solomon Islands to the UNGA, 
‘UNGA Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) 
<http://www.responsibilitvtoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=firelated&id=2409> 
accessed 6 January 2012.
1362 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan, ibid. For a review o f the kind o f factors which underscore the 
lack o f trust in the UN, see R Zuber and A C B Laso, ‘Trust but Verify: Building Cultures o f  Support for the 
Responsibility to Protect Norm’ (2011) 3 (3) GRtoP 286, particularly 290-293.
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concentrate on national security threats.1363 However, the US recently established a national 
early warning and assessment system which focuses specifically on the mass atrocity crimes 
to which RtoP relates.1364 Significantly, the Senate Resolution which established the system 
explicitly referred to the Outcome Document’s RtoP provisions.1365 This raises the possibility 
that RtoP’s consensus adoption has helped to close the gap between the protection of 
national and human security, at least in one developed State.1366
On the other hand, there is the risk that some States could manipulate their intelligence in 
order to encourage or discourage secondary RtoP’s activation in accordance with their own 
political agenda. Relevant practice suggests that this risk could be particularly strong when 
intelligence is given by governments who are either (i) geographical neighbours of the State 
at issue; or (ii) who have a kinship tie to a particular group(s) in the State at issue. Indeed, 
minority protection research observes that international assessment of a particular State may 
be exploited by neighbouring or Kin States in order to publicise and gain international 
support for the situation inside the State.1367 Relevant RtoP practice sustains this risk.
Syria can be drawn upon with respect to geographically neighbouring States. Syria 
suggests that neighbouring States can be a useful source of information regarding RtoP 
crimes and tool for exerting diplomatic pressure against a State to protect its population. For 
example, Turkey hosts several thousand Syrian refugees, permitted the appointment of a 
Syrian National Council Office in its territory, attached economic sanctions against the 
regime and declared its commitment to take further measures in order to help protect the
1363 See for instance, MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 1360), 983-985.
1364 On this see generally, United States Senate Concurrent Resolution (1 1th Congress, 2nd Session, 2010) Res 
DAV10643; White House Office o f the Press Secretary, ‘Creation o f  an Interagency Atrocities Prevention Board 
and Corresponding Interagency Review’ (4 August 2011) Presidential Study Directive PSD-10; International 
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘US Senate Resolution on Preventing Genocide and Mass Atrocities’ 
(5 August 2010) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/134- 
americas/2912-us-senate-resolution-dav 10643-on-preventing-genocide-and-mass-atrocities-> accessed 14 July 
2012 and J Claes, ‘Obama Announces Formation o f the Atrocities Prevention Board’ (United States Institute o f  
Peace, 23 April 2012) <http://www.usip.org/publications/obama-announces-formation-the-atrocities-prevention- 
board> accessed 14 July 2012.
1365 ‘Whereas, in 2005, the United States and all other members o f  the United Nations agreed that the 
international community has “ a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapter VI and VIII o f the United Nations Charter, to help protect populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,”  and to take direct action if  national 
authorities are unwilling or unable to protect their populations’. US Senate Resolution 2010, ibid, preambular 
para 3.
366 This imbalance is considered to have arisen as a result o f 9/11. On the way in which the events o f 9/11 
impacted upon the United States and other States commitment to protecting populations from mass atrocity 
crimes, see generally MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 1360). The ICISS Report, published in the immediate 
aftermath o f 9/11, acknowledged the way in which the event could shift States attentions (i) from the policy 
tension that arose in the Kosovo case (the need to protect another State’s populations from mass atrocity crimes 
perpetrated by its national authorities); (ii) to protecting their own populations from terrorist attacks. To this 
effect, ICISS noted that ‘[a]t least until the horrifying events o f  11 September 2001 brought to centre stage the 
international response to terrorism, the issue o f intervention for human protection purposes has been seen as one 
o f the most controversial and difficult o f all international relations questions’. ICISS Report (n 1359) vii and ix.
1367 On this issue, see particularly L Thio, ‘Developing a “Peace and Security” Approach Towards Minorities’ 
Problems’ (2003) 52 (1) ICLQ 115, 124-25.
192
population from the regime.1368 However, Syria equally highlights that neighbouring States 
can sometimes downplay the seriousness of the situation inside the State because they want 
to avoid secondary RtoP’s activation against a regime with whom they have close ties. 
Lebanon is a primary example. Lebanon abstained from the October 2011 vote regarding the 
adoption of a draft UNSC Resolution on Syria, because it wanted to ‘defend that brotherly 
Arab country and its right to sovereignty and the integrity of its people and land, including 
the right to ensure the security and safety of all its citizens’.1369
In terms of Kin States, the Russia-Georgia conflict suggests that some governments could 
manipulate the information they give in order to justify their use of armed force against a 
State which threatens consolidating its influence in the region.1370 Kin States’ potential abuse 
of the early warning system is overlooked by Kemp and Popovski.1371 Both note that some 
States will resist the system in order to ‘avoid [...] scrutiny’1372 of their internal affairs by 
external actors. They do not apply similar political realism to their analysis of the sources of 
information used by the system, however. Instead, both commend the ‘two-way exchange of 
information’1373 under the system, setting aside the way in which this could encourage Kin 
States to manipulate information in order to increase their level of interference in the affairs 
of the third State in which the minority group resides.
1.2 Scope of the System: Value Added or Doubling-Up?
The Office’s specific focus on RtoP crimes may represent value added to existing early 
warning systems, including those in a minority protection context. The SAPG’s1374 early
1368 On Turkey’s role in relation to the situation in Syria, see International Coalition o f the Responsibility to 
Protect, ‘Crisis in Syria’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria> accessed 12 
August 2012. For a persuasive argument with respect to the way in which neighbouring States could take a more 
prominent role in relation to Syria, not least that o f Turkey, see generally A M Slaughter, ‘How to Halt the 
Butchery in Syria’ The New York Times (New York, 23 February 2012)
<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/24/opinion/how-to-halt-the-butchery-in-syria.html?_r=l> Last accessed 12 
July 2012.
1369 Statement o f the Representative o f Lebanon to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6627. For a useful histology o f  the relationship between Lebanon and Syria from the perspective o f the Kin 
State’s role in discharging secondary RtoP, see particularly J Castellino, “RtoP and Kinship in the Context o f  
Syria and Lebanon” in W Kemp, V Popovski and R Thakur (eds), Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Problem o f  the Kin-State (UN University Press, Tokyo 2011) 122-143.
1370 The possible manipulation o f a situation by a Kin State and its possible impact on the RtoP framework at a 
doctrinal and policy level have been discussed at various junctures throughout the thesis, particularly from the 
perspective o f the Russia-Georgia conflict. See chapters one, two and four.
371 V Popovski and W Kemp, “The Role o f the Kin State in Minority Protection” in Kemp, Popovski and Thakur 
(n 1369)231-239.
1372 ibid, 239 (ellipsis added).
1373 ibid, 239.
1374 On the early warning and assessment function o f the Special Adviser on the Prevention o f Genocide, see 
particularly L Woocher, ‘Developing a Strategy, Methods and Tools for Genocide Early Warning ’ (Report 
prepared for the Office o f the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide, 
September 2006) <
www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdfiW oocher%20Early%20waming%20report,%202006-l 1 -10.pdfi> 
accessed 10 August 2012.
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warning role in a minority protection context has been criticised for prioritising indicators of 
genocide.1375 Similarly, the UN Independent Expert on Minority Rights recommended the 
establishment of an early warning system which can ‘highlight patterns of extreme violence 
or social exclusion aimed at or affecting minority communities’.1376 In short, a system which 
could alert the international community to potentially impending atrocities before (i) the 
specific elements of the crime of genocide became sufficiently apparent to engage the 
SAPG’s mandate; or (ii) the signs of a potential ethnic conflict in a European State engaged 
the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities’ mandate.1377 The SAPG’s mandate 
was extended in 2007 to cover ‘other mass atrocities’.1378 However, some States1379 consider 
that there remains a tendency to focus on genocide.
The present author considers that practice to date suggests that RtoP’s early warning 
system may overcome the drawbacks of existing systems. In their joint statements on RtoP 
situations, the SAPG and Special Adviser on RtoP pay equal attention to the different crimes 
which RtoP covers. For example, reference has so far been made to the possibility of (i) 
ethnic cleansing emerging in Kyrgyzstan;1380 and (ii) crimes against humanity emerging in 
cases like Abyei,1381 Libya1382 and Syria.1383 Arguably, this is because the specification that
1375 Srinivason’s assessment o f the role o f the Special Adviser in Darfur is a good example o f this criticism. She 
argues that whilst the genocide focus o f the SAPG ‘may usefully contribute to’ prompting Early Warning’s of 
other atrocity crimes, the role does not itself ‘assume a broader integrated early warning function’. S Srinivasan, 
Minority Rights, Early Warning and Conflict Prevention: Lessons from  Darfur (Minority Rights Group 
International, London 2006) 8. See also criticisms regarding the lack o f  follow-up powers o f the Special Adviser 
on the Prevention o f Genocide by, for example, H Nasic, ‘Minority Rights Instruments and Mechanisms:
Minority Protection Along the Conflict Continuum’ (2007) EURAC Research, European Academy, 75; A Brown, 
‘Reinventing Humanitarian Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?’ (2008) House o f  
Commons Research Paper 08/55, 32, fn 75. See the detailed analysis framework used by the Special Adviser 
when assessing States for indicators o f the specific crime o f genocide, Office o f the Special Adviser o f  the 
Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide, ‘Office o f the UN Special Adviser on the Prevention of 
Genocide: Analysis Framework’ <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/engagement_partners.shtml> 
accessed 10 October 2012.
1376 UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Specific Groups and Individuals: Minorities. Report of the Independent 
Expert on Minority Issues’ (6 January 2006) UN Doc E/C N.4/2006/74,18.
1377 On the mandate o f the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, see especially CSCE, ‘CSCE 1992 
Summit: The Challenges o f Change’ (Helsinki, 9-10 July 1992) Section II. See also UN Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities, ‘Protection o f Minorities: Possible Ways and Means 
of Facilitating the Peaceful and Constructive Solution o f Problems Involving Minorities’ (10 August 1993) UN  
Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/34, 71 (UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f  
Minorities); Thio (n 1367), 117-128 and G Pentassuglia, “Minority Rights, Human Rights: A Review o f Basic 
Concepts, Entitlements and Implementation Procedures under International Law” in M Weller and A Morowa 
(eds), Mechanisms fo r  the Implementation o f  Minority Rights (Council o f Europe Press, Strasbourg 2005) 23.
1378 On this extension, see Letter from the UNSG to the President o f  the UNSC (7 December 2007) UN Doc 
S/2007/721 (Letter from the UNSG to the UNSC President 2007). See also UNHRC, ‘Report o f the Secretary- 
General on the implementation o f the Five Point Action Plan and the activities o f  the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention o f  Genocide’ (2008) UN Doc A/HRC/7/37.
1379 Letter from the UNSG to the UNSC President 2007, ibid.
1380 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Kyrgyzstan’ (15 June 2010) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012.
1381 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in the Abyei Region o f Sudan’ (16 March 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012.
1382 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Libya’ (22 February 2011)
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RtoP covers genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing makes the 
exact crimes that should be considered as ‘other mass atrocities’1384 more explicit. 
Accordingly, there is scope to argue that value added may arise from the specificity of 
RtoP’s early warning system.
2 International Assistance and Capacity Building
Examination of relevant practice suggests that international assistance can be provided 
through a wide range of means, ranging from technical human rights assistance1385 to the 
deployment of peacekeepers.1386 Furthermore, there is now a general consensus that 
international assistance should be provided with the consent of the relevant authorities of the 
intended recipient State.1387
Relevant practice has helped to contour the approaches which may be adopted to the finer 
elements of the international assistance process, including (i) the general character of 
secondary RtoP assistance measures; (ii) to whom assistance may be provided; (iii) what 
steps can be taken to ensure the provision of assistance when the consent of relevant actors’ 
is not forthcoming; and (iv) the factors which should be taken into consideration in decisions 
regarding the form(s) of assistance which should be provided in a particular case.
2.1 The Character of Assistance: Structural vs. Operational Measures
The preceding chapter argued that basing secondary RtoP’s activation on an imminence 
threshold suggests that secondary RtoP entails a preventive component. It is therefore 
unsurprising that secondary RtoP’s assistance measures largely consist of prevention
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012. (UNSG’s Special 
Adviser’s Statement on the Situation in Libya 2011).
1383 UN Press Release, ‘Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General on the Prevention o f Genocide, 
Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, Urge Immediate Action to End Violence in 
Syria’ (10 February 2012); UN Press Release, ‘Special Advisers o f the United Nations Secretary-General on the 
Prevention o f Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, on the Situation in 
Syria’ (21 July 2011); UN Press Release, ‘Marking a Full Year o f  Violent Suppression o f Anti-Government 
Protests in Syria, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide,
Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, Edward Luck, Release the Following Statement’ (15 March
2012) and UN Press Release, ‘Statement o f the Special Advisers o f the Secretary-General on the Prevention o f  
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Syria’ (14 June 2012). All statements available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml. Last accessed 27 July 2012.
138 Letter from the UNSG to the UNSC President 2007 (n 1378).
1385 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 16-17.
1386 ibid, 18.
1387 See e.g. ibid, 18; UNHRC, ‘Report o f the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms o f racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (30 March 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/43, 18; UNHRC, 
‘Report o f the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms o f racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and 
related intolerance, Githa Muigai’ (30 March 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/43, 18; International Law Commission, 
‘Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters’ (22 July 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3019, 3.
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strategies. The character of the prevention strategies appears to have altered before and after 
the World Summit, however. Before the World Summit, the use of structural and operational 
prevention strategies were emphasised equally. The ICISS Report is a primary example, 
recommending the “responsibility to prevent” be discharged through (i) ‘direct’1388 
(operational1389) measures, such as the deployment of human rights monitors;1390 and (ii) ‘root 
cause’1391 (structural1392) measures, such as strengthening national legal provisions for 
minority rights.1393 After the World Summit, relevant actors have suggested that secondary 
RtoP requires the use of both operational and structural prevention.1394 However, structural 
measures have received limited support in practice. Recommendations to incorporate 
development assistance into existing development/rule of law programmes1395 and to utilise 
the technical assistance provided by relevant human rights bodies1396 are examples of the few 
structural prevention activities recommended in the Secretary-General’s Report which have 
some State support.1397 Furthermore, case studies like the Cote d’Ivoire1398 and Darfur1399 
highlight that, in practice, there remains a tendency to apply operational assistance measures.
Arguably, the shift toward focusing on operational assistance measures could be the
1388 ICISS Report (n 1359), 23-27.
1389 “Operational” prevention activities have been defined as involving ‘early engagement to help create 
conditions in which responsible authorities can resolve tensions before they lead to violence’. Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict — Final Report (Carnegie Commission 
on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Washington D.C.1997) at 69, cited in International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography and Background (International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 32. (ICISS, Research, Bibliography and Background).
1390 ICISS Report (n 1359), 24.
1391 ibid, 22-23.
1392 Structural prevention activities are broadly understood as those which ‘address the root causes o f deadly 
conflict’. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflict -  Final Report 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997) 40 cited in ICISS, Research, 
Bibliography and Background (n 1389), 32.
1393 ICISS Report (n 1359), 23.
1394 Report o f the UNSG, ‘The Role o f Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) UN Doc A/59/744, 7; Statement o f the OSCE High Commissioner on National 
Minorities to the UNGA, ‘Thematic Debate on The Role o f Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011)
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 6 January 2012.
1395 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342) 19-21.
1396 ibid, 16-17.
1397 See e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f  the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Uruguay, Malaysia, 
Mexico and Ecuador to the UNGA, ‘Informal Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (9 August 2010) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 6 January 2012.
1398 Peacekeepers were already in the region when the situation became an “R2P case”. However, in response to 
the perpetration o f RtoP crimes, the peacekeeping mandate was strengthened and troop numbers expanded. See 
for instance, UNSC Res 1962 (20 December 2010) UN Doc S/RES/1962, para 3 [renewing the mandate o f the 
UNOCI mission],
1399 On this deployment see UNSC Res 1706 (2006) UN Doc S/RES/1706 and UNSC Res 1769 (2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1769. For a discussion o f the deployment o f peacekeepers to Darfur, see especially R Belloni, ‘The 
Tragedy o f Darfur and the Limits o f the ‘Responsibility to Protect” (2006) 5 (4) Ethno politics 327 and M 
Clough, “Darfur - Whose Responsibility to Protect?” in Human Rights Watch, World Report 2005 (Human 
Rights Watch, United States 2005) 25-39 <http://www.hrw.org/legacy/wr2k5/darfur/index.htm> accessed 6 
January 2012 and Grono (n 1360).
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outcome of replacing the ICISS RtoP “continuum”1400 with the “three pillar”1401 approach. 
This shift changed the relationship between the State and the international community in 
preventing RtoP crimes. In the ICISS Report, prevention features as a distinct 
“responsibility”.1402 Although, the Report states that the prevention of RtoP crimes is ‘first 
and foremost, the responsibility of sovereign States’,1403 it does not clearly distinguish the 
preventive responsibilities of the State and international community. This general approach 
to prevention suggests that preventive activities involve some partnership or ongoing co­
operation between the State and international community. The following paragraph on the 
use of legal means to prevent RtoP crimes is one example of the general approach to 
prevention adopted in the ICISS Report:
‘Root cause prevention may also mean strengthening legal protections and 
institutions. This might involve supporting efforts to strengthen the rule of law; 
protecting the integrity and independence of the judiciary; promoting honesty and 
accountability in law enforcement; enhancing protections for vulnerable groups, 
especially minorities; and providing support to local institutions and organizations 
working to advance human rights’.1404
The three-pillar approach outlined in the UNSG’s 2009 Report moves away from this 
general approach by providing that certain prevention activities fall under States’ primary 
RtoP duty (e.g. training the national judiciary in ‘human rights, international humanitarian 
law and refugee law’1405), whilst others can be undertaken by the international community 
under secondary RtoP’s international assistance component (e.g. the deployment of 
peacekeepers1406). Accordingly, it can be argued that there has not been a complete shift 
away from using structural prevention strategies to discharge RtoP following the World 
Summit. Instead, efforts to distinguish primary and secondary RtoP have resulted in a clearer 
allocation of structural and operational prevention strategies between the actors who will 
usually discharge them.
The abovementioned shift may also explain why the Outcome Document does not refer to 
the “responsibility to rebuild”.1407 The ICISS Report provides that relevant actors should 
discharge operational and structural measures to help prevent RtoP crimes from re-emerging 
in States where RtoP crimes have been perpetrated.1408 The reformulation of the RtoP 
framework at the World Summit enabled many of these measures to be divided between
1400 As per the ICISS Report (n 1359).
1401 As per UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342).
1402 ICISS Report (n 1359), 19-27.
1403 ibid, 19.
1404 ibid, 23.
1405 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 11.
1406 ibid, 18.
1407 ICISS Report (n 1359), 39.
1408 ibid, 39-45.
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primary RtoP and secondary RtoP’s assistance component in subsequent practice, thereby 
diminishing the need to maintain a distinct “responsibility to rebuild”. For example, the 
UNSG’s 2009 Report largely allocates (i) structural measures, such as institution building, to 
States’ primary RtoP duty; and (ii) operational measures, such as ‘[p]ost-trauma peace 
building’,1409 to secondary RtoP’s assistance component.
Has the shift in secondary RtoP’s prevention strategies since the World Summit impacted 
on secondary RtoP’s contribution to the protection of populations, including minorities? On 
the one hand, minority protection research strengthens the view that structural measures can 
help to prevent RtoP crimes. For example, grievances over natural resources among ethnic 
minority groups were central to the eruption of violence in Darfur and, by extension, the 
RtoP crimes committed there.1410 Minority protection research also commends structural 
measures for providing ‘opportunities to enhance protection of civilians by incorporating 
analysis and action that directly engages with minority concerns’.1411
Conversely, focusing upon operational measures can be important at a policy level. 
Primarily, delimiting assistance to measures which are relevant to cases in which a 
population has already sustained RtoP-type harm helps to reassure States that they will not 
be subject to international interference outside the context of RtoP-type harm against the 
population. This is significant because, although the assistance pillar is focused on equipping 
the State to better protect its population, “helping” and “encouraging” populations’ 
protection suggests that the State may come under diplomatic pressure to cooperate and 
comply with the international community’s offers of assistance. Two issues are relevant 
here.
First, it can be difficult to formulate a set of structural prevention mechanisms for global 
acceptance because States can be influenced by their varying cultural, social and economic 
positions. Whilst one group of States may favour focusing upon building democratic 
institutions and installing the rule of law, this can raise concerns among States who do not 
use democratic government models. In short, this approach could associate secondary RtoP 
with the external imposition of democracy and liberalism1412 or, to borrow Chomsky’s 
language, the “standards of the West”.1413 In contrast, another group of States may favour 
focusing upon development assistance. This can create concern among those States who, due
1409 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 21.
1410 See generally, Srinivasan (n 1375).
1411 ibid, 8.
1412 On the capacity for secondary RtoP to be seen to impose the values o f  certain States, see generally T 
McCormack, “The Responsibility to Protect and the End o f the Western Century” in P Cunliffe (ed), Critical 
Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 35-48 and D Chandler, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the “Liberal Peace”’ (2004) 11(1)  International Peacekeeping 59. On the 
concept o f liberalism generally, see R Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms, Laws and the Use o f  Force 
in International Politics (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 24.
1413 N Chomsky, A New Generation Draws the Line: “Humanitarian” Intervention and the Standards o f  the West 
(Pluto Press, London 2012).
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to their economic position, consider that they will be looked upon to increase their 
development assistance to third States. This can risk secondary RtoP being interpreted as that 
which puts certain States under increased economic burden.1414 Drawing upon the ICISS 
Report’s handling of structural prevention measures, Oman1415 persuasively explains the 
central policy concern which some States have over providing the international community a 
role in structural prevention initiatives. She writes:
‘[T]he more nebulous root cause threats to human security identified by the 
Commission do involve profound issues of culturally relative standards of value, 
both with respect to the particular types of situations that should be regarded as 
requiring intervention and with respect to the limits on intervention itse lf.1416
The present author finds Oman’s view persuasive. It plausibly outlines the way in which 
States’ competing cultural perspectives may underscore the development of globally 
acceptable structural measures. In so doing, the argument identifies a possible policy 
reason for why discharging secondary RtoP’s assistance component through 
structural measures has only been explicitly endorsed by a handful o f  States. 
Furthermore, Om an’s view m ay provide an explanation for why the UNSG’s 2009 
Report highlights that some international assistance measures can be particularly useful 
because of their cultural relativity. To this effect, the UNSG’s 2009 Report encourages 
relevant actors to utilise regional assistance initiatives because they can more readily adapt to 
‘local conditions and cultures’.1417 The potential impact of cultural concerns on the 
development of the character of secondary RtoP’s assistance component may also 
underscore why RtoP commentators are increasingly considering how to accommodate 
culturally relative perspectives into the RtoP framework.1418
Second, focusing largely upon operational measures and limiting the few structural
1414 See e.g. the way in which economic concerns have influenced the divide in State views between a right to 
development and the adoption o f a rights-based approach to development in P Uvin, ‘From the Right to 
Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How Human Rights Entered Development’ (2007) 17 (4/5) 
Development in Practice 597, 598-599.
1415 N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: A Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 22 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 
355.
1416 ibid, 365.
1417 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 16.
1418 See generally R Mani and T G Weiss, Responsibility to Protect: Cultural Perspectives in the Global South 
(Routledge, Abingdon 2011) and R Mani and T G Weiss, ‘RtoP’s Missing Link, Culture’ (2011) 3 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 451. See further, R Thakur, ‘Responsibility to Protect is Universal’ The Daily Yomiuri 
(17 November 2009) reprinted in R Thakur, The People vs. The State: Reflections on UN Authority, US Power 
and the Responsibility to Protect (UN University Press, Tokyo 2011) 209-211 and P Orchard, ‘Review Article: 
The Evolution o f the Responsibility to Protect: At a Crossroads?’ (2012) 88 (2) Int. Affairs 377, 381-385 
[discussing cultural perspectives from the viewpoint o f secondary RtoP’s responsive component, particularly 
accommodating the use o f armed force to varying cultural perspectives]; D Capie, ‘The Responsibility to Protect 
Norm in Southeast Asia: Framing, Resistance and the Localisation Myth’ (2012) 25 (1) Pacific Review 75, 79-81 
[discussing RtoP’s ‘localisation’ in Asian States] and G Day and C Freeman, ‘Operationalising the Responsibility 
to Protect - The Policekeeping Approach’ (2005) 11 Global Governance 139, 141-142 [emphasising the 
importance o f culturally relative perspectives in rule o f law activities in territories recovering from RtoP crimes].
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measures recommended to the mandates of existing bodies, like the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights,1419 reinforce that secondary RtoP’s assistance component 
should be discharged in a collective and institutional manner.1420 The operational and (few) 
structural assistance measures recommended equally rely upon the coordination, expertise 
and resources of relevant international and regional organisations. For example, 
peacekeeping (operational)1421 and technical human rights assistance (structural).1422 This 
approach better guards against the potential impact that secondary RtoP may have upon 
present approaches to minority protection than earlier RtoP Reports did. If practice following 
the World Summit had reiterated the range of structural measures proposed in the ICISS 
Report, Kin States may have been able to more readily misuse secondary RtoP’s assistance 
component. One example is the ICISS’s proposal for preventive efforts to address ‘political 
needs and deficiencies’1423 in a State. A Kin State may have exploited this structural measure 
in order to add legitimacy to breaching wider minority protection provisions which prohibit 
Kin States’ from ‘financing political parties of an ethnic or religious character in a foreign 
country, as this may have destabilizing effects and undermine good inter-State relations’.1424 
Whilst the ICISS advised that structural prevention efforts, including those of a political 
nature, should be undertaken with respect to friendly relations and minority protection 
principles,1425 we can question whether such advice would have been sufficiently guarded 
against secondary RtoP’s assistance Pillar being misused in this way by Kin States. This is 
because the provision of similar advice in a minority protection context has not prevented 
Kin States from taking actions which violate the principle of friendly relations and the need 
for the host State’s consent to confer benefits upon a minority group.1426 A good example can 
be found in RtoP practice to date. The requirement for Kin States to refrain from conferring 
citizenship ‘en masse’1427 did not prevent Russia from conferring Russian citizenship upon 
residents of South Ossetia without Georgia’s consent.1428 Notably, this occurred immediately 
prior to Russia’s use of armed force against Georgia under the pretext of discharging
1419 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 16.
1420 This was discussed in detail in chapter two with regard to State views on the meaning which is to be given to 
the “international community” as the secondary RtoP bearer.
1421 Or, as the UN Secretary-General refers to this, “preventive deployment” and “international military 
assistance”. UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 18-19.
1422 ibid, 16.
1423 ICISS Report (n 1359), 23.
1424 ‘States may provide support to cultural, religious or other non-governmental organisations respecting the laws 
and with explicit or implied consent o f the country in which they are registered or operating. However, States 
should refrain from financing political parties o f an ethnic or religious character in a foreign country, as this may 
have destabilizing effects and undermine good inter-State relations’. OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities and Inter-State Relations and 
Explanatory Note (OSCE HCNM, The Hague 2008) 7. (OSCE HCNM, Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations).
1425 ICISS Report (n 1359), 22-23 [outlining the way in which preventive strategies should operate].
1426 On these requirements, see e.g. OSCE HCNM, Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1424), 6-7.
1427 ibid, 6-7.
1428 On this see Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(28 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5969.
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RtoP.1429 Admittedly, the Outcome Document may have tried to circumvent this risk by 
explicitly providing for international assistance to be provided to “States”,1430 not wider 
aspects of the population like ‘political parties’.1431 However, chapter two noted that practice 
suggests that there can be cases where the “State” is interpreted in competing ways, not least 
in secessionist enclaves like South Ossetia. This writer would therefore argue that focusing 
by and large upon operational measures can act as a further safeguard against Kin States 
invoking secondary RtoP’s assistance component to violate principles of territorial integrity, 
friendly relations and non-interference, not least because present guidance clearly requires 
that relevant global organisations/institutions lead the discharge of these measures.
This need not undermine the way in which secondary RtoP’s discharge can be tailored 
toward addressing the specific concerns of minority groups themselves, rather than via the 
State. Indeed, secondary RtoP does provide some outlets for engaging with the specific 
concerns of minorities. For example, the early warning system for RtoP crimes envisages a 
role for local actors which, presumably, would include minorities.1432 Furthermore, the 
alternative view advanced in minority protection research is that structural prevention is 
already carried out under existing mechanisms, such as UN Human Rights treaty bodies.1433 
There is therefore scope to argue that secondary RtoP does not need to embrace structural 
prevention strategies to ensure that it can be effective in the protection of populations, 
including minorities, because existing international mechanisms like UN Human Rights 
treaty bodies and the Peacebuilding Commission [PBC] already carry out this task. In this 
line, it is important to recall that the Outcome Document commits the international 
community to providing assistance to help States build the requisite capacity to protect their 
populations from RtoP crimes ‘before crises and conflicts break out’.1434 Although no 
relevant actor has, to date, explicitly justified the provision of assistance measures in 
advance of ‘crises and conflicts’1435 emerging, this does not necessarily mean that the 
commitment has not been discharged whatsoever. The UNSG connects this commitment to 
RtoP’s early warning and assessment system and, therefore, to action carried out before RtoP
1429 ibid.
1430 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 138 [‘The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise this responsibility’, emphasis added].
1431 OSCE HCNM, Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1424), 7.
1432 ‘United Nations decision-making concerning the responsibility to protect should be informed and enriched, 
whenever possible, by local knowledge and perspectives, as well as by the input o f regional and sub-regional 
organizations’. UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and Assessment (n 1346), 4.
1433 See Nasic, ‘Minority Rights Instruments and Mechanisms’ (n 1375). See also UN Sub-Commission on the 
Prevention o f Discrimination and Protection o f Minorities (n 1377) 71 [highlighting the way in which treaty -  
bodies provide an effective Early Warning function].
1434 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139. /
1435 ibid.
crimes occur.1436 Thus, it may simply be that structural assistance steps have been justified 
by reference to the discharge of existing mechanisms, as opposed to explaining that existing 
structural prevention initiatives have been discharged in order to fulfil the aforementioned 
Outcome Document commitment.1437
2.1.1 Present Literature
The character of prevention (assistance) measures has been the subject of debate among 
commentators. Essentially two views on the issue are taken. The first view is that secondary 
RtoP could be more effective at preventing RtoP crimes if it prioritised structural measures, 
such as development assistance. For example, Sarkin1438 considers that prevention strategies 
should focus on socio economic rights to ensure that social and economic inequalities within 
a State do not trigger RtoP crimes.1439 Others1440 suggest focusing on structural prevention in 
order to avoid assistance becoming ‘militaristic’1441 which they consider would make 
secondary RtoP’s prevention strategies too ‘reactive’,1442 coming into effect only after there 
has been some civil unrest or violence within a State. On the one hand, the present writer 
considers that this is a persuasive argument. Operational prevention measures will usually 
involve discharging secondary RtoP after the population has sustained harm and they can 
therefore be considered as more “reactive”1443 than structural prevention strategies which 
target the factors which could trigger RtoP crimes in the future.
1436 UNSG 2010 Report, Early Warning and Assessment (n 1346), 2. [‘The implementation o f preventive 
measures “before crises and conflicts break out” and the identification o f  which States “are under stress” 
necessarily entail timely early warning and impartial assessment by the United Nations’].
1437 As Luck explains, just because States have not expressly attached the RtoP-label to protective actions does 
not necessarily mean that the actions were not undertaken for RtoP purposes. This may be because a number of 
the means o f discharging the framework are already available under existing mechanisms. E C Luck, ‘The 
Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the RtoP Concept’ (Keynote address, European Science Foundation 
Conference ‘The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice’ Linkoping, June 2010).
1438 J Sarkin, ‘The Role o f the United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional Organisations in 
Dealing with Africa’s Human Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2009) 53 (1) Journal o f African Law 1,12. See also Volk who argues that the responsibility could be 
more effective if  the ‘militarisation o f foreign assistance’ was replaced with a focus on development assistance to 
prevent RtoP crimes and conflict. J Volk and S Stedjan, “Building Structures for Peace: A Quaker Lobby Offers 
Strategies for Peacemakers” in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds.) Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral 
Compact for the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009) 199-218.
1439 Sarkin, ibid, 12. See further, J Sarkin, ‘Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm o f International 
Law in the Post-Libya Era? How its Third Pillar Ought to Be Applied’ (2012) 1 Groningen Journal o f  
International Law 11, 26-27 [discussing the contours and scope o f the preventive component o f secondary RtoP] 
and 31-35 [discussing the ways in which more emphasis should be put on to, essentially structural, by 
‘establishing the democratic structure o f the State’].
1440 See e.g. S Rimmer, ‘Refugees, Internally Displaced Persons and the “Responsibility to Protect’” (March
2010) New Issues in Refugee Research, Research Paper No 185, UNHCR.
1441 A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Military Intervention’ (2008) 84 (4) Journal of  
Ethics and International Affairs 615, 634.
1442 For example Rimmer who states that ‘the 2009 developments are flawed in that even the prevention pillar is 
too reactive and unnecessarily shallow’. Rimmer (n 1440), 6 and 15. See also S Sharma, ‘Toward a Global 
Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on the Path to Implementation’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 121.
1443 Rimmer, ibid, 6.
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On the other hand, the present author writer does not find the view to be entirely 
compelling. It tends to overlook the possibility that there may be less emphasis on using 
structural measures because, following alterations to the framework of RtoP at the World 
Summit, such measures have been largely assigned to the State under primary RtoP. 
Furthermore, this standpoint tends to set aside why the incorporation of structural measures 
has received limited State support. The present author would argue that secondary RtoP’s 
‘slippery-slope’1444 dimension may explain why continuing to discharge the majority of 
structural measures under non-RtoP guises (i.e. in the mandates of existing bodies), is more 
politically acceptable to States.1445 This is vital for the efficacy of secondary RtoP’s 
assistance pillar. In light of this, the present author considers the opposing view in present 
literature to be more persuasive.
The second view is that secondary RtoP should maintain a focus on operational 
prevention strategies. Bellamy considers that the considerable “gap” between State 
commitment to responsive and preventive strategies in wider practice suggests that it is 
unlikely that structural prevention initiatives would be routinely used in secondary RtoP 
practice.1446 At a policy level, Bellamy1447 points to how the incorporation of these initiatives 
would require the international community to interfere more extensively in the internal 
affairs of the State (e.g. its economic policies, rule of law programmes). This may seem 
justifiable once some harm to the population emerges, but it generally requires that the 
international community discharge secondary RtoP and embroil themselves in internal issues 
at a much earlier stage than under operational prevention strategies and therefore can 
provide, as Oman eloquently writes, ‘a licence for economic and political engineering in 
countries that lack liberal democratic political structures’.1448
At a doctrinal level, it is argued that incorporating a broad range of structural prevention
1444 Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
1445 Oman makes a similar point in her analysis o f the potential implications o f the handling o f structural 
measures in the ICISS Report. She argues: ‘So as a matter o f brute fact, partly as a consequence o f the process of 
globalisation itself, many states cannot perform the root cause preventive functions that a legalised responsibility 
to prevent would require. However, the ICISS report defines sovereignty in such a way that states under scrutiny- 
inevitably those o f the economic south-wili fail to carry out these open-ended preventive functions set out by the 
responsibility to prevent. And, because the report holds that a state's claim to sovereignty is partly constituted by 
its success in fulfiling the responsibility to protect (which encompasses the responsibility to prevent), the 
governments o f such states could face challenges to their sovereign status if  the RtoP's line o f reasoning is 
followed to its logical conclusion’, emphasis original. Oman (n 1415), 366-367.
1446 This includes funds for responding to conflicts and those for the prevention o f conflicts within the UN. As 
Bellamy notes: ‘[b]y 2005, the UN’s Trust Fund for Preventive Action had received US$33 million from thirty- 
five donors. This compares to an annual running cost o f around US$5 billion for the UN’s peace operations. This 
suggests that States are willing to contribute to international peace and security efforts but that advocates o f  
conflict prevention have not yet succeeded in persuading governments o f their case’. A Bellamy, ‘Conflict 
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2008) 14 (2) Global Governance 135, 143-44. See also, A Bellamy, 
The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 98-131.
1447 A Bellamy, ‘Realising the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 10 (2) International Studies Perspectives 111,
120 .
1448 Oman (n 1415), 367.
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strategies undermines the four crime scope of RtoP.1449 For example, it could require that the 
international community provide (i) rule of law assistance to States emerging from conflict 
in order to prevent further RtoP crimes arising; or (ii) development assistance to countries 
below the “bottom billion”1450 to prevent RtoP crimes manifesting from economic inequality. 
Given that we remain unsure of the precise factors that trigger RtoP crimes,1451 some 
commentators1452 consider that we could reasonably expect the incorporation of further 
structural prevention strategies to steadily expand the type of cases in which secondary RtoP 
is discharged. Bellamy suggests that this could introduce the “dilemma of 
comprehensiveness”1453 into the discharge of secondary RtoP. In his view, if  we attempt to 
frame preventive policies under RtoP to appeal to all, particularly those who favour a 
structural prevention approach, we risk secondary RtoP’s prevention strategies being framed 
so widely that it ends ‘up meaning very little to anybody’.1454
One issue which has not been considered in the literature is the way in which specific 
structural measures should be discharged, should future practice develop to use these 
measures. This writer would suggest that it is important to discharge these measures in a way 
which ensures minorities’ protection and the prevention of RtoP crimes. The ICISS did not 
take the nature of the discharge of specific structural measures into account.1455 However, the 
2009 Report of the UNSG suggests one way in which future practice might achieve this.1456 
Noting that the ineffective distribution of development assistance can create the climate of 
inequality in which RtoP crimes might arise, the UNSG recommended that development 
assistance be targeted ‘to give the poor and minority groups a stronger voice in their 
societies’.1457 This appears to call for development assistance to be distributed with respect to 
minorities’ position within the State. This approach could help the discharge of structural 
measures in future practice (e.g. development assistance) to uphold existing minority 
protection principles, such as the requirement for ‘programmes of co-operation and 
assistance amongst States’1458 to ‘be planned and implemented with due regard for the
1449 Bellamy, ‘Realising the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1447), 120.
1450 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 19.
1451 As Bellamy notes: ‘[a]nalysts have long argued that this is because it is difficult to draw direct causal links 
between preventive action and the absence o f conflict’. Bellamy, ‘Conflict Prevention’ (n 1446), 144.
1452 See e.g. Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1446), 98.
1453 E C Luck, “Prevention: Theory and Practice” in F Hampson et al (eds), From Reaction to Conflict 
Prevention: Opportunities fo r  the UN System (Lynne Riener, Boulder 2001) 256 cited in Bellamy, ibid.
1454 E C Luck, ibid.
1455 Rather general conditions were suggested, such as recommending that preventive strategies uphold minority 
rights. See ICISS Report (n 1359), 23 and contrast this with the lack o f guidance on the nature o f the discharge of 
specific structural measures, such as development at 24.
1 56 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 19.
1457 ibid.
1458 UNGA Res 47/135, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities’ (1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/135 art 5 (2). (UN Declaration on Rights Persons Belonging to 
Minorities). The Human Rights Commission interpreted this provision as having particular significance in 
development assistance programmes, UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Final text o f the Commentary to the
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legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities’.1459
2.2 To whom should Assistance be Provided?
The next issue to consider is to whom the international assistance should be provided. On the 
one hand, the position seems to be quite straightforward. A variety of relevant actors have 
clarified that assistance should be given to State actors. For example, the Special Rapporteur 
on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance 
stated that under secondary RtoP ‘[t]he international community has the responsibility to 
provide assistance to the State when requested,1460 to enable them to protect populations. The 
International Law Commission [ILC] made a similar statement during their discussions on 
whether secondary RtoP’s scope enabled it to be applied in the context of natural 
disasters.1461 Noting that the UNSG’s 2009 Report reiterated that the Outcome Document 
clearly provided for secondary RtoP to cover genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and ethnic cleansing,1462 the ILC stated that ‘it had become clear that the responsibility to 
protect without the consent o f  the affected State did not constitute an accepted principle 
under international law’.1463 The UNSG also supports providing assistance to States’ with 
their consent, recommending that the international community consider providing assistance 
when a State (i) Tacks the capacity to protect its population effectively’;1464 (ii) ‘faces an 
armed opposition that is threatening or committing crimes and violations relating to the 
responsibility to protect’;1465 or (iii) its ‘national political leadership is weak, divided or 
uncertain about how to proceed’.1466
Conversely, this writer would argue that the UNSG’s recommendation suggests that the 
issue of to whom assistance should be provided may be more complex and contentious, 
depending upon the specific context in the State to which the international community 
intends to provide assistance. Notably, none of the three contexts outlined by the UNSG
Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’ (2 
April 2001) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.5/2001/2, 16-17.
1459 UN Declaration on Rights Persons Belonging to Minorities, ibid, art 5 (2).
1460 Emphasis added. UNHRC, ‘Report o f the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms o f racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance’ (30 March 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/43, 18.
1461 On these discussions, see especially International Law Commission, ‘Protection o f Persons in the Event of  
Disasters’ (15 July 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/SR.3015,4-5, 10-12 and 17 (ILC, Protection o f Persons in the Event 
o f Disasters 15 July 2009 Report); International Law Commission, ‘Protection o f Persons in the Event o f  
Disasters’ (22 July 2009) (n 1387), 3 ,5  and 8-9 (ILC, Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters 22 July 
2009 Report); International Law Commission, ‘Second Report on the Protection o f Persons in the Event o f  
Disasters’ (7 May 2009) UN Doc A/CN.4/615, 2 ,4  and 5.
1462 ILC, Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters July 2009 Report, ibid, 10-11 and ILC, Protection of  
Persons in the Event o f Disasters 22 July 2009 Report, ibid, 5.
1463 Emphasis added. ILC, Protection o f Persons in the Event o f Disasters 22 July 2009 Report (n 1387), 3.
1464 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 15.
1465 ibid.
1466 ibid.
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include situations in which State actors are committing RtoP crimes. This suggests that the 
UNSG does not consider that assistance should be provided to governments who commit 
RtoP crimes. This interpretation is further supported by the Secretary-General’s statement 
that military assistance should be provided for:
‘[A] range of non-coercive purposes, such as prevention, protection, peacekeeping 
and disarmament, or to counter armed groups that seek to both overthrow the 
Government by violent means and to intimidate the civilian population through 
random and widespread violence’.1467
The above statement suggests that the principal objective of providing international 
assistance is to enable national authorities to discharge primary RtoP. It suggests that this can 
include international assistance being provided to national authorities so that they can quash 
armed groups which are perpetrating RtoP crimes against the population. However, this 
leaves two questions unanswered. Can assistance be provided when it is national authorities 
who are committing RtoP crimes? If so, to whom should the assistance be given? Two trends 
in the case studies of Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria merit reflection with respect to these 
questions.
First, the international community has provided military assistance (e.g. peacekeepers) to 
the government that it considered had won the national election despite the fact that (i) there 
remained some dispute over the national election results;1468 (ii) the internationally 
recognised government did not have effective control of the territory of the State; and (iii) 
the internationally recognised government was implicated in the commission of RtoP crimes 
within the State.1469 To this end, it is noteworthy that the UNSC authorised the expansion of 
the existing peacekeeping mission in the Cote d’Ivoire based upon the consent of who it 
considered to be the President elect (Ouattara).1470 Second, members of the international 
community (e.g. third States) have provided assistance to rebel movements which have 
mobilised in response to the commission of RtoP crimes by the State’s national authorities, 
despite the fact that the rebel movements (i) were not in effective control of the territory of 
the State; and (ii) that they are reported to have subsequently perpetrated RtoP-type crimes 
against supporters of the existing government.1471 Third States provided military and other
1467 Emphasis added, ibid, 18.
1468 See Bellamy and William’s discussion o f the Ivoirian Constitutional Council’s decision that there had been 
vote rigging and, therefore, that Gbagbo was the rightful winner. A Bellamy and P D Williams, ‘The New Politics 
o f Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 (4) Int. Affairs 825, 832.
1469 Human Rights Watch, ‘Cote d’Ivoire: Ouattara Forces Kill, Rape Civilians During Offensive’ (Human Rights 
Watch, 9 April 2011) <http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/09/c-te-d-ivoire-ouattara-forces-kill-rape-civilians- 
during-ofifensive> accessed 14 August 2011.
1470 Statement o f the Representative o f the Cote d ’Ivoire to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6508.
1471 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry to Investigate All Alleged Violations o f 
International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (1 June 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/17/44, 7.
(Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry in Libya).
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assistance to the rebel movements in both Libya and Syria. For instance, France dropped 
arms to assist the Libyan rebels in their fight against forces loyal to the Gaddafi regime,1472 
whilst the UK provided the Libyan rebels representative body (the National Transitional 
Council) with police equipment.1473 In Syria, third States (e.g. Saudi Arabia1474) are reported 
to have supplied arms to the Free Syrian Army in order to assist them in their fight against 
the Syrian national army.
Significantly, neither of the aforementioned forms of assistance was provided explicitly 
on the grounds of discharging secondary RtoP. This could suggest that assistance was not 
provided in order to specifically discharge secondary R2P. However, we should be cautious 
about simply discounting the significance of the practice for a number of reasons. Primarily, 
it is noteworthy that RtoP-type language was used to justify the provision of assistance. For 
example, the French military spokesman argued that France’s arms drop in Libya was 
necessary to protect civilians because ‘it appeared that in certain zones the security situation 
was extremely tense for these undefended populations’.1475 Furthermore, we should recall 
that secondary RtoP is rarely explicitly referred to as a justification for the discharge of 
specific means. Typically, primary RtoP is referred to and the measures taken thereafter are 
those which have been outlined in international practice as means through which to 
discharge secondary RtoP. Whilst the practice to date is limited, it nevertheless raises the 
possibility that the collective discharge of secondary RtoP may run parallel to third States’ 
unilateral provision of international assistance to actors other than a State’s national 
authorities, at least in cases where the national authorities’ perpetration of RtoP crimes has 
led to their leadership being contested. It is therefore worthwhile to consider the rationale 
and potential doctrinal, policy and legal implications of the trends.
It is difficult to determine why the international community would provide assistance to 
any actor which has committed RtoP crimes. However, it is arguable that the decision to 
provide international assistance to the elected government and rebel movements was 
determined on the basis that these actors were not responsible for the emergence of RtoP 
crimes in the Cote d’Ivoire, Libya or Syria. In the Cote d’Ivoire, the forces loyal to the
1472 ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ {BBC News, London, 30 June 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13979632> 5 August 2011. (‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms 
Drop to Libyan Rebels’).
1473 UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘UK Provides Equipment to the National Transitional Council in Libya’ 
(30 June 2011) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=624285882> accessed 14 August
2011. (UK FCO, ‘UK Provides Equipment’).
1474 See e.g. J Vela, ‘Exclusive: Arab States Arm Rebels as UN Talks o f Syrian Civil War’ The Independent 
(London, 13 June 2012) <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/exclusive-arab-states-arm- 
rebels-as-un-talks-of-syrian-civil-war-7845026.html> accessed 12 July 2012. Note, however, Evans’ interesting 
observation that some Arab States may be supplying arms to the rebels for broader religious purposes. G Evans, 
‘Saving the Syrians’ {Project Syndicate, 23 May 2012) <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/saving- 
the-syrians> accessed 16 June 2012.
1475 Statement o f the French Military Spokesman (Thierry Burkhard) cited in ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms 
Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472).
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internationally recognised government reportedly committed RtoP crimes in response to 
those perpetrated by forces loyal to the previous government. Similarly, it is alleged that the 
rebel movements in Libya and Syria perpetrated RtoP crimes (i) in response to those 
committed by the Libyan and Syrian governments; and (ii) on a lesser scale and gravity than 
those perpetrated by the existing governments.1476 However, given the limited practice, we 
should bear in mind that this conclusion is tentative.
Notwithstanding this, the trend in the three case studies could possibly have a bearing on 
what approach the international community may adopt to determining whom to provide 
assistance to when State actors have perpetrated RtoP crimes. This writer would argue that 
the approach adopted in these cases seemed to be generally influenced by which particular 
actor the international community considered to have the greatest legitimacy}*11 States 
providing assistance to the Libyan rebels, such as the UK, argued that the Gaddafi regime 
had Tost all legitimacy’1478 and that the rebels’ leadership (the NTC) had ‘increasing 
legitimacy’.1479 In the Cote d’Ivoire, the internationally community recognised who they 
considered to be the President Elect as the legitimate interlocutor with the international 
community.1480 In Syria, some third States1481 recognised the Syrian rebel leadership (the 
SNC) as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people, arguing that the existing 
government no longer had legitimacy. On the one hand, the present author would suggest 
that, the efficacy of using legitimacy as the basis for determining to whom assistance would 
be provided in such contexts is questionable. If States recognise a government to lose
1476 As the final Report o f the Human Rights Council fact-finding mission in Libya states: ‘The commission 
received few er  reports o f facts that would amount to the commission o f international crimes by forces connected 
with the opposition’. Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry in Libya (n 1471), 7. The Report o f the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on Syria focuses overwhelmingly upon human rights violations 
perpetrated by State actors and pro-government militia. See particularly, UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (15 September
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/53, 8-10. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 
Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’).
1477 Chapter two outlined that a number o f  third States and other actors have emphasised the “legitimacy” o f the 
opposition groups in Libya, Syria and the Cote d’Ivoire.
1 7 UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Libya’ <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/global-issues/mena/libya/> accessed 
14 August 2011.
1479 UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Libya Contact Group Meeting Concludes’ (15 July 2011) 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=News&id=631324382> accessed 14 August 2011.
1480 See for example UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (7 December 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6437. For a discussion o f  
the way in which the previous government o f the Cote d’Ivoire came to be recognised by the international 
community and the potential disadvantages o f this, see Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 
1446), 148.
1481 See generally, Syrian National Council, ‘Syrian National Council Worldwide’
<http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/snc-worldwide/snc-map.html> accessed 12 May 2012 (SNC, ‘Syrian National 
Council Worldwide’). See further, UK Foreign Commonwealth Office, ‘Foreign Secretary: “We Have to 
Intensify Pressure on Syria’” (24 February 2012) <http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest- 
news/?id=734211682&view=News> accessed 12 May 2012; E Labott, ‘Clinton to Syrian Opposition: Ousting al- 
Assad is Only First Step in Transition’ (CNN, 6 December 2011) <http://articles.cnn.com/2011-12- 
06/middleeast/world_meast_clinton-syrian-opposition_l_assad-syrian-opposition-syrian-national- 
council?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST> accessed 12 May 2012 and Syrian National Council, ‘The Syrian National 
Council Meets with the French Minister o f Foreign Affairs and the EU High Representative o f Foreign Affairs’
(24 November 2011) <http://www.syriancouncil.org/en/press-releases/item/546-the-syrian-national-council- 
meets-with-the-ffench-minister-of-foreign-affairs-and-the-eu-high-representative-of-foreign-affairs.html> 
accessed 12 May 2012.
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legitimacy on the basis that it has committed RtoP crimes, then it would seem to follow that 
States should not recognise other actors who commit RtoP crimes (e.g. anti-government 
rebels) to have legitimacy either. However, this has not taken hold in practice. In cases like 
the Cote d’Ivoire, legitimacy seems to have been determined on the basis of international 
interpretation of the results of the national elections (e.g. UNSG’s Special Representative for 
Cote d’Ivoire1482 ), despite ongoing dispute over the results at the national level (e.g. Ivoirian 
Council1483). Outside the context of national elections, such as in Libya and Syria, legitimacy 
seems to be based on whichever actor has committed fewest RtoP crimes, or at least, that 
they committed those crimes after the other side (e.g. national military, Gaddafi or Al-Assad 
militia) had done so. Arguably, a further factor which may have been taken into account here 
is that the national authorities in effective control had, at least in the contexts of Libya and 
Syria, failed to respond to the international community’s calls for them to fulfil primary 
RtoP 1484 Jh contra^ both the NTC1485 and SNC1486 explicitly committed themselves to 
protection activities, including the more effective handling of the tensions which could 
underscore the occurrence of future R2P crimes in Libya and Syria, such as minority 
protection. This factor raises a number of questions with regard to the potential implications 
of adopting a legitimacy approach to determining to whom to provide international 
assistance.
At a policy level, chapter two outlined the possibility that “legitimacy” was also the basis 
of some actors’ recognition of the NTC and SNC as the national authorities of Libya1487 and 
Syria.1488 If this interpretation is correct, there may be a link between determining to whom 
assistance is to be provided and the recognition of new national authorities. This raises the 
possibility that regime change and the creation of new internal political arrangements can 
overlap with the discharge of secondary RtoP.1489 This overlap can be direct. For example,
1482 Bellamy and Williams, ‘Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1468), 832. [‘After 
receiving a briefing from the Secretary General’s Special Representative for Cote d’Ivoire, who insisted that 
Ouattara had prevailed, the Council formally supported this view in Resolution 1962 (20 December 2010) and 
urged the parties to respect this result’].
14 Bellamy and Williams, ‘Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’, ibid.
1484 Examples o f  the international community’s calls for the national authorities to discharge primary RtoP were 
given in chapter three. See e.g. UNHRC Res S-16/1, ‘The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab 
Republic in the Context o f Recent Events’ (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1 (UNHRC Res S- 
16/1); UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, para 4. (UNSC Res 1973).
1485 See generally, National Transitional Council, ‘A Vision o f a Democratic Libya’ 
<www.ntclibya.org/english/libya/> accessed 12 July 2012.
1486 See especially, Syrian National Council, ‘National Covenant for a New Syria’ (27 March 2012) 
<www.syriancouncil.org/en/issues/item/618-national-covenant-for-a-new-syria.html> accessed 12 July 2012.
1487 These include France, Qatar, Maldives, Italy, Gambia, UK, Senegal, Jordan, Malta, Spain, Australia, United 
Arab Emirates, Germany and Canada. For a list see National Transitional Council, ‘International Recognition’ 
<http://www.ntclibya.com/InnerPage.aspx?SSID=6&ParentID=3&LangID= 1 > accessed 14 August 2011. See 
further, ‘Britain Expels Gaddafi’s Embassy Staff (Sky News, London, 27 July 2011) 
<http://news.sky.com/home/uk-news/article/16038369> accessed 14 August 2011 (‘Britain Expels Gaddafi’s 
Embassy Staff).
1488 See generally, SNC, ‘Syrian National Council Worldwide’ (n 1481).
1489 On the interplay between regime change and secondary RtoP, see especially A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility 
to Protect and the Problem o f  Regime Change’ (e-International Relations, 27 September 2011) <www.e­
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interpreting measures used to discharge secondary RtoP in a particular case to date, such as 
some third States’ argument that the arms embargo applied in Libya1490 did not cover the 
rebels1491 and, furthermore, the way in which the No Fly Zone helped the rebels to gain 
ground against the regime.1492 Alternatively it can be indirect. For instance, providing 
unilateral assistance to the opposition (e.g. police equipment,1493 arms1494) and unilateral 
actions against the regime (e.g. sanctions1495), alongside discharging secondary RtoP 
collectively (e.g. collective sanctions and use of armed force in Libya1496 and, in Syria, 
diplomatic condemnation of the harm to the population1497). Connecting secondary RtoP’s 
discharge with regime change could lead some States to stand back from, or completely 
abandon, their acceptance of RtoP. The chief example of this is the way in which Russia has, 
since RtoP’s invocation in Libya, frequently criticised RtoP.1498
It is also necessary to bear in mind that “legitimacy” is open to interpretation and can be 
transient. Providing assistance which can help to overthrow a government perpetrating RtoP 
crimes based on perceptions of “legitimacy” can create the breeding ground for the 
perpetration of further RtoP crimes in the State. Practice to date suggests that the risk of new 
RtoP crimes can disproportionately threaten minorities in the territory. This can be due to
ir.info/201 l/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/> accessed 12 July 2012; A 
Bellamy, ‘Stopping Genocide and Mass Atrocities: The Problem o f Regime Change’ (Protection Gateway, 6 July 
2012) <http://protectiongateway.com/2012/07/06/stopping-genocide-and-mass-atrocities-the-problem-of-regime- 
change/> accessed 12 July 2012 and L Arbour, ‘For Justice and Civilians, Don’t Rule Out Regime Change’ The 
Globe and Mail (Toronto, 26 June 2012) <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/for-justice-and- 
civilians-dont-rule-out-regime-change/article4372211/> accessed 12 July 2012.
1490 UNSC Res 1970 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, paras 9-14. (UNSC Res 1970).
1491 The varying positions taken on this issue by States are examined later in this chapter, in the section on the 
scope o f secondary RtoP’s “Timely and Decisive Response Pillar”. On the debate, see N Watt, ‘Libya: Britain 
Backs Clinton View that UN has Sanctioned Arming Rebels’ The Guardian (London, 30 March 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/mar/30/libyan-britain-clinton-un-rebels> accessed 16 June 2011; ‘Libya: 
Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472) and R Booth, ‘Arming Libya Rebels Not Allowed 
by UN Resolutions, Legal Experts Warn U S’ The Guardian (London, 30 March 2011) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/201 l/mar/30/arming-libya-rebels-america-wamed> accessed 16 June 2011.
1492 D H Levine, ‘Some Concerns about the Responsibility Not to Veto’ (2011) 3 (3) GRtoP 323, 343.
1493 UK FCO, ‘UK Provides Equipment’(n 1473).
1494 Statement o f the French Military Spokesman, Thierry Burkhard, cited in ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms 
Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472) and Vela (n 1474).
1495 For example, those o f the United States and Turkey against the Syrian regime. See respectively White House 
Office o f the Press Secretary, ‘Executive Order: Syria Human Rights Abuses’ (29 April 2011) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/201 l/04/29/fact-sheet-executive-order-syria-human-rights-abuses> 
accessed 18 July 2012 (White House Executive Order April 2011); White House Office o f the Press Secretary, 
‘Executive Order 13573: Blocking Property o f Senior Officials o f the Government o f  Syria’ (18 May 2011) 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/18/executive-order-blocking-property-senior-ofificials- 
govemment-syria> accessed 5 January 2012 (White House Executive Order May 2011); White House Office of 
the Press Secretary, ‘Executive Order 13582: Blocking Property o f the Government o f Syria and Prohibiting 
Certain Transactions with respect to Syria’ (18 August 2011) < http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- 
office/201 l/08/18/executive-order-13582-blocking-property-govemment-syria-and-prohibiting> accessed 5 
January 2012 (White House Executive Order August 2011) and ‘Turkey Imposes Economic Sanctions on Syria’
(BBC News, London, 30 November 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15959770> accessed 5 
January 2012 (Turkey Imposes Economic Sanctions on Syria’).
1496 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1490), paras 9-25 and UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484), paras 13-16 and 19-23 [sanctions] and 
4-12 [use o f armed force].
1497 See e.g. UNSC Presidential Statement, ‘The Situation in the Middle East’ (3 August 2011) UN Doc 
S/PRST/2011/16. (UNSC Presidential Statement, ‘The Situation in the Middle East’ 2011).
1498 See especially, Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (25 June 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6790.
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minorities being considered to remain loyal to the previous and “illegitimate” government. 
Libya is a strong example. The rebels are reported to have perpetrated RtoP-type crimes 
against migrant workers (so-called ‘new minorities’1499). As Gaddafi has used mercenaries of 
sub-Saharan descent, migrant workers from the sub-Saharan region were mistaken for 
mercenaries.1500 Accordingly, Libya highlights that a legitimacy approach to providing 
assistance can marginalise certain sections of the population, particularly those who remain, 
or are believed to be, loyal to the existing regime.
Whilst events in Syria are still unfolding at the time of writing, there is the potential for a 
similar, though slightly different, situation to arise. The Syrian regime is led by the Alawite 
minority and there is a general feeling of ‘better the devil you know than the devil you 
don’t’1501 among many of the other religious and ethnic minority groups in the State. Ethnic 
Kurds, Christians and Jews are reported to be wary of a “new Syria” because the existing 
regime supported a “secular Syria”.1502 The fear is that the religious and ethnically orientated 
lines which are increasingly emerging within anti-government movements make the 
maintenance of secularism in the “new Syria” less and less likely.1503
The situations in Libya and Syria tend to resonate with the ICISS’s warning that reverse 
ethnic cleansing can occur in territories going through the transition from crises and conflicts 
to peace.1504 However, there is no longer an explicit rebuilding responsibility in the RtoP 
framework. Admittedly, the gap created by the removal of this responsibility can be 
somewhat filled by (i) existing international mandates, not least the PBC; and (ii) providing 
for States to discharge some of the measures that were delineated as part of the 
“responsibility to rebuild” in the ICISS Report.1505 Can these developments sufficiently fill 
the void created by the removal of a distinct rebuilding responsibility? The presence of
1499 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’ (1979) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l, 10. (UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f 
Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities’).
1500 Report o f the International Commission o f Inquiry in Libya (n 1471) 6.
1501 This phrase is borrowed from J Welsh, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Where Expectation 
Meets Reality’ (2010) 24 (4) Ethics & International Affairs 415,428.
1502 On this issue, see especially M Rafizadeh, ‘For Syria’s Minorities, Assad is Security’ (A lJazeera , 16 
September 2011) <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/09/2011912135213927196.html> accessed 12 
July 2012 and S Starr, ‘Syria’s Minorities are Afraid - After Assad, they shouldn’t be’ (Huffington Post, 9 July 
2012) <http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/stephen-starr/syrias-minorities-are-afraid_b_1652651.html> accessed 12 
July 2012. The uncertainty surrounding the tensions between various groups may influence decisions over 
whether or not to take more coercive action in Syria. On this issue, see Patrick’s observations on whether or not 
Syria could meet the ICISS criteria for consequences o f intervention in S M Patrick, ‘RIP for RtoP? Syria and the 
Dilemmas o f Humanitarian Intervention’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 12 June 2012) 
<http://blogs.cff.org/patrick/2012/06/12/rip-for-r2p-syria-and-the-dilemmas-of-humanitarian-intervention/> 
accessed 10 July 2012.
1503 Rafizadeh, ibid.
1504 ICISS Report (n 1359), 40. For a discussion o f reverse ethnic cleansing in the field o f minority protection 
more generally, see particularly W Kymlicka, ‘The Internationalisation o f Minority Rights’ (2008) 6 (1 ) ICON 1,
24.
1505 For an interesting discussion o f the way in which Libyans’ should themselves take “ownership” o f the 
rebuilding process, see R Thakur, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between Opportunistic 
Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism’ (2011) 7 (4) Security Challenges 13,23-24 < 
http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol7no4Thakur.html> accessed 2 February 2012.
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UNMIL1506 to help with Libya’s transitional period did not stop multiple small conflicts 
breaking out along ethnic lines within the territory following the removal of the regime and 
the NTC taking interim power.1507 Furthermore, there is a risk that the new authorities of the 
State will not take the necessary steps to respond to harm to ‘new minorities’.1508 State 
officials are not immune from the legacy of previous violence or holding grievances against 
those who are seen to have supported the previous regime. These issues suggest that there 
were two benefits to maintaining a distinct rebuilding responsibility. First, it specifically 
focused on protecting populations from RtoP crimes and, therefore, could have a stronger 
role than existing mechanisms like the PBC which tend to focus on the general development 
of post-conflict/crises territories.1509 Second, the international community played a central 
role in its discharge, thereby diminishing the risk of national authorities failing to adopt the 
measures necessary for ensuring that grievances against certain sections of the population 
did not impact on their protection in the post-conflict/crises phase.
Notwithstanding these merits, the field of minority protection helps us to understand 
some of the broader policy reasons which may have underscored the decision to remove an 
explicit rebuilding responsibility. The ICISS Report acknowledged that in some instances the 
outcome of the use of armed force may require that some form of autonomous arrangement 
be put in place for minority groups in order to reduce the prospect of further RtoP crimes, 
including reverse ethnic cleansing.1510 This is reminiscent of the Copenhagen Document’s 
reference to autonomous arrangements being an example of best practice for minority 
protection.1511 However, States have flatly rejected the formulation of any right to autonomy 
for minority groups because of the implication that this could encourage territorially 
cohesive minorities to claim that this right extends to their secession from the State.1512 Any 
connection between autonomy and secondary RtoP’s discharge implicit to the rebuilding 
responsibility would have therefore only increased the reservations of those States who
1506 On the mandate o f the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), see UNSC Res 2009 (16 September 2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/2009, para 12.
1507 On this issue, see particularly, R Falk, ‘Libya After Gaddafi: A Dangerous Precedent?’ (Al Jazeera, 22 
October 2011) <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/20111022132758300219.html> accessed 6 
May 2012.
1508 UNCHR (Sub-Commission), ‘Study on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities’ (n 1499), 10.
1509 Chapter one noted that Schabas makes a similar observation regarding the PBC’s mandate. W A Schabas, 
Report: Preventing Genocide and Mass Killing: The Challenge fo r  the United Nations (Minority Rights Group 
International, London 2006) 12.
1510 ICISS Report (n 1359), 36.
1511 Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, ‘Document o f the Moscow Meeting o f the Conference 
on the Human Dimension o f the CSCE’ (adopted 29 June 1990) para 35 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304> accessed 12 November 2012.
1512 As Kymlicka explains: ‘[I]n those cases where minorities seized territory and established their own 
autonomous governments, the results were often various forms o f discrimination and harassment— even ethnic 
cleansing— against anyone who did not belong to the minority’ and further ‘there is anxiety that such minorities 
are irredentist— that is, that they wish to redraw international boundaries so as to unite (or reunite) the territory 
where they live with their adjacent kin State. Indeed, it is often assumed that they would collaborate willingly 
with their kin State if  it militarily invaded the country in order to claim this territory.’ Kymlicka (n 1504) 22-25.
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considered that secondary RtoP could be used as a pretext for regime change and the creation 
of new territorial arrangements, thereby entirely undermining the State’s territorial integrity.
2.2.1 Present Literature
The approach and potential ramifications of international practice concerning the recipient of 
international assistance has received limited attention in present literature. Bellamy and 
Williams are a notable exception. They correctly observe that the UNSC based the 
deployment of peacekeepers on the consent of the internationally recognised President 
Elect1513 and, although recognising that the reasons for this action are unclear,1514 accurately 
acknowledge that this approach may have some bearing on contemporary understandings of 
the scope of ‘host State consent’,1515 at least in RtoP cases.
Wider arguments in the literature also bear some relevance on this issue. One argument 
which merits greater reflection is Megret’s suggestion that third States’ may support groups 
who seek to overthrow governments for political, rather than protective, reasons.1516 In this 
line he notes that ‘the long history of states supporting violent groups that had very little to 
do with a last-ditch effort to avert atrocities’.1517 The present author would argue that this 
contention suggests that we should be cautious regarding the risk that broader political 
reasons (e.g. discontent with the existing regime in general) may underscore the decision of 
some members of the international community to provide assistance to actors who seek to 
overthrow the regime which is in effective control, especially in cases where (i) the actors 
receiving assistance have also been implicated in the commission of RtoP crimes; and/or (ii) 
the provision of assistance accompanies the recognition of the recipients as the legitimate 
national authorities. Megret suggests two ways of minimising this risk. First, ensure 
assistance is provided by the international community collectively, rather than by third States 
unilaterally.1518 Second, provide military assistance to rebel movements only when they:
‘[F]ight at least significantly to prevent atrocities and protect populations; their 
ability to do so in a way that is compatible with humanitarian values; their chances
1513 Bellamy and Williams, ‘Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1468), 832.
1514 Bellamy and Williams, ibid.
1515 Bellamy and Williams, ibid.
1516 This argument was raised as part o f the wider discussion in the literature concerning whether secondary RtoP 
may have essentially internationalised the protection o f populations. Nouwen and Megret are useful examples. 
Whilst Nouwen criticises secondary RtoP for subsuming populations ability to protect themselves from RtoP 
crimes, Megret suggests that the international community endorse that there is an obligation to assist populations 
own efforts to resist RtoP crimes. S Nouwen, ‘RtoP and Complementarity: Critical Lessons from the Practice of 
the ICC’ (Paper presented at the European Science Foundation ‘The Responsibility to Protect: From Principle to 
Practice’ conference, 8-12 June 2010, Linkoping, Sweden) and F Megret, ‘Beyond the ‘Salvation’ Paradigm: 
Responsibility to Protect (Others) vs. the Power o f Protecting O neself (2009) 40 Security Dialogue 575.
1517 Megret, ibid, 589.
1518 ibid.
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of success; and the risk that the use of violence might precipitate a harsh reaction 
from the State’.1519
Megret’s proposals could be ineffective. It would be difficult to attain consensus among the 
international community regarding providing assistance to rebel movements because of the 
political interests that this impacts upon (e.g. non-interference in internal affairs, principle of 
neutrality in civil wars). In the absence of consensus, Libya illustrates that some third States 
will proceed to provide unilateral assistance, including military assistance.1520 Furthermore, 
although Megret’s second criterion could perhaps guide the provision of military assistance 
in some cases, the provision of assistance to rebels in Libya in spite of reports that they 
perpetrated RtoP-type crimes, suggests that not all States be deterred by fighting which is 
incompatible ‘with humanitarian values’.1521
Another argument in present literature which merits consideration here is secondary 
RtoP’s relationship with ‘suicidal rebellions’.1522 Two opposing views are taken on this 
relationship. On the one hand, Bellamy1523 denies that there is a credible relationship between 
secondary RtoP and suicidal rebellions because, in his mind, the gravity of RtoP crimes laid 
down in international definitions of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, 
would require that potential suicidal rebels to ‘submit themselves to unspeakable levels of 
harm to gain the action of the international community’.1524 In contrast, Kuperman1525 
suggests that there are two forms of suicidal rebellions. The first is where rebels acquire and 
use arms in a bid to achieve their wider political and/or territorial objectives, irrespective of 
whether they are able to adequately defend the population from the States response.1526 The 
second is where rebels deliberately prompt the State to perpetrate violence against them in 
order to attract international intervention on their behalf and to thereafter further their own 
political cause.1527 The present author finds Kuperman’s view to be more persuasive. 
Bellamy’s argument tends to presume that suicidal rebellions would encourage the State only 
to perpetrate harm against the rebels themselves. Whilst this could be the case in some 
instances, Libya and Syria raise the possibility that rebel movements will mobilise in 
response to harm sustained by the broader population and seek international intervention to 
help them to establish new political arrangements which, in their view, will better secure
1519 ibid.
1520 ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472) [also outlining Russia’s response to 
unilateral actions] and UK FCO, ‘UK Provides Equipment’ (n 1473).
1521 Megret (n 1516), 589.
1522 Or the “moral hazard” o f doctrines permitting armed force for human protection purposes. A Kuperman, ‘The 
Moral Hazard o f Humanitarian Intervention: Lessons from the Balkans’ (2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly 
49.
1523 Bellamy, ‘Problem o f Military Intervention’ (n 1441).
1524 ibid, 631-632.
1525 Kuperman (n 1522).
1526 ibid, 51 (what Kuperman describes as “irresponsible” rebellions).
1527 ibid. (what Kuperman terms as “fraudulent” rebellions).
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populations’ protection. Thus, to the extent that a rebellion can be characterised as “suicidal” 
because the rebels lack the means to adequately protect the population from RtoP crimes, the 
provision of military and other assistance to rebel groups can be one way of making 
rebellions less “suicidal” and more effective. At one level, this can help to ease some o f the 
policy concerns of States which can arise when there is delay or deadlock to international 
action. The conflicts emerging in the backdrop of the “Arab Spring” have been exploited by 
offers of military assistance to anti-government rebels by non-State groups with their own 
political agenda. The influx of Al-Qaeda affiliated groups in Yemen and Syria are examples. 
When the political will is present, international action can be taken in response to this 
exploitation and to address the concerns of third States that it raises with respect to their own 
national security. We see this with the UNSC’s clear condemnation of the presence of such 
elements in Yemen.1528 When the political will to act is not present, third States can be left 
with a choice between (i) leaving the rebels without outside assistance, knowing that this will 
encourage them to accept the offers of assistance from terrorist factions and, thereby, create 
the conditions in which wider threats to the maintenance of international peace and security 
in the immediate or longer term can flourish;1529 or (ii) provide assistance to the rebels. 
However, providing assistance to rebel movements may also reinforce the reluctance of 
some States to support international action in a particular case. The strongest example of this 
is Russia’s argument before the UNSC on the situation in Syria. After denouncing the 
declarations of some third States that the Al-Assad regime no longer has legitimacy, Russia 
argued that the prospect of civil war in Libya was increasing and that the Syrian opposition 
groups were ‘hoping for foreign sponsors’1530 for their cause. Accordingly, the provision of 
international assistance to non-State actors can be somewhat of a vicious circle when (i) it is 
used in conjunction with outside support for regime change; and (ii) to try and circumvent 
the harm to the population arising as the result of the international community’s deadlock.
Finally, an issue raised by Thakur1531 points to a broader implication which providing 
assistance to those with perceived “legitimacy” could have. Discussing RtoP’s role in 
Burma, Thakur notes that ‘[ujnappealing as they might be, the generals are in effective 
control of Burma. The only way to get aid quickly to where it is needed most is with the 
cooperation of the authorities’.1532 This argument highlights that one practical benefit of
1528 UNSC Res 2014 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014, para 13.
1529 For an excellent discussion o f  the difficult decisions involved in rebels acceptance o f assistance from terrorist 
groups, see D Aaronovitch, ‘Remember Bosnia: Seedbed o f Radical Islam’ The Times (London, 1 June 2012) 
<http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/davidaaronovitch/article3431388.ece> accessed 9 August 
2012 .
1530 Statement o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
1531 R Thakur, “RtoP: A Forward-Looking Agenda” Kemp, Popovski and Thakur (n 1369). See further, R Thakur, 
“The Responsibility to Protect and the North-South Divide” in Thakur, The Responsibility to Protect: Norms,
Laws and the Use o f  Force in International Politics (n 1412), 152-154.
1532 Thakur, “RtoP: A Forward-Looking Agenda”, ibid, 18 and Thakur, “The Responsibility to Protect and the 
North-South Divide”, ibid, 153.
215
maintaining the traditional approach to government recognition, even in secondary RtoP 
cases, is that the protection of the population can often require that the authority with whom 
the international community cooperate are in effective control of the territory. Indeed, the 
Libyan rebel’s lack of effective control of large parts of Libya made it extremely difficult for 
international humanitarian assistance to actually reach sections of the population such as the 
Berber minority in the Nafusa mountain range.1533 Accordingly, there is a need to be cautious 
that determining to whom assistance should be provided on the basis of legitimacy, rather 
than effective control, does not inhibit the protection of the populations on the ground.
2.3 The Consensual Nature of International Assistance: 
Obtaining Consent
What steps can be taken in order to obtain consent for the provision of assistance? The 
capacity for consent to be coerced or induced merits consideration in light of relevant 
practice.
2.3.1 Acquiring Consent: Coercion and Inducements
When the Burmese junta refused to permit access to humanitarian agencies, France1534 
proposed that the UNSC permit humanitarian assistance to be provided without consent 
through the use of force. Whilst this proposal was unsuccessful,1535 it was supported by the 
European Parliament.1536 This suggests that at least some actors consider that the consent of 
the actor in the State concerned may be coerced by pointing to the availability of non­
peaceful secondary RtoP responsive measures or, indeed, overridden if  the protection of the 
population so requires.
The drawbacks of coercing consent extend beyond the difficulty in gaining consensus on 
its usage, however. The UNSC’s original authorisation for the deployment of peacekeepers 
to Darfur is a useful illustration of the broader implications of a coercive approach,
1533 See National Transitional Council o f Libya
<http://ntclibya.com/InnerPage.aspx?SSID=15&ParentID=l l&LangID=l> accessed 9 August 2011 and National 
Transitional Council, ‘Update on the Nafusa Mountain Crisis’ (19 May 2011)
<http://www.ntclibya.com/NewsDetail.aspx?NewsID=65&SSID=13&ParentID=l 1 &LangID= 1 &Type=2> 
accessed 9 August 2011.
1534 ‘Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV.5898 [reiterating the need to provide humanitarian assistance to protect the population o f  Burma].
1535 This was a closed meeting and therefore it is not clear which members opposed this proposal or the reasons 
for doing so.
1536 The European Parliament Resolution recalled the French Foreign Minister’s citation o f  RtoP with regard to 
Burma and recommending that the proposal be raised before the Security Council. See European Parliament 
Resolution, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (May 2008) EP Doc P6_TA(2008)0231, paras K and 5.
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specifically coercing consent by demonstrating the political will to authorise peacekeepers 
without the prior consent o f the government. It should first be noted that the deployment of 
peacekeepers could be an effective means of responding to RtoP crimes under secondary 
RtoP’s ‘timely and decisive response’1537 component. However, it is dealt with here because 
the UNSG’s 2012 RtoP Report stresses that this is a consensual reaction and, accordingly, 
falls within secondary RtoP’s assistance component.1538 Twelve States1539 voted in favour of 
the UNSC Darfur peacekeeping Resolution, giving mixed reasons for their affirmative votes. 
Argentina1540 and the UK1541 stood alone in expressly referring to secondary RtoP to explain 
their affirmative votes, arguing that the action was necessary to protect the population. 
China,1542 Qatar1543 and Russia1544 abstained from the vote, challenging the acceptability of 
authorising consensual measures prior to consent being given by the intended recipient State. 
Sudan refused to concede to the authorisation, considering it to be an attempt to place Sudan 
under ‘colonisation’.1545 This resonates with the ICISS view that one implication of coercing 
consent is that it is ‘more likely to engender greater political resistance from the targeted 
State’.1546
Is it therefore more viable to follow the ICISS’s recommendation and induce consent?1547 
An inducement approach seems consistent with the Outcome Document’s reference to the 
international community “encouraging”1548 States to fulfil primary RtoP. However, practice 
to date has not explicitly referred to the use of inducements and, therefore, their effectiveness 
in RtoP cases cannot be determined. This is probably because inducements, particularly 
those of a positive nature, are of a largely preventive or proactive character. They are 
designed to crystallise before an RtoP situation breaks out or in its aftermath, in order to 
encourage the State to uphold primary RtoP.
1537 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1538 UNSG Report 2012, ‘Timely and Decisive Response’ (n 1350), 5. [‘United Nations peacekeeping missions 
are based on the principle o f consent and generally deploy in support o f and with the overall consent o f the host 
State. As such, they fall under pillar two and are to be distinguished from pillar three tools’].
1539 These were: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Peru, Slovakia, UK, United 
Republic o f Tanzania, US. UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5519.
154 Argentina argued that the authorisation was necessary because ‘the Security Council cannot shirk its 
responsibility to protect’. Statement o f Argentina to the UNSC, ibid.
154 The UK recalled States commitment at the World Summit to assist States to protect their populations and 
noted that it was: ‘[V]ery pleased that this is the first Security Council resolution mandating a United Nations 
peacekeeping operation to make an explicit reference to this responsibility’. Statement o f the Representative of 
the United Kingdom to the UNSC, ibid.
1542 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, ibid.
1543 Statement o f the Representative o f Qatar to the UNSC, ibid.
1544 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid.
1545 ‘U.N. Approves Peacekeeping Force in Darfur, Despite Sudan Opposition’ (PBS News Hour, 31 August 
2006) <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/africa/july-dec06/darfur_08-31.html> accessed 11 April 2012.
1546 ICISS Report (n 1359), 25.
1547 ibid.
1548 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 138.
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2.3.2 Present Literature
The use of coercion has been both commended and criticised by commentators.1549 In relation 
to coercion, Bellamy1550 draws upon Stamnes1551 “Speech Act” theory of RtoP. He argues that 
using the “RtoP label”, such as France did in relation to Burma, can help to coerce consent 
for assistance because of the opinion that RtoP is a “slippery slope”1552 toward forcible 
intervention.1553 However, Bellamy has also argued that France’s response to Burma serves to 
“militarise” the RtoP framework, thereby moving ‘attention away from non-military 
solutions’.1554 To Bellamy, the militarisation of RtoP suggests that there are ‘serious 
misunderstandings about what RtoP says (and does not say)’,1555 specifically that the 
tendency is to focus on militarised action and overlook the need for a more comprehensive 
development of the international assistance component.1556 The present author agrees that 
implying or threatening the use of armed force to provide populations with the assistance 
needed when relevant actors fail to consent to international assistance does introduce a 
coercive dimension to the assistance component. However, the present author also considers 
that we may sometimes need to accept that coercing (and, yes, militarising) assistance 
through the threat of armed force can be one of few options left to the international 
community in some cases.1557 Furthermore, Burma testifies to the fact that a coercion 
approach can ultimately be effective for the very reason that it reinforces secondary RtoP’s 
potential ‘slippery-slope’ 1558 to the national authorities at issue. Arguably, it is through such
1549 See particularly, M Matthews, ‘Tracking the Emergence o f  a New International Norm: The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Crisis in Darfur’ (2008) 31 Boston College International and Comparative Law Review 137, ISO- 
52; N Wheeler, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate Over where Authority 
should be Located fo r  the Use o f  Force (Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, Oslo 2008) 10-18; N  
Wheeler and T Dunne, “Operationalising Protective Intervention: Alternative Models o f  Authorisation” in W 
Knight and F Egerton (eds), The Routledge Handbook o f  the Responsibility to Protect (Abingdon: Routledge,
2012) 89-93 and A Bellamy ‘The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On’ (2010) 24 (2) Ethics and 
International Affairs 143,147-53.
1550 Bellamy, ibid.
1551 E Stamnes, “ Speaking RtoP’ and the Prevention o f Mass Atrocities’ (2009) 1 (1) Global Responsibility to 
Protect 70.
1552Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
1553 Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On’ (n 1549), 159.
1554 Bellamy, ‘Problem o f Military Intervention’ (n 1441), 634.
1555 ibid.
1556 To this effect, Bellamy writes that ‘the problem highlighted’ by France’s response to Burma ‘seems to be that 
there is something inherently militaristic about RtoP that diverts attention away from non-military solutions. On 
closer inspection, however, this is a problem produced by serious misunderstandings about what RtoP says (and 
does not say) and about its potential to harness a wide range o f measures— military and non-military— to the 
prevention o f genocide and mass atrocities and the protection o f  populations from them. As noted earlier, the use 
o f military intervention is only one o f four key commitments associated with RtoP as conceived by the World 
Summit. The other three— especially the commitments to encourage and help states to fulfil their responsibility, 
and to use a range o f non-coercive measures to prevent and protect vulnerable populations— have not attracted 
the attention they deserve and remain under-conceptualised’, ibid, emphasis added.
1557 To be more specific, in cases where, as in Burma, (i) consent to international assistance is not forthcoming; 
appropriate peaceful responsive measures cannot be undertaken due to deadlock in the Security Council and there 
remains ambiguity over whether the requisite degree o f  harm for the activation o f ‘non-peaceful’ responsive 
measures has been sustained by the population at issue.
1558 Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
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practice that the more specific aspects of secondary RtoP’s discharge can be contoured, 
including in terms of clarifying what steps can and should be taken in cases where a gap in 
protection could otherwise arise due to national authorities non-cooperation and the 
international community’s deadlock. Accordingly, the present author would argue that 
France’s efforts to coerce Burma’s consent may be seen as an effort to better define the 
parameters of international assistance, not as a pre-occupation with secondary RtoP’s 
military components or example of secondary RtoP’s assistance component remaining 
‘ under-conceptualised ’.1559
Inducing consent receives limited attention in present literature. A notable exception is 
Wheeler1560 who draws upon non-RtoP practice to suggest that a variety of negative 
inducements could be utilised. These include the withdrawal of military and economic 
assistance (e.g. World Bank and IMF loans1561) to the intended recipient State. The present 
author would suggest that negative inducements should always be approached cautiously, 
however. The kind of negative economic inducements discussed by Wheeler should be offset 
against the specific economic situation of the intended recipient State. In cases like 
Kenya,1562 economic difficulties within the State can create tensions between sections of the 
population (e.g. competition over resources) and, ultimately, lead to violent clashes between 
groups and the perpetration of RtoP crimes. Accordingly, decision makers should be mindful 
of the potential for the application of negative inducements to detrimentally affect the 
population and contribute to the kind of tensions which can develop into the perpetration of 
RtoP crimes.
In view of the potential risks associated with negative inducements, the present author 
would suggest that future practice might also consider utilising positive inducements. With 
regard to what form positive inducements could take, guidance may be drawn from the 
UNSG’s recommendation that they could include ‘promises of new funding or investments 
or the promise of new trade terms’.1563 Furthermore, future practice might make more use of 
those inducements which do not detract from what a State (and its population) already has 
but, rather, establish conditions which, once met, allow the State (and its population) to 
achieve more. To achieve this, fuller consideration could be given to the UNSG’s 
recommendation for introducing RtoP criteria into peer review mechanisms.1564 For example, 
supplementing the Copenhagen criteria for admission to the European Union with a
1559 Bellamy, ‘Problem o f Military Intervention’ (n 1441), 634.
1560 Wheeler, ‘Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: The Continuing Debate over where Authority 
Should be Located for the Use o f Force’ (n 1549) and Wheeler and Dunne, “Operationalising Protective 
Intervention: Alternative Models o f Authorisation” (n 1549) 90-92.
1561 ibid, 12-13.
1562 On the economic tensions which underscored the post-election violence in Kenya, see UNHCHR, ‘Report 
from the OCHR Fact-Finding Mission to Kenya (6-28 February 2008)’ (2008), 5-6 and 9-10.
1563 ICISS Report (n 1359), 24.
1564 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 13.
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requirement that the State is implementing primary RtoP effectively.1565 There is also scope 
for expanding coercion tactics in light of recent international practice on the recipient of the 
international assistance. In this line, one form of coercion could be simply stating that if the 
government does not consent to the provision of assistance, the international community will 
look to other “legitimate” actors to provide consent.
2.4 Types of Assistance: Humanitarian, Military and Diplomatic
When the consent of the relevant actor in the State concerned is present, the international 
community may provide humanitarian, military or diplomatic assistance. An overarching 
theme regarding the provision of the aforementioned assistance in the cases in which RtoP 
has been cited to date is that the measures are tailored to the specific context at hand. Two 
trends in practice deserve consideration here.
2.4.1 The Scope and Objectives of Providing Assistance
The first trend is members of the international community will be involved in the practical 
provision of the assistance to varying degrees. In some cases the scope of the international 
community’s role may be limited to deploying the practical support for the relevant State 
actors to then distribute. In other cases, the international community’s role can extend to 
deploying actors to undertake a proactive assistance role on the ground. This can be in order 
to ensure that the assistance provided actually reaches the relevant actor in the State 
concerned for appropriate distribution to protect the population. For instance, in Somalia 
third States gave practical support (e.g. deployment of ships) to ensure that the humanitarian 
aid provided was not intercepted by non-State actors, such as the Somali pirates.1566 
Alternatively, it can be undertaken in order to support the relevant actors in the State 
concerned to take the necessary steps to protect the population from RtoP crimes. In cases 
involving the provision of military assistance, the varying roles have been accommodated 
within the mandate of the peacekeeping mission.1567 For instance, in the Cote d’Ivoire1568
1565 See Statement o f  the Representative o f Italy to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97. See further on these criteria, ‘Summaries o f  Legislation: Accession Criteria (Copenhagen Criteria)’ 
(Europa) <http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm> accessed 14 
August 2012 and C Johnson, ‘The Use and Abuse o f Minority Rights: Assessing Past and Future EU Policies 
toward Accession Countries o f Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe’ (2006) 13 Int. J. Minority and Group 
Rts. 27.
1566 UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 March 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5858.
1567 On developments in the substance and scope o f  peacekeeping mandates, see generally V Holt and T 
Berkman, The Impossible Mandate? Military Preparedness, The Responsibility to Protect and Modem Peace
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supportive tasks entailed detailing and seizing weapons in order to help to monitor the arms 
sanctions imposed by the UNSC. In contrast, the peacekeeping mission in South Sudan 
entailed supporting development (e.g. providing the government with advice on the 
establishment of State infrastructure and policy1569) because it was a newly established State.
The second trend is that the general objective of providing assistance may vary. In cases 
where the recipients of the assistance are newly formed authorities, the focus may be upon 
developing their national capacity to protect populations from RtoP crimes and, therefore, to 
function as effective primary RtoP bearers. Thus, in Libya military assistance to the rebels 
by third States, such as the UK1570 and France,1571 took the form of arms and police 
equipment. In cases where national leadership remains uncertain, assistance may focus upon 
establishing an appropriate authority. For example, mediation assistance was given in Kenya 
to address the competed national elections results and establish a coalition government.1572 In 
cases where the recipients of the assistance are challenged by armed groups, the objective of 
the assistance may be providing immediate protection to populations and/or equipping the 
recipients of the assistance to bear primary RtoP effectively. To achieve the former, 
assistance may involve mandating peacekeepers to protect civilians through force if 
necessary.1573 To achieve the latter, assistance may involve mandating peacekeepers to 
support the disarmament of armed groups, the establishment of national human rights 
policies and efforts to ensure that humanitarian agencies have unimpeded access to 
populations.1574
On the one hand, the abovementioned trends regarding the types of assistance measures 
which can be used suggest that secondary RtoP’s assistance component is fundamental to the 
international community having a role in preventing RtoP crimes from arising or recurring. 
However, examination of relevant practice suggests that using assistance measures to 
prevent RtoP crimes has been of variable effectiveness. To this effect, it should be recalled 
that RtoP crimes have arisen in States where a peacekeeping mission is serving. The UNOCI
Operations (The Henry L. Stimson Centre, Washington D. C. 2006) and J Lie, Protection o f  Civilians, The 
Responsibility to Protect and Peace Operations (Norwegian Centre for International Affairs, Oslo 2008).
1568 UNSC Res 1584 (2005) UN Doc S/RES/1584. (UNSC Res 1584).
1569 UNSC Res 1996 (2011) UN Doc S/RES/1996. (UNSC Res 1996).
1570 UK FCO, ‘UK Provides Equipment’ (n 1473).
1571 ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472).
1572 On the mediation efforts in Kenya see Human Rights Watch, ‘Ballots to Bullets: Organised Political Violence 
and Kenya’s Crisis o f Governance’ (2008) Human Rights Watch Report 20 (1) (A), 67-69 
<http://www.hrw.org/reports/2008/kenya0308/index.htm> accessed 16 November 2011 and at in M Preston- 
McGhie and S Sharma, “Kenya” in J Genser and I Cotier, The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise o f  Stopping 
Mass Atrocities in Our Time (OUP, Oxford 2012) 287-295.
1573 For example, the UNSC authorised peacekeepers in the Cote d’Ivoire to ‘use all necessary means to carry 
outits mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat o f physical violence’. UNSC Res 1975 (2011) UN Doc 
S/RES/1975 at para 6 (UNSC Res 1975).
1574 For example, these objectives were incorporated into the mandates o f the peacekeeping missions in the Cote 
d’Ivoire, Darfur and South Sudan. See respectively, UNSC Res 1795 (2008) UN Doc S/RES/1765, paras 4 and 11 
[Cote d’Ivoire]; UNSC Res 1769 (2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769, paras 9 and 15 (a) (i) and UNSC Res 2003 (2011) 
UN Doc S/RES/2003, paras 3, 5 and 21 [Darfur]; UNSC Res 1996 (n 1569), para 3 (b) (iv) [South Sudan].
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mission in the Cote d’Ivoire is a good illustration. Despite being deployed in 2005,1575 
national elections led to tensions increasing. Whilst the UNSC expanded the peacekeepers on 
the ground,1576 RtoP crimes nevertheless emerged. This suggests that even the most proactive 
assistance measures can fail to prevent RtoP crimes. Arguably, one explanation for this, at 
least in terms of military assistance, is that the wide ranging mandates of peacekeepers can 
embroil them in so many activities that they ultimately become overstretched and unable to 
protect civilians effectively.1577 Accordingly, whilst consensual measures can be more 
politically acceptable to States, the international community requires redress to a wider range 
of means if it is to have an effective role in protecting populations. As the UNSG eloquently 
states, each RtoP pillar ‘would make little sense standing alone’.1578
3 The Timely and Decisive Response'1579 Pillar
The general consensus is that secondary RtoP’s Timely and Decisive Response Pillar can be 
discharged through either peaceful or non-peaceful measures.1580 Each set of responsive 
measures merit individual consideration, not least because they each give rise to competing 
doctrinal and policy considerations.
3.1 Peaceful Responsive Measures
The Outcome Document provides that the ‘international community, through the United 
Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect
1575 UNSC Res 1584 (n 1568).
1576 See e.g. UNSC Res 1942 (2010) UN Doc S/RES/1942.
1577 Waal has put forward a similar argument. See A De Waal, ‘Darfur and the Failure o f the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (2007) 83 (6) International Affairs 1039, 1050-51. Tsagourias also takes this view, arguing that tasking 
peacekeepers with wide-ranging protection activities can place excessive demands upon them and therefore 
amount to more ‘peace enforcement than to peacekeeping’. N Tsagourias, ‘Consent, Neutrality / Impartiality and 
the Use o f Force in Peacekeeping: Their Constitutional Dimension’ (2007) 11 (3) Journal o f Conflict and Security 
Law 465,482. See further on the overlap between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and RtoP, Gerber R, 
‘Peacekeeping and the Responsibility to Protect’ ( UN-USA, The Interdependent, Washington D.C, 29 May 2012) 
<http://theinterdependent.com/peacekeeping/article/peacekeeping-and-the-responsibility-to-protect> accessed 7 
July 2012. Some commentators suggest that the effectiveness o f wide ranging mandates can be further 
undermined by the fact that peacekeepers often suffer from inadequate or inappropriate training. See W Pace, N 
Deller and S Chhatpar, “Realising the Responsibility to Protect in Emerging and Acute Crises: A Civil Society
Proposal for the United Nations” in Cooper and Kohler (n 1438), 238. On additional factors which could
undermine the effectiveness o f  peacekeepers, see M Odello, ‘Tackling Criminal Acts in Peacekeeping 
Operations: The Accountability o f Peacekeepers’ (2010) 15 (2) Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 347, 380.
1578 UNSG Report 2012, Timely and Decisive Response (n 1350), 4.
1579 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1580 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 22.
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populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.1581 
The UNSG’s 2009 Report interprets this to cover a range of measures at the international 
community’s disposal, including (i) the deployment of fact-finding missions;1582 (ii) referral 
of a situation for inclusion on the UNSC’s agenda;1583 (iii) consideration of a situation in the 
UNGA;1584 and (iv) using diplomacy to remind national authorities of their primary RtoP 
duty and that individual criminal accountability can arise for the perpetration of RtoP 
crimes.1585
Again, a second layer of relevant practice develops upon the more specific aspects of the 
general means of discharging peaceful responsive measures. This second form of practice 
has helped to contour three significant issues, specifically (i) what “peaceful” responsive 
measures are understood to mean; (ii) the types of peaceful responsive measures that can be 
used; and (iii) the varying nature of these measures.
3.1.1 The Meaning of "Peaceful”
States have adopted two different interpretations to the meaning of “peaceful” responsive 
measures. The first approach is adopted by European States like Sweden,1586 Italy,1587 
Hungary1588 and also the European Union.1589 This approach classifies “peaceful” responsive 
measures broadly, encompassing measures which (i) fall short of the most coercive and 
intrusive forms of international action, such as collective sanctions and the use of armed 
force; and (ii) require somewhat more intrusion than assistance measures which “help” and 
“encourage” the State to fulfil primary RtoP because they can, for example, involve 
international assessments of whether national authorities are implicated in the perpetration of 
RtoP crimes. Thus, under the first approach peaceful responsive measures are considered to 
include measures which can ‘help to protect’1590 the population by (i) aiding the State to bring 
a situation to an end; and (ii) involve the international community taking direct action 
against the State. The second approach is adopted by Russia1591 and China1592 and also Latin
1581 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1582 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 23.
1583 ibid.
1584 ibid.
1585 ibid.
1586 Statement o f the Representative o f Sweden (on behalf o f  the Nordic Countries) in UN OHCHR, ‘Human 
Rights Council Opens Fourth Special Session on Syria’ (1 June 2012)
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12212&LangID=E>  accessed 7 July 
2012. (UN OHCHR, ‘Fourth Special Session on Syria’).
1587 Statement o f the Representative o f Italy, ibid.
1588 Statement o f the Representative o f Hungary, ibid.
1589 Statement of the Representative o f Denmark (on behalf o f  the European Union), ibid.
1590 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1591 Statement of the Representative o f the Russian Federation in UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests 
Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (1 June 2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx7NewsIENl 2 2 15&LangID=E> accessed 7 July
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American States like Venezuela1593 and Cuba.1594 This approach is quite narrow, with 
appropriate peaceful measures being limited to responsive measures which ‘help to 
protect’1595 populations by helping the State to meet primary RtoP and resolve the situation. 
This writer would therefore argue that the divide in State views regarding the character of 
peaceful responsive measures seems to turn on the meaning which should be given to 
“helping to protect” populations and “peaceful”. The extent of the divide in State views on 
the character of peaceful responsive measures, the extent to which this divide can impact 
upon secondary RtoP’s discharge and the reasons which underscore the division between 
States are all issues which most clearly come through in the case studies of Libya and Syria.
In relation to Libya, consideration should be given to State responses to the UNHRC’s 
suspension of Libya’s membership for failing to discharge its human rights obligations and 
protect its populations effectively.1596 Several representatives unequivocally supported this 
action.1597 States like Russia and China were more cautious, noting that the action was an 
exception and should not set precedents for the UNHRC’s future responses.1598 With regard 
to Syria, reference can be made to the opposing positions taken to what constitutes a 
“peaceful” response during UNHRC debate on the situation. On the one hand, some States1599 
supported the adoption of the June UNHRC Resolution.1600 These States considered that 
condemning the ongoing violence and Syrian authorities’ lack of cooperation with the 
international community was an appropriate UNHRC response. In contrast, Russia urged 
States’ supporting a ‘peaceful settlement’1601 of the situation in Syria to reject the UNHRC 
Resolution. The flipside of rejecting a Resolution in order to ensure a ‘peaceful
2012. (UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in 
the Events in El Houleh’).
1592 Statement o f the Representative o f China in UN OHCHR, ‘Fourth Special Session on Syria’ (n 1586).
1593 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela, ibid.
1594 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba in UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests Commission o f
Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (n 1591).
1595 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1596 See UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Passes Resolution on Libya in Special Session’ (25 February 
2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10768&LangID=E> accessed 
14 November 2011 (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Passes Resolution on Libya in Special Session’); 
UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f  Human Rights in Libya’ (25 February 2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx7NewsIENl 0766&LangID=E> accessed 14 
November 2011 (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Libya’); UN 
Press Release, ‘General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’ (1 March 2011) UN Doc 
GA/11050 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/gal 1050.doc.htm> accessed 14 November 2011. (UN  
Press Release, ‘General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’).
1597 See especially, Statements o f the Representatives o f Hungary (on behalf o f  the European Union), The 
Maldives and Costa Rica in UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’, 
ibid.
1598 Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China, ibid.
1599 See the meeting record in UN OHCHR, ‘Fourth Special Session on Syria’ (n 1586).
1600 UNHRC Res S-19/1, ‘The Deteriorating Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the 
Recent Killings in El-Houleh’ (4 June 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-19/1. (UNHRC Res, S-19/1).
1601 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation in UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests 
Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (n 1591).
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settlement’1602 is that the Resolution at issue is not “peaceful”. Russia seemed to be 
concerned that the Resolution was biased because it does not explicitly refer to the acts of 
“terrorism” being perpetrated against regime members/supporters.1603 Venezuela1604 and 
Cuba1605 echoed this view, denouncing the Resolution and voted against its adoption because 
they considered that it was one-sided and interference in Syria’s internal affairs.
There are two significant elements to the above practice. First, the divide in State views 
seems to be at least partly influenced by reservations over blurring the distinction between a 
“peaceful” and “non-peaceful” response. For example, Russia notably (i) qualified its 
acceptance of Libya’s suspension as a sui generis response;1606 (ii) condemned the UNHRC 
for being addressed by the former UN Envoy on Syria;1607 and (iii) criticised the UNHRC’s 
June Resolution for being inconsistent with the more objective position adopted in UNSC 
Presidential Statements on the Syrian situation.1608 Each of these responses suggests that 
Russia is apprehensive over the international community’s capacity to undertake “peaceful” 
responses through other organs, such as the UNHRC, when the UNSC fails to act effectively, 
thereby undermining the UNSC’s discretion over whether to respond to a particular situation. 
This relates to the second issue, namely that States’ understanding of “peaceful” responsive 
measures seems to correspond with their views on when particular secondary RtoP measures 
are activated.1609 Russia seems to consider that measures which entail any non-peaceful 
element should be authorised only when the UNSC considers that there is no prospect for 
peaceful means to ensure populations’ protection from RtoP crimes. Russia argued before 
the UNSC that it deems ‘unacceptable the threat of an ultimatum and sanctions against the 
Syrian authorities. Such an approach contravenes the principle of a peaceful settlement of the 
crises.1610 Arguably, this suggests that Russia considers threatening sanctions against the 
Syrian regime violates the duty to resolve disputes peacefully contained in Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter. The difficulty with conflating the duty to resolve disputes peacefully and the 
meaning of “peaceful” means is that it suggests that there is a duty to exhaust all “peaceful” 
means before non-peaceful means can be used and, when used, by the UNSC. In effect, 
Russia’s standpoint suggests that some States could try to conflate secondary RtoP’s 
peaceful measures component with the duty to resolve disputes peacefully in order to prevent
1602 ibid.
1603 ibid.
1604 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela in UN OHCHR, ‘Fourth Special Session on Syria’ (n 1586).
1605 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba in UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests Commission of 
Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (n 1591 ).
160 Statement o f the Representative of the Russian Federation in UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly 
Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’ (n 1596).
1607 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation in UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests 
Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (n 1591).
1608 ibid.
1609 This issue was discussed at length in chapter four.
1610 Statement of the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
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the international community undertaking a more robust response.
3.1.2 Types of Peaceful Responsive Measures
The Outcome Document explicitly links secondary RtoP’s peaceful responsive component to 
Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter.1611 This suggests that Chapters VI and VIII can be 
drawn upon to determine what responsive measures can be considered as “peaceful” in the 
context of secondary RtoP. Examination of these sections of the UN Charter suggests that 
two peaceful measures which the international community could utilise are (i) to refer a 
situation to be considered for inclusion on the UNSC’s agenda (Chapter VI, UN Charter); 
and (ii) for regional organisations to use their own pacific mechanisms to ‘help to protect 
populations’1612 (Chapter VIII, UN Charter).
Practice suggests that the Outcome Document’s reference to “other peaceful means” has 
been interpreted quite widely, encompassing the deployment of observer missions to monitor 
compliance with peace plans and fact-finding missions to assess the situation on the ground. 
Although various UN organs have the power to deploy a fact-finding mission,1613 the HRC 
has shown a particular willingness to do so in RtoP cases. Whilst the Mission to Gaza 
invoked RtoP in its findings,1614 the Mission to Darfur used RtoP as a framework for its 
investigation and recommendations.1615
The Outcome Document’s reference to the use of peaceful diplomatic responsive 
measures has also been interpreted quite broadly in practice. The use of mediation to try to 
bring the situations in Kenya and Syria to a peaceful end showed the way in which 
diplomatic measures can be direct, involving a series of meetings between State officials and 
the Representative of the African Union1616 (in Kenya) and Joint Representative of the Arab 
League and UN1617 (in Syria). Diplomatic peaceful measures may also be impartial with 
regard to who is accountable for the harm sustained by the population. This was the case in 
the UNSC’s Presidential Statements on Syria which, mainly at the bequest of Russia and 
China, avoid attaching blame to any particular party and call for a cessation of violence in
1611 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1612 ibid.
1613 For example, the UNSC, UNHRC and the UNGA. UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 23.
1614 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (15 September 2009) UN 
Doc A/HRC/12/48, 531.
1615 See generally UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (9 
March 2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/80. (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human 
Rights in Darfur’).
1616 On the mediation efforts in Kenya see e.g. Preston-McGhie and Sharma (n 1572), 287-295.
1617 On the mediation efforts in Syria, see A Bellamy and T Dunne, ‘Syria: RtoP on Trial’ (Lowy Institute fo r  
International Policy: The Interpreter, 5 June 2012) <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/06/05/Syria- 
RtoP-on-trial.aspx> accessed 14 July 2012 and J Traub, ‘Enough Talking Kofi’ (Foreign Policy, 25 May 2012) 
<http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/05/25/enough_talking_kofi7pageM),0> accessed 16 June 2012.
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the State in general.1618
Practice also highlights that the discharge of peaceful responsive means is context- 
dependent. When the discharge envisages access to the State’s territory, a wide range of 
actors can impede its effectiveness. Fact-finding missions1619 can be denied access to the 
State territory, thereby requiring the Mission’s personnel to draw upon wider evidential 
techniques (e.g. interviewing refugees1620) in order to report on the situation on the ground. 
The case studies of Libya and Syria illustrate that, at other times, fact-finding/observer 
missions cannot fulfil their mandate due to the security situation on the ground or constraints 
on their access to certain areas by State authorities.1621
Wider policy issues can also impede diplomatic peaceful responsive measures’ 
effectiveness. The fundamental difficulty here is garnishing the political will to take the 
requisite form of diplomatic response. Russia1622 and China’s1623 emphasis on impartiality in 
relation to events in Syria prevents the UNSC from strongly denouncing the Syrian 
authorities’ role in the RtoP crimes committed therein. Efforts have been made to circumvent 
this somewhat by securing the UNGA1624 and UNHRC’s1625 condemnation of the situation. 
However, an unequivocal diplomatic response from the UNSC would carry particular weight
1618 See e.g. UNSC Presidential Statement, ‘The Situation in the Middle East’ 2011 (n 1497).
1619 For example in Darfur and Syria. On the issue o f non-access to the territory o f the State, see the Statement o f  
the Representative o f Sudan to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f 
High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc HRC/07/12 
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf7view01 /E6DF2E2811EABFA3C12572A000717B7E?opendocume 
nt> accessed 12 November 2011. For an overview o f the discussions between the Syrian government and the 
Human Rights Council on the issue o f access to the territory o f the State, see UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 1476), 3-4.
1620 See as examples UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 
1615), 2-3 and UNHRC, ‘Report o f the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation o f  Human 
Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’, ibid, 3.
162 On Libya, see Report o f  the International Commission o f Inquiry in Libya (n 1471), 16-17 [outlining the 
challenges encountered by the Commission when trying to collect information because o f the security situation 
on the ground]. On Syria, see the circumstances surrounding the suspension o f the Arab League’s fact-finding 
mission and the temporary suspension o f the UN Observer Mission in Syria in ‘Arab League Suspends Syria 
Mission’ The Guardian (London, 28 January 2012) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/28/arab-league- 
suspends-syria-monitoring> accessed 12 July 2012 [outlining the security circumstances which surrounding the 
suspension o f the Arab League’s fact-finding mission]; ‘Increasing Bloodshed Leads to Suspension o f  UN 
Observer Mission in Syria’ (Russia Today, Moscow, 16 June 2012) <http://www.rt.com/news/un-mission- 
escalating-violence-987/> accessed 12 July 2012 and ‘Syria UN Observer Mission Must Be ‘Reconfigured’ - 
Mood’ {BBCNews, London, 5 July 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18721577> accessed 
12 July 2012 [both detailing the impediments to the Observer’s movement in Syria, including when trying to 
verify the facts surrounding specific “massacres” o f civilians].
1622 See e.g. Statement o f  the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627
1623 See e.g. Statement o f  the Representative o f China, ibid.
1624 UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’ 
(22 November 2011) UN Doc GA/SHC/4033 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 l/gashc4033.doc.htm> 
accessed 5 January 2012 (UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights 
Violations in Syria’) and UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly Adopts more than Sixty Resolutions 
Recommended by Third Committee Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in 
Syria’ (19 December 2011) UN Doc GA/11198 <http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2011/gal 1198.doc.htm> 
accessed 5 January 2012. (UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly Adopts more than Sixty Resolutions 
Recommended by Third Committee Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in 
Syria’).
1625 For instance, UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1484) and UNHRC Res S-19/1 (n 1600).
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because it illustrates the discontentment of the organ charged with the primary authority to 
authorise collective sanctions and the use of armed force.1626 However, this requires the P5 to 
set aside their own interests in maintaining strict adherence to non-interference in States’ 
internal affairs and, furthermore, to avoid labelling other States’ push for strong diplomatic 
action as ‘blackmail’1627 of the UNSC.
Strauss1628 points to further impediments to utilising peaceful responsive measures. He 
argues that the HRC’s mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur illustrated that the 
HRC lacks the capacity to translate its fact-finding missions’ recommendations into 
practice.1629 For example, the HRC cannot independently sanction a State for failing to adopt 
such recommendations.1630 There is some merit to this argument. In Darfur, the fact-finding 
mission’s recommendations were merely taken note of by the HRC.1631 However, the HRC’s 
unprecedented suspension of Libya for harming its populations1632 raises the possibility that 
similar diplomatic sanctions may be used in the future in order to overcome the HRC’s 
incapacity to independently sanction States which fail to implement a fact-finding mission’s 
recommendations, at least when the gravity and scale of the harm sustained by the 
population merits this response. Of course, this would depend on there being sufficient 
political will among the HRC to suspend a State’s membership.
3.1.3 The Nature of Peaceful Responsive Measures
Examination of relevant practice suggests that secondary RtoP’s peaceful responsive 
measures entail a multi-faceted nature. When fact-finding or observer missions are deployed, 
peaceful responsive measures can have an investigative and/or monitoring nature.1633 They 
can establish whether the situation on the ground warrants, or has come to warrant in the
1626 Arbour makes a similar argument, opining that the P5 should use their “influence” accordingly when dealing 
with cases involving RtoP crimes. L Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International 
Law and Practice’ (2008) 34 Review o f  International Studies 445,453-454.
1627 As Russia did with regard to the push from States like the United Kingdom for a reference to Chapter VII 
action if  the Syrian government did not comply with the ceasefire within ten days o f the date o f the draft 
Resolution. See, J Heintz, ‘Syria Crisis: Russia Accuses West o f Blackmail on New Security Council Resolution’ 
(Huffington Post World, 16 July 2012) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/16/syria-crisis-russia- 
blackmail_n_1676235.html> accessed 20 July 2012.
1628 E Strauss, The Em peror’s New Clothes? The United Nations and the Implementation o f  the Responsibility to 
Protect (Nomos, Baden Baden 2009).
1629 Strauss notes that ‘the Human Rights Council proved to be too weak as a body to carry through the full 
implementation o f its recommendations. In addition to unity it lacked any effective sanctions it could have 
applied’, ibid, 68.
ibid.
1631 ibid, 65.
1632 UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Passes Resolution on Libya in Special Session’ (n 1596); UN 
Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Libya’ (n 1596); UN Press Release, 
‘General Assembly Suspends Libya from Human Rights Council’ (n 1596).
1633 The Secretary-General seems to instead draw a distinction between investigation and a response, despite 
peaceful means (e.g. fact-finding missions) being considered as a responsive measures in their own right. See 
UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 23.
228
course of the missions’ mandate, the application of (i) further peaceful responsive measures 
(e.g. diplomatic denouncement of harm to population which has been verified by observer or 
fact-finding mission);1634 or (ii) non-peaceful responsive measures (e.g. collective 
sanctions).1635
Peaceful responsive measures can also be symbolic of the international community’s 
political will to apply ‘tougher measures’1636 in a particular case. The application of these 
measures clearly denotes to that the international community has begun to discharge 
secondary RtoP. To the State subject to the measure, this highlights that the potentially 
‘slippery-slope’1637 toward armed intervention has now commenced. In some cases this may 
help to deter the perpetration of RtoP crimes.
When the UNSC fails to authorise non-peaceful responsive measures, peaceful responsive 
measures can also represent a stopgap. Notably, peaceful responsive measures are been 
increasingly relied upon in cases where the UNSC does not act effectively. A good example 
is the June HRC Resolution. This challenged the very neutral language of relevant UNSC 
Presidential Statements by adopting a far less impartial approach to the issue of who was 
responsible for the majority of harm sustained by the Syrian population.1638
3.2 Non-Peaceful Responsive Measures
The Outcome Document does not explicitly refer to the type of non-peaceful responsive 
measures which can be discharged. However, it does provide that the international 
community is:
‘ [P]repared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case- 
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as 
appropriate ’.1639
This provision suggests that the international community can use non-peaceful responsive 
measures which conform to the UN Charter, such as Chapter VII enforcement measures. It
1634 For example, denouncement o f the El-Houleh “massacre” in Syria. UNHRC Res S-19/1 (n 1600).
1635 See e.g. UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1615),
25.
1636 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342) 25.
1637 Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
1638 The relevant extract o f the Resolution condemns: ‘the killings, confirmed by United Nations observers, o f  
dozens o f men, women and children and the wounding o f hundreds more in the village o f  El-Houleh, near Horns, 
in attacks that involved the wanton killing o f civilians by shooting at close range and by severe physical abuse by 
pro-regime elements and a series o f  Government artillery and tank shellings o f  a residential neighbourhood, and 
reiterating that all violence in all its forms by all parties must cease’, emphasis added. UNHRC Res S-19/1 (n
1600), para 2.
1639 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
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also suggests that there are some general characteristics of non-peaceful responsive measures 
under secondary RtoP. First, the initial italicised term denotes that non-peaceful responsive 
measures should be collectively discharged.1640 Second, the express provision for collective 
action to be taken ‘through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter’1641 tends to 
affirm the general prohibition on armed force, specifically that this can only be deviated 
from when the armed force is (i) authorised by the UNSC;1642 or (ii) undertaken as part of a 
State’s right to self-defence.1643 Third, the provision for collective action to be undertaken ‘in 
cooperation with regional organisations, as appropriate’1644 sustains the requirement in 
Articles 53 of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, that is that enforcement action undertaken by 
regional should be authorised by the UNSC.1645 Finally, the Outcome Document criteria for 
discharging secondary RtoP through collective means are notably framed in the present tense 
(i.e. ‘national authorities are manifestly failmg to protect populations’.1646 This suggests that 
a finding of a State’s manifest failure to protect populations from RtoP crimes should be 
based on the present circumstances, not past events. Arguably, this clarifies when UNSC 
authorisation for the use of non-peaceful measures should be granted, including the use of 
armed force. The terms suggest that UNSC authorisation should be given at the same time 
that populations’ require protection from RtoP crimes and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to provide this. This tends to undermine Bellamy’s1647 argument that the international 
community could “revive”1648 an earlier UNSC authorisation for non-peaceful responses for 
the protection of a particular population, in order to legitimise armed force which was being 
used at a later date to discharge secondary RtoP.
Subsequent practice has elaborated upon, or involved discussion of, the more specific 
aspects of the discharge of secondary RtoP’s non-peaceful responsive component, including 
(i) the scope and substance of the decision making process on the authorisation of these 
measures; (ii) what steps can be taken when the basic requirements for the discharge of these 
measures cannot be met in a particular case; and (iii) the acceptable outcomes of discharging 
secondary RtoP through non-peaceful means. This process of clarification has enabled a 
more robust understanding of which aspects of discharging non-peaceful measures continue 
to cause controversy and why they cause this.
1640 ibid.
1641 ibid.
1642 United Nations, Charter o f  the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI art 42. (UN Charter).
1643 UN Charter, ibid, art 51. The legal significance o f this overlap is examined in detail in chapter six.
1644 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1645 UN Charter (n 1643), art 53 (1).
1646 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1647 Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1446).
1648 ibid, 91. The merits o f  Bellamy’s argument on the possibility to rely on revived Security Council 
authorisation are considered at length in the next chapter. For an overview o f  the role o f the “revival argument” in 
the Iraq intervention see C Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (3rd ed, OUP, Oxford 2008) 348-66.
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3.2.1 The Scope and Substance of the Decision Making Process
Unlike the ICISS Report,1649 the Outcome Document does not expressly recommend that 
decisions over the use of armed force conform to Just War-type criteria.1650 One reason for 
this could be that incorporating such criteria could have suggested that secondary RtoP’s 
discharge can and should involve the use of armed force. Furthermore, as the criteria focus 
largely upon ensuring that the use of armed force is undertaken for humanitarian purposes, 
an explicit reference to the criteria could have compounded some States’ concerns that 
secondary RtoP was essentially an attempt bring humanitarian intervention in through the 
back door of the UN, despite several States’ deep seated political and legal concerns 
regarding it.
Nevertheless, this writer would argue that the Outcome Document alludes to some of the 
criteria and, therefore, that the criteria were not entirely abandoned in the RtoP framework 
which emerged at the World Summit. For example, qualifying armed force to instances 
where national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations1651 overlaps with 
requiring that armed force has a ‘just cause’1652 and is undertaken with the ‘right intention’1653 
of protecting populations. Furthermore, requiring non-peaceful responses to be undertaken 
‘through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter’1654 suggests that the use of 
force should satisfy the requirement of ‘right authority’ (i.e. by being authorised by the 
UNSC).
Examination of the decision to use armed force to protect Libyan civilians suggests that, 
whilst the Outcome Document does not require the criteria to be followed, they may still be 
drawn upon in practice. Aside from the fact that the civilian protection mandate of the armed 
force in Libya reflects the criteria of just cause and right intention,1655 it is notable that the 
UK (a chief actor in the use of armed force in Libya) explicitly referred to the criteria when 
justifying its actions to Parliament.1656 The fact that the use of armed force in Libya assumed
1649 The criteria were outlined in chapter one. ICISS Report (n 1359), 32-37 and, on the “right authority” 
requirement, 47-55.
1650 Although the former Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, suggested that States consider including an express 
reference to the criteria within the Outcome Document, this was not adopted. Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger 
Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for AH’ (March 2005) UN Doc A/59/2005, 33. 
(Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’).
1651 This point was also made by Sharma. See Sharma, ‘Toward a Global Responsibility to Protect: Setbacks on 
the Path to Implementation’ (n 1442), 123. She further argues that ‘contrary to certain critics, the Outcome 
Document's decision to dispense with elaborating a list o f criteria, and electing to treat prospective interventions 
on a "case-by-case basis," conforms to the casuistry o f classical just war thought’. Sharma, 134.
1652 Sharma also notes the overlap between these Outcome Document provisions and the just cause criteria, ibid, 
134. On the just cause requirement, see ICISS Report (n 1359), 32-34.
1653 On this requirement see ICISS Report, ibid, 35-36.
1654 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1655 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484), para 4.
1656 For example the opposition leader, Ed Miliband, invoked the ICISS Report’s proposed criteria on the use of 
armed force at the House o f  Commons debate on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 (2011). Statement o f Ed 
Miliband, HC Deb 21 March 2011, vol 525, col 716. See also, ‘David Cameron: Libya Action is Necessary, 
Legal and Right’ The Telegraph (London, 20 March 2011)
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the nature of enforcing a No Fly Zone further suggests that the use of armed force to 
discharge secondary RtoP will, at least sometimes, comply with the requirement for the 
means of using force to be proportionate to the situation at hand.1657 Libya suggests that, in 
practice, proportionate means may be determined by taking into account the views of the 
population and relevant regional organisations. This approach comes through (i) in State1658 
references to the fact that the Arab League Resolution had specifically requested the UNSC 
to authorise armed force in the form of a No Fly Zone; and (ii) Resolution 1973’s exclusion 
of ‘a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory’1659, echoing the 
NTC’s1660 request for armed force to not include the deployment of land forces.
Libya also raises the possibility that present approaches to decision making on the use of 
armed force may actually be more stringent than they would have been had the criteria been 
adopted. The ICISS clarified that the criteria for using armed force as a “last resort” did not 
require all less coercive measures to be first exhausted. However, despite the UNSG’s 2009 
Report stressing that responsive measures can be discharged non-incremental,1661 responses 
to the situation in Libya were incremental. The international community steadily increased 
the severity of the measures used. The response began with diplomatic measures.1662 When 
international condemnation failed to persuade the Libyan authorities to protect their 
population, the UNSC strengthened its response by referring the situation to the ICC and 
authorising the application of targeted sanctions.1663 Based on the view that these measures 
had failed to deter the Libyan authorities from causing any further harm to its population, the 
international response culminated with the UNSC authorising the use of armed force.1664 
Admittedly, an incremental approach helps distance secondary RtoP from the wider concept 
of humanitarian intervention by suggesting that armed force will not be the first measure
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8393478/David-Cameron-Libya- 
action-is-necessary-legal-and-right.html> accessed 10 March 2012.
1657 On the establishment o f  a No Fly Zone in Libya, see UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484), paras 6-12. On the 
requirement o f proportionality see ICISS Report (n 1359), 37.
165 See Statements o f  the Representatives o f Lebanon, the United Kingdom, Colombia and China to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
1659 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484), para 4.
1660 ‘[W]e request from the international community to fulfil its obligations to protect the Libyan people from any 
further genocide and crimes against humanity without any direct military intervention on Libyan soil’. The 
Transitional Interim National Council o f Libya, ‘Founding Statement’ (5 March 2011)
<http://ntclibya.org/english/founding-statement-of-the-interim-transitional-national-council/> accessed 25 March
2 0 1 1 .
1661 This was also recommended by the UNSG: ‘In a rapidly unfolding emergency situation, the United Nations, 
regional, sub-regional and national decision makers must remain focused on saving lives through “timely and 
decisive” action not on following arbitrary, sequential or graduated policy ladders that prize procedure over 
substance and process over results’ and, further, ‘[t]alk is not an end in itself, and there should be no hesitation to 
seek authorization for more robust measures if  quiet diplomacy is being used as a delaying tactic when an earlier 
and more direct response could save lives and restore order. Paragraph 139 o f the Summit Outcome reflects the 
hard truth that no strategy for fulflling the responsibility to protect would be complete without the possibility o f  
collective enforcement measures, including through sanctions or coercive military action in extreme cases’. 
UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 22-23 and 24-25.
1662 See e.g. UNSG’s Special Adviser’s Statement on the Situation in Libya 2011 (n 1382).
1663 UNSC Res 1970 (n 1490), paras 4-8 [ICC referral] and 9-21 [sanctions].
1664 UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484), paras 4-5.
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considered, if at all. However, an incremental approach contradicts that Chapter VII 
empowers the UNSC to adopt a non-incremental approach to its enforcement. Article 42 
provides that the UNSC can authorise armed force if they consider that the situation 
represents a breach or threat to the peace and that less coercive means would be, or have 
proved to be, inadequate.1665 Thus, once Article 39 has been activated the UNSC have the 
power to apply armed force as a measure of first, not last, resort. Accordingly, Libya raises 
the possibility that the approaches adopted to use of armed force in practice may be more 
rigid than they would be under both the criteria and Chapter VII. Furthermore, an 
incremental approach ultimately relies upon the ‘slippery-slope’1666 nature of secondary RtoP 
encouraging relevant actors to protect a population from RtoP crimes. For example, 
collective sanctions are considered to have a deterrent effect because they can demonstrate:
‘[T]he international community’s commitment to meeting its collective 
responsibilities under paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome and serve as a warning 
of possibly tougher measures if the violence against a population persists’.1667
However, Libya suggests that this may overestimate the deterrent effect of adopting an 
incremental approach because, despite the application of stringent targeted sanctions, the 
situation in Libya escalated to such a level that the UNSC considered it necessary to 
authorise the use of armed force.1668 This drawback of an incremental approach is also 
apparent in other case studies, not least Darfur and the Cote d’Ivoire. Six years after the 
UNSC applied comprehensive sanctions in response to Darfur,1669 extensive violations of 
arms sanctions and a failure to attach financial and travel sanctions continue to be reported. 
Despite being under a robust sanctions regime since 2006, RtoP crimes were committed in 
the Cote d’Ivoire, thereby raising questions over the capacity for sanctions to deter the 
commission of RtoP crimes in the longer term.1670 This practice suggests that adopting the 
traditionally non-incremental approach to the discharge of Chapter VII in RtoP cases may 
enable the international community to protect populations’ in the requisite ‘timely and 
decisive’1671 manner.
(i) Present Literature
The literature in this area tends to focus on the merits and demerits of adopting Just War-
1665 UN Charter (n 1643), art 42.
1666 Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
1667 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 25.
1668 See UNSC Res 1970 (n 1490) regarding the escalation o f the situation in Libya and UNSC Res 1973 (n 1484) 
on the authorisation o f the use o f armed force.
1669 UNSC Res 1591 (2005) UN Doc S/RES/1591.
1670 UNSC Res 1975 (n 1573).
1671 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
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type criteria.1672 One group of commentators support the adoption of the criteria, arguing that 
the criteria could facilitate agreement on the authorisation of armed force and, furthermore, 
make it more difficult for States or coalitions of the willing to use armed force on the pretext 
of human protection when, in actual fact, it is motivated by broader political goals like 
regime change.1673 However, this argument tends to undermine the fact that, irrespective of 
the potential merits of the criteria, States did not fulfil the former UNSG’s recommendation 
to explicitly refer to all of the criteria in the Outcome Document.1674 Perhaps most 
significantly, the view that the criteria could prevent armed force being used for broader 
political goals tends to disregard the fact that the ICISS provided that it was sufficient that 
armed force be largely, not entirely, motivated by human protection.1675
Bellamy1676 is more critical of the criteria, arguing that formulating a checklist would 
essentially provide new technical standards for the UNSC to debate.1677 The present author 
finds this view compelling, not least because it reflects the standpoint on the criteria which 
States like Australia have adopted. Australia raised concern over the potential for the criteria 
to stall UNSC decision making on the authorisation of armed force, arguing that the criteria 
‘must remain flexible so as to not tie the hands of the Council in cases where action is 
needed’.1678 Bellamy’s view is further supported by the competing views adopted by States 
regarding the use of armed force in Libya. Examination of State views on the UNSC’s 
authorisation of armed force in Libya illustrates that clear divides already exist regarding
1672 See e.g A Bellamy, ‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World 
Summit’ (2006) 20 (2) Ethics and International Affairs Journal 143, 166; C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: 
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101 (1) AJIL 99, 109; J Brunee, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Use o f Force: Building Legality?’ (2010) 2 Global Responsibility to Protect 191,199; R Thakur, 
‘Behind the Headlines: Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2004) 62 (1) Canadian Institute o f International 
Affairs 1,13; S Breau, ‘The Impact o f the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping’ (2007) 11 (3) Journal o f  
Conflict and Security Law 429, 434; W Pace and N Deller, ‘Preventing Future Genocides: An International 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2005) 36 (4) World Order 15, 29; M Kalkman, ‘Responsibility to Protect: A Bow  
Without an Arrow?’ (2009) 5 Cambridge Student Law Review 75, 85; H Nasu, ‘Operationalising the 
Responsibility to Protect and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas o f  Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 
(2) Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 209, 223; MacFarlane, Thielking and Weiss (n 1360), 988; R Thakur, 
‘In Defence o f the Responsibility to Protect’ (2003) 7 (3) Int. J. Hum. Rts. 160, 163 and Alvarez, ‘The 
Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 1360).
1673 Some RtoP commentators would point to the Russia-Georgia conflict as one such illustration. See e.g. G 
Evans, ‘Russia, Georgia and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2009) 1 (2) Amsterdam Law Forum 
<http://ojs.ubvu.vu.n1/alf/article/view/58/l 15> accessed 17 March 2011.
1674 Report o f the UNSG, ‘In Larger Freedom’ (n 1650), 33.
1675 This was discussed in detail in chapter one.
1676 Bellamy, ‘Problem o f Military Intervention’ (n 1441).
1677 ibid, 627. [ ‘It is important to recognise, however, that agreement on thresholds does not guarantee agreement 
on whether the thresholds have been breached or on what is the most appropriate response in actual cases’]. See 
further at 628 and 629.
1678 Statement o f the Representative o f Australia to the UNGA, ‘Informal Discussion on Responsibility While 
Protecting’ (21 February 2012) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35- 
r2pcs-topics/4002-informal-discussion-on-brazils-concept-of-responsibility-while-protecting> accessed 30 May 
2012 ( ‘Informal Discussion on Responsibility While Protecting’). Furthermore, Australia noted the way in which 
the criteria o f “last resort” could implicate the effective protection o f populations, arguing that ‘[t]he criteria o f  
force as a last resort should not be a requirement to rigidly and physically test and exhaust all lesser options 
before resorting to military force, but rather a matter o f making a reasonable, objective judgment based on all the 
available evidence that no lesser measures could succeed in halting or averting the harm in question’.
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issues to which the criteria relate.1679 For example, whether the use of armed force has a 
reasonable prospect of success. Whilst Russia1680 and Brazil1681 suggested that the use of 
armed force could cause further harm to Libyan civilians (e.g. by damaging infrastructure), 
the UK,1682 France,1683 Colombia1684 and the US1685 all considered that the use of armed force 
was permissible and necessary to protect civilians. The case study of Libya therefore 
suggests that it could be difficult to gain consensus among States on whether the use of 
armed force in a particular situation can satisfy the criteria or elements thereof.
Other commentators suggest that the focus should instead be placed on ensuring that the 
armed force is carried out legitimately.1686 For example, Pattison argues that the focus on 
adopting the criteria suggests that issues of jus ad bellum have been prioritised over issues of 
jus in bello:
‘The recent shift in the debate away from the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ 
towards a ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP) has, if anything exacerbated the focus on 
ad bellum issues. Contemporary legal and political discussions have concentrated on 
legitimate authority (e.g., whether Security Council authorisation is necessary for 
intervention) and just cause (e.g., how serious the humanitarian crisis has to be in 
order for military intervention to be appropriate)’.1687
The present author considers that Libya tends to add weight to the view that the criteria’s 
legitimisation of the resort to armed force does not necessarily legitimise the actual use of 
armed force. For example, in the immediate aftermath of the use of armed force in Libya, 
some States criticised ‘the excessive use of force’1688 by the coalition. These criticisms 
underscored Brazil’s conceptualisation of the so-called ‘responsibility whilst protecting’.1689 
This concept essentially recommends that decision making on the use of armed force and the 
actual use of armed force fulfil certain requirements.1690 In terms of the former, Brazil’s
1679 The competing interpretations o f UNSC Res 1973 are also outlined by Bellamy and Williams in Bellamy and 
Williams, ‘Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1468), 847-848.
1680 A de Carbonnel, ‘Medvedev Says Russia Worried over Use o f Force in Libya’ (Reuters, Moscow, 22 March
2011) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/201 l/03/22/uk-libya-russia-medvedev-gates-idUKTRE72L5GI20110322> 
accessed 29 March 2011.
1681 Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6498.
1682 Statement o f the Representative o f  the United Kingdom to the UNSC, ibid.
1683 Statement o f the Representative o f  France to the UNSC, ibid.
1684 Statement o f the Representative o f  Colombia to the UNSC, ibid.
1685 Statement o f the Representative o f  the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
1686 J Pattison, ‘Humanitarian Intervention, the Responsibility to Protect and Jus in Bello’ (2009) 1 Global 
Responsibility to Protect 364 and Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1446), 166.
1687 Pattison, ibid, 365.
1688 For e.g. the Russian Federation. See Carbonnel, ‘Medvedev Says Russia Worried over Use o f Force in Libya’ 
(n 1680).
1689 UNGA/UNSC, ‘Annex to the Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative o f Brazil to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General: Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the 
Development and Promotion o f  a Concept’ (11 November 2011) UN Doc A/66/551 -S/2011/701. (UNGA/UNSC, 
‘Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion o f a Concept’).
1690 Pattison also makes this point. See J Pattison, ‘The RtoP and Responsibility while Protecting: The Secretary- 
General’s Timely and Decisive Report on Timely and Decisive Reponses’ (University o f  Denver Human Rights
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proposals substantially overlap with the ICISS’s Just War-type criteria. For example, Brazil 
urges secondary RtoP’s discharge through non-peaceful measures to be ‘a truly exceptional 
course of action, or a measure of last resort*mx (e.g. last resort criterion) and for detailed 
consideration to be given to whether the use of armed force could be more hindrance than 
help to the population at issue (e.g. reasonable prospects criterion). With respect to the latter, 
Brazil’s recommendations tend to overlap with some of the ICISS’s operational guidelines 
on the use of armed force, not least the requirement for the use of armed force to comply 
with all relevant international humanitarian law obligations.1692 Brazil’s ‘responsibility 
whilst protecting’1693 concept has been applauded by States like Guatemala1694 and South 
Africa.1695 The UNSG’s 2012 Report on RtoP’s timely and decisive response component also 
dedicates an entire section to explaining the concept.1696 However, the concept has also 
raised concerns. States, such as Australia1697 and the US,1698 have expressed reservations over 
codifying an incremental approach to the discharge of secondary RtoP’s non-peaceful 
component, suggesting that ‘[t]he criteria of force as a last resort should not be a requirement 
to rigidly and physically test and exhaust all lesser options before resorting to military 
force’.1699 Similarly, the Netherlands1700 cautioned that requiring decision makers to consider 
the potential negative consequences of using armed force in a particular case could mean that 
armed force is not used to protect populations because of “worst case scenario” 
considerations. To the Netherlands, assessing the consequences of armed force in advance of 
its usage needs to be approached carefully in order to ensure that this ‘does not lead to the 
institutionalisation of inaction’.1701 Thus, at the time of writing it remains unclear whether or 
not the discharge of secondary RtoP through the use of armed force in future practice will be 
subject to, or influenced by, the ‘responsibility whilst protecting’1702 concept.
and Human Welfare Online Journal, 31 October 2012) < http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/roundtable/2012/panel- 
b/10-2012/pattison-2012a.html> accessed 4 November 2012.
1691 Emphasis added, Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, ‘Informal Discussion on 
Responsibility while Protecting’ (n 1678).
1692 On these guidelines, see ICISS Report (n 1359), 57-67.
1693 UNGA/UNSC, ‘Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion o f a Concept’ 
(n 1689).
1694 Statement o f the Representative o f  Guatemala to the UNGA, ‘Informal Discussion on Responsibility While 
Protecting’ (n 1678).
1695 Statement o f the Representative o f South Africa to the UNGA, ibid.
1696 UNSG Report 2012, Timely and Decisive Response (n 1350), 13-15.
1697 Statement o f the Representative o f Australia to the UNGA, ‘Informal Discussion on Responsibility While 
Protecting’ (n 1678).
1698 Statement o f the Representative o f  the United States to the UNGA, ibid.
1699 Statement o f the Representative o f  Australia to the UNGA, ibid.
1700 Statement o f the Representative o f  the Netherlands to the UNGA, ibid.
1701 ibid.
1702 UNGA/UNSC, ‘Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the Development and Promotion o f a Concept’ 
(n 1689).
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3.2.2 Filling the Gap: Coercing. Inducing or Bypassing UNSC Authorisation
Requiring UNSC authorisation for non-peaceful responsive measures means that their 
discharge is ultimately dependent upon the P5 refraining from using the veto. Practice to date 
suggests that the prospect of the veto preventing the discharge of secondary RtoP remains a 
real problem. Admittedly, neither Russia nor China wielded their veto power to prevent the 
use of armed force in Libya despite the relatively short time given for the UNSC to consider 
its authorisation.1703 Nevertheless, Syria tends to negate the possibility that Libya may have 
shown positive developments regarding the use of the veto in RtoP cases. After all, Russia 
and China have, at the time of writing, wielded their veto no less than three times in order to 
prevent the UNSC from putting conditions upon the Syrian national authorities, including a 
mere threat of redress to Chapter VII measures in the event of the authorities’ non- 
compliance.1704 In such cases, what can the international community do to give effect to their 
commitment to undertake a ‘timely and decisive’1705 response through non-peaceful 
measures? Practice to date suggests that three approaches could possibly be adopted. The 
nature of these approaches broadly overlaps with those adopted when a State’s refusal to 
provide consent to the provision of international assistance similarly threatens the capacity 
for secondary RtoP to be discharged effectively.
First, the broader international community may try to induce UNSC authorisation through 
diplomatic action. In the lead up to UNSC meetings regarding further draft Resolutions on 
Syria, a number of State representatives, the Joint Arab League and UN Special Envoy on 
Syria and the UNSG, called upon and/or met with Russian diplomats to try to encourage 
their cooperation at the UNSC.1706 The UNGA was also utilised to circumvent the UNSC’s 
failure to unequivocally condemn the violence in Syria and to put diplomatic pressure on 
Russia and China to be more cooperative in the UNSC. In this line, the UNGA adopted two 
Resolutions on the situation in Syria in the immediate aftermath of vetoed UNSC action,
1703 See the Statement o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
1704 See draft UNSC Resolutions and the Statements o f the Representatives o f China and the Russian Federation 
with regard to their decision to veto: (i) Draft UNSC Res S/2011/612 (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612 and 
UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627; (ii) Draft UNSC Res S/2012/77 (4 February
2012) UN Doc S/2012/77 and UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711; and (iii) Draft 
UNSC Res S/2012/538 (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538 and UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6810.
1705 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1706 See e.g. UN News, ‘Syria: After Moscow Meeting, Joint Special Envoy Voices Hope for Council Agreement’ 
(New York, 17 July 2012) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42491&Cr=Syria&Crl=> accessed 
20 July 2012; ‘U.S. President Barack Obama Meets with Russian President Putin in Los Angeles’ Chicago 
Tribune (Chicago, 19 June 2012) <http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/columnists/ct-met-aj-kass-obama- 
putin.jpg-20120623,0,1874175.photo> accessed 20 July 2012; UNSG, ‘Readout o f  the Secretary-General’s 
Meeting with H.E. Mr. Sergey Lavrov, Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation’ (16 February 2012) 
<http://www.un.org/sg/offthecuff/index.asp?nid=2229> accessed 20 July 2012.
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thereby demonstrating the existence of broad political will for collective action in Syria.1707 A 
State may also try to induce authorisation by curtailing its existing economic ties with a 
UNSC member who is failing to cooperate with the broader will of the international 
community. To this effect, it is notable that, following the third double Russian-Chinese 
veto, the US almost immediately suspended its arms trade agreements with Russia.1708
Second, members of the international community may try to coerce UNSC authority. 
Notably, States, such as France1709 and the US,1710 used language suggestive of a possible 
willingness to act collectively outside the UNSC should Russia and China continue to hinder 
international efforts to respond to the situation in Syria effectively. To date, this has 
transformed into some forms of concrete action, including the application of unilateral 
sanctions.1711 However, as no State explicitly justified these measures on the basis of 
secondary RtoP, it is possible that unilateral measures are still considered to fall outside the 
RtoP framework and instead represent, at the very most, a parallel regime.
This is not to say that unilateral non-peaceful measures have no place in RtoP cases, 
however. All States are free to determine the nature and extent of their relations with other 
States, pursuant to existing obligations such as trade agreements. Indeed, a primary example 
of this is Italy gaining a concession to participation in the European Union’s sanctions 
against the Syrian regime so that it could fulfil its existing trade agreements with Syria.1712 
Furthermore, unilateral sanctions can be effective when they are used to prop up existing 
collective sanctions. This is because the effectiveness of collective sanctions is ultimately 
dependent upon being ‘fully and consistently implemented by Member States’.1713 Practice 
suggests that it is generally difficult to ensure that all UN Member States comply with 
sanctions applied by the UNSC.1714 Furthermore, compliance with UNSC authorised
1707 UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’
(n 1624) and UN Press Release, ‘General Assembly Adopts more than Sixty Resolutions Recommended by Third 
Committee Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic Human Rights Violations in Syria’ (n 1624).
1708 ‘Syrian Protest Derails US Mi-17 Deal with Russia’ (Flight Global, 20 July 2012)
<http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/syrian-protest-derails-us-mi-17-deal-with-russia-374580/> accessed 
22 July 2012.
1709 For instance, after the third double veto France cautioned: ‘This double veto leaves the Security Council 
disarmed amid the violence o f  the Assad regime, but France will not leave the Syrian people alone in the face of 
the crimes being committed against them’. Statement o f the Representative o f France to die UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810.
1710 For example, after the third double veto the United States argued: ‘The United States has not and will not pin 
its policy on an unarmed observer mission that is deployed in the midst o f such widespread violence and that 
cannot even count on the most minimal support o f this Security Council. Instead, we will intensify our work with 
a diverse range o f partners outside the Security Council to bring pressure to bear on the Assad regime and to 
deliver assistance to those in need. The Security Council has failed utterly in its most important task on its agenda 
this year. This is another dark day in Turtle Bay’. Statement o f the Representative o f  the United States to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810.
1711 For example the United States, see White House Executive Order April 2011 (n 1495).
1712 On Italy’s concession, see ‘EU Steps up Syria Sanctions with Ban on Oil Imports’ (BBC News, London, 2 
September 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14759416> accessed 5 January 2012.
171 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 25.
1714 See e.g. the sanctions committee on Libya, reporting that several months after the sanctions were applied, the 
committee had only received thirty implementation reports from member States. The number was not increased
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sanctions by States proximate to the State subject to the sanctions could be interpreted as 
simply an act of compliance with UN Charter obligations, not as a signal of potentially more 
coercive unilateral measures if the situation is not resolved. Accordingly, States’ application 
of unilateral sanctions in conjunction with the collective sanctions can, when applied by the 
immediate neighbours or allies of the State concerned, help to send a clearer message of 
condemnation of the situation inside the State. This can reinforce to the State at issue that 
their neighbouring State/ally is not merely complying with UNSC authorised sanctions 
because of its UN Charter obligations but, rather, as a signal of their preparedness to 
potentially support or undertake more coercive unilateral/collective responses if the situation 
is not resolved.
Third, members of the international community may bypass the requirement for UNSC 
authorisation. Some States have taken unilateral actions in order to strengthen the collective 
measures applied to protect the population (e.g. arms drop to Libyan rebels1715) or, 
alternatively, to address the vacuum in protection created when the UNSC fails to authorise 
non-peaceful responsive measures (e.g. application of regional/unilateral sanctions in 
Syria1716). To date, these measures have not extended to the use of unauthorised and/or 
unilateral armed force. Whilst Russia used unilateral and unauthorised armed force against 
Georgia under the pretext of discharging its RtoP Russian citizens residing in South 
Ossetia,1717 the legality and legitimacy of this claim was readily denounced by the broader 
international community.1718 No other State has argued that the unilateral or unauthorised use 
of armed force is an appropriate secondary RtoP response. However, it remains to be seen
by the committee issuing two notes verbale reminding member States o f their reporting responsibility. UNSC  
Committee, ‘Chairman’s Second Report Pursuant to Paragraph 24 (e) o f Security Council Resolution 1970 
(2011)’ (24 June 2011).
1715 ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (n 1472).
1716 For details on Turkey’s sanctions and those o f the Arab League (including diplomatic sanction o f suspending 
Syria from the regional organisation) see ‘Turkey Imposes Economic Sanctions on Syria’ (n 1495). On Arab 
Leagues’ suspension o f Syria, see e.g. Y Saleh and A Samir, ‘Arab League Suspends Syria as Global Pressure 
Rises’ (Reuters, Cairo, 12 November 2011) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/12/us-arabs-syria- 
idUSTRE7AB0CP20111112> accessed 5 January 2012. On United States economic sanctions see, White House 
Executive Order April 2011 (n 1495); White House Executive Order May 2011 (n 1495); White House Executive 
Order August 2011 (n 1495). With regard to sanctions imposed by the European Union see ‘Statement o f  the 
High Representative on the Extension o f Restrictive Measures Against Syrian Individuals Responsible for and 
associated with Repression’ (1 August 2011) < http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/fr/article_l 1265_fr.htm> 
accessed 5 January 2012; International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Crisis in Syria’ 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria> accessed 5 January 2012 and ‘EU 
Tightens Sanctions on Syria’ (Aljazeera, 1 December 2011)
<http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/12/2011121125337233662.html> accessed 5 January 2012.
1717 See respectively, Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV/5952 and “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian 
Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (Ministry o f  Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 August 
2008)
<www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574al0026259770penD  
ocument> accessed 11 May 2012.
1718 See generally State responses in the UNSC: UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952; 
UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5951; UNSC Verbatim Record (10 August 2008) UN 
Doc S/PV.5953; UNSC Verbatim Record (19 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5961 and UNSC Verbatim Record (28 
August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5969. State denouncement o f the use o f armed force is discussed at length in chapter 
six.
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whether the continued inability to act through the UNSC in response to Syria may cause this 
position to change. Similarly, no regional organisation or coalition of the willing has yet 
claimed to be able to act without the prior authorisation of the UNSC. Admittedly, 
ECOWAS did threaten the use of armed force with respect to the situation in the Cote 
d’Ivoire.1719 However, this was a threat and the fact that ECOWAS approached the UNSC to 
request authorisation for the use of armed force in Mali tends to undermine the possibility 
that its response to the Cote d’Ivoire was indicative of its preparedness to use unauthorised 
collective armed force under secondary RtoP.1720
Present literature discusses additional routes through which to bypass the requirement for 
UNSC authority. A frequent recommendation is for the UNGA to invoke its residual 
responsibility to maintain international peace and security and, acting under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution, recommend the application of collective sanctions or armed force.1721 
Admittedly, the Outcome Document provides that non-peaceful responsive measures are to 
be discharged ‘through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII’.1722 On the one hand, the italicised term could open the way for non-peaceful 
responsive measures to be based upon Chapter IV of the Charter and its explicit conferral of 
a residual responsibility to maintain international peace and security upon the UNGA.1723 
Conversely, the present author would suggest that the Outcome Document tends to qualify 
this because it clearly provides for non-peaceful measures to be discharged ‘through the 
Security Council’1724.
1719 ECOWAS applied sanctions against Cote d’Ivoire and threatened to use force if  the situation in the Cote 
d’Ivoire did not improve. See respectively, ECOWAS, ‘Final Communique o f the Extraordinary Session o f the 
Authority o f Heads o f State and Government on the Cote d’Ivoire’ (24 December 2010) No 192/2010 and 
ECOWAS, ‘Resolution A/RES. 1/03/11 o f the Authority o f the Heads o f  State and Government o f ECOWAS on 
the Situation in the Cote d’Ivoire’ (1 March 2011) No 043/2011. See further Bellamy, The Global Effort to End 
Mass Atrocities (n 1446), 146.
1720 See UN Press Release, ‘Security Council Examining Request for UN Mandate for African Troops in Mali’ 
(18 June 2012) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42266&Cr=+mali+&Crl=> accessed 6 July 
2012 .
1721 See e.g Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 1672), 13; Breau (n 1672), 434; Pace and Deller (n 1672), 29; 
Kalkman (n 1672), 85; Brunee (n 1672), 199; N Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles 
and Procedures’ (2001) 2 Melbourne Journal o f International Law 1, 12, 16 and 17 (notes the difficulty o f  
attaining consensus and associated difficulties such as that a case satisfy the specific requirements o f  the 
Resolution). The use o f this Resolution to circumvent a failure to act on the part o f the Security Council has also 
been proposed by: ICISS Report (n 1359), 53; UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 25; Statement 
o f the Representative o f Cameroon to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; 
Statement o f the Representative o f Benin to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100; Statement o f  the Representative o f Lesotho to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty 
Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on the Responsibility 
to Protect’ (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10849; Statement o f Egypt (on behalf o f the Non-Aligned Movement) to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f the Representative o f 
Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect 
Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850 and Statement o f the 
Representative o f Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
1722 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139, emphasis added.
1723 UN Charter (n 1643), art 11 (2). For a discussion o f the substance and basis o f  the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution see for example C Tomuschat, ‘Uniting for Peace’ (UN Audiovisual Library o f  International Law,
2008) <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/ufp/ufp.html> accessed 17 May 2011. See also Gray (n 1648), 259-61.
1724 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
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Some commentators1725 seem to overlook the fact that the scope of the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution is narrow. As O’Connell1726 explains, the Resolution permits the UNGA to 
recommend the use of armed force which conforms to the prohibition on armed force.1727 
This means that the UNGA can only use the Uniting for Peace Resolution to recommend the 
use of armed force which is being undertaken (i) with the consent of the State concerned; (ii) 
as part of a States right to self-defence;1728 or (ii) with UNSC authorisation.1729 This 
undermines the capacity of the Resolution to legitimate the use of armed force which is 
illegal and, particularly, the use of armed force to protect populations which is not authorised 
by the UNSC. Of course, if secondary RtoP were to develop in State practice as a new legal 
basis for the use of armed force, the Resolution could assume a legalising function. In the 
interim, any discharge of secondary RtoP through armed force which has been recommended 
by the UNGA would lack a legal mandate.1730 In light of this, the present author finds the 
opposing view in present literature to be more persuasive and politically realistic. In this 
section of the literature, the Uniting for Peace Resolution is limited to a route through which 
to bypass the UNSC’s failure to authorise collective sanctions short o f the use o f  armed 
force.1731 This seems consistent with practice to date which has limited discussion of the 
Uniting for Peace Resolution to the role that it could have in securing the application of 
enforcement measures below armed force, such as collective diplomatic sanctions.1732
1725 This tendency in the literature usually arises from outlining, rather than assessing, the proposals in the 1CISS 
Report with regard to circumventing a failure o f the Security Council to act. Notably, ICISS did emphasise that 
the Uniting for Peace Resolution would lack binding force and, therefore, would be more an instrument through 
which to legitimise unauthorised armed force than legalise it. See e.g. Pace and Deller (n 1672), 29 and L Tiewa, 
‘China and the Responsibility to Protect: Maintenance and Change for its Policy o f  Intervention’ (2012) 25 (1) 
The Pacific Review 153, 156-157. See also, ICISS Report (n 1359), 53.
1726 M O’Connell, “Responsibility to Peace: A Critique o f  RtoP” in Cunliffe, Critical Perspectives on the 
Responsibility to Protect (n 1412). This distinction is also recognised by Levine and Egerton and Knight. See 
respectively Levine, ‘Some Concerns about the Responsibility Not to Veto’ (n 1492), 325 and Wheeler and 
Dunne, “Operationalising Protective Intervention: Alternative Models o f Authorisation” (n 1549) 95-96.
1727 O’Connell, ibid, 75-77.
1728 As per UN Charter (n 1643), art 51.
1729 As per UN Charter, ibid, art 42.
1730 On the difference between a recommendation and a binding provision see particularly O’Connell (n 1726), 
75-77. On the difficulty in attaining the consensus o f  the UNGA and the way in which this could undermine its 
effectiveness as an outlet through which to bypass the failure o f the Security Council to act, see especially 
Wheeler, ‘Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures’ (n 1721), 12, 16 and 17 and A. 
Orford, ‘From Promise to Practice? The Legal Significance o f the Responsibility to Protect Concept’ (2011) 3 
Global Responsibility to Protect 400, 407-409.
1731 M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept o f  the Responsibility to Protect 
within the Process o f International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal o f Int’l L. 469, 504-505.
1732 See especially, UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 25; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Cameroon to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f  the 
Representative oiBenin  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement 
o f the Representative o f Lesotho to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Express Strong 
Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1722); 
Statement o f Egypt (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f  the Representative o f Azerbaijan to the UNGA in UN Press Release, 
‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (n 
1722) and Statement o f the Representative o f Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.98.
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Some commentators1733 have reviewed at length whether unilateral sanctions can be used 
in order to discharge secondary RtoP when the UNSC refuses to authorise collective 
sanctions. However, such measures have not been used under this pretext in practice and, 
therefore, appear to exist presently as measures which can be discharged concurrently with 
collective secondary RtoP measures. Similarly, consideration has been given to whether the 
Outcome Document leaves open the possibility of using unauthorised armed force.1734 
However, as noted above, the interpretation given to the Outcome Document in practice to 
date is that UNSC authority is required.1735 Notwithstanding this, there remains a risk that the 
international community may need to resort to illegal armed force in order to protect 
populations when the UNSC fails to act, a risk heightened each time Russia and China refuse 
to authorise a collective response to Syria. Accordingly, secondary RtoP has not entirely 
reconciled the policy dilemma of humanitarian intervention, specifically the argument that 
armed force can be “illegal but legitimate” in certain cases.1736
Indeed, the fact that Russia and China have used the veto in a case involving clear RtoP- 
type harm to a population tends to also undermine the other proposal made in the literature
1733 See especially, Payandeh (n 1731), 508-513 and V Bilkova, “The Responsibility to Protect: Unilateral Non- 
Forcible Measures and International Law” in A Nollkaemper and J Hoffmann (eds), The Responsibility to 
Protect: From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012) 291-305.
1734 Bellamy has observed that the Outcome Document’s failure to prohibit unauthorised action may provide ‘a 
window for lawyers to defend unauthorised intervention by reference to the outcome document’. Bellamy, 
‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1672), 166. See further, Stahn (n 1672), 109 and Payandeh, ibid, 507- 
508. On the range o f  considerations which could undermine the prospect o f States resorting to the use o f  
unilateral and/or unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes, see especially C Badescu, 
Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Security and Human Rights (Routledge, Abingdon 
2011) 158-159; A Bellamy, Global Politics and the Responsibility to Protect: From Words to Deeds (Routledge, 
Abingdon 2011) 155; C Lu, ‘Humanitarian Intervention: Moral Ambition and Political Constraints’ (2007) 62 
Int’l J. 942, 947-949 and J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should 
Intervene? (OUP, Oxford 2010) 8-9.
1735 This has been affirmed by the overwhelming majority o f States and most commentators. See e.g. Statement of 
Australia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 2005); Statement o f Canada to the UNGA, 
‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’, (21 June 2005); Statement o f Chile to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting of 
the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statement o f China to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (21 June
2005); Statement o f Colombia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005); Statement of 
Dominica (on behalf o f  CARICOM) to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005);
Statement o f the European Union to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statement 
of France to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statement o f Israel to the UNGA, 
‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005); Statement o f  New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level 
Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statement o f  Tanzania to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (30 June 2005) and Statement o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ 
(22 June 2005). All statements are available at
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c427?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012 and 
The majority o f commentators consider that the Outcome Document does predicate the use o f armed force upon 
Security Council authority, see for instance G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes 
Once andfor All (Brookings, Washington D.C. 2008) 223-41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of  
Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 1626), 456; J Welsh and M Banda, “International Law and the 
Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ Responsibilities” in A Bellamy, S E Davies and L 
Glanville (eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 225; Breau 
(n 1672), 440 and 464; Nasu (n 1672), 219; E McClean, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Role o f  International 
Human Rights Law’ (2008) 13 (1) Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 123, 129; J McCarthur, ‘A 
Responsibility to Rethink? Challenging Paradigms in Human Security’ (2008) 63 Int’l J. 422,431-33 and N 
Wheeler and F Egerton, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: ‘Precious Commitment’ or a Promise Unfulfilled?’
(2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 114, 128-29.
1736 This dilemma is reviewed in further depth in the next chapter.
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with regard to overcoming UNSC inaction, namely for the P5 to agree to not wield the veto 
in RtoP cases.1737 Similarly, the use of the veto in Syria illustrates that Blatter and William’s 
assertion that the ‘responsibility not to veto’1738 is making ‘headway within P5 States’1739 
does not extend presently to Russia and China. The proposal was rejected at the World 
Summit,1740 with members of the P5 (e.g. China,1741 Russia1742 and the US1743) suggesting that 
urging them to refrain from using the veto in RtoP cases corresponded to an expectation that 
the UNSC should authorise the use of armed force to protect populations and, therefore, that 
it was necessary to reinforce the UNSC’s Chapter VII discretion over whether or not to 
authorise the application of enforcement measures.1744 As a result o f this viewpoint, the final 
text qualified the use of non-peaceful responsive measures to a ‘case-by-case basis’.1745 The 
present author would argue that the inclusion of this phrase in the Outcome Document 
indirectly provides for the use of this discretion, including via the use of the veto, to be 
entirely consistent with the international community’s responsibility to protect. Accordingly, 
the recommendation to abolish the veto seems to the present author to, as yet, be merely 
another recommendation ‘which has no teeth’.1746
3.2.3 Secondary RtoP's Non-Peaceful Discharge: The Question of Regime Change
Is regime change an acceptable outcome of secondary RtoP’s discharge? As the ICISS 
directly addressed issues pertaining to what constitutes a “right intention” for the use of
1737 See e.g. Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 1626), 
453 and Thakur, ‘Behind the Headlines’ (n 1672), 12; A Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Permanent 
Five: The Obligation to Give Reasons for a Veto” in Nollkaemper and Hoffmann (n 1733), 199-211 and A Blatter 
and P D Williams, ‘The Responsibility Not to Veto’ (2011) 3 (3) GRtoP 301. The legal merits and demerits o f  
this proposal and the way in which it has been approached among States are considered at length in the next 
chapter.
1738 A Blatter and P D Williams, ibid, 301.
1739 Blatter and Williams, ibid, 318.
1740 Earlier drafts o f the OD invited the UNSC to ‘refrain from using the veto’ in RtoP cases but the final text 
omitted this provision. See e.g. UNGA, ‘Revised draft outcome document o f the High-level Plenary Meeting of 
the General Assembly o f September 2005 submitted by the President o f the General Assembly’ (5 August 2005) 
UN Doc A/59/HLPM/CRP. 1 /Rev.2.
1741 Statement o f China to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005) 
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c427?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012.
1742 Statement o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), ibid.
1743 The United States stated ‘that a determination as to what particular measures to adopt in specific cases cannot 
be predetermined in the abstract but should remain a decision within the purview o f  the Security Council' . 
Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘US Proposals for UN Reform’ (22 
June 2005) <http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 14 May
2012 .
1744 The United States stated ‘that a determination as to what particular measures to adopt in specific cases cannot 
be predetermined in the abstract but should remain a decision within the purview o f  the Security Council''. 
Statement o f the Acting Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ibid.
1745 Outcome Document (n 1336), para 139.
1746 This phrase is borrowed from Arbour who uses it to highlight the way in which calling for a complete 
distinction between regime change and the discharge o f secondary RtoP can, in cases like Syria, be politically 
unrealistic. Arbour, ‘For Justice and Civilians’ (n 1489).
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armed force1747 and the ways in which States subject to the use of armed force should be 
rebuilt,1748 the ICISS were almost compelled to adopt a position on the acceptability of 
regime change as a reason for, or outcome of, secondary RtoP’s non-peaceful discharge. 
Whilst the ICISS recognised that a government’s failure to protect its population can 
contribute to decision making on the use armed force for human protection purposes, the 
ICISS cautioned that the objective of using armed force is ‘not to change constitutional 
arrangements or undermine sovereignty, but to protect them’.1749
In contrast, the Outcome Document omits reference to issues pertaining to the rebuilding 
of States following the use of armed force and the criteria which a decision to use armed 
force should satisfy. Arguably, this enabled the Outcome Document drafters to simply leave 
the question of whether regime change is an acceptable outcome of secondary RtoP’s 
discharge as an issue to be developed in subsequent State practice. Of course, this was a 
political necessity. If regime change had been impliedly excluded, those States who consider 
that governments which harm their own population can be overthrown would have been 
unlikely to accept the Outcome Document. If regime change had been expressly permitted, 
the Outcome Document may not have been accepted by States which were concerned that 
secondary RtoP and humanitarian intervention are ‘the same coin with a different face’.1750
On the one hand, leaving the matter open to development in State practice could help 
secondary RtoP more effectively protect populations. Armed force carried out on the pretext 
of humanitarian intervention, such as the Kosovo intervention,1751 suggests that regime 
change will often be an unavoidable result of the use of force for human protection purposes. 
Indeed, the use of armed force in Libya did lead to the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime, 
preventing the regime from harming the Libyan population again.
On the other hand, the Libya case study illustrates that simply leaving this matter open to 
subsequent development can cause States who are sensitive to external regime change (e.g. 
Russia1752) to question or retract their acceptance of the RtoP framework at the World
1747 ICISS Report (n 1359), 35-36.
1748 ibid, 39-47.
1749 ICISS Report, ibid, 25. See further at 43, explaining that ‘the responsibility to protect is fundamentally a 
principle designed to respond to threats to human life, and not a tool for achieving political goals such as greater 
political autonomy, self-determination, or independence for particular groups within the country (though these 
underlying issues may well be related to the humanitarian concerns that prompted the military intervention). The 
intervention itself should not become the basis for further separatist claims’, and, further, that the objective o f the 
use o f force is ‘not to change constitutional arrangements or undermine sovereignty, but to protect them’.
1750 Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97.
1751 On this point, see H Hannum, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: Paradigm or Pastiche?’ (2009) 60 (2) NILQ 
135, 143.
1752 See Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 
June 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6790. Note also that Russia explained its first veto o f proposed Security Council action 
in relation to the crisis in Syria in the following manner: ‘Given the basis o f statements by some Western 
politicians on President A l-Assad’s loss o f  legitimacy, such an approach could trigger a full-fledged conflict in 
Syria and destabilization in the region as a whole’, emphasis added. Statement o f the Russian Federation to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
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Summit. Notably, States such as South Africa,1753 Russia1754 and China1755 argued that regime 
change in Libya exceeded the scope of Resolution 1973. Accordingly, these States appeared 
to consider that discharging secondary RtoP through the use of armed force should not 
facilitate regime change, even when it is the existing regimes’ perpetration of RtoP crimes 
against its population that triggers the UNSC’s authorisation of armed force. Arguably, some 
third States’ declarations that the NTC are the ‘sole governmental authority’1756 of Libya 
underscored these States apprehensions over secondary RtoP’s capacity to legitimate regime 
change. These declarations raise, at least the possibility, that some States’ consider regime 
change to be an acceptable outcome of secondary RtoP’s discharge, especially when the 
population sustains harm from the existing government. Perhaps most significantly, the 
aforementioned declarations were made before armed force was used in Libya. This opens 
up the possibility that some States’ consider regime change to be acceptable when a 
government perpetrates RtoP crimes against its population even before armed force has been 
authorised by the UNSC, thereby generating concern over whether secondary RtoP could be 
used as a pretext for intervention for broader political goals like the overthrow of 
governments.
This has a bearing on present literature regarding the scope and substance of the 
relationship between secondary RtoP and regime change. In terms of the former, the 
declarations of some third States’ in Libya raises the possibility that limiting secondary 
RtoP’s connection to regime change to cases in which it is discharged through armed force 
may conceptualise the relationship too narrowly.1757 In terms of the substance of the 
relationship, commentators adopt opposing viewpoints. Some commentators1758 challenge 
the view that Libya highlights the ever closer connection between secondary RtoP and 
regime change. Pattison,1759 Dunne1760 and Weiss1761 all concur that regime change did not 
motivate the use o f armed force in Libya, thereby setting aside the question of whether
1753 Statement o f the Representative of South Africa to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 July 2011) UN 
Doc S/PV.6595. See also, Statement of the Representative o f South Africa to the UNSC in UN Press Release, 
‘Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Briefing Security Council on Libya Situation, Says Negotiation 
Process must have Time to ‘Grow and Bear Fruit” (27 June 2011) UN Doc SC/10297.
1754 Statement o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6528.
1755 Statement o f China to the UNSC, ibid.
1756 ‘Britain Expels Gaddafi’s Embassy Staff (n 1487).
1757 For example, Hannum argues that the 2008 recognition o f Kosovo’s statehood: ‘[CJonfirms the worst fears 
o f those who see theoretically “humanitarian intervention” as a first step to overthrowing governments and 
breaking up the territorial integrity and independence that many States won only a few decades ago’. Hannum (n 
1751), 143. See further, J Pattison, ‘The Ethics o f  Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’ (2011) 25 (3) Ethics & Int. 
Affairs 271, 272-273.
1758 See e.g. Pattison, ibid; T G Weiss, ‘RtoP Alive and Well After Libya’ (2011) 25 (3) Ethics & Int. Affairs 287, 
291 and T Dunne, ‘RtoP, Libya and the Myth o f Regime Change’ (Lowy Institute fo r  International Policy: The 
Interpreter, 5 September 2012) <http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/09/05/RtoP-Libya-and-the-myth-of- 
regime-change.aspx> accessed 4 October 2012.
1759 Pattison, ‘The Ethics o f Humanitarian Intervention in Libya’, ibid, 288-289.
1760 Dunne, ‘RtoP, Libya and the Myth o f Regime Change’ (n 1758).
1761 T G Weiss, ‘RtoP Alive and Well After Libya’ (n 1758), 291.
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regime change motivated, or was facilitated by, third States provision of assistance to the 
rebels. Bellamy and Williams represent the middle ground of present debate.1762 They 
recognise that regime change can be a necessary outcome when the government perpetrates 
RtoP crimes inside the State but, nevertheless, encourage consideration of whether it is 
possible to distinguish secondary RtoP from regime change and still ensure populations’ 
protection.1763 A primary recommendation is for the use of armed force to always have 
UNSC authority.1764 To Bellamy and Williams, UNSC authorisation ensures that potential 
interveners can convince the P5 that regime change is not the primary motivation of the use 
of armed force.1765 The present author considers that this proposal is unlikely to regulate the 
issue effectively. The most convincingly argued proposal for protecting populations through 
the use of armed force is highly unlikely to lead Russia and China to support the UNSC in 
authorising the use of armed force in Syria. Indeed, Syria highlights that, even in cases 
where populations are clearly sustaining RtoP-type harm, the broader political interests 
which certain States have in ensuring that intervention does not occur in a particular State 
will be prioritised over the necessity of a timely and decisive response. In such cases, the 
present author doubts that a strong argument about using force to protect a population would 
succeed in convincing all members of the P5 to set aside their own political interests. In light 
of this, the present author considers that the most compelling view in present literature is that 
adopted by Luck1766 and Arbour.1767 They acknowledge that regime change can be 
absolutely necessary in cases where the government has perpetrated RtoP crimes against its 
population but, significantly, do not similarly encourage consideration to be given to 
curtailing the relationship to cases where armed force is used and authorised by the 
UNSC.1768
At present, policymakers have left to one side whether regime change can be a legitimate 
outcome of the use of armed force or, indeed, secondary RtoP’s discharge more generally. 
Whilst it would be impossible for policymakers to settle a matter as politically charged as 
this all at once, Libya highlights that leaving the issue unsettled can reinforce reservations 
about the potential impact of secondary RtoP on fundamental principles like non-interference 
in internal affairs and neutrality in civil wars. Moreover, the ambiguity which presently
1762 See generally, Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Regime Change’ (n 1489); 
Bellamy and Williams, ‘Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect’ (n 1468) and Bellamy, ‘Stopping 
Genocide and Mass Atrocities’ (n 1489).
1763 Bellamy, ‘Stopping Genocide and Mass Atrocities’, ibid. Bellamy’s proposals on how to regulate the 
relationship between secondary RtoP and regime change are examined in more detail in chapter seven.
1764 ibid.
1765 ibid.
1766 Statement o f Edward Luck in interview with Bernard Gwertzman on behalf o f the Council on Foreign 
Relations (1 September 2011) cited in Bellamy, ibid.
1767 Statement o f  Edward Luck, ibid and Arbour, ‘For Justice and Civilians, Don’t Rule Out Regime Change’ (n 
1489).
1768 Statement o f  Edward Luck, ibid and Arbour, ibid.
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surrounds the issue can enable States to support the overthrow of regimes failing to fulfil 
primary RtoP and facilitate other States to retract their acceptance of the RtoP framework. 
Thus, whilst policymakers may want to avoid addressing this question in order to not 
jeopardise secondary RtoP’s maintenance in practice, they must realise that a failure to 
confront the matter poses just as much of a threat to secondary RtoP’s future.
Conclusion
By drawing upon approaches in practice to date, the chapter outlined the scope of secondary 
RtoP’s early warning, assistance and responsive components. Noting the wide range of 
measures which may be used to discharge secondary RtoP and their competing nature, the 
chapter argued that secondary RtoP’s scope can mean different things in different cases. 
Whereas in Libya its scope did involve armed force, in the Cote d’Ivoire its scope took hold 
as international assistance. Secondary RtoP’s scope in practice is then, in many ways, best 
described as context-dependent. Perhaps most significantly, as the discharge of secondary 
RtoP is not simply a question of whether or not to use force, the scope of the responsibility is 
clearly not synonymous with humanitarian intervention.1769
A recurrent theme throughout the chapter was secondary RtoP’s relationship with existing 
obligations/practice. Essentially, the chapter suggests that there are four dimensions to this 
relationship. First, secondary RtoP does replicate existing obligations/practice but there is 
usually a persuasive rationale for doing so. A primary example is the generally State-centric 
and consent-based approach which is taken to the provision of international assistance. This 
echoes the approach to assistance taken in a minority protection context but, in so doing, 
helps reconcile secondary RtoP’s assistance component with the principle of friendly 
relations between States,1770 at least when it is the State’s consent that is required. In 
addition, practice to date suggests that there is a general consensus that the use of armed 
force under secondary RtoP requires UNSC authority. Whilst this may mean that the legal 
regime on the use of armed force will remain in the status quo, we cannot underestimate the 
extent to which this helps to make RtoP more politically palatable, especially to States which 
rejected the wider concept of humanitarian intervention.
Second, existing obligations/practice may be approached more restrictively under
1769 Bellamy takes a similar view, contending that a fundamental difference between secondary RtoP and 
humanitarian intervention is that the former does not provide merely a choice ‘between sending in the marines 
and standing aside in the face o f humanitarian emergencies’. Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities 
(n 1446), 98. In contrast, Hannum argues that the interplay between secondary RtoP and the existing regime on 
the use o f armed force (i.e the need for Security Council authority) means that para 139 o f  the Outcome 
Document ‘does little more than reaffirm relevant provisions o f  the UN Charter’. Hannum (n 1751), 138.
1770 OSCE HCNM, Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations (n 1424), 7.
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secondary RtoP. The main example of this is the fact that the UNSC have responded to RtoP 
cases in a graduated manner to date, despite the fact that it can implement Chapter VII 
enforcement measures non-incrementally. Whilst adopting a graduated approach to its 
discharge can help to distance secondary RtoP from the idea that armed force will typically 
be a measure of first resort, it is necessary to ensure that this does not become exhaustive, 
thereby restraining armed force from being used immediately if the protection of a 
population so demands.
Third, elements of secondary RtoP have the capacity to represent value added. For 
example, secondary RtoP can add value to existing minority protection mechanisms through 
its specificity. One illustration is secondary RtoP’s early warning and assessment 
component. Secondary RtoP’s focus on four specific crimes can help the international 
community, through the Joint Office on early warning and assessment, to concentrate on 
those factors which could indicate the perpetration of R2P crimes, irrespective of any nexus 
to conflict and whether the group at issue is a “national minority” or not. This usefully 
supplements the early warning systems used in a minority protection context at present, not 
least that of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.
The fourth dimension to the relationship is that it is yet evolving. Essentially, it seems that 
as secondary RtoP develops the more complex its relationship with existing obligations 
becomes and, to the present author, these complexities require deeper reflection by 
policymakers in future practice. To this effect, practice to date raises significant questions 
regarding whether it is possible for secondary RtoP’s assistance component to always be 
discharged in full conformity with the principle of neutrality in civil wars, not least when the 
perpetration of RtoP crimes by the existing government triggers an armed insurrection. 
Furthermore, the approaches taken to the recipients of assistance in the case studies of the 
Cote d’Ivoire, Libya and Syria open up the possibility that the traditional approach of State 
consent to external assistance may not be routinely followed in certain RtoP contexts. 
Secondary RtoP’s interaction with regime change is undoubtedly a thorny issue but, 
nevertheless, an issue which must be directly considered in future practice. In addition, to 
consideration of whether regime change can be anything but an inevitable consequence of 
secondary RtoP’s discharge and, in what contexts this is a permissible outcome, there is a 
need to examine whether those who are subsequently recognised as the legitimate national 
authorities of the State will actually be able and willing to discharge their primary RtoP duty, 
including toward minorities. Consideration should include questions, such as whether 
leaving the responsibility for ensuring populations’ protection in ‘post-trauma’1771 contexts to 
States’ national authorities replaces the “responsibility to rebuild” effectively. Is it possible
1771 UNSG 2009 Report, Implementing RtoP (n 1342), 21.
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that, at least in some cases, the new national authorities may be “unable or unwilling” to do 
more than simply turn a blind-eye to these occurrences?
Secondary RtoP’s multifaceted relationship with existing obligations/practice raises 
significant questions with respect to the legal status of RtoP. Is there any support for 
secondary RtoP creating new legal provisions for the use of armed force? Can the UNSC’s 
failure to discharge secondary RtoP, including through vetoing proposed protective action, 
entail legal responsibility? Is secondary RtoP best characterised as a right, duty or 
responsibility to protect? These and other significant legal questions form the basis of the 
following chapter.
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LEGAL STATUS AND CHARACTER OF PRIMARY AND 
SECONDARY RtoP 
ANOTHER CASE OF LEGITIMACY vs. LEGALITY? 
Introduction
At the 2005 World Summit the Outcome Document1772 was adopted by consensus, without a 
vote.1773 No State1774 indicated that they considered the Outcome Document to formulate 
primary or secondary RtoP as a legally binding obligation. Nonetheless, several States1775 
suggested that both responsibilities subsume a variety of States obligations under existing 
treaty and customary international law. This chapter therefore examines whether there is 
support for reinterpreting existing treaty obligations or customary international law in light 
of subsequent practice1776 regarding primary and secondary RtoP and, if so, which. It also 
explores whether there is any evidence in subsequent practice to suggest that primary and
1772 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, paras 138-140. (Outcome Document).
1773 It is not necessary to discuss the complex and lengthy negotiations on the drafting o f the substantive aspects 
o f the Outcome Document as these have been outlined throughout the preceding chapters and, furthermore, at 
length in the literature. See particularly, A Bellamy, The Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass 
Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 83-97; E Strauss, The Emperor's New Clothes? The United Nations 
and the Implementation o f  the Responsibility to Protect (Nomos, Baden Baden 2009) 11-18; E C Luck, 
“Sovereignty, Choice and the Responsibility to Protect” and E Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the 
Bush - On the Assumed Legal Nature o f the Responsibility to Protect” in A Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville 
(eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff Leiden 2011) 20-24 (Luck) and 27- 
34 (Strauss).
1774 All State views given at the World Summit are detailed in Annex I (e).
1775 See especially: Statements o f the Representatives o f the Marshall Islands and Sweden to the UNGA, ‘High- 
Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (19 April 2005) and Statement o f the Representative o f  Guatemala to the UNGA, 
‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (20 April 2005). Statements delivered in April 2005 are available at 
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c304?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012 (April 
2005 State Views). Statements o f the Representatives o f Peru, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Pakistan, France,
Algeria, New Zealand and South Africa to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, Andorra to the UNGA, 
‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 June 2005); Statements o f the Representatives o f Sri Lanka, Tanzania 
and Viet Nam to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (30 June 2005) and Statement o f the 
Representative o f Spain to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 July 2005). Statements delivered 
in June-July 2005 are available at
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c3957theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012 (June- 
July 2005 State Views). Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the 
Plenary’ (1 August 2005) and Statement o f the Representative o f Indonesia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting 
of the Plenary’ (August 2005). Statements delivered in August 2005 are available at 
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c427?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012 
(August 2005 State Views). August statements are also summarised in World Federalist Movement, ‘State-by- 
State Positions on the Responsibility to Protect’ (11 August 2005)
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/civil-society?view=fjrelated&id=2411> 
accessed 7 August 2012 (WFM Report).
1776 Article 31 (3) o f the Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties 1969 permits agreements between State 
parties to a treaty to ‘be taken into account’ when interpreting the treaty provision. On the use o f subsequent State 
practice as interpretive aides generally. See Vienna Convention on the Law o f Treaties 1969 (adopted 23 May 
1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 1155 UNTS 331 art 31 (3) and V Lowe, International Law (OUP, 
Oxford 2007) 92.
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secondary RtoP, or elements thereof, have become new customary international law,1777 It 
further considers whether the Outcome Document could be an instrument of soft law.xm
The chapter draws extensively upon trends in practice regarding the legal status and 
character of primary and secondary RtoP. This includes over four hundred State views1779 on 
RtoP surveyed by this writer, delivered during the (i) Outcome Document’s drafting and 
adoption;1780 (ii) 2005-2011 UN Security Council [UNSC] meetings regarding the Protection 
of Civilians in Armed Conflict;1781 (iii) 2006-2011 opening sessions of the UN General 
Assembly [UNGA];1782 and (iv) 2009-2011 annual UNGA thematic debates on RtoP.1783 The 
chapter also utilises this writer’s comprehensive review of State positions regarding primary 
and secondary RtoP in national,1784 regional1785 and global1786 practice since 2005.
1777 In wider international legal discourse there is debate over the process through which customary international 
law is created. The merits o f this debate fall beyond the scope o f  this chapter. Here, it is sufficient to note that this 
chapter will examine the formation o f customary international law in accordance with the traditional school o f  
thought on the subject, examining the State practice that exists and whether or not this practice has been 
accompanied by evidence o f opinio juris. This writer would argue that adopting this approach can help to ensure 
that the analysis o f RtoP’s status as a rule o f customary international law is (i) legally accurate (i.e. not conflating 
the formation o f customary international law and General Principles o f  international law); and (ii) legitimate (i.e. 
taking into account State views as a whole, not merely a selection of those who provide opinio juris). For a good 
overview o f this debate and its merits and demerits, see particularly A Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modem 
Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (2001) 95 AJIL 757. On the formation o f new 
customary international law, see generally H Thirlway, “The Sources o f International Law” in M Evans (ed), 
International Law  (2nd edn OUP, Oxford 2006) 124; Lowe, International Law, ibid, 47-55; R Higgins, ‘The 
United Nations and Lawmaking: The Political Organs’ (1970) 64 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 37 and M Akehurst 
and P Malanczuk (eds), Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn Routledge, London 1997) 
44. For judicial pronouncement on the requirements for the formation o f new customary international law, see 
particularly Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States o f  
America), Merits, Judgment, ICJReports 1986 atl4, para 186; North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1969 at 3, para 77 and, further, at 43.
17 On this see generally, C Chinkin, ‘The Challenge o f Soft Law: Development and Change in International 
Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 850; A Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship o f Treaties and Soft Law’ (1999)  48 
(4) ICLQ 901 and A Boyle, “Soft Law in International Law Making” in Evans, International Law, ibid,141-58. In 
the specific context o f RtoP see e.g. G Shaffer and M Pollack, ‘Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security’ 
(2011) 52 Boston College Law Review 1147; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 
33; J Welsh and M Banda, “International Law and the Responsibility to Protect: Clarifying or Expanding States’ 
Responsibilities” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 1773) 135-37; C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political 
Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101 (1) AJIL 99,118; N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: A 
Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 22 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 355, 355.
1779 The State views drawn upon in this chapter are detailed in Annex I (a)-(i).
1780 State views given at these debates are detailed in Annex I (a)-(e).
1781 State views given at these debates are detailed in Annex I (i).
1782 State views given at these debates are detailed in Annex I (h).
1783 State views given at these debates are detailed in Annex I (g) (i)-(iii).
1784 This includes Federal Ministry o f Defence, ‘White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future o f  
the Bundeswehr’ (2006), 44 (Federal Ministry o f Defence, ‘White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the 
Future o f the Bundeswehr’); UK Cabinet Office, ‘The National Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom:
Security in an Interdependent World’ (March 2008), 48 (Cabinet Office, ‘The National Security Strategy o f  the 
United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World’); Presidence de la Republique, ‘The French White Paper 
on Defence and National Security’ (June 2008), 9 (Presidence de la Republique, ‘1116 French White Paper on 
Defence and National Security’); Norwegian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, ‘Norway’s Humanitarian Policy’ 
(Report No.40 to the Storting, 2008-2009), 28 (Norwegian Ministiy o f Foreign Affairs, ‘Norway’s Humanitarian 
Policy’) and Norwegian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, ‘Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian Development 
Policy Adapting to Change’ (Report No. 13 to the Storting, 2008-2009), 68 (Norwegian Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs, ‘Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian Development Policy Adapting to Change’). All policies are 
available at <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archi ve/go vemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 10 October 2011.
1785 This includes European Parliament Res, ‘On the Southern Neighbourhood and Libya in particular’ (10 March 
2011) EP Doc P7_TA(2011)0095; European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Situation in Zimbabwe’ (18 December
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Parts one and two consider primary and secondary RtoP’s legal status respectively. It is 
argued that examination of State views and practice suggests three phases of development. In 
terms of primary RtoP, the three phases are (i) creation (2005-2006); (ii) refinement (2007- 
2008); and (iii) implementation (2009-2012). In relation to secondary RtoP, the position is 
somewhat different. Although there is increasing State practice to suggest a move toward 
implementation, elements of State views and practice suggest that refinement continues. The 
three phases used in this case are therefore (i) creation (2005-2006); (ii) refinement (2007- 
2008); and (iii) continued refinement and moves toward implementation (2009-2012). Each 
phase outlines the trends which have emerged in State views and practice which bear 
significance on primary and secondary RtoP’s legal status. Four questions are addressed. 
First, do primary and/or secondary RtoP represent new legal obligations? Is the State practice 
widespread and consistent and accompanied by evidence of opinio juris so as to argue that 
both responsibilities have become new customary international law? Second, do primary 
and/or secondary RtoP subsume obligations under existing treaty and customary 
international law? Is the legal significance of both responsibilities therefore limited to the 
fact that they subsume existing legal obligations and, therefore, entail legally binding 
elements? Third, does the legal significance of primary and/or secondary RtoP reside in then- 
capacity to generate new interpretations of existing treaty obligations and/or rules of 
customary international law that they subsume? Is there, for example, evidence to support 
reinterpreting existing treaty obligations, such as those under the UN Charter, in light of the 
subsequent State practice regarding primary and secondary RtoP? Fourth, is the Outcome 
Document best explained as an instrument of soft law which we should interpret existing 
obligations in accordance with? If so, is there scope to suggest that primary and/or secondary
2008) EP Doc P6_TA(2008)0640; European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Situation in Darfur’ (28 September 
2006) EP Doc P6_TA(2006)0387; European Parliament Resolution, ‘Situation in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen in 
the Context o f the Situation in the Arab World and North Africa’ (7 July 2011) EP Doc P7_TA(2011)0333; 
European Parliament Resolution, ‘Expulsion o f NGO’s from Darfur’ (12 March 2009) EP Doc. 
P6_TA(2009)0145; European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (22 May 2008) EP Doc. 
P6_TA(2008)0231 (European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’) and ECOWAS, ‘Final 
Communique o f the Extraordinary Session o f the Authority o f Heads o f State and Government on the Cote 
d’Ivoire’ (24 December 2010) No. 192/2010.
1786 This includes UNGA Res 63/308 (14 September 2009) UN Doc A/RES/63/308; UNSC Res 1674 (28 April
2006) UN Doc S/RES/1674 (UNSC Res 1674); UNSC Res 1894 (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/RES/1894; UN, 
‘Outcome Document o f the Durban Review Conference’ (24 April 2009)
<http://www.un.org/durbanreview2009/> accessed 24 November 2011; UNSC Res 1755 (20 April 2007) UN Doc 
S/RES/1755; UNSC Res 1706 (31 August 2006) S/RES/1706 (2006) (UNSC Res 1706); UNSC Res 1769 (31 
July 2007) UN Doc S/RES/1769; UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970 (UNSC Res 1970); 
UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973 (UNSC Res 1973); UNHRC Res S-15/1, ‘The Situation 
of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (25 February 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/S-15/1, para 2 (UNHRC 
Res S-15/1); UNHRC Res S-16/1, ‘The Current Human Rights Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic in the 
Context o f Recent Events’ (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1 (UNHRC Res S-16/1); UN Press 
Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 August 2011) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=l 1324&LangID=E> accessed 14 
November 2011 (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Syrian Arab 
Republic’); UNHRC, ‘Report o f  the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (9 March
2007) UN Doc A/HRC/4/80 (UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in 
Darfur’).
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RtoP have become political or moral obligations? What are the implications of this? Could it 
strengthen claims that action which is not pursuant to international law is at least morally 
and/or politically legitimate?
Part three utilises the findings made in the preceding sections to examine what character. 
primary and secondary RtoP have, or could have. Have primary and secondary RtoP been 
formulated as duties, rights, permissions and/or responsibilities to protect? If formulated as 
“responsibilities”, should we understand the “responsibility” in accordance with its 
traditional public international law meaning as responsibility for an internationally wrongful 
act? Alternatively, is there scope to suggest that “responsibility” may be used in a more 
novel sense, such as in a manner akin to the notion of “responsibility” emerging in a business 
and human rights context?1787
1 The Legal Status of Primary RtoP
1.1 The Creation Phase (2005)
The period between April and December 2005 largely focused upon creating primary RtoP 
as a responsibility which States would commit to ‘act in accordance with’.1788 State views 
during the drafting of the Outcome Document,1789 and at its adoption,1790 suggest that 
developing consensus about primary RtoP was relatively uncontroversial. State views point 
to one explanation for this. Primary RtoP was considered to subsume, not expand, the 
existing legal duties that States owed to their populations. To this effect, several States 
expressly1791 or impliedly1792 explained that primary RtoP subsumes States existing legal
1787 UNHRC, ‘Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/8/5. (UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights).
1788 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
1789 State views are detailed in Annex I (a).
1790 State views are detailed in Annex I (b).
1791 Peru is a good example. It argued that States which ‘violate the Geneva Convention, the Convention against 
Genocide and the international humanitarian law also violate the international law and can be intervened by the 
United Nations’. This suggests that Peru considered primary RtoP to subsume States duties under both treaty (e.g. 
Geneva Convention and Genocide Convention) and customary international law (e.g. the general reference to 
‘international humanitarian law’). Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNGA, June 2005 State Views 
(n 1780). See further, Statements o f  the Representatives o f  Canada, Chile, Croatia, Brazil and Pakistan to the 
UNGA, June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1792 Other States touched upon primary RtoP as that which subsumes States existing legal obligations by the
language which they used. For example, the United States commented that the idea that States owed a 
responsibility to protect its population was ‘a given’, whilst the Marshall Islands suggested that the primary 
responsibility to protect populations ‘will always remain a national’ one. Statements o f the Representatives o f the 
Marshall Islands, Sweden and Guatemala to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), April 
2005 State Views (n 1775); Statements o f the Representatives o f South Africa, New Zealand and Algeria to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statements o f the Representatives o f the United 
States, United Kingdom, Andorra and Korea to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 June 2005) 
and Statements o f the Representatives o f Sri Lanka, Tanzania and Viet Nam to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting 
o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Spain to the
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duties, particularly those under criminal, humanitarian and human rights law instruments. 
Indeed, the US1793 and Pakistan1794 proposed altering the draft language on primary RtoP to 
one clearly denoting that primary RtoP subsumes States existing legal duties. The US 
suggested that the draft be altered to simply ‘underscore’1795 that States owe their populations 
protective duties. Pakistan went further, arguing that it was ‘evident’1796 that States already 
owe their populations protective legal duties and that this should be emphasised. This writer 
considers that the US and Pakistan’s recommendations may be explained in one of two ways. 
The first possibility is that these States were clarifying that they did not intend for the 
Outcome Document’s primary RtoP provisions to create new customary international law. 
Second, these States may have been concerned that the draft language on primary RtoP could 
suggest a willingness by States to reinterpret existing treaty provisions, not least that States 
accept that a failure to fulfil their existing protective duties effectively can activate peaceful 
or non-peaceful responsive measures under secondary RtoP. In fact, the way in which 
primary RtoP could create this reinterpretation was alluded to by States like Brazil.1797 Brazil 
stressed that the interplay between a failure to fulfil primary RtoP and secondary RtoP’s 
activation helps to ensure that States implement their existing humanitarian law duties more 
effectively.1798
Similar trends regarding primary RtoP’s legal status arose in the wider State practice
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 July 2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the 
Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 August 2005), August 2005 State 
Views (n 1775) and Statement o f the Representative o f Indonesia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (August 2005), WFM Report (n 1775).
1793 Letter o f the US Ambassador, John Bolton, to the President o f  the UNGA (30 August 2005) 
<http://www.reformtheun.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid= 15&limit= 15&limitstart=0 
&order=date&dir=ASC&category=9&Itemid=240> accessed 14 May 2012 (Letter o f the US Ambassador, John 
Bolton). [‘With respect to the first sentence o f paragraph 118, we agree that the host state has a responsibility to 
protect its populations from such atrocities, and we agree in a more general and moral sense that the international 
community has a responsibility to act when the host state allows such atrocities. But the responsibility o f  the 
other countries in the international community is not o f  the same character as the responsibility o f the host, and 
we thus want to avoid formulations that suggest that the other countries are inheriting the same responsibility that 
the host state has. The text should reflect this view’. It proposed altering the language to from noting that primary 
RtoP lay ‘first and foremost with each individual State’ to ‘underscore’ that ‘each State is responsible’ for 
protecting its populations.] Chapter two discussed the broader significance o f  this statement in terms o f  the 
primary RtoP bearer.
Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 
2005). WFM Report (n 1775).
1795 Letter o f the US Ambassador, John Bolton (n 1793), 3.
1796 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 
2005). WFM Report (n 1775).
1797 Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (22 June 2005), 
June 2005 State Views (n 1775). Guatemala is a further illustration. It focused upon primary RtoP’s impact upon 
the existing international human rights law obligations States owe to their populations. It argued that primary 
RtoP was a fundamental responsibility o f States which strengthened their implementation o f international human 
rights law obligations. Although Guatemala did not expressly elaborate on why it considered primary RtoP to 
strengthen the implementation o f these existing obligations, we could suggest that it was alluding to the interplay 
between primary and secondary RtoP as a new, strengthening interpretation o f States accountability for a failure 
to fulfil these obligations.Statement o f the Representative o f  Guatemala to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(16 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7
1798 Statement o f the Representative o f Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 June 2005), 
June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
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which occurred during this phase. In the UNSC, States and other relevant actors1799 affirmed 
that primary RtoP subsumes States legal duties under existing treaty and customary 
international law. For example, Luxembourg, speaking on behalf of the European Union, 
noted that primary RtoP ‘reaffirms’1800 States existing humanitarian and human rights law 
obligations. This statement should be given particular weight because it was made on behalf 
of a prominent regional organisation and should therefore be taken to reflect the position of 
its Member States. This trend in the views of States and other relevant actors suggests that 
primary RtoP was recognised to entail legally binding elements but that, over this phase, 
there was no support for primary RtoP having become new customary international law.
States1801 also elaborated on the specific humanitarian and criminal law duties which 
primary RtoP subsumes. These included States duties under the Geneva Conventions to 
permit access to humanitarian agencies and to protect civilians.1802 Norway1803 and Panama1804 
focused upon primary RtoP’s interplay with international criminal law. Norway1805 
highlighted that RtoP crimes are in practice often committed not only by non-State actors but 
by national authorities who, Norway stressed, ‘have [the] primary responsibility to 
protect’.1806 Recognition of primary RtoP subsuming existing human rights, criminal and 
humanitarian law duties alludes to primary RtoP’s capacity to create new interpretations of 
States existing treaty duties. Given the interplay between a failure to fulfil primary RtoP and 
secondary RtoP’s activation, this trend in State views suggests growing consensus that such 
crimes incur not only individual criminal accountability (e.g. under the Rome Statute) but, 
rather, activate peaceful or non-peaceful international responses under secondary RtoP. 
Accordingly, there appears to have been growing recognition during this phase that (i) 
primary RtoP is an obligation of States; and (ii) secondary RtoP represents a new way of 
promoting and ensuring States compliance with the existing legal duties that primary RtoP 
subsumes.
1799 See e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f  Peru, Luxembourg (on behalf o f  the European Union), Norway 
and Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209.
1800 Statement o f the Representative o f Luxembourg (on behalf o f  the European Union) to the UNSC, ibid.
1801 See particularly the Statements o f the Representatives o f Peru, Norway and Panama to the UNSC, ibid and 
Statement o f the Representative o f Congo to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5476.
1802 Peru specified that primary RtoP subsumes the obligation to permit access to humanitarian agencies and to 
protect civilians, particularly the most vulnerable such as women, children, refugees and IDP’s. Congo 
supplemented this by stating that national authorities are obligated to ‘guarantee access for humanitarian 
personnel to populations in need’. Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 and Statement o f  the Representative o f Congo to the UNSC, ibid.
1803 Statement o f the Representative o f Norway to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5209.
1804 Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, ibid.
1805 Statement o f the Representative o f Norway to the UNSC, ibid.
1806 Statement o f the Representative o f Norway to the UNSC, ibid. Panama also noted that primary RtoP 
subsumed existing international criminal law obligations, specifically those identifying sexual crimes as crime 
against humanity. It argued that ‘sexual violence against women as a tool o f war or simple political pressure’ 
could constitute a manifest failure to fulfil primary RtoP and thereby activate secondary RtoP. Statement o f  the 
Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319
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1.2 The Refinement Phase (2006 - 2008)
During this phase, there was limited discussion among States regarding their implementation 
of primary RtoP at national level to protect their own populations. However, Timor-Leste1807 
later explained that it had implemented primary RtoP during this period. At the 2009 UNGA 
thematic debate on RtoP, Timor-Leste1808 explicitly referred to its national authorities’ 
implementation of primary RtoP during its 2006 crises. Timor-Leste explained that primary 
RtoP was fulfiled by (i) recognising that the State could not effectively protect its population 
alone; and (ii) requesting neighbouring States to provide it with assistance to do so.1809 
Notably, Timor-Leste acknowledged that the situation had not involved RtoP crimes.1810 
Thus, expressly referring to primary RtoP’s implementation suggests that Timor-Leste 
considered that this incurred an obligation to take steps to prevent RtoP crimes, including by 
requesting assistance.
Significantly, Timor-Leste stated that it discharged primaiy RtoP because of the ‘legal 
and moral obligation to protect’1811 owed to its population. It is quite likely that the source of 
the legal and moral obligation Timor-Leste refers to could be States duties under human 
rights law that primary RtoP subsumes. Although existing treaty and customary international 
law do not legally obligate States to request the assistance of third States to protect their 
population, primary RtoP’s preventive component clearly overlaps with States existing 
human rights law duties. For example, States are required to protect and ensure the right to 
life but they have a margin of appreciation with the specific means used to fulfil this duty. 
Arguably, Timor-Leste may have simply utilised this margin of appreciation by requesting 
assistance. Timor-Leste’s further comments strengthen this interpretation of its statement, 
specifically that (i) the assistance enabled the ‘realisation of human rights’1812 in the State; 
and (ii) a breach of primary RtoP can arise when there is ‘a clear failure to meet obligations 
relating to the responsibility to protect’.1813 Thus, Timor-Leste adds weight to States 
recognising primary RtoP as an obligation of States which entails legally binding elements 
but does not in itself impose new legal obligations.
In the latter part of this phase, the UN Human Rights Council [UNHRC] used RtoP as a 
framework for assessing the human rights situation in Darfur.1814 The Report noted that
1807 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
1808 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1809 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1810 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1811 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1812 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1813 Statement o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, ibid.
1814 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1786). On this
see generally, Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1778), 125-127; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand
is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 42-26 and, further, Strauss, The E m peror’s  New Clothes? (n 1773), 63-68.
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Sudan had accepted the RtoP framework at the Summit.1815 Based on the presence of RtoP 
crimes in Darfur, the Report concluded that the Sudanese government had violated primary 
RtoP and, therefore, encouraged the international community to discharge secondary 
RtoP.1816 This was challenged by Sudan,1817 Pakistan (on behalf of the Organisation of the 
Islamic Conference)1818 and Algeria (on behalf of the Arab League).1819 We should attach 
particular weight to the standpoints of Pakistan1820 and Algeria1821 because they were speaking 
on behalf of two prominent regional organisations and, therefore, their positions reflect those 
of their Member States. Both voiced concern over the appropriateness of using RtoP as a 
framework, arguing that this exceeded the mandate given by the UNHRC to the High-Level 
Mission on the situation of human rights in Darfur.1822 Furthermore, they stressed that RtoP 
had ‘multiple political and security dimensions’.1823 For these reasons, both felt that they 
could not comment on the Report’s findings. Whilst political reasons quite likely 
underscored these protests (e.g. OIC and AL members’ strong ethnic and religious ties to the 
Arabic/Islamic Sudanese government), this writer would suggest that they may have been 
partly motivated by legal considerations. The underlying concern of Algeria and Pakistan 
and, therefore the regional organisations that they were representing, seemed to be that the 
Report entailed the implication that primary RtoP created a new interpretation of States 
existing human rights treaty obligations, specifically that a State’s violation of its existing 
obligations could activate secondary RtoP. The broader context supports this interpretation. 
The UNHRC Report on Darfur was released approximately six months after the Sudanese 
government rejected UNSC Resolution 1706.1824 The Report noted the UNSC’s authorisation 
for the deployment of peacekeepers in Resolution 1706 as an example of the ‘international
1815 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f  Human Rights in Darfur’, ibid, 9. [‘[t]he 
Sudan joined in the adoption o f the World Summit Outcome Document, explicitly accepting its responsibility to 
protect and pledging to act in accordance with it. With its ratification o f various human rights and humanitarian 
law treaties it has also accepted specific legal obligations that underpin this responsibility’].
1816 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’, ibid, 25 [‘The 
Mission further concludes that the Government o f the Sudan has manifestly failed to protect the population o f  
Darfur from large-scale international crimes, and has itself orchestrated and participated in these crimes. As such, 
the solemn obligation o f the international community to exercise its responsibility to protect has become evident 
and urgent’, emphasis original].
1817 Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council 
Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc 
HRC/07/12
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsfrviewO 1 /E6DF2E2811EABFA3C12572A000717B7E?opendocume 
nt> accessed 12 November 2011. (UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f High-Level 
Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’).
1818 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC, ibid.
1819 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC, ibid.
1820 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC, ibid.
1821 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC, ibid.
1822 Statements o f the Representatives o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) and 
Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC, ibid.
182 Statements o f the Representatives o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) and 
Algeria (on behalf o f  the Arab League) to the UNHRC, ibid.
1824 UNSC Res 1706 (n 1786).
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community’s responsibility to protect’.1825 Furthermore, the Report encouraged the UNSC to 
make further attempts to secure this deployment and recommended the application of 
targeted sanctions.1826 Accordingly, approving the Report could have suggested that these 
actors supported reinterpreting States existing treaty obligations as that which, when violated 
in the context of primary RtoP, activates peaceful and non-peaceful responsive measures 
under secondary RtoP.1827
Over this phase, States1828 gave particular attention to refining the nature and scope of the 
existing legal duties which primary RtoP subsumes. For example, Croatia1829 stressed that 
primary RtoP encompassed existing obligations regarding the use of child soldiers in armed 
conflict. Denmark1830 stood alone in alluding to the way in which primary RtoP could 
generate new customary international law or otherwise progressively develop international 
law. Denmark rejected the argument that the Sudanese government’s rights to sovereignty 
and non-interference were being violated by ongoing attempts to secure a peacekeeping 
force in the region,1831 arguing instead that ‘it is the right of the population of Darfur to get 
protection that is being violated’.1832 The latter alludes to the possibility that primary RtoP 
could, over time, progressively develop existing international law by evolving into a 
collective right o f  populations to protection, 1833 Arguably, Denmark alludes to the possibility 
that primary RtoP reformulates the existing legal rights of populations as a general collective 
right to protection, a right which the international community has an interest in protecting 
under secondary RtoP. Essentially, Denmark’s view opens up the possibility that primary 
RtoP not only collectively repackages States legal duties but also the legal rights of members
1825 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1817), 20.
1826 UNHRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’, ibid, 27.
1827 At a political level, there may have been concern over the fact that the UNSC tends to attach particular weight 
to the Reports and findings o f the Human Rights Council and the views o f relevant regional organisations when 
applying Chapter VII enforcement measures. For example, UNSC Resolution 1970 authorising the application o f 
sanctions and a referral o f  the situation in Libya to the ICC explicitly welcomes ‘the Human Rights Council 
resolution A/HRC/S-15/2 o f  25 February 2011, including the decision to urgently dispatch an independent 
international commission o f inquiry to investigate all alleged violations o f international human rights law in the 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, to establish the facts and circumstances o f such violations and o f the crimes perpetrated, 
and where possible identify those responsible’. UNSC Res 1970 (2011) (n 1786), para 5, emphasis original.
1828 See for example, Statement o f the Representative o f Croatia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May
2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898; Statement o f the Representative o f Liechtenstein to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703; Statement o f the Representative o f Panama to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781; Statement o f the Representative o f Slovenia (on 
behalf o f  the European Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898; 
Statement o f the Representative o f Australia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc 
S/PV.5898; Statement o f  the Representative o f Mexico to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN 
Doc S/PV.5703; Statement o f the Representative o f Nigeria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June
2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703.
1829 Statement o f the Representative o f Croatia to the UNSC, ibid.
1830 Statement o f the Representative o f Denmark to the UNGA in UNGA, ‘Opening o f the Sixty First Session of
the UN General Assembly’ (September 2006) <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/index.shtml> accessed 14 
October 2011.
1831 Statement o f the Representative o f Denmark to the UNGA, ibid.
1832 Statement o f the Representative o f Denmark to the UNGA, ibid.
1833 The potential for primary RtoP to develop to entail a collective right to protection was discussed at length in
chapter three.
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of States’ populations (i.e. as a collective right to protection). However, chapter three 
observed (i) that there is presently limited State support for this reinterpretation of existing 
human rights; and (ii) that Pakistan1834 and Algeria’s1835 standpoints on the UNHRC’s Darfur 
Report suggest that the development of a collective right of populations to protection, 
enforceable through the UNHRC, would generate protest among some States and regional 
organisations. Accordingly, the more persuasive explanation for the collective right to 
protection alluded to by Denmark is that it represents shorthand for the existing human rights 
of members of States’ populations which primary RtoP subsumes.
1.3 The Implementation Phase (2009 onward)
In 2009, there was a strong shift toward implementing primary RtoP. Most notably, the UN 
Secretary-General [UNSG] followed up on the Outcome Document commitment for the 
UNGA to continue considering RtoP,1836 organising a thematic debate in the UNGA on 
RtoP’s implementation where States could consider his Report on the topic.1837 This signalled 
a major step from viewing primary RtoP as a principle to an obligation which could and 
should be implemented in practice.
Examination of State views reveals that no State expressly considered primary RtoP to 
represent a new legal obligation during this period. Accordingly, no evidence of opinio juris 
emerged over this period to suggest that States recognise primary RtoP to have become new 
customary international law. Indeed, some States1838 seemed to reject the possibility that the 
Outcome Document’s primary RtoP provisions impose new legal obligations on States. The 
Republic of Korea1839 did so most clearly, arguing that primary RtoP was ‘just a restatement 
of the positive binding obligation of States to protect their populations from the four crimes 
enumerated therein’.1840 Similarly, Brazil1841 stated primary RtoP was ‘not a principle proper,
1834 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan (on behalf o f  the Organisation o f  the Islamic Conference) to the 
UNHRC in UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f  
Human Rights in Darfur’ (n 1817).
1835 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria (on behalf o f the Arab League) to the UNHRC in UN Press 
Release, ‘Human Rights Council Discusses Report o f High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in 
Darfur’, ibid.
1836 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
1837 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677, 2. 
(UNSG Report 2009, Implementing RtoP).
1838 These include: Statement o f the Republic o f  Korea to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f Brazil to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97; Statement o f  Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98; Statement o f  Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; 
Statement o f Uruguay to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 and the 
Statement o f the Netherlands to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
1839 Statement o f the Republic o f  Korea to the UNGA, ibid.
1840 Statement o f the Republic o f  Korea to the UNGA, ibid.
1841 Statement o f Brazil to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
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much less a novel legal prescription’1842 but, rather, a ‘powerful political call for all States to 
abide by legal obligations already set forth in the Charter, in relevant human rights 
conventions and in international humanitarian law and other instruments’.1843 This suggests 
that Brazil considered primary RtoP to represent a political obligation and, furthermore, that 
the Outcome Document was an instrument of soft law which could influence States to 
implement their existing treaty and customary international law duties more effectively.1844 
Chile1845 echoed this view, noting that the discussion of RtoP should not be a ‘legal one’1846 
but, rather, a ‘political debate, with moral connotations’,1847 recognising that primary RtoP 
‘rests on long-standing obligations under international law’.1848 Chile therefore appeared to 
interpret the Outcome Document to be an instrument of soft law which politically reinforces 
States existing legal duties. Whilst Uruguay1849 endorsed this view, Morocco1850 focused on 
excluding arguments that the Outcome Document could be legitimately interpreted as a 
UNGA Resolution which creates ‘instant customary international law’.1851 Morocco argued 
that any such interpretation of the Outcome Document would be wrong at a moral and 
political level,1852 thereby restating that the development of customary international law is 
based upon State consent.1853
During the thematic debate, there was also widespread acknowledgment that primary 
RtoP subsumes States existing legal duties and, therefore, that it entails legally binding 
elements.1854 Significantly, this included States like Sri Lanka,1855 Myanmar,1856 Iran,1857
1842 Statement o f Brazil to the UNGA, ibid.
1843 Statement o f Brazil to the UNGA, ibid.
1844 As noted in chapter three, Switzerland took a similar view, rejecting that primary RtoP could either weaken 
the existing legal obligations it subsumes or creating legal obligations anew. Instead, Switzerland pointed to 
primary RtoP having value as soft law by representing an additional mechanism through which to encourage 
States to effectively implement their existing legal obligations. Statement o f Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
1845 Statement o f Chile to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record, ibid.
1846 Statement o f Chile to the UNGA, ibid.
1847 Statement o f Chile to the UNGA, ibid.
1848 Statement o f Chile to the UNGA, ibid.
1849 Statement o f Uruguay to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record, ibid.
1850 Statement o f Morocco to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record, ibid.
1851 On this see e.g. Lowe, International Law  (n 1776), 41-42.
1852 Statement o f Morocco to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
1853 On the consensual nature, see generally A Fohr, Modern Concepts o f  Customary International Law as a 
Manifestation o f  a Value-Based International Order (Duncker & Humboldt, Berlin 2006) 21-26 and Roberts, 
‘Traditional and Modem Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation’ (n 1777), 784.
1854 This included: Statement o f Sri Lanka to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV. 100; Statement o f  Myanmar to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100; Statement o f  the Representative o f  Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.105; Statement of Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 
September 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 105; Statement o f the Representative o f the Netherlands to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative o f Ukraine to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative of 
Italy to the UNGA, UNSC Verbatim Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Guatemala to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6151 (Res.l). 
185 Statement o f the Representative o f Sri Lanka to the UNGA, ibid.
1856 Statement o f the Representative o f Myanmar to the UNGA, ibid.
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Sudan,1858 Nicaragua1859 and Venezuela1860 which, up until this point, had remained relatively 
silent on primary RtoP. None of these States suggested that primary RtoP imposed any new 
legal obligations. However, Sudan1861 endorsed the view that primary RtoP affirms States 
existing duties to protect populations from ‘humanitarian crimes’.1862 Furthermore, 
Nicaragua1863 acknowledged that primary RtoP affirms that States are obligated to ‘watch 
over’1864 their populations ‘by ensuring the rights to life, food, education and health care’.1865 
Recognising that primary RtoP included legally binding obligations was a significant 
admission for Sudan given the situation in Darfur. This is also true of both Sri Lanka and 
Myanmar which, in earlier years, were alleged to have breached primary RtoP.1866 
Accordingly, recognition of primary RtoP as an obligation which they owed to their 
populations carries particular legal significance.
In subsequent State practice during this phase the shift toward implementing primary 
RtoP became even more apparent. Whilst the primary RtoP duty of Libya and Syria’s 
national authorities was recalled in UNHRC Resolutions,1867 the primary RtoP duty of Libya 
and Yemen’s national authorities was recalled in UNSC Resolution’s 1970,1868 19731869 and 
2014.1870 No State protested against any of these express references to primary RtoP.1871 This
1857 Statement o f the Representative o f Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 and Statement o f the Representative o f Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.105.
1858 Statement o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 and 
Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009, UN  
Doc A/63/PV.105.
1859 Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009), ibid.
1860 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009),
ibid.
1861 Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009), ibid.
1862 Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNGA, ibid.
1863 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009), 
ibid.
1864Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, ibid.
1865 Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, ibid.
1866 On Sri Lanka, see generally UN Security Council Update Report, ‘Sri Lanka’ (4 June 2009), 6 < 
http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-report/lookup-c-glKWLeMTIsG-b-5214273.php> accessed 11 
October 2011. On Myanmar, see European Parliament Resolution, ‘The Tragic Situation in Burma’ (n 1786), 
paras K and 5 and the Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 
2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898.
1867 UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1786), para 2; UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1786), para 1 and UNHRC Res S-19/1, ‘The 
Deteriorating Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, and the Recent Killings in El-Houleh’ (4 
June 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/S-19/1, para 5. (UNHRC Res S-19/1).
1868 The UNSC “recalled” the ‘Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population’. UNSC Res 1970 
(2011) (n 1786), preambular para 9.
1869The UNSC “reiterated” ‘the Libyan authorities responsibility to protect its population’. UNSC Res 1973 
(2011) (n 1786), preambular para 4.
1870The UNSC “recalled” the ‘Yemeni government’s primary responsibility to protect its population’. UNSC Res 
2014 (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/RES/2014(2011), preambular para 14. (UNSC Res 2014).
1871 With respect to the references to primary RtoP in relation to the situation in Libya, see UNSC, Verbatim 
Record (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491; UNSC, Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498 
and UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Passes Resolution on Syria in Special Session’ (25 February 
2011) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10768&LangID=E> accessed 3 
August 2012 and UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f Human Rights in Libya’ 
<http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10766&LangID=E> accessed 3 
August 2012. In relation to the references to primary RtoP in the context o f the situation in Yemen, see UNSC,
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silence could be legally significant because, as Elias1872 explains, ‘[t]he "acquiescence” 
version of consent’1873 to the formation of new customary international law ‘comes into 
play’1874 in such contexts. Essentially, there is a general understanding that the silence of 
States with respect to a practice which warrants their objection (e.g. the affirmation of 
national authorities owing primary RtoP) can be considered as States’ acquiescence with the 
fact that the rule at issue is of a binding nature.1875 Although silence may be for wider 
political reasons, it can be used as a presumption of the existence of States’ acceptance of the 
formation of new customary international law.1876 Silence can be used to rebut a State’s 
argument that they did not consent to the formation of that new rule because there is the 
presumption that, if a State did not intend to consent to the development of the new rule, it 
would have objected.1877 State silence with respect to explicit references to primary RtoP in 
the contexts of Libya, Syria and Yemen could therefore indicate that States acquiesced with 
the idea that primary RtoP imposes an obligation to protect populations from RtoP crimes.
The primary RtoP obligation of the Syrian national authorities was also explicitly recalled 
in both October 20111878 and February 20121879 draft UNSC Resolutions. Whilst the October 
draft UNSC Resolution recalls ‘the Syrian government’s primary responsibility to protect its 
population’,1880 the February draft UNSC Resolution ‘[djemands that the Syrian government 
immediately [...] protects its population’.1881 Both draft Resolutions were vetoed by Russia 
and China.1882 Furthermore, Brazil, India, Lebanon and South Africa abstained from the vote 
on the adoption of the October 2011 draft UNSC Resolution.1883 However, the reference to 
primary RtoP was not explicitly challenged by any of the aforementioned States,1884 thereby 
suggesting they agreed that primary RtoP obligated the Syrian authorities to protect its 
population from RtoP crimes.
UNSC Verbatim Record (21 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6634. With respect to the references to primary RtoP 
in the context o f the situation in Syria, see UN Press Release, ‘Human Rights Council Debates Situation o f  
Human Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ (n 1786) and UN OHCHR, ‘Human Rights Council Requests 
Commission o f Inquiry to Conduct a Special Inquiry in the Events in El Houleh’ (1 June 2012) 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12215&LangID=E> accessed 7 July 
2012 .
1872 O Elias, ‘The Relationship Between General and Particular Customary International Law’ (1996) 8 Aff. J. 
Int’l & Comp. L. 67.
1873 Elias, ibid, 87.
1874 Elias, ibid.
1875 Elias, ibid.
1876 Elias, ibid.
1877 Elias, ibid.
1878 Draft UNSC Res (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/2011/612, preambular para 5. (Draft UNSC Resolution, 4  
October 2011).
1879 Draft UNSC Res (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/2012/77, para 2. (Draft UNSC Res, 4 February 2012).
1880 Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 October 2011 (n 1878), preambular para 5.
1881 Draft UNSC Res, 4 February 2012 (n 1879), para 2.
1882 See the voting records in UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc. S/PV.6627, 2 and UNSC 
Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711, 2.
1883 See the voting record in UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011), ibid.
1884 Statement o f the Representatives o f the Russian Federation, China, Brazil Lebanon and South Africa to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011), ibid and Statements o f the Representatives o f the Russian 
Federation and China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711.
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The approach taken to primary RtoP in the case studies of Libya, Syria and Yemen could 
entail a broader legal significance. Notably, each of the abovementioned UNHRC and UNSC 
Resolutions separated references to primary RtoP from references to States existing human 
rights/humanitarian law obligations.1885 As an example, the UNHRC Resolution on Libya 
‘[sjtrongly calls upon the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its 
population [...] and to fully respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including 
freedom of expression and freedom of assembly’.1886 This distinction may be legally 
significant because it reinforces the suggestion that primary RtoP can create new 
interpretations of States’ existing human rights treaty duties by offering the prospect of 
different mechanisms to promote and ensure State compliance. To be more specific, primary 
RtoP can be distinguished from States existing human rights obligations by reason of the 
consequences which can arise in the event of its breach. That is, a manifest failure to fulfil 
primary RtoP effectively can activate the application of non-peaceful responsive measures 
under secondary RtoP.1887
2 The Legal Status of Secondary RtoP
2.1 The Creation Phase (2005)
Examination of State views given during the Outcome Document’s drafting1888 and at its 
adoption1889 illustrates that there was no intention to formulate secondary RtoP as new 
customary international law. However, New Zealand1890 and Mexico1891 argued that
1885 With respect to the Human Rights Council’s Resolutions, see for example (i) UNHRC Res S-15/1 (n 1786), 
para 2 which urges ‘the Government o f Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its population’ and to ‘fully 
respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom o f expression and freedom o f  assembly’; 
(ii) UNHRC Res S-16/1 (n 1786), para 1 which calls for the Syrian government to ‘protect its population’ and 
‘respect fully all human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom o f expression and freedom o f  
assembly’. For similar examples, see further UNHRC Res S-19/1 (n 1867), para 5. With respect to this 
distinction in the relevant UNSC Resolutions, see e.g. (i) UNSC Res 2014 (n 1870), preambular para 14 and para 
5 which respectively recall ‘the Yemeni Government’s primary responsibility to protect its population’ and 
demand ‘that the Yemeni authorities immediately ensure their actions comply with obligations under applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law’; (ii) UNSC Res 1970 (2011) (n 1786), preambular para 9 and 
para 2 (a) which respectively recall ‘the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population’ and urges the 
Libyan authorities to ‘respect human rights and international humanitarian law’; and (iii) UNSC Res 1973 (2011) 
(n 1786), preambular para 4 and para 3 which respectively reiterate ‘the responsibility o f the Libyan authorities to 
protect the Libyan population’ and demand ‘that the Libyan authorities comply with their obligations under 
international law, including international humanitarian law, human rights and refugee law’.
1886 UNHRC Res S-15/1, ibid, emphasis original.
1887 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
1888 Statements delivered are detailed in Annex I (a) -  (d).
1889 Statements delivered are detailed in Annex I (e).
1890 Statement o f the Representative o f New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 
2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
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secondary RtoP was an ‘emerging norm’1892 and ‘evolving law’.1893 Examination of these 
statements suggests that these States were referring to the way in which secondary RtoP 
could strengthen emerging interpretations of the treaty provisions to which it relates, not that 
it was in the process of becoming new customary international law. To this effect, both 
States1894 noted that the UNSC’s discharge of secondary RtoP through Chapter VII 
enforcement measures was consistent with the growing recognition that events inside a State, 
such as the perpetration of RtoP crimes, can in themselves represent a threat to international 
peace and security. This approach affirms that these States consider secondary RtoP’s 
discharge through non-peaceful responsive measures, such as the use of armed force, should 
be pursuant to existing legal provisions, not least the requirement for UNSC authority under 
Article 42 of the UN Charter.1895 Furthermore, it reminds the UNSC that Article 39'896 has 
been interpreted in earlier practice to be activated by internal protection issues like RtoP 
crimes and, therefore, that the Outcome Document can be effective as soft law, specifically 
by formally acknowledging acceptability of this emerging practice. The US1897 was cautious 
regarding the legal implications of this, arguing that:
‘[T]he Charter has never been interpreted as creating a legal obligation for UNSC 
members to support enforcement action in various cases involving serious breaches 
of international peace. Accordingly, we believe just as strongly that a determination 
as to what particular measures to adopt in specific cases cannot be predetermined in 
the abstract but should remain a decision within the purview  of the UNSC’.1898
Essentially, the US appears to reject that secondary RtoP’s interplay with Article 39, and the 
UNSC’s particular role in discharging secondary RtoP, mean that secondary RtoP imposes a 
new legal obligation to act upon the UNSC. Furthermore, the US stated that ‘the Council 
may, and is fully empowered to, take action under the Charter, including enforcement action, 
if so required’,1899 thereby affirming that Article 39 gives the UNSC discretion over whether 
to authorise enforcement measures in a specific case. However, the US noted that a key
1891 Statement o f the Representative o f Mexico to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), 
April 2005 State Views (n 1775).
18 2 Statement o f the Representative o f New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (28 July 
2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1893 Statement o f the Representative o f Mexico to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), 
April 2005 State Views (n 1775).
18 4 Statement o f the Representative o f Mexico to the UNGA, ibid and Statement o f the Representative o f  New 
Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1895 Article 42 provides: ‘Should the UNSC consider that measures provided for in Article 41 would be 
inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be 
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, 
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces o f Members o f the United Nations’. United Nations, 
Charter o f  the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI art 42. 
(UN Charter).
1896 UN Charter, ibid, art 39.
1897 Letter o f the US Ambassador, John Bolton (n 1793), 1.
1898 Letter o f the US Ambassador, John Bolton, ibid, emphasis added.
1899 Letter o f the US Ambassador, John Bolton, ibid.
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outcome of the Summit was the formulation of ‘a moral obligation to help others and a moral 
duty to make sure our actions are effective’.1900 Whilst the US does not expressly refer to 
secondary RtoP, the statement raises the possibility that the US may recognise secondary 
RtoP as a new moral and/or political responsibility to protect populations of the 
international community, including the UNSC.
Other States suggested that Article 27 (3) of the Charter should be reinterpreted in light of 
secondary RtoP.1901 Whilst the UN Charter does not explicitly confer the P5 a veto power, 
Article 27 (3) provides that non-procedural matters of the UNSC, such as those taken under 
Chapter VII, require an affirmative vote of nine members and a concurring vote o f  the P5.mi 
Peru1903 and Switzerland1904 proposed that the P5 agree not to use the veto in cases involving 
RtoP crimes. Significantly, neither suggested that the UNSC were under any new legal 
obligation to refrain from using the veto in RtoP cases. Instead, Peru1905 called upon the P5 to 
adopt a “gentleman’s agreement’7906 on the issue. No member of the P5 expressly accepted or 
rejected this proposal. However, China,1907 Russia1908 and the US1909 seemed to reject this at 
the Summit by urging that secondary RtoP must be discharged in accordance with the UN 
Charter which, presumably, includes the requirement for a concurring vote of the P5.
There was also some consideration over whether secondary RtoP had any legal effect 
upon the prohibition on the use of armed force under existing treaty and customary 
international law. No State suggested that unilateral or unauthorised armed force could be 
used to discharge secondary RtoP. Indeed, several States1910 affirmed that armed force under 
secondary RtoP should be undertaken collectively with prior UNSC authority. This suggests 
no intention (i) to create secondary RtoP as new customary international law permitting the
1900 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 
2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.2.
1901 See particularly, Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ 
(28 July 2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775) and Statement o f the Representative o f  Switzerland to the UNGA, 
‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), April 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1902 UN Charter (n 1895) art 27 (3).
1903 Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 2005), 
July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
19 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 
2005), April 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1905 Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 2005), 
July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
190 Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNGA, ibid.
1907 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005) 
June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1908 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenaiy’ (21 June 2005), ibid.
1909Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 
June 2005), ibid.
1910 These include: Statements o f the Representatives o f Canada, Chile, China, European Union, France and 
New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005); Statement o f  the 
Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 June 2005); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f  Dominica (on behalf o f  CARICOM), Israel, Tanzania and Colombia to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the 
Representative o i Australia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (28 July 2005), July 2005 State 
Views (n 1775).
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use of unilateral or unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes or (ii) for the 
Charter prohibition to be reinterpreted as not extending to such in light of the subsequent 
State practice on secondary RtoP. Nonetheless, some States1911 were concerned that 
secondary RtoP’s adoption could entail these legal implications. States like Cuba,1912 
Algeria,1913 Malaysia (on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement)1914 and Pakistan1915 argued 
that secondary RtoP was a new name for humanitarian intervention and, therefore, a 
deviation from the existing legal prohibition on armed force. During early negotiations on 
the Outcome Document, Russia1916 also argued that secondary RtoP undermined the UN 
Charter and international law. Arguably, Russia was also concerned that secondary RtoP 
could generate new customary international law or interpretation of the treaty prohibition on 
armed force, thereby undermining the principle of non-interference in internal affairs which 
it strongly defends. However, the Outcome Document was ultimately adopted by consensus, 
at least partly because the final text provided that collective action under secondary RtoP 
should be ‘through the UNSC, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII’.1917 
This provision overcomes the implication that secondary RtoP could, over time, legalise the 
unilateral or unauthorised use of armed force for human protection purposes and, rather, 
reinforces that the legal use of armed force must be collective with the UNSC’s 
authorisation.
Following the Outcome Document’s adoption, the UNSC began to consider affirming the 
Outcome Document’s RtoP provisions in a Resolution regarding the protection of civilians
1911 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, Belarus Qatar, Egypt, Cote d ’Ivoire, Colombia, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), April 2005 State Views (n 1775); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f  Cuba, Algeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Iran and Singapore to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f  the 
Representative o f the Democratic Republic o f  Korea  and Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (22 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statements o f  the Representatives o f Viet Nam, Sri 
Lanka and Venezuela to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005), June 2005 State Views 
(n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Argentina to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (July 
2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statements o f  the Representatives o f Cuba, Algeria, Syria and 
Mauritania (on behalf o f  the African Group) to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 2005), 
WFM Report (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Malaysia (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to 
the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 August 2005), August 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement 
o f the Representative o f Zimbabwe to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2005) UN Doc 
A/60/PV.4 and Statement o f the Representative o f  Cuba to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (16 September 
2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.81.
1912 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (April 2005), 
April 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting of 
the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 2005), WFM Report (n 1775) and Statement o f  the 
Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (16 September 2005), ibid.
19 Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 
2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775) and Statement o f the Representative o f Algeria to the UNGA, ‘High- 
Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 2005), WFM Report (n 1775).
1914 Statement o f the Representative o f Malaysia (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) to the UNGA, ‘High- 
Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 August 2005), August 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1915 Statement o f the Representative o f Pakistan to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 
2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1916 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (21 June 2005), ibid.
1917 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
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in armed conflict. However, it was difficult to reach consensus on this Resolution and 
examination of the drafting history suggests that this was partly due to legal reasons. The 
original draft proposed including two express references to RtoP1918 but neither incorporated 
the qualified phrases used in the Outcome Document. Instead, the proposed references (i) 
referred to ‘the responsibilities of individual Member States as well as the international 
community’1919 to take protective action; and (ii) specified that the international community 
could act ‘through the United Nations, including the UNSC’,1920 as opposed to the Outcome 
Document requirement for such action be taken ‘through the UNSC’.1921 These provisions 
implied that secondary RtoP could be implemented unilaterally (i.e. ‘the responsibilities of 
individual’7922 States) and that there may be a source of authority for collective action other 
than the UNSC. On the one hand, these could be pursuant to other existing obligations. As 
Liechtenstein1923 has highlighted, secondary RtoP interconnects with States individual treaty 
obligations such as the obligation to call upon the United Nations to take appropriate action 
to prevent genocide.1924 Furthermore, the idea of there being a source of authority for 
collective action other than the UNSC tends to reinstate the Charter provision that the 
UNGA has a residual obligation to maintain peace and security1925 and capacity to 
recommend collective measures short of the use of armed force when there is a threat to 
this.1926 The fact that the provisions left open the possibility of unilateral action could have 
undermined the compromise reached at the Summit with respect to secondary RtoP creating 
no new legal basis for the use of unilateral or unauthorised armed force for human protection 
purposes. It is therefore unsurprising that no State suggested that secondary RtoP formulated 
any new legal obligations. However, some States1927 raised the possibility of reinterpreting
1918 The first proposed reference read as follows: ‘[r]ecalling the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, 
including its provisions regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and in this regard the responsibilities o f individual Member States as well 
as the international community, acting through the United Nations, including the UNSC’. The second proposed 
reference was worded in essentially the same way. The only notable difference was that this reference ‘underlines 
the importance’ o f  the Outcome Document’s RtoP paragraphs. Proposed Draft UNSC Res, ‘Protection o f  
Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (21 November 2005), preambular para 4 and para 7
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/united-nations?view=fjrelated&id=2410> 
accessed 10 Januaiy 2012. (Proposed Draft UNSC Res, 21 November 2005).
1919 Proposed Draft UNSC Res, ibid.
1920 Proposed Draft UNSC Res, ibid.
1921 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139, emphasis added.
1922 Proposed Draft UNSC Res, 21 November 2005 (n 1918), preambular para 4 and para 7.
1923 Statement o f the Representative o f Liechtenstein to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1924 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f the Crime o f  Genocide 1948 (adopted 9 December 1948, 
entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 art 8. (Genocide Convention).
1925 UN Charter (n 1895), art 11 (2).
1926 UNGA Res 377 (V), ‘Uniting for Peace Resolution’ (3 November 1950) UN Doc A/RES/377(V). On this see 
M O’Connell, “Responsibility to Peace: A Critique o f RtoP” in P Cunliffe (ed), Critical Perspectives on the 
Responsibility to Protect (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 75-77.
1927 This includes: Statement o f  the Representative o f Norway to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 
2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209; Statements o f the Representatives o f Peru and Canada (on behalf o f  Australia and 
New Zealand) to the UNSC, ‘Protection o f Civilians in Armed Conflict’ (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319;
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existing treaty obligations in light of secondary RtoP, including whether the UNSC’s 
obligation to maintain peace and security could be reinterpreted as entailing a parallel 
obligation to protect populations. In terms of the P5, the UK1928 and France1929 took similar 
positions. Whilst neither State endorsed nor rejected the argument that the UNSC owes an 
obligation to protect populations from RtoP crimes, both defended the UNSC’s role in the 
protection of populations. France stressed that the Outcome Document represents a ‘major 
political and philosophical progress’1930 which can ‘guide the work’1931 of the UNSC in the 
‘protection of populations’.1932 Similarly, the UK1933 called for a consensus understanding of 
the UNSC’s role in these areas in order to strengthen and develop its humanitarian work. 
Both States therefore alluded to human protection being an acceptable objective of the 
UNSC’s fulfilment of their Charter obligation to maintain peace and security. This was not 
supported by China1934 and Russia.1935 Both argued that the UNSC should not subsume the 
UNGA’s role in the development of secondary RtoP. This suggests, albeit implicitly, that 
China and Russia reject reinterpreting the UNSC’s Charter obligation under secondary RtoP. 
One policy consideration which could underscore Russia and China’s position is that the 
reinterpretation could require the UNSC to adopt a proactive protection role and, therefore, 
increased intervention in a State’s internal affairs. Egypt1936 and Colombia1937 alluded to this. 
Egypt rejected reinterpreting the UNSC’s peace and security obligation in protection terms. 
It argued that these are broader thematic issues which fall within the mandate of the UNGA 
and that the UNSC had no mandate to conduct legislative activities in this area.1938 
Colombia1939 argued that the UNSC’s involvement in wider ‘thematic issues’,1940 such as the 
general protection of civilians in armed conflict, exceeds the ‘area of competence assigned 
to’1941 it by the UN Charter. This suggests that Egypt1942 and Colombia1943 may have been
Statements o f the Representatives o f Liechtenstein and Rwanda to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 
December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1928 Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 
2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1929 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, ibid.
1930 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, ibid.
1931 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, ibid.
1932 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, ibid.
1933 Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, ibid.
1934 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319.
1935 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, ibid.
1936 Statement o f the Representative o f Egypt to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1937 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5209.
1938 Statement o f the Representative o f Egypt to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1939 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5209.
1940 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, ibid.
1941 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, ibid.
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apprehensive regarding the capacity of the UNSC to formulate general policies regarding the 
protection of populations when a situation does not constitute a threat to international peace 
and security.
Further consideration was also given to reinterpreting the UNSC’s veto power in light of 
secondary RtoP. States like Liechtenstein1944, Rwanda1945 and Peru1946 all called for the UNSC 
to agree to refrain from using its veto power in RtoP cases, not that secondary RtoP imposed 
a new legal obligation on the P5 not to use the veto. Again, members of the P5 reacted 
differently to the proposal. The UK,1947 US1948 and France1949 remained silent on the issue, 
strengthening the possibility that they could acquiesce with a reinterpretation of Article 27 
(3) in RtoP cases. Russia1950 and China1951 were also silent. However, the preceding section 
noted these States have argued that secondary RtoP must be discharged in full accordance 
with the UN Charter. Presumably, this would include secondary RtoP’s implementation 
conforming to Article 27 (3) because such cases would engage the UNSC in “non-procedural 
matter(s)” and, therefore, be subject to existing legal requirement for a concurring vote of the 
P5.
2.2 The Refinement Phase (2006-2008)
Between 2006 and 2008 the legal significance and content of secondary RtoP was refined. 
UNSC Resolution 1706 (2006)1952 authorised the deployment of peacekeepers to Darfur and 
become the first country-specific UNSC Resolution to explicitly affirm the Outcome 
Document’s RtoP provisions, including those on secondary RtoP. 1953 Whilst Sudan failed to 
give effect to this authorisation, it is nevertheless legally significant because it suggests a 
growing consensus that secondary RtoP could be implemented in practice. No State
1942 Statement o f the Representative o f Egypt to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1943 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5209.
1944 Statement o f the Representative o f Liechtenstein to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1945 Statement o f the Representative o f Rwanda to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
1946 Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319.
1947 Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 
2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l).
1948 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
1949 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
1950 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 
December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319.
1951 Statement o f the Representative o f  China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
1952 UNSC Res 1706 (n 1786).
1953 UNSC Res 1706, ibid, preambular para 2. YRecalling also its previous resolutions 1325 (2000) on women, 
peace and security, 1502 (2003) on the protection o f humanitarian and United Nations personnel, 1612 (2005) on 
children and armed conflict, and 1674 (2006) on the protection o f civilians in armed conflict, which reaffirms 
inter alia the provisions o f paragraphs 138 and 139 o f the 2005 United Nations World Summit Outcome 
Document’, emphasis original].
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suggested that secondary RtoP legally obligates the UNSC to protect populations through, 
for example, the deployment of peacekeepers. However, some States1954 appeared to support 
reinterpreting the UNSC’s obligation to maintain peace and security in light of secondary 
RtoP, specifically as that entailing a parallel, discretionary, moral obligation to protect 
populations through the measures available to the UNSC under the UN Charter. The US1955 
stressed the need for the UNSC to act quickly in order to address the alleged genocide taking 
place in Darfur. This could suggest that the US position on the issue of whether secondary 
RtoP affects the UNSC’s discretion under Article 39 is evolving, specifically toward 
recognising that the UNSC should interpret this discretion in light of a moral or political 
obligation of the international community to protect populations from RtoP crimes. 
Slovakia1956 and Greece1957 are useful illustrations of the standpoint taken by States without a 
permanent seat on the UNSC. Greece argued that ‘when the Council is faced with a 
humanitarian crisis it has a moral duty to act expeditiously to stop human suffering’.1958 
Slovakia1959 made a similar argument, stating that ‘the UN Security Council has the moral 
duty and responsibility to act without delay to prevent an escalation of the crisis’.1960 The 
italicised terms suggests that these States could support reinterpreting the UNSC’s Charter 
obligation to include a parallel moral obligation to protect populations.
In 2006 the UNSC also unanimously adopted Resolution 1674,1961 affirming the Outcome 
Document RtoP provisions in the specific context of the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict.1962 Prima facie, its unanimous adoption could be legally significant1963 by suggesting 
a growing willingness to discharge secondary RtoP in practice. However, State views do not
1954 See the statements o f the following representatives: Argentina, Congo, Denmark, France, Ghana, Greece, 
Japan, Peru, Slovakia, United Kingdom, United Republic o f  Tanzania, United States to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (31 August 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5519.
1955 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
1956 Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNSC, ibid.
1957 Statement o f the Representative o f  Greece to the UNSC, ibid.
1958 Statement o f the Representative o f Greece to the UNSC, ibid.
1959 Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNSC, ibid.
1960 Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNSC, ibid.
1961 UNSC Res 1674 (n 1786).
1962 It reaffirmed ‘the provisions o f paragraphs 138 and 139 o f the 2005 WSOD regarding the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’. UNSC Draft Res 
(27 April 2006) UN Doc S/2006/267, preambular para 4.
1963 Thirlway, “The Sources o f International Law” (n 1777), 124. This requirement emanates from the following 
dicta o f the ICJ in the Nicaragua case: ‘It is not to be expected that in the practice o f States the application o f the 
rules in question should have been perfect, in the sense that States should have refrained, with complete 
consistency, from the use o f force or from intervention in each other’s internal affairs. The Court does not 
consider that, fo r  a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice, must be in absolutely 
rigorous conformity with the rule. In order to deduce the existence o f  customary rules, the Court deems it 
sufficient that the conduct o f  States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, and that instances o f  State 
conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches o f  that rule, not as 
indications o f  recognition o f  a new rule. If a State acts in a way which is inconsistent with a recognised rule, but 
defends its conduct by appealing to exceptions or justifications contained within the rule itself, then whether or 
not the State’s conduct is in fact justifiable on that basis, the significance o f  that attitude is to confirm rather than 
to weaken the rule’, emphasis added. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States o f  America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p 14, para 186.
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support this interpretation. China1964 argued that secondary RtoP could not be practically 
implemented until it had been discussed by the UNGA. In contrast, other States1965 focused 
on the way in which secondary RtoP could be practically implemented by affirming the 
Outcome Document provisions regarding its implementation through assistance, peaceful 
and non-peaceful means.
There was also a legal dimension to State views. First, further support emerged for 
existing treaty obligations being reinterpreted in light of secondary RtoP. States like 
Slovakia,1966 Slovenia,1967 Liechtenstein1968 and Belgium1969 all called for the UNSC to refrain 
from using the veto in RtoP cases, suggesting support for reinterpreting Article 27 (3) in 
light of secondary RtoP. In addition, Ghana1970 added its support for reinterpreting the 
UNSC’s peace and security obligation as that which entailed a parallel, moral obligation to 
protect populations. Ghana argued that the UNSC owe a moral ‘humanitarian duty’1971 to 
protect populations from RtoP crimes. This tends to shift from seeing the UNSC’s 
obligations within the strict confines of international peace and security and, instead, turn 
toward recognising the UNSC to owe at least a moral or political obligation to protect 
populations from RtoP crimes. The P5 remained relatively silent regarding both of these 
proposals. However, Russia began to adopt a somewhat different approach to secondary 
RtoP and, accordingly, its position could be said to have evolved during this phase.
During the Outcome Document’s drafting, Russia argued that secondary RtoP’s 
implementation should be pursuant to the UN Charter1972 and following the UNGA’s 
consideration of RtoP.1973 However, in 2007 Russia1974 outlined that the UNSC’s role under 
secondary RtoP is to support States own efforts to protect the population. On the one hand, 
this challenges the contention that the UNSC owes an obligation, moral or otherwise, to 
protect populations when national authorities fail to do so. This could show a growing
1964 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5476.
1965 See e.g.: Statements o f the Representatives o f Slovakia, Ghana and Japan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577; Statements o f the Representatives o f Tanzania, Congo, 
Argentina and Austria (on behalf o f  the European Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) 
UN Doc S/PV.5476.
1966 Statement o f the Representative o f Slovakia to the UNSC, ibid.
1967 Statement o f the Representative o f Slovenia (on behalf o f  the Human Security Network) to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476.
1968 Statement o f the Representative o f Liechtenstein to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
1969 Statement o f the Representative o f Belgium to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN 
Doc S/PV.5781.
1970 Statement o f the Representative o f Ghana to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 December 2006) UN  
Doc S/PV.5577.
1971 Statement o f the Representative o f Ghana to the UNSC, ibid.
1972 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1973 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 
December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319.
1974 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 
November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 and Statement o f  the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703.
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sensitivity to the way in which the Outcome Document’s secondary RtoP provisions could, 
as an instrument of soft law, lead modification in the interpretations given to fundamental 
principles of the UN Charter. This includes principles which Russia is eager to uphold (i) 
because o f  its national interests (e.g. respect for State sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
non-intervention); and (ii) those which enable it to defend its national interests in the UNSC 
(e.g. the veto power). Conversely, it could illustrate the way in which States positions on 
secondary RtoP can be influenced by their own political interests. Arguably, Russia’s 
national political interests at this time may have influenced why its position evolved toward 
endorsement of secondary RtoP, including its capacity to be practically implemented. 
Notably, Russia’s evolving position on secondary RtoP (i) coincided with the way in which 
its interests in the South Ossetian region were being increasingly threatened by Georgia’s 
international development and ambitions (e.g. NATO membership);1975 and (ii) preceded 
Russia’s use of unilateral and unauthorised armed force against Georgia. These issues raise 
questions regarding the legal significance of Russia’s invocation of RtoP to justify its armed 
force against Georgia.1976
As the ICJ has observed, the significant aspect of State practice involving deviations from 
the prohibition on armed force is the legal justification which a State offers, irrespective of 
whether the State may have been influenced by political considerations.1977 The Court 
advised that the reason for this is because ‘[rjeliance by a State on a novel right or an 
unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend 
towards a modification of customary international law’.1978 Prima facie, Russia’s violation of 
the prohibition on armed force and reference to RtoP suggests that it considers the Outcome 
Document to create either (i) new customary international law permitting unilateral or 
unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes; or (ii) a new interpretation to the 
Charter prohibition on armed force. However, no State endorsed the deviation from the legal 
regime on armed force under existing treaty and customary international law. Instead, a 
recurrent theme in State1979 approaches to Russia’s actions was the denunciation of the use of 
force for contravening Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. This reinforces the
1975 On Russia’s interests in the area, see C Borgen, ‘Imagining Sovereignty, Managing Secession: The Legal 
Geography o f Eurasia’s “Frozen Conflicts’” (2007) 9 Or. Rev Int’l L. 477 and N Cutts, ‘Enemies through the 
Gates: Russia’s Violations o f International Law in the Georgia/Abkhazia Conflict’ (2007-2009) 40 Case W. Res. 
J. Int’lL . 281.
1976 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (.Ministry o f  
Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 August 2008)
<www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574al0026259770penD  
ocument> accessed 11 May 2012 and Statement o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S.PV.5952.
1977 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States o f  America), 
Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, para 207.
1978 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, ibid.
1979 See particularly: Statements o f the Representatives o f Belgium, United States and the United Kingdom  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952.
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treaty and customary international law prohibition on armed force, specifically that force 
should not be used against the ‘sovereignty and territorial integrity of a State’.1980 It suggests 
that States rejected the argument that the prohibition on armed force does not extend to the 
unilateral and unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes. Perhaps most 
significantly, Russia has not claimed that the Outcome Document alters the existing legal 
regime on armed force in any of its other statements on RtoP but, instead, has argued that 
RtoP’s implementation should be in full accordance with the UN Charter.1981 Consequently, 
this writer would argue that we should consider Russia’s actions in this case to be politically 
motivated and that which have no impact upon the existing legal regime on armed force.
The idea that secondary RtoP subsumes existing legal obligations, rather than creating 
them anew, was also noted by Trinidad and Tobago1982 during this phase. It urged ‘the 
international community to exercise its responsibility to protect’1983 in Darfur, arguing that it 
had a ‘fundamental legal and moral obligation to act in cases such as this’.1984 This writer 
would suggest reference to the international community owing a legal obligation does not 
represent evidence of opinio juris on the part of this State. Rather, it alludes to the fact that 
secondary RtoP subsumes a number of obligations under existing treaty and customary 
international law and, therefore, that the international community owe a legal obligation to 
the extent that secondary RtoP has placed these legal obligations into a new political and 
moral framework.
2.3 The Continued Refinement and Moves toward Implementation Phase 
(2009 onward)
In 2009 there was a clear shift toward strengthening State acceptance that secondary RtoP 
could be institutionalised and implemented in practice. In terms of institutionalisation within 
the UN, the UNSG1985 (i) recommended the appointment of a Special Adviser on RtoP (at the
1980 The UN Charter prohibition on armed force provides that: ‘All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use o f force against the territorial integrity or political independence o f  any State, or 
in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes o f the United Nations’. UN Charter (n 1895) art 2 (4), 
emphasis added.
1981 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
1982 See particularly the Statement o f the Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago, ‘Opening o f the Sixty First 
Session o f the UN General Assembly’ (September 2006) <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/index.shtml> 
accessed 14 October 2011.
1983 Statement o f the Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago, ibid.
1984 Statement o f the Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago, ibid.
1985 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008-2009: Estimates in Respect o f  
Special Political Missions, Good Offices and Other Political Initiatives Authorised by the General Assembly 
and/or the UNSC’ (30 October 2007) UN Doc A /62/512/Add. 1, para 31 (UNSG Report, ‘Proposed Programme 
Budget for the Biennium 2008-2009); Letter o f the UNSG to the President o f the UNSC (31 August 2007) UN 
Doc S/2007/271. (Letter o f the UNSG to UNSC President, 31 August 2007).
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level of Assistant UNSG);1986 (ii) organised for the UNGA to hold annual thematic debates 
on RtoP (particularly its secondary elements); and (iii) proposed appointing additional staff 
to act in conjunction with his Special Advisers on RtoP and the prevention of genocide as 
part of a Joint Office on Early Warning for RtoP-type crimes.1987 Some States1988 rejected 
moves toward institutionalisation. It was argued that secondary RtoP was not accepted as a 
fully established principle at the Summit1989 and, therefore, the appointment of a “Special 
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect” was altered to the appointment of a “Special 
Adviser” with a focus on RtoP.1990 Furthermore, one group of States1991 rejected secondary 
RtoP’s implementation in practice on the basis that the Outcome Document provided for the 
UNGA to continue considering RtoP.1992 The majority of States refuted this, suggesting that 
they considered the provision to simply require that UNGA debates be held to enable deeper 
discussion of the Outcome Document’s ambiguous aspects.1993 The provision may therefore
,986UNSG Report, ‘Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2008-2009 and Letter o f the UNSG to UNSC 
President, 31 August 2007, ibid.
1987 For details o f this recommendation see Report o f the UNSG, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (14 July 2010) UN Doc A/64/864, 6-8.
1988 Examples include: Statements o f the Representatives o f  Iran, Venezuela, Nicaragua and Ecuador to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.105; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l); 
Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6066(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 
November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427(Res.l) and Statement o f Cuba to the UNGA Fifth Committee (3 March
2008) in UN Press Release, ‘United Nations Human Resources Structures must be adapted to meet Growing 
Demands o f Peacekeeping, Other Field Operations, Budget Committee Told’ (4 March 2008) UN Doc 
GA/AB/3837 <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/gaab3837.doc.htm> accessed 2 November 2011. (UN 
Press Release, ‘United Nations Human Resources Structures must be adapted to meet Growing Demands of 
Peacekeeping, Other Field Operations, Budget Committee Told’).
1989 e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba, Egypt, Pakistan and Sudan to the UNGA Fifth Committee in 
UN Press Release, ‘United Nations Human Resources Structures must be adapted to meet Growing Demands of 
Peacekeeping, Other Field Operations, Budget Committee Told’, ibid.
1990 UN Press Release, ‘Secretary-General Appoints Edward C. Luck o f United States as Special Advisor’ (21 
February 2008) UN Doc SG/A/1120. On this adaptation o f  the mandate, see M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power 
Comes Great Responsibility? The Concept o f the Responsibility to Protect within the Process o f International 
Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal o f Int’l L. 469,477.
1991 Venezuela is a good example. In argued that: ‘Some countries have groundlessly tried to affirm that this 
concept is a norm that can be implemented without the required discussions, but we believe that the General 
Assembly must discuss this concept and provide it with a consensus interpretation’. Statement o f the 
Representative o f Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6151 (Res.l). 
Other examples include: Statements o f  the Representatives o f  Iran, Venezuela, Ecuador and Nicaragua to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.105; Statement o f the Representative o f  
Iran to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 100; Statement o f the 
Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l); 
Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6066(Res.l); Statement o f the Representative o f Sudan to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 
November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427(Res.l) and Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA Fifth 
Committee in UN Press Release, ‘United Nations Human Resources Structures must be adapted to meet Growing 
Demands o f Peacekeeping, Other Field Operations, Budget Committee Told’ (n 1988).
1992 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
1993 Further support for this could be said to come from the approach o f relevant international actors. It should be 
noted that the Chef de Cabinet to the Secretary-General argued that the RtoP framework was accepted at the 
Summit but, admittedly, ‘did not have widely shared consensus, yet’. Statement o f the Chef de Cabinet to the 
Secretary-General to the UNGA Fifth Committee in UN Press Release, ‘United Nations Human Resources 
Structures must be adapted to meet Growing Demands o f Peacekeeping, Other Field Operations, Budget 
Committee Told’ (n 1988).
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be more focused upon ensuring continued discussion of secondary RtoP, rather than that 
which entails legal significance by preventing its practical implementation.
State views during this phase helped to clarify the way in which States interpret 
secondary RtoP’s legal status. No State suggested that secondary RtoP imposes new legal 
obligations upon the international community, thereby undermining any evidence of opinio 
juris with regard to it becoming new customary international law. Rather, some States1994 
suggested that secondary RtoP repackages States existing legal obligations into a new, 
political framework. For instance, Switzerland1995 argued that secondary RtoP was an 
important step in ‘political mobilisation’1996 but, whilst RtoP ‘covers numerous existing 
international law obligations, it remains a political concept and does not in itself constitute a 
new norm’.1997 Finland1998 is a further illustration, stating that RtoP ‘is a programmatic, rather 
than a clearly legal concept. From the legal point of view, it is a question of already existing 
mandates and responsibilities’.1999 Essentially, these views highlight that elements of RtoP 
can have legal status because they subsume existing legal obligations and, furthermore, that 
the Outcome Document can be an effective instrument of soft law by encouraging 
compliance with these existing legal obligations.
Wider steps over this period and responses to country-specific situations, such as Syria, 
helped to further refine secondary RtoP’s legal status. First, there was further clarification 
over whether the UNSC’s veto power should be reinterpreted in light of secondary RtoP. 
More States, like Timor-Leste2000, supported the call for the non-use of the veto in RtoP 
cases. Furthermore, Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Singapore and Switzerland proposed 
a draft UNGA Resolution regarding the UNSC’s accountability and transparency. The 
Resolution proposed that the P5 refrain from ‘using a veto to block Council action aimed at 
preventing genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity’.2001 However, Switzerland 
withdrew the draft Resolution in the course of the UNGA meeting because discussions on 
the draft revealed that, although States supported ‘improving the Council’s working
1994 See particularly, Statements o f the Representatives o f Switzerland, Israel, Ghana, Algeria and Chile to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98; Statement o f the Representatives o f the 
Netherlands and Sweden (on behalf o f  the European Union) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97; Statements o f the Representatives o f Timor-Leste and Kazakhstan to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100.
1995 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, ibid.
1996 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, ibid.
1997 Statement o f the Representative o f Switzerland to the UNGA, ibid.
1998 Speech o f the President o f  the Republic o f  Finland at the High-Level Forum on the Responsibility to Protect 
(28 August 2009) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.Org/index.php/component/content/article/l33-europe/2526- 
finland-high-level-forum-on-rtop-explores-how-to-take-the-norm-forward> accessed: 10 October 2011.
1999 Speech o f the President o f  the Republic o f  Finland, ibid.
2000 Statement o f the Representative o f Timor-Leste to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100.
2001 Draft UNGA Res, ‘Improving the Working Methods o f the UNSC’ (28 March 2012) UN Doc A/66/L.42, 
para 20.
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methods, they were not ready to act’2002 on the issue. Perhaps most significantly, during this 
phase Russia2003 and China2004 used their veto to block the adoption of three draft UNSC 
Resolutions on Syria.2005 This suggests that neither Russia nor China accept reinterpreting the 
veto power in light of secondary RtoP, specifically as a power not to be used when RtoP 
crimes are being perpetrated against a population. However, there is wider legal and political 
significance to these developments. To this effect, the proposal for the P5 to read the veto 
power in light of secondary RtoP tends to reiterate that, in absence of the adoption of a 
“gentleman’s agreement”2006 on the matter, the UNSC’s role in RtoP cases will be regulated 
by Article 27 (3) of the UN Charter. Furthermore, State responses to the vetoes in Syria point 
to further treaty obligations which secondary RtoP subsumes and, therefore, additional 
legally binding elements of it. States like France2007 and the US2008 both reminded the UNSC 
that Russia and China’s vetoes would not prevent them from taking further action in the 
UNSC or through others, such as relevant regional organisations. Indeed, the first, second 
and third double vetoes were directly proceeded by the adoption of UNGA Resolutions2009
2002 UN Press Release, ‘Switzerland Withdraws Draft Resolution in General Assembly Aimed at Improving 
UNSC’s Working Methods to Avoid ‘Politically Complex’ Wrangling’ (16 May 2012) UN Doc GA711234 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gal 1234.doc.htm> accessed 7 August 2012.
2003 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627; Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 and Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian 
Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6810.
2004 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011), ibid; 
Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012), ibid and 
Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012), ibid.
2005 Draft UNSC Resolution, 4 October 2011 (n 1878); Draft UNSC Res, 4 February 2012 (n 1879) and Draft 
UNSC Res (19 July 2012) UN Doc S/2012/538.
2006 Statement o f the Representative o f Peru to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319.
2007 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6627 [‘Let there be no mistake. This veto will not stop us', emphasis added]; Statement o f the 
Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 [‘We 
weathered a first double veto and returned to the Council; today, we have weathered a second on the part o f the 
same countries. However, for the sake o f the principles that guide the Council and the work o f  the United 
Nations’] and Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012) 
UN Doc S/PV.6810 [T will say again what I said on 4 February: no, once again, the double veto will not stop us 
[...] This double veto leaves the UNSC helpless against the violence o f the Syrian regime, but France will not 
leave the Syrian people to face the crimes to which they are victim alone', emphasis and ellipsis added].
2008 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011), 
ibid [‘In failing to adopt the draft resolution before us, the Council has squandered an opportunity to shoulder its 
responsibilities to the Syrian people. We deeply regret that some members o f the Council have prevented us from 
taking a principled stand against the Syrian regime’s brutal oppression o f  its people. But the suffering citizens o f  
Syria are watching today, and so is the entire Middle East. The crisis in Syria will stay before the UNSC, and we 
will not rest until the Council rises to meet its responsibilities', emphasis added] and Statement o f the 
Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (19 July 2012), ibid [‘The United 
States has not and will not pin its policy  on an unarmed observer mission that is deployed in the midst o f  such 
widespread violence and that cannot even count on the most minimal support o f the UNSC. Instead, we will 
intensify our work with a diverse range o f partners outside the UNSC to bring pressure to bear on the Al-Assad 
regime and to deliver assistance to those in need’, emphasis added.]
2009 See respectively, UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights 
Violations in Syria’ (22 November 2011) UN Doc GA/SHC/4033
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/201 l/gashc4033.doc.htm> accessed 7 August 2012 (UN Press Release, 
‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’) and UNGA Third 
Committee Voting Record, ‘Situation o f Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 November 2011) UN 
Doc A/C.3/66/L.57/Rev.l (UNGA Third Committee Voting Record, Syria); UNGA, ‘General Assembly Adopts
276
which denounced the situation and called for compliance with primary RtoP.2010 This affirms 
that States accept secondary RtoP’s discharge should also be pursuant to the UN Charter 
obligations conferring (i) primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security 
upon the UNSC;2011 and (ii) a residual responsibility for the maintenance of such upon the 
UNGA.2012
However, Russia and China’s vetoes highlight the way in which secondary RtoP’s 
discharge will, irrespective of its legal status, depend upon the existence of political will, 
particularly that of the P5. This raises the question of whether secondary RtoP has had any 
effect upon the legal consequences for veto use. Commentators2013 have argued that the veto 
in RtoP cases could engage the vetoing States responsibility for an internationally wrongful 
act. To do so, the veto must violate a legal obligation of the vetoing State, such as a violation 
of the duty to prevent genocide.2014 There has been limited consideration by States of 
secondary RtoP’s interplay with this method of legal redress against the use of the veto. 
Certainly, there is nothing to suggest that secondary RtoP strengthens the legal 
consequences. For example, whilst France,2015 Portugal,2016 the UK,2017 the US2018 and 
Germany2019 all expressed disappointment at Russia and China’s use of the veto in Syria, no 
State argued that this could or should entail legal consequences. Similarly, there is nothing to 
suggest that secondary RtoP weakens the legal consequences which can be attached under 
existing mechanisms, not least the regime on State Responsibility. Thus, secondary RtoP 
may not only subsume the existing legal obligations which permit the use of a veto (Article 
27 (3) of the UN Charter), it may also subsume the existing legal regimes which can attach 
consequences to the use of the veto (ILC Articles on State Responsibility).2020
more than Sixty Resolutions Recommended by Third Committee Including Text Condemning Grave, Systematic 
Human Rights Violations in Syria’ (19 December 2011) UN Doc GA/11198
<http://www.un.Org/News/Press/docs//2011/gal 1198.doc.htm> accessed 5 January 2012; UNGA Res 66/176, (23 
February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/176; UNGA Res 66/253 (21 February 2012) UN Doc A/RES/66/253; UNGA, 
‘General Assembly, in Resolution, Demands All in Syria ‘Immediately and Visibly’ Commit to Ending Violence 
that Secretary-General says is Ripping Country Apart’ (3 August 2012) UN Doc G A/11266 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2012/gal 1266.doc.htm> accessed 8 August 2012.
2010 See e.g. Draft UNGA Res, ‘The Situation in the Syrian Arab Republic’ (31 July 2012) UN Doc A/66/L.57 
(adopted on the 3 August 2012), paras 1-3 (condemning the violence in the State) and para 3 (recalling primary 
RtoP).
2011 UN Charter (n 1895), arts 24 (1) and 39.
2012 UN Charter, ibid, art 11 (2).
2013 See particularly, L Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f  Care in International Law and 
Practice’ (2008) 34 Review o f International Studies 445,454 and A Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega 
o f Sovereignty’ (2009) 20 (3) EJIL 513, 540.
2014 Arbour and Peters, ibid.
2015 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6627.
2016 Statement o f the Representative o f Portugal to the UNSC, ibid.
2017 Statement o f the Representative o f the United Kingdom to the UNSC, ibid.
2018 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2019 Statement o f the Representative o f Germany to the UNSC, ibid.
2020 For proposals regarding legal consequences for a failure to discharge if  that failure overlaps with a breach of 
a States existing obligation, such as the duty to prevent genocide, see particularly, Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 2013), 454; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and
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Second, this phase further contributed toward whether or not the UNSC’s obligation to 
maintain international peace and security should be reinterpreted in light of secondary RtoP. 
The US2021 explained that the UNSC’s adoption of Resolution 1970 on Libya was an example 
o f it acting to ‘support the Libyan peoples universal rights’2022 and it illustrates that the 
UNSC, on behalf of the international community, ‘will not tolerate violence of any sort 
against the Libyan people by their Government or security forces’.2023 Whilst such practice 
suggests that the US could recognise the UNSC to owe an obligation to protect populations, 
it does not consider this a new legal obligation. In Libya, the US2024 pointed to the action 
being taken under Chapter VII of the Charter. This suggests that they consider the legal 
authority for their actions to be their pre-existing provisions of the Charter. Similarly, the US 
alluded to the UNSC’s obligation to protect being of a moral nature, stating that it was 
‘outraged’2025 that the UNSC has ‘utterly failed to address an urgent moral challenge and a 
growing threat to regional peace and security’2026 in Syria. Together these aspects of practice 
suggest that the US does not consider secondary RtoP to confer a new legal obligation to 
protect upon the UNSC but, rather, it strengthens the understanding that (i) the UNSC’s 
obligation to maintain international peace and security should be reinterpreted in light of a 
moral and/or political obligation to protect populations in cases involving RtoP crimes; and
(ii) threats to international peace and security can arise from events inside a State’s borders, 
not least the perpetration of RtoP crimes.
This was challenged by States like Venezuela2027 and Syria.2028 Following calls for the 
UNSC to take action to protect the Syrian population, Syria2029 cautioned the UNSC against 
interpreting its peace and security obligation to include a protection component. Similarly, 
Venezuela2030 warned that the UNSC cannot apply or interpret secondary RtoP until full 
consensus is attained in the UNGA. Notably, Venezuela2031 earlier disapproved of the 
Outcome Document explicitly referring to the role of the UNSC because it considers the 
current composition of the UNSC is unrepresentative and, therefore, there is a risk that it will
Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 540 and A Peters, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Permanent Five: The 
Obligation to Give Reasons for a Veto” in A Nollkaemper and J Hoffmann (eds), The Responsibility to Protect: 
From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012) 205-206.
2021 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 February
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6491.
2022 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2023 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2024 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2025 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2026 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, ibid.
2027 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531(Res.l).
2028 Statement o f the Representative o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
2029 Statement o f the Representative o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNSC, ibid.
2030 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531(Res.l).
2031 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.105.
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overlook some cases involving RtoP crimes due to the national political interests of the 
P5 2032 Venezuela’s position therefore highlights that political and not legal reasons can 
underscore why some States may challenge the view that the UNSC can have the mandate to 
protect.
Perhaps the most significant development over this phase was the UNSC’s authorisation 
of collective armed force in Libya to ‘protect civilians’.2033 Significantly, Resolution 1973 
expressly referred to the primary RtoP obligation of the Libyan national authorities.2034 This, 
along with the explicit protective objective of the armed force,2035 suggests that the UNSC 
authorised armed force as part of secondary RtoP. At a legal level, the important issue is that 
the armed force was carried out in full conformity with the existing legal regime on armed 
force because it had UNSC authority. Libya therefore tends to reinforce the point that armed 
force under secondary RtoP should comply with the existing legal regime and, therefore, the 
requirement for UNSC authority represents another legally binding element of secondary 
RtoP.
States adopted three positions on secondary RtoP following authorisation for the use of 
armed force in Libya. First, some States pushed for secondary RtoP to undergo further 
refinement. Brazil is a primary example, proposing the adoption of the concept of 
“Responsibility whilst Protecting”2036 in order to ensure that the use of armed force was 
authorised only as a last resort.20*1 As discussed in chapter five, this suggests that Brazil 
considers that the UNSC should discharge Chapter VII enforcement measures incrementally 
in RtoP cases. This standpoint raises the possibility that, at least some States, consider the 
Outcome Document to be an instrument of soft law in light of which existing treaty 
provisions can be reinterpreted (e.g. UNSC’s power to discharge Chapter VII non- 
incrementally).
The second approach adopted in the aftermath of Libya was that the Outcome Document 
did not formulate secondary RtoP as a doctrine capable of implementation in practice but, 
rather, merely committed States to ‘continue consideration’2038 of RtoP in the UNGA. 
Venezuela used the informal discussion on the concept of “Responsibility whilst 
Protecting”2039 to argue that secondary RtoP’s implementation in practice was premature and,
2032 Statement o f the Representative o f Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531(Res.l).
2033 UNSC Res 1973 (2011) (n 1786), preambular para 4.
2034 UNSC Res 1973, ibid.
2035 UNSC Res 1973, ibid.
2036 UNGA/UNSC, ‘Annex to the Letter dated 9 November 2011 from the Permanent Representative o f Brazil to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General: Responsibility while Protecting: Elements for the 
Development and Promotion o f a Concept’ (11 November 2011) UN Doc A/66/551-S/2011/701.
2037 UNGA/UNSC, ibid.
2038 ibid.
2039 UNGA, ‘Informal Discussion on Responsibility While Protecting’ (21 February 2012). State views are 
available at <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/4002-
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given the Outcome Document ‘continue consideration’2040 provision, that which lacked any 
basis.2041 Thus, this approach seems to have been partly facilitated by Brazil urging 
secondary RtoP to undergo further refinement.
Russia and China used the period following the Libya intervention to return to the 
standpoint that they had adopted on secondary RtoP during the preliminary stages of the 
Outcome Document’s drafting. To Russia, secondary RtoP should not be practically 
implemented because it remains too ‘ambiguous’.2042 This illustrates that Russia does not 
accept secondary RtoP to have sufficient clarity to become new customary international 
law.2043 Furthermore, Russia and China2044 recalled the principle of non-intervention in 
internal affairs in the specific context of the perpetration of RtoP crimes in Syria.2045 This 
suggests that both States reject reinterpreting the principles of non-intervention and respect 
for State sovereignty as subject to States’ national authorities protecting their populations 
from RtoP crimes.2046 It is quite likely that these challenges to secondary RtoP’s practical 
implementation may have been politically motivated, after all Syria is Russia’s main ally in 
the Middle East. However, the challenges nevertheless highlight that some States may not 
even have accepted RtoP in principle, let alone as a norm which is capable of being 
implemented in practice so as to become new customary international law.
The above view contradicts the third position taken by States in the aftermath of the 
Libya intervention, namely that the international community needs to implement secondary 
RtoP more consistently in practice, not least in Syria. This standpoint was adopted by States 
like France, the UK and the US which took steps to try to apply political pressure on the 
UNSC to act effectively, including sponsoring the original UNGA Resolution on Syria.2047 
The significance of approaching the UNGA when the UNSC fails to act lies in the fact that it 
suggests that some States consider secondary RtoP as a moral and/or political responsibility
informal-discussion-on-brazils-concept-of-responsibility-while-protecting> accessed 30 May 2012. ( ‘Informal 
Debate on the Responsibility While Protecting’).
2040 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2041 Recalling the “further consideration” provision, Venezuela argued that it is ‘concerned that UN officials use 
resources o f the institution to implement the “responsibility to protect”. The best proof that there is no consensus 
on this issue and its implementation is the discussion that we are having today. We emphasise: until today, there 
is no consensus on the scope and nature o f the responsibility to protect’, emphasis added. Statement o f the 
Representative o f Venezuela to the UNGA, ‘Informal Debate on the Responsibility While Protecting’ (n 2039).
2042 Statement o f the Representative o f  the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 June
2012) UN Doc S/PV.6790.
2043 On the requirement o f clarity for the development o f a new rule o f  customary international law, see e.g. 
Payandeh (n 1990), 481-482.
2044 See especially, Statements o f the Representatives o f China and the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
2045 See especially, Statements o f  the Representatives o f China and the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record, ibid.
2046 On this, see e.g. the UNSG’s comments on the way in which the RtoP framework laid down at the World 
Summit accommodates the principle o f “sovereignty as responsibility” in UNSG Report 2009, Implementing 
RtoP (n 1837), 7-8.
2047 UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’ 
(n 2009) and UNGA Third Committee Voting Record, Syria (n 2009).
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of the international community to engage all available mechanisms to ensure the protection 
of populations from RtoP crimes.
2.4 The Legal Status of Primary and Secondary RtoP: General Findings
The present author’s analysis of over four hundred State views2048 indicates that no State 
intended to formulate primary or secondary RtoP as new customary international law at the 
Summit. Furthermore, there is no evidence in subsequent State practice to support the view 
that either responsibility has become new customary international law. However, there have 
been some legal dimensions to the practice. Primarily, there is some support for both primary 
and secondary RtoP creating new interpretations of the treaty obligations that they subsume. 
In terms of primary RtoP, this includes the recognition (i) of a general duty to prevent RtoP 
crimes and that this can clarify States implementation of their existing duties in an RtoP 
context; and (ii) that a failure to fulfil existing duties effectively can legitimately activate 
secondary RtoP and, therefore, the involvement of the international community. Presently, 
there is limited support for these constituting binding interpretations of treaty obligations. 
However, this could evolve in the future in light of further State practice. In terms of 
secondary RtoP, there is growing support among some States for reinterpreting the UNSC’s 
obligation to maintain peace and security in light of secondary RtoP as a moral and/or 
political responsibility to protect populations from RtoP crimes. This could be explained as 
an attempt to standardise the UNSC’s role in mass atrocity crimes and to try to add moral 
and political pull upon the UNSC to curtail its discretion over the application of enforcement 
measures in RtoP cases.2049
Consideration was also given to whether secondary RtoP changes the existing legal 
regime on armed force. Elements of State approaches in Libya raise the possibility that 
secondary RtoP does not simply subsume the existing legal regime on armed force. For 
example, a clear theme in this case study was the permissibility of using armed force fo r  
human protection purposes.2050 For instance, Colombia2051 justified its vote in favour of the 
authorisation of armed force based on belief that the armed force was:
2048 Surveyed State views are detailed in Annex I (a)-(i).
2049 The UNSC has taken a relatively ad hoc approach to recognising that its Chapter VII powers have been 
activated by RtoP crimes. The UNSC has expressed its “readiness” to consider RtoP-type crimes as threats to 
international peace and security in instruments. However, this is merely a commitment o f preparedness. UNSC 
Resolution 1296 (2000) UN Doc S/RES/1296. For a discussion o f the activation o f Article 39 in the context o f 
RtoP crimes, see Payandeh (n 1990), 494-497.
2050 See particularly, Statements o f Representatives o f  the United States, United Kingdom, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Colombia, China and the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
205'Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, ibid.
281
‘[Ajimed at protecting the civilian population from imminent attacks by a Government 
that, through its actions and statements, has shown that it is not up to the international 
responsibility o f protecting its population’.2052
Arguably, this suggests an acceptance that armed force for human protection purposes can 
be legitimate. However, the implicit endorsement of the existing prohibition on armed force 
in the Russia-Georgia case,2053 and that armed force was collective and authorised in the 
Libya case,2054 suggests that States consider that the use of armed force for human protection 
purposes must still be undertaken pursuant to the existing legal regime in order to be legal. 
The permissibility of using armed force for human protection purposes has also been 
endorsed in the national policies of States like the UK,2055 US,2056 France2057 and Germany.2058 
With the exception of Germany,2059 none of the policies mention the need for UNSC 
authorisation. This does not mean that these States consider they can use force absent UNSC 
authority, especially since they have affirmed this requirement at international level.2060 
However, this remains a risk given that the UK had, pre-RtoP, argued that the Charter 
prohibition did not extend to unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes and 
that other European States and the US had participated in unauthorised humanitarian 
interventions.2061 This relates to the prospect of secondary RtoP being argued to formulate a
2052 Statement o f the Representative o f Colombia to the UNSC, ibid.
2053 See particularly, Statements o f the Representatives o f Belgium, United States and the United Kingdom to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc UN Doc S/PV.5952.
2054 UNSC Res 1973 (2011) (n 1786).
2055 UK Cabinet Office, ‘The National Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom’ (n 1784), 48.
2056 US, ‘National Security Strategy’ (2010) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document- 
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 10 October 2011,48. For an overview o f the significant 
aspects o f this policy in terms o f armed force, see C Henderson, ‘The 2010 United States National Security 
Strategy and the Obama Doctrine o f ‘Necessary Force” (2010) 15 (3) Journal o f Conflict & Security Law 403.
2057 Presidence de la Republique, ‘The French White Paper on Defence and National Security’ (n 1784), 9 and 11.
2058 Federal Ministry o f Defence, ‘White Paper 2006 on German Security Policy and the Future o f the 
Bundeswehr’ (n 1784), 44. [‘Over the past few years, greater awareness o f the importance o f a more just world 
order has emerged where human rights must be protected and international humanitarian law strengthened. Not 
least due to the lessons learned in Kosovo, the notion is also becoming increasingly accepted in international law 
that the use o f force can be necessary to avert humanitarian disasters, combat terrorist threats and protect human 
rights. The international law doctrine o f  the Responsibility to Protect has developed as a result o f  the lessons 
learned from the intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Even i f  the states that have adopted this doctrine are probably  
still not in the majority, the debate about the Responsibility to Protect is increasingly impacting on the ways o f  
thinking in western countries. In the long term, this will affect the mandating o f international peace missions by 
the United Nations UNSC as legitimation under international law is crucial especially when military force is 
used’, emphasis added.]
2059 Federal Ministry o f  Defence, ibid.
2060 Statement o f the Representative o f France to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 
2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775). The United Kingdom and the United States have not expressly affirmed 
the need for UNSC authority in their general statements on RtoP. However, both approached the UNSC for 
authorisation in Libya which, as the United Kingdom Prime Minister later stated made the armed force “legal”. 
‘David Cameron: Libya Action is Necessary, Legal and Right’ The Telegraph (London, 20 March 2011) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/afficaandindianocean/libya/8393478/David-Cameron-Libya- 
action-is-necessary-legal-and-right.html> accessed 10 March 2012.
2061 For an overview o f  State positions on the interplay between the humanitarian intervention doctrine and the 
prohibition on armed force, see e.g. C Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (3rd edn OUP, Oxford 2008) 
47-51. For a discussion o f State positions, including the involvement o f other European States and the United 
States in the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo, see Gray at 39-47. See further G Evans, ‘From Humanitarian 
Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006-2007) 24 Wis. Int’l L.J 703. For an interesting assessment of
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regional (e.g. European level /United States level) or local (e.g. United Kingdom / France) 
customary law with regard to unauthorised armed force to protect populations from RtoP 
crimes. Even if there was a claim to this in future State practice, there is no basis to suggest 
that this could be legalised under secondary RtoP. It would clash with the Charter obligation 
for UNSC authority2062 and Article 103 of the Charter2063 obligates States to prioritise their 
Charter obligations over other laws (e.g. regional rule of customary law).
Admittedly, the overwhelming majority of State views,2064 the various responses to 
Russia’s armed force in South Ossetia and the authorised armed force in Libya all suggest 
that the use of unilateral or unauthorised armed force under secondary RtoP would be illegal. 
Furthermore, whilst the ICJ understands that international law can sometimes simply tolerate 
certain acts,2065 this would not apply to the unilateral or unauthorised use of armed force for 
human protection purposes because there is a clear prohibition on the use of armed force in 
both existing treaty and customary international law. There is therefore no room in which the 
idea of toleration could crystallise. Accordingly, the resort to unauthorised or unilateral 
armed force to discharge secondary RtoP would be illegal.
There could be situations where States or other actors consider it better to commit an 
illegal breach of the existing prohibition on armed force than to stand by whilst populations 
fall victim of RtoP crimes, however. We saw such a situation in State practice pre-RtoP, 
such as in Kosovo. Furthermore, Russia’s practice in South Ossetia illustrates that a State, 
group of States (i.e. “coalitions of the willing”) or regional organisations may nevertheless 
use unauthorised or unilateral armed force in RtoP cases. Additionally, this could arise if the 
UNSC cannot or will not act to discharge secondary RtoP. Syria could be one possible case. 
At the time of writing the UNSC remains unable to coercively discharge secondary RtoP
the role o f these States in Kosovo, see N White, ‘The Legality o f  Bombing in the Name o f Humanity’ (2000) 5 
(1) Journal o f Conflict & Security Law 27.
2062 UN Charter (n 1895), art 42.
2063 ibid, art 103 [‘In the event o f  a conflict between the obligations o f the Members o f the United Nations under 
the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the 
present Charter shall prevail’].
064 For e.g. Statements o f the Representatives o f Peru, Canada, Croatia, Pakistan Chile, France, South Africa, 
Algeria and New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State 
Views (n 1775); Statements o f the Representatives o f Brazil, the United States, the United Kingdom, Andorra and 
Korea to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (22 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f  the Marshall Islands, Sweden and Guatemala to the UNGA, ‘High-Level 
Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), April 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statements o f the Representatives o f Sri 
Lanka, Tanzania and Viet Nam to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (30 June 2005), June 2005 
State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Spain to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (1 July 2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775) and Statements o f the Representatives o f Brazil and 
Indonesia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (1 August 2005), August 2005 State Views (n 
1775).
2065 For e.g. third States’ recognition o f Kosovo’s unilateral declaration o f independence because international 
law neither expressly permits nor prohibits States from recognising Statehood. See the Declaration o f  Judge 
Simma, Advisory Opinion on the Legality o f  K osovo’s Unilateral Declaration o f  Independence, ICJ Reports 
2010, p. 3.
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because of the unwillingness of States, such as Russia2066 and China.2067 Should other States 
prioritise respect for existing legal regime on armed force over the protection of the Syrian 
population from RtoP crimes? The very fact that such questions are still relevant in present 
practice suggests that, legally, we have come no further forward from the 1990s debate on 
the legality vs. legitimacy of humanitarian interventions.2068 This is significant given that this 
was the very debate that RtoP was designed to resolve.2069 In addition, it raises the question 
of whether secondary RtoP has had any impact upon the perceived legitimacy o f unilateral or 
unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes. This writer would suggest that in 
cases where unilateral or unauthorised armed force is used because the UNSC fails to 
discharge secondary RtoP, the Outcome Document’s express recognition of the international 
community’s role in protecting populations could strengthen the contention that such armed 
force is both morally and politically legitimate.
These findings relate to broader themes in RtoP literature regarding legal status.2070 On the 
one hand, they strengthen some of the arguments made by commentators with regard to the 
legal status of primary and secondary RtoP. Whilst commentators2071 have noted that primary 
RtoP relates to States existing duties, such as the duty to prevent genocide, there has been 
limited consideration of whether primary RtoP (i) constitutes a legal obligation in its own 
right; (ii) may do more than simply repackage States existing duties by creating new 
interpretations to treaty duties (e.g. promote new forms of accountability in relation to 
States’ violations of existing human rights, humanitarian law duties) or, indeed, whether it 
could generate a new rule of customary international law over time (e.g. States’ duties with 
respect to a collective right to protection). In relation to secondary RtoP, Payandeh2072 argues 
that its legal value lies in its capacity to create new interpretations of the existing treaty 
provisions it covers, particularly those under the UN Charter.2073 In this line, Payandeh argues
2066 Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Records (4 
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 and (19 July 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6810.
2067 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Records, ibid.
2068 See particularly, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect (International Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 1-9.
2069 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, ibid.
2070 See particularly: Payandeh (n 1990); Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1778), 25- 
57; Welsh and Banda (n 1778); Stahn (n 1778) and L Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility 
to Protect” in S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), Protecting the Displaced: Deepening the Responsibility to 
Protect (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2010) 196-200; W Burke-White, “Adoption o f the Responsibility to Protect” in 
J Genser and I Cotier (eds), The Responsibility to Protect: The Promise o f  Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time 
(OUP, Oxford 2012) 22-23.
2071 See especially, A Bellamy and R Reike, “The Responsibility to Protect and International Law” in Bellamy, 
Davies and Glanville (n 1773), 89-94 [outlining the legal duties which primary RtoP interconnects with under 
international criminal, humanitarian and human rights law] and D Scheffer, “Atrocity Crimes Framing the 
Responsibility to Protect” in R Cooper and J Kohler (eds), Responsibility to Protect: The Global Moral Compact 
fo r  the 21st Century (Palgrave Macmillan, New York 2009) 77-98 [outlining the interplay between the RtoP 
framework and the legal basis and development o f  international criminal law].
2072 Payandeh (n 1990).
2073Payandeh, ibid, 491-92 [arguing that secondary RtoP may be used as a “dynamic interpretation” o f UN 
Charter obligations],
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that it is not secondaiy RtoP ‘as such that will become a norm of international law, but rather 
a concrete norm of international law that will change in light of the responsibility to 
protect’.2074 The present author’s examination of over four hundred State views2075 upholds 
this interpretation. There is nothing to suggest that States intended to formulate secondary 
RtoP as a new customary international law which obligated the international community to 
protect populations. Instead, the intention at the Summit was for secondary RtoP to be 
formulated as a new political/moral framework which subsumed obligations under the UN 
Charter in the specific context of preventing and responding to RtoP crimes.2076 As Canada2077 
argued, secondary RtoP’s value lies in its capacity to bring a ‘new purpose’2078 to the UN and 
its implementation of the UN Charter.
This trend in State views also adds support to some commentator2079 arguments regarding 
secondary RtoP’s potential to strengthen existing interpretations of treaty provisions. For 
example, it is argued that secondary RtoP reinforces the expanded interpretation of Article 
39 of the UN Charter,2080 specifically the wider notion of threats to peace and international 
security which arose during the 1990s.2081 Admittedly, elements of practice to date suggest 
that secondary RtoP reinforces this interpretation of Article 39, not least the explicit link 
between the UNSC’s Chapter VII mandate and the international community’s commitment 
to utilise Chapter VII enforcement measures in order to protect populations from RtoP 
crimes.2082 However, practice also suggests that whether or not this interpretation is utilised 
in RtoP cases remains at the discretion of the UNSC. As noted in chapter four, this discretion 
was clearly in operation in Syria when Russia and China suggested that the human rights
2074Payandeh, ibid.
2075 See Annex I (a)-(i).
2076 Burke-White takes a similar view, noting that ‘the relevant provisions o f the Outcome Document are political 
statements by heads o f government and the General Assembly reiterating existing international legal rules, 
potentially laying the groundwork for the establishment o f  new legal obligations in the future. More specifically, 
the document reaffirms existing rules o f treaty and customary international law prohibiting and requiring the 
prevention o f war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. While shifting the focus from the prosecution 
o f such crimes to their prevention, the Outcome Document builds on, rather than creates legal rules’. Burke- 
White (n 2070), 23.
2077 Statement o f the Representative o f Canada to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 
2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775).
2078 Canada, ibid.
2079 For e.g. Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 48-54; S Rosenberg, 
“Responsibility to Protect: A Framework for Prevention” in Bellamy, Davies and Glanville (n 1773), 191; P 
Akhavan, ‘Preventing Genocide: Measuring Success by What Does Not Happen’ (2011) 22 (1) Crim. L. F. 1, 13- 
lb; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 2013), 445- 
458; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 539 and Payandeh (n 1990), 499-501 
[with regard to its effect upon the UNSC P5].
2080 See particularly, Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’, ibid, 538-539; A M Slaughter, 
‘Security, Solidarity and Sovereignty: The Grand Themes o f  UN Reform’ (2005) 99 (3) AJIL 619, 626-627; 
Payandeh, ibid, 494-497. See also J Schott, ‘Chapter VII as Exception: UNSC Action and the Regulative Ideal o f 
Emergency’ (2007) 6 (1) Nw. Univ. J. Int’l Hum Rts. 24.
2081 Peters, Slaughter, Payandeh, ibid.
2082 As Payandeh writes: ‘Unlike Article 24(1) o f the U.N. Charter, which refers only to the responsibility o f  the 
UNSC for peace and security, the responsibility to protect links the power o f the UNSC explicitly to the 
humanitarian responsibility for the well-being of individuals’. Payandeh, ibid, 501.
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violations occurring were ‘not sufficiently egregious’2083 to warrant action under Chapter VII. 
The present author’s findings regarding secondary RtoP’s legal status also tend to challenge 
other arguments in the literature. Some commentators2084 argue that the Outcome Document 
is at most soft law because of the qualified language which is used in its secondary RtoP 
provisions.2085 There are reasons to be cautious regarding this. State practice suggests that 
secondary RtoP subsumes existing treaty obligations, such as those under the UN Charter, 
and therefore that elements of it are legally binding. Furthermore, qualified language may 
merely suggest that the international community retains a margin of appreciation with regard 
to their discharge of secondary RtoP. Legal obligations often embody such discretion and, as 
such, the use of qualified language need not necessarily be considered as an indication of 
soft law. Indeed, the UNSC’s mandate to maintain peace and security is effectively a 
discretionary obligation since its discharge depends upon there being sufficient political will 
to recognise that a situation falls within the scope of Article 39. Nevertheless, the legal status 
of this is unquestioned because, whilst entailing a subjective aspect, it remains a provision of 
a legally binding treaty. However, there is some support for the opposing view in the 
literature. Burke-White argues that terming the Outcome Document as an instrument of soft 
law ‘creates the misperception of a legally binding rule and may lead States worried about 
creeping legalisation to denounce the norm in an effort to avoid its legal codification’.2086 At 
one level, this is almost a prophetic statement. Secondary RtoP’s discharge in Libya created 
resurgence in State protests regarding secondary RtoP’s role in contemporary international 
affairs. Conversely, we have to bear in mind that soft law has been considered to represent a 
suitable compromise between those States who would accept a binding duty and those who 
would resist attempts to formulate a binding duty.2087 The field of minority protection is a 
useful illustration. Whilst the UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
Minorities remains an instrument of soft law,2088 it remains significant because (i) it maps out 
whether there is relative international consensus with respect to the nature and scope of
2083 Statement o f the Representative o f the United States to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6627.
2084 See especially, Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 25-57; Welsh and Banda,
(n 1778); Stahn (n 1778) and Shaffer and Pollack, ‘Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security’ (n 1778), 
1232.
2085 This writer does not find all o f these arguments compelling. For example, Strauss asserts that the “further 
consideration” provision is one aspect o f the Outcome Document which points to it being “soft law” because it 
qualifies RtoP’s capacity to become a norm o f customary international law. As authority, Strauss cites the ICJ’s 
reasoning in the North Sea Continental Shelf Case. This writer would suggest that caution should be taken here. 
The ICJ was addressing the issue o f whether a treaty provision could generate a norm o f customary international 
law. The principle therefore seems to have little bearing upon the capacity for a General Assembly Resolution, 
such as the Outcome Document, to become a customary international law rule. See Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand 
is Worth Two in the Bush”, ibid, 33 and North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 3, para 77.
2086 Burke-White (n 2070), 2.
2087 Chinkin, ‘The Challenge o f Soft Law’ (n 1778), 861.
2088 As Weller explains: ‘[t]here has been no movement seeking to convert the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities into a binding legal 
standard’. M Weller (ed), Universal Minority Rights (OUP, Oxford 2007), preface.
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States’ duties in the field of minority protection; and (ii) was less controversial among States 
because of its essentially political nature than that of Article 27 of the ICCPR. Whilst there 
remains resistance to secondary RtoP’s capacity to be discharged in practice, we have to 
offset this against the fact that, had the RtoP framework been proposed in the sense of new 
legally binding obligations, we would be unlikely to be witnessing its role in practice seven 
years later. Rather, those States who are sensitive to any weakening of the principles of non­
interference and the prohibition on armed force would at the very least have issued 
reservations at the time of its adoption, greatly restricting secondary RtoP’s role in practice. 
Perhaps most significantly, the field of minority protection reminds us that we need to bear 
in mind the significant impact that terming the Outcome Document as soft law can have 
upon those States who do not fear ‘creeping legalisation’2089 as much. The UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities can be influential because it encourages 
willing States to act in conformity with the minority rights therein and, moreover, for States 
to put pressure on those who are failing to act in conformity with those rights.2090 Thus, 
labelling the Outcome Document as soft law can help to strengthen the political legitimacy 
of efforts to apply secondary RtoP in practice, including by pressurising those members of 
the P5 who refuse to give effect to secondary RtoP in Syria.
Finally, the findings tend to challenge arguments that there is a prospect for secondary 
RtoP to develop the law on the unauthorised use of armed force for human protection 
purposes. The first argument is that the Outcome Document could itself provide an opening 
for countering claims that using unilateral or unauthorised armed force to discharge 
secondary RtoP is illegal. Bellamy,2091 Stahn2092 and other commentators2093 have noted that 
there could be some legal significance to the fact that the Outcome Document does not 
actually exclude unilateral or unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes. The 
present author does not find this argument compelling. Primarily, it tends to undermine the 
significance of the Outcome Document’s explicit statement that secondary RtoP should be 
discharged ‘through the UNSC, in accordance with the UN Charter’.2094 Context is important 
here. Examination of the drafting history of the Outcome Document suggests that this
2089 Burke-White (n 2070), 2.
2090 As Eide notes: ‘[pjolitical mechanisms can be useful in increasing the pressure on States which are reluctant 
to cooperate in the implementation o f minority rights’. A Eide, “Mechanisms for Supervision and Remedial 
Action” in Weller, Universal Minority Rights (n 2088), 25.
2091 Bellamy has observed that the Outcome Document’s failure to prohibit unauthorised action may provide ‘a 
window for lawyers to defend unauthorised intervention by reference to the outcome document’. A Bellamy, 
‘Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit’ (2006) 20 (2) 
Ethics and International Affairs 143, 166.
2092 Stahn (n 1778), 109.
2093 Payandeh (n 1990), 507-508.
2094 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
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provision was incorporated into the text in response to some States2095 arguing that secondary 
RtoP challenged the UN Charter by seeking to codify humanitarian intervention. We should 
therefore not attach too much significance to the fact that the Outcome Document does not 
explicitly exclude unilateral or unauthorised armed force. Rather, it would seem, that the 
drafters intended for the existing Charter prohibition on this to be read into the provisions on 
secondary RtoP via the inclusion of the requirement for its discharge to be ‘in accordance 
with the UN Charter’.2096
The second argument, advanced by Bellamy,2097 is that the use of unauthorised force for 
human protection purposes could fall outside the scope of the Charter prohibition.2098 Article 
2 (4) of the UN Charter prohibits armed force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity 
of a State or ‘in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.2099 
The Purposes entail the promotion of international respect for human rights.2100 According to 
Bellamy,2101 the use of force to protect populations from RtoP crimes could be argued to fall 
within the remit of this Purpose and, therefore, outside the legal reach of the Charter 
prohibition. Essentially, Bellamy is raising the possibility of using the argument advanced in 
earlier practice by proponents of humanitarian intervention (e.g. the UK). That is, the view 
that such armed force fell outside the Charter prohibition because it was undertaken to 
uphold human rights and, therefore, was in pursuit of the purposes of the United Nations.2102 
Again, the present author does not find this argument compelling. Admittedly, some State 
views are resonant of the earlier divisions regarding whether humanitarian intervention could 
be legally reconciled with the Charter prohibition. For example, in earlier practice China 
argued that there was no scope for this because the armed force was still being launched 
against a States sovereignty and territorial integrity.2103 China holds onto this interpretation 
today.2104 However, this should be offset against the fact that, since the Summit, no State has
2095 Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba, Belarus, Qatar, Egypt, Cote d ’Ivoire, Colombia, Bangladesh and 
Indonesia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (April 2005), April 2005 State Views (n 1775); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f Cuba, Algeria, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Iran and Singapore to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f the 
Representatives o f the Democratic Republic o f  Korea  and Brazil to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (22 June 2005), June 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statement o f  the Representatives o f Viet Nam, Sri 
Lanka and Venezuela to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005), June 2005 State Views 
(n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Argentina to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (July 
2005), July 2005 State Views (n 1775); Statements o f the Representatives o f  Cuba, Algeria, Mauritania (on 
behalf o f  the African Group), Malaysia (on behalf o f  the Non-Aligned Movement) and Syria to the UNGA, ‘High- 
Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (August 2005), WFM Report (n 1775); Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (16 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.81 and Statement o f  the 
Representative o f Zimbabwe to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.4.
2096 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2097 Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1773), 91.
2098 Bellamy, ibid.
2099 UN Charter (n 1895), art 2 (4).
2100 ibid, art 1 (3).
2101 Bellamy, The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (n 1773), 91.
2102 Gray (n 2061), 39-51.
2103 Gray, ibid.
2104 Statement o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6498.
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suggested that unauthorised armed force can be reconciled with the Charter prohibition. 
Rather, the majority of States consider that the use of armed force to discharge secondary 
RtoP should comply with Article 42 of the Charter by having the authorisation of the 
UNSC.2105 Whilst it is still too early to draw any definitive conclusions from this practice, it 
raises the possibility that States have moved away from attempts to reconcile the use of 
unauthorised armed force for human protection purposes with the Charter prohibition. 
Instead, States seem to understand that they owe (i) the general obligation to refrain from 
armed force in international relations; and (ii) the obligation to gain UNSC authorisation for 
the use of armed force. One explanation for this could be that secondaiy RtoP’s adoption at 
the Summit to some extent defeated arguments surrounding the wider concept of 
humanitarian intervention. To this effect, it codified a political consensus that there is no 
absolute prohibition on the use of armed force and that authorised and collective armed force 
for human protection purposes is both legal and legitimate. The present author would argue 
that practice to date therefore sustains the majority view in the existing literature on 
secondary RtoP’s armed force component.2,06 That is, that the secondary RtoP codified in the 
Outcome Document does not create any new legal rules regarding the use of armed force but, 
rather, establishes a political legitimacy for using armed force to protect populations from 
RtoP crimes in cases like Libya.2107
2105 These include: Statement o f the Representatives o f Australia to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the 
Plenary’ (28 July 2005); Statements o f the Representatives o f Canada, Chile, China, European Union, France 
and New Zealand to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (21 June 2005), Statement o f the 
Representative o f the United States to the UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’ (22 June 2005); 
Statements o f the Representatives o f Colombia, Dominica (on behalf o f  CAR1COM), Israel and Tanzania to the 
UNGA, ‘High-Level Meeting o f the Plenary’ (30 June 2005). June-July 2005 State Views (n 1775).
2106 The following are good examples o f this position: G Evans, The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass 
Atrocity Crimes Once and fo r  A ll (Brookings, Washington D.C. 2008) 223-41; Arbour, ‘The Responsibility to 
Protect as a Duty o f Care in International Law and Practice’ (n 2013), 456; Welsh and Banda (n 1778), 225; S 
Breau, ‘The Impact o f the Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping’ (2007) 11 (3) Journal o f Conflict &
Security Law 429,440 and 464; H Nasu, ‘Operationalising the “Responsibility to Protect” and Conflict 
Prevention: Dilemmas o f Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict’ (2009) 14 (2) Journal o f Conflict & Security 
Law 209, 219; E McClean, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The Role o f International Human Rights Law’ (2008) 
13 (1) Journal o f Conflict and Security Law 123, 129; J McCarthur, ‘A Responsibility to Rethink? Challenging 
Paradigms in Human Security’ (2008) 63 Int’l J. 422,431-33 and N Wheeler and F Egerton, ‘The Responsibility 
to Protect: ‘Precious Commitment’ or a Promise Unfulfilled?’ (2009) 1 Global Responsibility to Protect 114, 128- 
29; J Brunee and S Toope, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Use o f Force: Building Legality?” in Bellamy, 
Davies and Glanville (n 1773), 71-79 and J Sarkin, ‘Is the Responsibility to Protect an Accepted Norm o f  
International Law in the Post-Libya Era? How its Third Pillar Ought to Be Applied’ (2012) 1 Groningen Journal 
o f International Law 11-48, 21-28.
2107 Some commentators consider that the political legitimacy o f using armed force for human protection 
purposes was confirmed in UNSC Resolution 1973’s explicit link between armed force and protecting civilians in 
Libya. See especially, J Welsh, ‘Civilian Protection in Libya: Putting Coercion and Controversy Back into RtoP’
(2011) 25 (3) Ethics & International Affairs 255, 258-260; A Bellamy, ‘Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: 
The Exception and the Norm’ (2011) 25 (3) Ethics & International Affairs 263, 263-264; Shaffer and Pollack, 
‘Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security’ (n 1778), 1235-1236 and A Bellamy and P D Williams ‘The 
New Politics o f Protection? Cote d’Ivoire, Libya, and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) 87 (4) Int’l Aff. 825, 
825.
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3 The Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP
Determining the character of primary and secondary RtoP is important because it can help to 
clarity some of the approaches taken in practice with respect to their legal status. For 
example, if secondary RtoP is not a binding duty, then can we expect anything but the UNSC 
to fa il to act in accordance with it in cases like Syria? Furthermore, secondary RtoP’s 
character merits consideration because it has become a major theme in the literature.2108 
Notably, primary RtoP’s character receives much less attention in present literature. 
Discussion of primary RtoP is limited to noting its overlap with States duties under existing 
treaty and customary international law.2109 This has led to the presumption that, because 
States already have duties to protect their populations from RtoP crimes, primary RtoP was 
formulated as a duty at the Summit.2110 There is some merit to this view. The Outcome 
Document (i) confers primary RtoP on the specific bearer (‘each individual State’2111) to 
which duties are assigned;2112 (ii) suggests that primary RtoP’s implementation is mandatory 
(i.e. the explicit provision that State undertake to ‘act in accordance’2113 with it); and (iii) 
clarifies that the only discretion that States have is in terms of the specific means that they 
use to discharge primary RtoP (e.g. to prevent RtoP crimes through ‘appropriate and 
necessary means’2114). This structure tends to overlap with the traditional formulation of 
States human rights duties, such as the legally binding duties with respect to minority rights 
in Article 27 of the ICCPR.2115 Specifically, primary RtoP overlaps with this duty (i) by being 
conferred on a particular bearer (e.g. “State Parties to the present Covenant’2116 / ‘each 
individual State’2117); (ii) its specificity in terms of the aim of the duty (e.g. to ensure that 
minorities are ‘not denied’2118 the rights therein / to prevent RtoP crimes in the State2119); and
(iii) programmatic nature (i.e. margin of appreciation regarding the specific means used to
2108 See especially, Payandeh (n 1990); Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 25-57; 
Welsh and Banda (n 1778); Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 196- 
200 and Stahn (n 1778), 118-119.
2109 See especially, Bellamy and Reike (n 2071), 89-94 [outlining the legal duties which primary RtoP 
interconnects with under international criminal, humanitarian and human rights law] and Scheffer (n 2071), 77-98 
[outlining the interplay between the RtoP framework and the legal basis and development o f  international 
criminal law],
2110 See particularly, Stahn (n 1778), 118-119.
2111 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
2112 On this requirement for a duty, see especially Cunliffe (n 1926), 55. See also K Tan, “The Duty to Protect” in 
T Nardin and M Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (New York University Press, New York 2006) 95; 
Welsh and Banda, (n 1778), 217-226 and Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect”
(n 2070), 295-297.
2113 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
2114 Outcome Document, ibid.
2115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 
March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 art 27. (ICCPR).
2116 Preamble, ibid.
2117 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
2118 ICCPR (n 2115) art 27.
2119 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
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implement Article 27 / discharging primary RtoP through ‘appropriate and necessary 
means’2120). The character of secondary RtoP is less clear, however. Accordingly, a useful 
starting point for our discussion of its character is to consider the approaches which have 
been adopted to this issue in present RtoP literature.
3.1 Duty, Right or Responsibility? Present Literature on the Character of 
Secondary RtoP
Secondary RtoP has been characterised in one of three ways in present literature, specifically 
as a (i) duty to protect populations from RtoP crimes2121 (e.g. duty of care2122 or duty to 
act2123); (ii) right to protect populations from RtoP crimes;2124 and (iii) responsibility to 
protect populations from RtoP crimes.2125 The present author considers that some arguments 
inherent in each approach are persuasive, whilst others are not compelling.
3.1.1 Duty to Protect
There are two persuasive aspects to assessments of whether secondary RtoP entails the 
character of a binding duty. First, commentators correctly point to the fact that the main 
impediment to recognising secondary RtoP as a duty or obligation lies in the fact that the 
Outcome Document does not identify a specific bearer but, instead, attaches secondary RtoP 
to the somewhat open-ended “international community”.2126 Whilst we saw in chapter two
2120 Outcome Document, ibid.
2121 See particularly, Arbour (n 2013); Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 51-54; 
Akhavan (n 2079), 13-16 [on secondary RtoP and the duty to prevent genocide]; Stahn (n 1778); Peters, 
‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 539; Payandeh (n 1990), 499-501; Nasu (n 2106), 
216-234; J Pattison, Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene? (OUP, 
Oxford 2010) 15-20 [examining whether armed force element is a duty rather than a right],
2122 Arbour, ibid.
2123 For e.g. Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 539; Payandeh (n 1990), 501 
and Nasu (n 2106), 216-234.
2124 Discussion o f  the way in which secondary RtoP contributes to moves away from, or an entrenchment of, a 
“right to intervene” is a major theme in RtoP literature. The following can be consulted as mere examples o f 
present consideration o f whether secondary RtoP entails the character o f a “right”: Peters, ibid, 533-535; 
Slaughter (n 2080), 621; Arbour (n 2013), 447-450; Brunee and Toope (n 2107), 76; A Orford, ‘From Promise to 
Practice? The Legal Significance o f the Responsibility to Protect Concept’ (2011)3 Global Responsibility to 
Protect 400, 401 and R Mani and T G Weiss, ‘RtoP’s Missing Link, Culture’ (2011) 3 Global Responsibility to 
Protect 451, 457.
2125 See especially, A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP, Cambridge 2011) 
25-27; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 48; Payandeh (n 1990), 482-484 and 
508-513; Welsh and Banda (n 1778), 216-220; L Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’
(2012) 12(1) Hum Rts. L. Rev. 1, 18-19 and further at 27-30; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  
Sovereignty’, ibid, 540; A Bird, ‘Third State Responsibility for Human Rights Violations’ (2010) 21 (4) EJIL 
883, 886-888 [on the specific issue o f the way in which secondary RtoP can be grounded in the “duty to 
cooperate” inherent in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility]. Brunee and Toope, ibid, 74-77. For a discussion 
of the “obligation to protect” in the context o f the framework o f  the ILC Articles on State Responsibility for an 
Internationally Wrongful Act, see generally M Hakimi, ‘State Bystander Responsibility’ (2010) 21 (2) EJIL 341.
2126 For e.g. Cunliffe argues that ‘not a single formulation o f the doctrine to date is able succinctly to express and 
logically to demonstrate that there is a single, identifiable agent formally obligated to act or intervene in a
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that examination of State views enables us to map out at least a working definition of the 
“international community”, there is a crucial difference between delineating which actors 
can discharge secondary RtoP and those which bear secondary RtoP as a general and 
binding “duty”. Second, the Outcome Document does not identify any consequences fo r  a 
failure to discharge secondary RtoP, something that should be in place if secondary RtoP 
was intended to entail the character of a duty.2127 Notably, the preceding section outlined that 
no consequences for a failure to discharge secondary RtoP have been developed or, indeed, 
proposed for development, in subsequent practice. For these reasons, this writer considers 
that secondary RtoP’s character cannot be ascribed to that of duty.
This writer does not find proposals regarding the ways in which secondary RtoP could be 
“perfected”2128 as a duty to be compelling either. It is important to recall that there is no 
widespread support among States for formulating secondary RtoP as a binding duty. For 
example, during drafting of the Outcome Document the US explicitly argued that the UNSC 
has never been interpreted to have a duty to authorise enforcement measures.2129 If the 
drafters had pressed for secondary RtoP to be accepted as a binding duty to protect 
populations then this would have quite likely led to challenges over undermining the 
UNSC’s discretion over whether or not to authorise the application of Chapter VII measures 
in RtoP cases. This would have probably led to deadlock over the RtoP framework at the 
Summit. Furthermore, the potentially significant implications inherent in “perfecting” 
secondary RtoP in a manner akin to the duty to prevent genocide extraterritorially should be 
borne in mind. Arbour infers that the existence of a “duty of care” could be based in the 
‘three elements’2130 approach flowing from the ICJ’s interpretation of the duty to prevent 
genocide in the Bosnia Genocide Case.213' Arbour proposes an expanded version of the ICJ’s 
notion of proximity which suggests that the duty to prevent genocide falls particularly on
particular situation’. Cunliffe (n 1926), 55. See also Tan (n 2112), 95; Welsh and Banda, ibid, 217-226 and 
Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 295-297.
2127 As Alvarez notes: ‘RtoP poses less serious but other troubling problems if  taken seriously as legal principle. 
For international lawyers who worship at the shrine o f the Articles o f  State Responsibility, all international legal 
persons are legally liable when they either take wrongful action or fail to act when action is demanded by 
international law. If there is such a thing as a responsibility to protect, the legal mind naturally assumes that a 
failure to exercise such responsibility is an internationally wrongful act entailing the usual panoply o f potential 
remedies, including the legal liability o f the wrongful actor and the potential for countermeasures against that 
actor by others’. J E Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f  RtoP’ (Panel Presentation at the ‘Hague Joint Conference 
on Contemporaiy Issues o f International Law: Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years After the 1907 Hague Peace 
Conference’, The Hague, 30 June 2007) <http://www.asil.org/pdfs/r2pPanel.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012. On 
the absence o f  consequences for a failure to discharge secondary RtoP and the significance for this for its 
character, see particularly Stahn (n 1778), 118 and Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 
1773), 53. Non-accountability under legal mechanisms is said to be a feature o f an instrument entailing “soft law” 
character. For a good discussion o f this see Chinkin, ‘The Challenge o f Soft Law’ (n 1778), 865-866. For 
proposals regarding legal consequences for a failure to discharge if  that failure overlaps with a breach o f  a States 
existing obligation, such as the duty to prevent genocide, see particularly, Arbour (n 2013), 454 and Peters, 
‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 540.
2128 See especially, Arbour, ibid, 451-455 and Tan (n 2112), 96.
2129 Letter of the US Ambassador, John Bolton (n 1793), 1.
2130 Arbour (n 2013), 451.
2131 Arbour, ibid, 449-455.
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States who are closest to the situation (e.g. neighbouring States).2132 Arbour considers that 
under the “duty of care” all reasonable steps to discharge secondary RtoP should be borne 
both by (i) States who are most geographically proximate to the RtoP situation;2133 and (ii) 
States who are proximate to the situation due to wider links such as historical, political and 
economic ties.2134 This writer would suggest that the effectiveness of this approach could 
have particular policy implications in RtoP cases involving minorities. In such cases, one 
could expect that the Kin State of the minority group may be the most proximate (e.g. Russia 
and Russian citizens in South Ossetia).2135 At a policy level, suggesting that such States 
should be the chief implemented of the “duty of care” may lead to the Kin State of the 
minority group inappropriately invoking this “duty” to justify their interference or 
intervention in the neighbouring State, thereby potentially undermining those existing 
minority protection principles which aim to restrict excessive interference of the Kin 
State.2136
3.1.2 Right to Protect
A persuasive view in this section of the literature2137 is that it is difficult to reconcile 
secondary RtoP as a general right to intervene/protect because rights are discretionary in 
terms of whether they are discharged and the specific ways in which they are discharged.2138 
The Outcome Document’s qualified language tends to resonate with the discretionary nature 
of rights. Discretion comes through in the Outcome Document provisions (i) for secondary 
RtoP to be discharged ‘through the UNSC [...] on a case-by-case basis';2139 and (ii) that the 
international community is ‘prepared to act’2140 in a ‘timely and decisive’2141 manner. These
2132 Arbour, ibid, 454-55.
2133 Arbour, ibid, 454.
2134 Arbour, ibid.
2135 On this see, N Turner and N Otsuki, The Responsibility to Protect Minorities and the Problem o f  the Kin 
State (UN University, Tokyo 2010) 2-3.
2136 See e.g. OSCE: High Commissioner for National Minorities, The Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on 
National Minorities and Inter-State Relations and Explanatory Note (OSCE HCNM, the Netherlands 2008) and 
Venice Commission, ‘Report o f the Preferential Treatment o f National Minorities by their Kin State’ (2001) Doc. 
CDL/INF <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-INF(201 l)019-e.pdf> accessed 18 June 2012.
2137 See e.g. Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 533-535; Slaughter (n 2080), 
621; Arbour (n 2013), 447-450; Brunee and Toope (n 2107), 76; Orford, ‘From Promise to Practice? The Legal 
Significance o f the Responsibility to Protect Concept’ (n 2124), 401 and Mani and Weiss (n 2124), 457.
2138 On the discretionary character o f “rights” in the specific context o f the “right to intervene” see Arbour (n 
2013), 447. We see this discretion coming through in the African Union’s right to intervene in cases involving 
mass atrocity crimes which is imposed by 4 (h) o f its Constitutive Act. It provides that the Union has the right to 
‘intervene in a Member State’ but it does not suggest that they must intervene. This is pursuant to all rights 
entailing some discretion over whether they are implemented at all. Furthermore, it provides that the right 
empowers the Union to ‘intervene’. The concept o f  intervention inherent to the right is wide-ranging, potentially 
involving a host o f acts (e.g. sanctions to the coercive use o f force). This is consistent with rights leaving their 
bearers discretion over the specific ways in which they exercise it. Constitutive Act o f the African Union 
(adopted 11 July 2000, entered into force 26 May 2001) 2158 UNTS 3 art 4 (h). (AU Constitutive Act).
2139 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139, emphasis added.
2140 Outcome Document, ibid.
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phrases suggest that the international community can discharge secondary RtoP but, at the 
same time, denote that the international community retains discretion over whether it is 
discharged in a particular case. These elements of the Outcome Document suggest that the 
international community may exercise a right to protect under secondary RtoP when it has 
the capacity and will to do so. However, this writer considers that characterising secondary 
RtoP as a general “right to protect” tends to undermine (i) that secondary RtoP interacts with 
existing treaty obligations (e.g. UNSC’s obligation to maintain international peace and 
security2142) and, therefore, that at least elements of secondary RtoP are stronger than a 
“right”; and (ii) the fact that, like duties, “rights” are also usually held by a specific bearer.2143
3.1.3 Responsibility to Protect
Assessments of secondary RtoP from the perspective of a responsibility to protect,2144 take 
different approaches to the way in which ‘[t]he vocabulary of responsibility’2145 works in the 
Outcome Document. Orford2146 construes “responsibility” in the sense of a permissive rule, 
arguing that the Outcome Document uses ‘language for conferring authority and allocating 
powers rather than as a language for imposing binding obligations and commanding 
obedience’.2147 The present author agrees that the Outcome Document (i) allocates authority 
to discharge secondary RtoP (i.e. through its references to peaceful responses being 
undertaken ‘through the United Nations’2148); (ii) allocates powers to discharge secondary 
RtoP (e.g. non-peaceful responses being undertaken ‘through the UNSC’,2149 in accordance 
with their existing power to authorise enforcement measures under Chapter VII); (iii) did not 
impose ‘binding obligations’2150 (e.g. it only “commits” the international community to
2141 Outcome Document, ibid.
2142 UN Charter (n 1895) arts 24 (1) and 39.
2143 For e.g. the right to intervene discussed above is conferred explicitly provides for ‘[t]he right o f the Union to 
intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision o f the Assembly in respect o f grave circumstances, namely 
war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity’, emphasis added. AU Constitutive Act (n 2138) art 4 (h).
2144 This assessment has been undertaken by, for example: Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility 
to Protect (n 2125) 25-27; Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 48; Payandeh (n 
1990), 482-484 and 508-513; Welsh and Banda (n 1778), 216-220; Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect 
Beyond Borders’ (n 2126), 18-19 and 27-30; Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 
2013), 540; Bird (n 2125), 886-888 [on the specific issue o f the way in which secondary RtoP can be grounded in 
the “duty to cooperate” inherent in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility] and Brunee and Toope (n 2107), 74- 
77.
2145 Orford, ibid, 25.
2146 Orford, ibid.
2147 She argues that we should instead evaluate its character as ‘a form o f  law that confers pow ers ‘o f a public or 
official nature’ and that allocates jurisdiction’, emphasis added. H L A Hart, The Concept o f  Law  (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford 1961) 28 and 32 cited in Orford, ibid, 25. Chesterman has supported Orford’s interpretation o f  the 
character o f  secondary RtoP as a permission to protect. See S Chesterman, ‘Leading from Behind: The 
Responsibility to Protect, the Obama Doctrine, and Humanitarian Intervention After Libya’ (2011) 25 (3) Ethics 
& International Affairs 279, 282.
2148 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2149 Outcome Document, ibid.
2150 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, (n 2125), 25.
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provide assistance to States to help them to fulfil primary RtoP2151); and (iv) does not 
“command obedience”2152 (i.e. it does not provide for consequences for a failure to discharge 
secondary RtoP).
However, this writer is not convinced by characterising the notion of “responsibility” 
inherent in secondary RtoP in the sense of merely a permission to protect.2153 Examination of 
the approaches taken to secondary RtoP’s status in practice suggests that at least elements of 
secondary RtoP are stronger than this. There is some support for interpreting existing treaty 
provisions in light of secondary RtoP as a moral and/or political obligation to protect, 
especially the UNSC’s mandate to maintain international peace and security.2154 Perhaps 
most significantly, contouring “responsibility” in the sense of permission tends to undermine 
that secondary RtoP also subsumes existing prohibitive obligations, not least the Charter 
prohibition on the use of armed force for human protection purposes which does not have the 
prior authorisation of the UNSC.2155
Glanville2156 represents the second way in which “responsibility” is contoured in present 
literature, examining secondary RtoP’s character in the sense of a moral, political or legal 
responsibility.2157 Glanville persuasively argues that secondary RtoP could amount to a 
general political responsibility because in practice relevant members of the international 
community have explained that they are undertaking certain actions for protective purposes 
and have provided reasons to justify a failure to take protective action.2158 There is some 
support for this characterisation in practice. With respect to justifying action for protective 
reasons, the explicit reference to using armed force to ‘protect civilians’2159 in Libya is a 
primary example. In relation to providing reasons to justify inaction, it is notable that 
Russia2160 and China2161 have sought to explain their decision to use the veto to block action 
in Syria. However, the argument that relevant actors may have a “political responsibility to 
protect” because they consider that they are required to provide a ‘reasonable justification for
2151 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2152 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, (n 2125), 25.
2153 Orford, ibid.
2154 The primary example o f  support for this possibility is that a number o f  third States sponsored the draft 
Resolution for the approval o f the Third Committee when Russia and China failed to discharge secondary RtoP, 
and their international peace and security, by blocking action in Syria. See UN Press Release, ‘Third Committee 
Approves Resolution Condemning Human Rights Violations in Syria’ (n 2009).
2155 UN Charter (n 1895) art 2 (4). This was clear in the fact that UNSC authority was gained for the use o f armed 
force in Libya. See also examples o f State views affirming the requirement for UNSC authority to discharge 
secondary RtoP through the use o f armed force (n 2064).
2156 Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070).
2157 Glanville, ibid, 192-196 [moral responsibility], 196-200 [legal responsibility] and 200-203 [political 
responsibility].
215* Glanville, ibid, 201-202.
2159 UNSC Res 1973 (2011) (n 1786), para 4.
2160 Statements o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Records (4 
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627, (4 February 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6711 and (19 July 2012) UN Doc 
S/PV.6810.
2161 Statements o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Records, ibid.
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inaction’,2162 tends to lose its grounding when we recall Russia2163 and China2164 explained 
their use of the veto in order to maintain respect for Syria’s sovereignty and the principle of 
non-interference in internal affairs, principles which secondary RtoP seeks to qualify and 
reconceptualise in light of human protection. In addition, whilst Glanville’s assessment of 
secondary RtoP as a moral responsibility had the potential to bring a new insight into 
discussions over its character, his assessment tends to become less compelling when he 
conflated the notion of “responsibility” with traditional understandings of a “duty”. To this 
effect, Glanville argues that the Outcome Document fails to confer secondary RtoP as a 
“responsibility” because it does not assign the responsibility to a specific bearer.2165 
Arguably, this tends to presume that a “responsibility” is subject to the same requirement as 
a binding “duty”, namely the requirement for a readily identifiable bearer and not the wider 
concept of the “international community”.2166 Finally, Glanville’s assessment of secondary 
RtoP as a “legal responsibility” highlights the difficulty that can arise when seeking to 
ground secondary RtoP’s overall character in existing legal formulations of rules, such as the 
duty of third States to prevent genocide extraterritorially. As Glanville notes, the barrier to 
this assessment is that secondary RtoP falls upon an array of potential actors by being 
assigned to the broader “international community”.2167 There is therefore ambiguity over 
which actors would carry out the “legal responsibility” and, therefore, whether secondary 
RtoP can be borne as a “legal responsibility” at all.2168
The third way in which “responsibility” is delineated in present literature is in its 
traditional public international law of accountability fo r  an internationally wrongful act. 
Several commentators2169 have examined the way in which secondary RtoP can be grounded 
in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. On the one hand, this assessment is useful. It 
helps to explain the interplay between a failure to fulfil primary RtoP and secondary RtoP’s 
activation by recalling that the (i) RtoP framework entails obligations erga omnes, such as 
the duty to prevent genocide;2170 and (ii) ILC Articles on State Responsibility provide that 
erga omnes obligations are owed to the international community as a whole.2171 On the other
2162 Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 204.
2163 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 
October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
2164 See particularly, Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record, ibid.
2165 Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 195-196.
2166 Cunliffe (n 1926), 55; Tan (n 2112), 95 and Welsh and Banda, (n 1778), 217-226.
2167 Glanville, “The International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 199-200.
2168 Glanville, ibid.
2169 See especially, Payandeh (n 1990), 508-513; Stahn (n 1778), 115-120; Welsh and Banda (n 1778), 216-220; 
Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’ (n 2126), 18-19 and 27-30; Peters, ‘Humanity as the 
Alpha and Omega o f Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 540; Bird (n 2125), 886-888; Brunee and Toope (n 2107), 74-77.
217 Payandeh, ibid, 510.
2171 International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
With Commentaries’ Yearbook o f the International Law Commission Vol. 2, Part 2 (2001), 32-38.
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hand, the ILC Articles do not address whether (i) there is a “positive duty of cooperation”2172 
to bring to an end serious breaches of erga omnes obligations; or (ii) States who are not 
directly affected by a breach of these obligations can apply countermeasures in response to 
the aforementioned type of violation.2173 In both cases, the ILC Articles leave the issues as 
subject to the further development of international law.2174 Difficulty is usually encountered 
when attempting to reconcile secondary RtoP with these aspects of the ILC Articles.
One example of this difficulty are the conclusions that Payandeh draws from her 
assessment of whether the RtoP Reports affirm that States who are not directly affected can 
apply countermeasures, as opposed to retorsions or claims for reparation.2175 Although she 
acknowledges that the UNSG’s 2009 Report on Implementing RtoP ‘discusses sanctions 
only in the context of the UNSC’,2176 Payandeh argues that the Report ‘nevertheless 
accentuates the importance of collective action outside the UN framework with regard to 
non-forcible measures’.2177 The present author would argue that the difficulty with invoking 
this as authority for the possibility that secondary RtoP attempts to progressively develop the 
issue left open by the ILC is that it tends to overlook what States agreed to undertake at the 
Summit. Here, it should be recalled that the Outcome Document provides that:
‘The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to 
use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.2178
As Payandeh herself recognises, the above Outcome Document provision isolates collective 
action to the UN.2179 Accordingly, it seems somewhat tentative to argue that secondary RtoP 
may develop the law regarding the adoption of countermeasures by States which are not 
directly affected by the breach of erga omnes obligations.
3.2 The Character of Primary and Secondary RtoP: General Findings
The present author considers that the character of primary RtoP is relatively clear. Primary
2172 International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (3 
August 2001) UN Doc A/56/83 art 41 (1) discussed in Stahn (n 1778), 115-116 and Bird (n 2125), 886-888. (ILC 
Articles on State Responsibility).
2173 International Law Commission Articles, ibid, art 54 discussed in Payandeh (n 1990), 510-511.
2174 ILC Articles, ibid, art 41 (1) discussed in Stahn (n 1778), 115-116 and ILC Articles, ibid, art 54 discussed in 
Payandeh, ibid.
2175 Payandeh, ibid, 511-513.
2176 Payandeh, ibid, 511-512.
2177 Payandeh, ibid, 512.
2178 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139, emphasis added.
2179 Payandeh, (n 1990), 512.
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RtoP is conferred on a specific bearer2180 and, furthermore, entails discretion not over 
whether it is implemented but only the specific means by which it is implemented.2181 
Primary RtoP therefore seems to largely overlap with the character of the existing duties of 
States that it subsumes.
In contrast, the above assessment of existing literature illustrates that secondary RtoP 
cannot be easily ascribed as a general duty, obligation, right or responsibility in its traditional 
forms. Unlike a general and binding duty, it is not assigned to a specific bearer2182 and there 
are no consequences for a failure to enforce it.2183 Secondary RtoP also lacks the precision of 
a “right” because it is not attached to any specific actor but the international community 
more generally. Furthermore, it seems to exceed a permissive responsibility because it also 
subsumes prohibitive obligations, not least the prohibition on the use of armed force which is 
not undertaken as part of a State’s right to self-defence or with the authorisation of the 
UNSC. This writer would argue that the overarching weakness in present literature flows 
from the fact that commentators are attempting to reconcile secondary RtoP’s character with 
traditional formulations (e.g. “duty”, “right”, “responsibility” in the sense of an 
internationally wrongful act). Arguably, the broader significance of secondary RtoP can be 
better appreciated by changing the point of reference of assessment from the old to the new.
3.2.1 A Way Forward? Secondary RtoP and the Emerging Notion of "Responsibility”
To this writer, secondary RtoP echoes the multi-faceted and heterogeneous character 
inherent in the novel notion of “responsibility” emerging in a business and human rights 
context.2184 There is the duty to protect upon States under primary RtoP2185 akin to States duty 
to protect human rights in the context of the business and human rights agenda.2186 Like the 
understanding that businesses, via their “sphere of influence”,2187 have a moral and/or social 
responsibility to contribute to protecting human rights in the course of their dealings, the 
international community has a general moral and/or political responsibility to undertake 
what actions they can to protect populations from RtoP crimes. Just as businesses 
“responsibility” is grounded in the expectation that they should take what actions they can to
2180 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
2181 Outcome Document, ibid.
2182 Cunliffe (n 1926), 55; Tan (n 2112), 95; Welsh and Banda (n 1778), 217-226 and Glanville, “The 
International Community’s Responsibility to Protect” (n 2070), 295-297.
2183 Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (n 2127); Stahn (n 1778), 118 and Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is 
Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 53.
2184 UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights (n 1787).
2185 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 138.
2186 UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights (n 1787), 9-14.
2187 UNHRC, ibid, 19-20.
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protect human rights,2188 secondary RtoP builds upon the expectations that arose from the 
inaction of the international community in cases like Rwanda, setting down an expectation 
that international protective action (i) should (not must) be undertaken (e.g. through Chapter 
VI, VII and VIII of the UN Charter); and (ii) should not (not must) be prevented from being 
undertaken (e.g. by UNSC veto).
Arguably, characterising secondary RtoP in terms of this emerging notion of 
“responsibility” helps to address questions left unanswered in present literature. The reason 
for the failure to assign secondary RtoP to a specific bearer may simply be because there was 
no intention to formulate it as a binding duty. Instead, the intent may have been to codify 
secondary RtoP as a general ‘global standard’2189 of the ‘expected conduct’2190 of each of 
member of the international community. For example that the UNSC should recognise RtoP 
crimes to represent threats to international peace and security, authorise Chapter VII 
enforcement measures when necessary.
Furthermore, it may be unnecessary to examine whether secondary RtoP does, by reason 
of not explicitly excluding individual States from applying countermeasures,2191 reflect and/or 
progress the traditional understanding of “responsibility” as accountability for an 
internationally wrongful act. It may be better to simply acknowledge that the general
consensus is that the role of individual States is limited to acting through the UN or regional
organisations and, therefore, that secondary RtoP seeks to codify the expectation of what 
third States should do in the event of RtoP crimes, not as an attempt to progress the law in 
relation to what actions third States may take to address an internationally wrongful act 
which they are not directly affected by.2192
It is perhaps unsurprising that the RtoP framework can be characterised in a similar way 
to that of business and human rights. Both frameworks were an attempt to map out a 
consensus over similar tensions. It would have been controversial to try to suggest that 
businesses have somehow acquired a binding duty to protect human rights, just as it would 
have been highly contentious to ask the international community to accept that it must act 
(including by authorising Chapter VII enforcement measures) in every case of RtoP crimes. 
Neither “duty” has any basis in existing international law. What both frameworks have 
achieved is (i) explicitly codifying that it is not only States who are in a position to protect
2188 UNSG’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, ‘The UN “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (September 2010), 2 <http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie- 
protect-respect-remedy-ffamework.pdf> accessed 11 February 2012 and UNHRC, ibid, 8.
UNSG’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, ibid.
2190UNSG’s Special Representative on Business and Human Rights, ibid.
2191 Stahn (n 1778), 119.
2192 Either in terms o f progressing (i) the nature o f  the “duty o f cooperation” under Article 41 (1), International 
Law Commission Articles on Responsibility o f States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) see Stahn, ibid,
115-116 or (ii) States who are not directly affected by the breach at issue undertaking countermeasures in the 
collective interest provision in Article 54, International Law Commission Articles on Responsibility o f  States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) (see Payandeh (n 1990), 510-511).
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human rights; (ii) identifying the broader range of actors who are in a position to do so (e.g. 
businesses,2193 regional organisations,2194 UNSC2195); and (iii) expressly providing that this 
respective range of actors should use the measures at their disposal in order to achieve this 
(e.g. workplace policies,2196 complaint mechanisms,2197 / Chapters VI,2198 v n 2199 and VIII2200 of 
the UN Charter).
Conclusion
This chapter began by noting that no State intended to create primary and secondary RtoP as 
new legal obligations at the Summit. The chapter therefore examined whether primary and 
secondary RtoP (i) entail legally binding elements; (ii) have become new customary 
international law in subsequent practice; (iii) create new interpretations to existing treaty 
obligations; or (iv) are effective as soft law.
The chapter noted that whilst primary and secondary RtoP have been discharged in State 
practice, there is no evidence to suggest that States or the international community consider 
that they are legally obligated to do so. Furthermore, an implicit theme throughout the 
chapter is that there is rarely an express statement that protective measures are being applied 
in order to implement primary and secondary RtoP. Although this may not be significant 
with regard to the actual implementation of the measures,2201 it can be legally significant 
because it suggests that the legal authority of their application is considered to be the existing 
instruments to which primary and secondary RtoP relate. Accordingly, at the time of writing, 
there is no evidence of opinio juris on which to argue that either has become new customary 
international law.
However, there is evidence that primary and secondary RtoP subsume a wide variety of 
legal duties and obligations and, therefore, that each entail at least legally binding elements. 
In terms of primary RtoP, these include States duties to (i) prevent genocide;2202 (ii) respect,
2193 UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights (n 1787), 14.
2194 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2195 Outcome Document, ibid.
2196 UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights (n 1787), 15 and 17.
2197 UNHRC, ibid, 24-25.
2198 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139.
2199 Outcome Document, ibid.
2200 Outcome Document, ibid.
2201 This was a point made by the UN Special Adviser on RtoP. E C Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The 
Evolution of the RtoP Concept’ (Keynote address at the European Science Foundation Conference ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice’, Linkoping, Sweden, 9 June 2010).
2202 Genocide Convention (n 1924) art 1. See also Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 2007, p. 221, para 430.
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protect and fulfil human rights;2203 and (iii) permit access to humanitarian agencies and 
personnel.2204 In relation to secondary RtoP, these include (i) calling upon ‘competent 
organs’2205 of the UN to take ‘appropriate measures’2206 to prevent genocide; (ii) the UNSC’s 
obligation to maintain international peace and security;2207 (iii) the UNGA’s residual 
obligation to maintain peace and security;2208 and (iv) the obligation to refrain from the use of 
armed force which is not carried out in self-defence or with the prior authorisation of the 
UNSC.2209
Consideration was also given to whether there is support for reinterpreting existing treaty 
obligations in light of primary and secondary RtoP. With regard to primary RtoP, the present 
author outlined that there is growing support for reinterpreting the consequences of a State’s 
breach of, for example, its human rights treaty obligations. State practice has moved beyond 
holding States accountable for such breaches in treaty monitoring bodies and, instead, 
toward these breaches activating secondary RtoP. This provides new ways of promoting and 
ensuring State compliance with their treaty obligations. In relation to secondary RtoP, it was 
suggested that there is growing support for reinterpreting the UNSC’s obligation to maintain 
peace and security in light of a moral and/or or political responsibility of the international 
community to protect populations from RtoP crimes. Furthermore, the Outcome Document 
succeeded in codifying that RtoP crimes inside a State can be interpreted as threats to 
international peace and security which activate Chapter VII enforcement measures.2210 
However, practice affirms that whether this interpretation is utilised in RtoP cases remains at 
the UNSC’s discretion. Significantly, practice suggests some support for reinterpreting the 
prohibition on armed force under treaty and customary international law. Whilst there is no 
support for secondary RtoP legalising the unilateral or unauthorised armed force for human 
protection purposes, the Outcome Document does seem to recognise that armed force can be
2203 On the scope o f States human rights duties, see generally UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment 
No. 31 [80]: The Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed on State Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 
2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add. 13. For a useful overview o f  the legal codification o f  the rights to life and 
non-discrimination, see respectively UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 6: The Right to Life 
[Article 6]’ (30 April 1982) and UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 18: Non-Discrimination’ 
(10 November 1989).
2204 This is generally considered to have become customary international law. It also finds reflection in treaty law, 
for e.g. in Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection o f Civilian Persons in Times o f War, Geneva 
(adopted 12 August 1949, entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287 art 23. On the entrenchment o f  this 
in treaty and customary international law see generally, International Committee o f the Red Cross, ‘Access for 
Humanitarian Relief to Civilians’ <http://www.icrc.Org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/vl_rul_rule55#Fnl> accessed 10 
March 2012.
2205 Genocide Convention (n 1924) art 8.
2206 Genocide Convention, ibid.
2207 UN Charter (n 1895) art 39.
2208 UN Charter, ibid art 42.
2209 UN Charter, ibid.
2210 Peters, ‘Humanity as the Alpha and Omega o f  Sovereignty’ (n 2013), 538-539; Slaughter (n 2080), 626-627; 
Payandeh, (n 1990), 494-497 and, further, Schott (n 2080), 24-80.
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applied for this purpose,2211 as do State responses to the Russia-Georgia conflict2212 and 
Libya.2213 Accordingly, secondary RtoP seems to codify that using UNSC authorised armed 
force for human protection purposes is both legitimate and legal.
This relates to a further theme in the chapter, namely that whilst neither primary nor 
secondary RtoP create new legal obligations, they add value by putting existing legal 
obligations into a new moral and political framework. It was noted that this is States general 
understanding of the status of both responsibilities and, therefore, that the Outcome 
Document is largely understood as a soft law instrument.2214 This can be effective by urging 
the enforcement of the existing legal framework and promoting new ways of ensuring States 
protect their populations. Conversely, it could entail implications, not least legitimising 
illegal actions which are undertaken to protect populations from RtoP crimes (e.g. 
unauthorised armed force in the event of UNSC inaction). The fact that illegal actions may 
still need to be undertaken suggests that secondary RtoP has not yet fully resolved the 
legality vs. legitimacy debate.2215
The chapter also argued that, whilst secondary RtoP clearly confers permission upon the 
international community to protect populations, its overlap with existing obligations suggests 
that it may be injudicious to argue that it merely permits certain protective actions to be 
undertaken.2216 Furthermore, fundamental aspects of secondary RtoP inhibit it from being 
fully characterised as a general duty or right to protect or simply State responsibility for an 
internationally wrongful act. To this writer, it is perhaps more appropriate to explain the 
RtoP framework as heterogeneous and multifaceted both in terms of (i) the status of its 
required/proposed actions that it incorporates (e.g. legal duties, obligations, moral/political 
responsibilities); and (ii) the general character of its components (e.g. duty of the State under 
primary RtoP, responsibility of the international community under secondary RtoP). RtoP’s 
heterogeneity is presently looked upon as an impediment because it undermines the capacity 
for either primary RtoP, secondary RtoP or the RtoP framework to become new customary 
international law in general.2211 Although this is a persuasive argument, this writer would
2211 Outcome Document (n 1772), para 139. This was, at least, Malaysia’s summary o f the key outcome o f  the 
World Summit. Statement o f the Representative o f Malaysia to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 
September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.4.
221 See particularly, Statements o f the Representatives o f Belgium, the United States and United Kingdom  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5952.
2213 See particularly: Statements o f the Representatives o f the United States, United Kingdom, Lebanon, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Colombia and South Africa to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (17 March 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6498. See also, UNSC Res 1973 (2011) (n 1786).
2214 Strauss, “A Bird in the Hand is Worth Two in the Bush” (n 1773), 25-57; Welsh and Banda (n 1778); Stahn 
(n 1778) and Shaffer and Pollack, ‘Hard Versus Soft Law in International Security’ (n 1778), 1232.
2215ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect (n 2068), 1-9.
2216 Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, (n 2125), 25-26.
2217 Payandeh (n 1990), 482 [arguing that ‘[t]he responsibility to protect is constructed as a comprehensive 
framework for the prevention and containment o f massive human rights violations. As such it cannot in its 
entirety become a legal norm. Single elements o f the concept possibly could be translated into single rights and 
duties. But that does not make the concept as such a suitable candidate for a legal norm’].
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argue that the legal value and broader significance of the heterogeneity of the RtoP 
framework merits closer reflection in future research. The RtoP framework utilises the 
concept of “responsibility” in a multifaceted way, in a manner akin to the notion of 
“responsibility” used in the business and human rights context.2218 Both frameworks (i) 
expand the concept of the bearer of the “obligations” that they entail; (ii) contain legal duties 
and moral/political responsibilities; and (iii) use the dichotomy of duty/responsibility to 
explain why States must undertake actions to protect human rights, and why a range of wider 
actors should take a range of actions to contribute to the fulfilment of the obligations borne 
by the State. If we accept this account of the RtoP framework, there is scope to argue that the 
framework has a wider bearing on international law, specifically by clarifying that 
responsibility can entail a wider meaning than simply accountability for an internationally 
wrongful act. The Outcome Document is therefore remarkable, irrespective of its legal 
status, because it successfully formulated a novel “responsibility” to protect in the face of 
immense political challenge.
2218 UNHRC, ‘Framework for Business and Human Rights (n 1787).
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CHAPTER VII 
RtoP’s SCOPE, VIABILITY AND VALUE ADDED 
RESEARCH RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
Bonhoeffer stated that “action springs not from thought, but from a readiness for 
responsibility”. On the one hand, the actions undertaken to mobilise RtoP between 2005 and 
2012 suggest that there is a widespread readiness for a “responsibility to protect”. In late 
2008, when work on this thesis began, it was considered remarkable that RtoP had its own 
Wikipedia page.2219 Four years later and RtoP has been explicitly referred to at the highest 
levels of international politics, is the subject of annual thematic UN General Assembly 
[UNGA] debates and the daily focus of an increasing body of national advisers. Perhaps 
most significantly, RtoP has now been invoked in an expanse of country-specific practice. 
Conversely, the failure to take effective action in Syria suggests that we may be some way 
from widespread readiness for the “responsibility to protect”.
This chapter utilises the preceding chapter findings to outline what the competing nature 
of practice to date suggests about RtoP’s current scope, viability and value added. The 
chapter considers some of the steps which may be taken in future practice to strengthen 
readiness for RtoP. The chapter concludes with a comment on RtoP’s development over the 
research period and the possibility that, for the immediate future at least, international 
attention may be less about “RtoP” and more “PtR” -  Protecting the Responsibility.
1 The 'Narrow' but 'Deep'2220 Nature of the RtoP Framework
Relevant practice sustains the UN Secretary-General’s depiction of RtoP as ‘narrow’2221 in 
terms of the harmful acts to which it applies and ‘deep’2222 in relation to its capacity to be 
discharged through a broad range of measures. However, practice also suggests that 
“narrow” and “deep” may appropriately summate other aspects of RtoP. A recurrent theme
2219 C Stahn, ‘Responsibility to Protect: Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm?’ (2007) 101 (1) AJIL 99,
100 .
2220 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 January 2009) UN Doc A/63/677, 8 
(Report o f the UNSG, Implementing RtoP).
2221 ibid, 8.
2222 ibid, 8.
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throughout the substantive chapters is that components of RtoP are “broad” in the sense that 
they can be tapered to the specific situation at hand. Examples include (i) the fact that who 
bears primary RtoP bearer in non-“State” territories may vary in accordance with the factual 
situation at hand; (ii) the specific means which are used to discharge primary RtoP can 
legitimately vary from State to State; and (iii) that in cases which, for example, involve an 
armed insurrection against the government implicated in the original perpetration of RtoP 
crimes, the recipient of assistance may not be the State’s national authorities.
Furthermore, the substantive chapters illustrate that decision making regarding RtoP and 
RtoP’s substance both entail depths which are not explicitly acknowledged by relevant 
actors, such as the UNSG. At a decision-making level, practice suggests that a range of 
additional considerations can influence whether secondary RtoP is discharged, or discharged 
through a particular measure. These deeper layers to decision making include issues like 
which actor inside a State has the requisite legitimacy to receive assistance, whether the 
potential RtoP beneficiaries overlap with the protected person of the RtoP crime 
apprehended and whether the human rights violations at issue are of the requisite character, 
gravity and scale to warrant secondary RtoP’s application. At a substantive level, there is a 
second layer to relevant practice which defines the more intricate aspects of primary and 
secondary RtoP’s discharge, thereby deepening the scope of discharge strategies. Notably, 
this layer of practice includes consideration of issues like whether State consent to assistance 
or the UNSC’s application of Chapter VII measures can be induced, coerced or (in the case 
of the UNSC) entirely bypassed and, furthermore, which human rights bear particular 
relevance to the prevention of RtoP crimes in the State.
2 RtoP's Relationship with Existing Obligations/Practice is 
Multifaceted
Various components of RtoP interconnect with an assortment of existing obligations, 
including (i) the duty bearer concept, duration and character of States existing human rights 
obligations; (ii) international criminal law, including elements of the mass atrocity crimes to 
which RtoP relates, the concept of individual criminal responsibility and the 
deterrent/reactive value thereof; (iii) relevant principles of international humanitarian law, 
including Occupying Powers duty to respect international humanitarian law in territories 
under their Occupation; (iv) the prohibition on the use of armed force and Chapters VI, VII 
and VIII of the UN Charter; and (v) the international community’s role in minority 
protection, development assistance and conflict prevention. To this writer, RtoP’s 
relationship can be summated as multifaceted and that which entails five  dimensions.
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First, there is often a persuasive rationale for why the RtoP framework subsumes, or is 
influenced by, relevant existing obligations/practice. The table displays some examples of 
the way in which various components of the RtoP framework replicate existing 
obligations/practice and the persuasive rationale which underscores this overlap:
Table (D): Examples of the Persuasive Rationale which underscores the Overlap between various 
components of RtoP and Existing Obligations/Practice
Primary RtoP Bearer 
Concept 
[“States” and 
“National 
Authorities”]
Existing human rights law 
obligations are owed by all aspects 
of States’ governments in their 
territory or territories under their 
effective control.
Helps:
To ensure that primary RtoP does not 
weaken the State-Centric concept of 
existing human rights obligations; and 
Uphold the understanding that human 
rights obligations are owed by State 
actors to those residing in their territory 
or territories under their effective 
control.
The “International 
Community” is an 
Umbrella Term for 
who can Discharge 
Secondary RtoP, not 
a “Bearer” Concept.
The way in which the 
“international community” is used 
in the context of State 
Responsibility and Minority 
Protection as shorthand for the 
range of actors who hold a vested 
interest in States’ performance of 
certain actions.
Helps to ground secondary RtoP in the 
existing international legal and political 
framework by linking who can discharge 
secondary RtoP, and when they can 
discharge secondary RtoP, to pre­
existing mandates. For example, 
secondary RtoP may be discharged in a 
non-peaceful manner by the Security 
Council when the situation represents a 
threat to international peace and security 
and, therefore, warrants the application 
of Chapter VII enforcement measures).
The Ongoing Nature 
of Primary RtoP’s 
Duration
The enduring nature of States’ 
existing human rights law 
obligations.
Ensures that primary RtoP does not 
weaken States’ existing human rights 
obligations by rendering them as 
obsolete when Secondary RtoP is being 
discharged.
The Consensual 
Nature of Secondary 
RtoP’s Assistance 
Component
The principle of host nation 
consent that is used in a number of 
existing contexts, including 
minority protection and 
peacekeeping missions.
Helps to link secondary RtoP’s 
assistance component with the 
fundamental policy reasons which 
underscore the principle of host nation 
consent, namely the maintenance of 
friendly relations between States.
Second, there may be some points o f departure between RtoP and existing 
obligations/practice. On the one hand, some existing obligations/practice may be approached 
more restrictively in RtoP practice. This could create a tension between our understanding of 
certain existing obligations/practice (i) generally (i.e. in non-RtoP contexts); and (ii) in the 
RtoP framework. One aspect of RtoP which could create this tension is its unsettled 
beneficiary concept. As chapter two outlined, States’ competing explanations of RtoP 
beneficiaries contradict the protected persons of some of the established human rights and 
criminal law mechanisms to which RtoP relates, specifically (i) the fact that existing
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international criminal and humanitarian law instruments provide some protection from war 
crimes to persons actively participating in hostilities (i.e. persons who do not have civilians 
status);2223 (ii) that the overwhelming majority of human rights protect individuals, not 
merely those with formal citizenship of the State, civilians status or a recognised right to 
self-determination; and (iii) similarly, relevant humanitarian and criminal law instruments do 
not qualify protection from mass atrocity crimes to the victim having formal citizenship of 
the State at issue. Thus, if the aforementioned beneficiary concepts were to take hold in 
future practice a conflict could arise between the protected person concepts of relevant 
human rights, criminal and humanitarian instruments (i) generally, whereby the wider 
protected person concepts would be upheld; and (ii) under the RtoP framework, whereby 
protection may, at least in some cases/States, be limited to persons with citizenship, civilians 
status or a recognised right to self-determination. Another area in which such a tension could 
arise is the UN SC’s general approach to the application of Chapter VII enforcement 
measures in non-RtoP and RtoP cases. The UNSC appear to apply Chapter VII measures 
incrementally in RtoP cases (e.g. diplomacy,2224 sanctions,2225 use of armed force2226), despite 
the fact that the UNSC can discharge these measures non-incrementally (e.g. begin with 
authorising armed force).2227
Conversely, existing obligations/practice may be approached less restrictively under the 
RtoP framework. The provision of military assistance in the context of disputed national 
election results in the Cote d’Ivoire,2228 and practical assistance to the insurrectionist 
movements in Libya and Syria,2229 are one illustration. Essentially, this practice raises 
important questions over whether secondary RtoP’s assistance component can always 
conform to the principle of neutrality in civil wars, especially when civil war is triggered by 
the perpetration of RtoP crimes.
The points of departure are of varying significance. Some departures could be conducive 
to RtoP’s application in practice. The fact that secondary RtoP’s activation to date has not 
involved assessments of whether the mass atrocity crime apprehended is being perpetrated 
with the requisite mens rea is one illustration. By drawing upon only some legal elements of
2223 Rome Statute o f the International Criminal Court (adopted 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002) 2187 
UNTS 90 (Rome Statute) art 8 (2) (b) (xxvi)/(xi) and art 8 (2) (e) (vii)/(ix).
2224 UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Libya’ (22 February 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012.
2225 UNSC Res 1970 (26 February 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1970, paras 9-21.
2226 UNSC Res 1973 (17 March 2011) UN Doc S/RES/1973, paras 4-5.
2227 Charter o f the United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN  
Charter) art 42.
2228 Statement o f the Representative o f the Cote d ’Ivoire to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (30 March 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6508. (Statement o f the Cote d'Ivoire, March 2011).
2229 See e.g. ‘Libya: Russia Decries French Arms Drop to Libyan Rebels’ (BBC News, 30 June 2011) 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-13979632> accessed 5 August 2011 and UK Foreign Commonwealth 
Office, ‘UK Provides Equipment to the National Transitional Council in Libya’ (30 June 2011) 
<http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/news/latest-news/?view=PressS&id=624285882> accessed 14 August 2011.
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these crimes, secondary RtoP can be discharged before the harm at issue becomes a mass 
atrocity “crime” in its full legal sense. At other times, the points of departure could have 
legal, practical and/or policy implications. Providing for the UN Human Rights Council 
[UNHRC] to monitor States’ compliance with primary RtoP as a separate obligation in itself 
could raise concerns over primary RtoP corresponding with a collective “right” of 
populations to protection from RtoP crimes. The collective nature of this right may prompt 
concerns over RtoP’s interplay with group rights, particularly RtoP’s capacity to strengthen 
secessionist tendencies and therefore threaten State sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Third, the scope and significance of RtoP’s relationship with existing obligations/practice 
are still evolving. Practice to date interacts, sometimes implicitly, with additional existing 
obligations/practice. One example is the connection between recognition and legitimacy used 
in the European minority protection context2230 and the way in which this is echoed in some 
third States’ recognition of the legitimate “national authorities”/assistance recipients in Libya 
and Syria.2231 If this interaction is subsequently maintained then RtoP’s relationship with 
existing obligations/practice may be strengthened. Contrastingly, RtoP’s relationship with 
existing obligations/practice may be problematic in future practice. There is a general 
consensus that discharging secondary RtoP through the legal use of armed force requires the 
prior authorisation of the UNSC.2232 However, in cases like Syria where the UNSC will not 
concede to the moral/political pull of secondary RtoP, then secondary RtoP’s connection to 
(i) the existing legal regime on armed force could become weaker, and (ii) the 
moral/political legitimacy of humanitarian intervention may become stronger.
Fourth, there is at least scope to argue that RtoP may influence the subsequent 
development of wider obligations. RtoP also appears to have had an influential effect on the 
way in which some obligations have been subsequently developed. Two illustrations can be 
given. First, RtoP’s codification was influential during discussions on the definition of the 
crime of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute.2233 Some States2234 voiced what 
Schabas terms the ‘RtoP argument’,2235 contending that the definition should not extend to 
the use of armed force for genuine human protection purposes (i.e. the so-called “grey area”
2230 European Community, ‘Declaration on the Recognition o f New States o f New States in Eastern Europe and in 
the Soviet Union’ (16 December 1991) reprinted in R Caplan, Europe and the Recognition o f  New States in 
Yugoslavia (CUP, Cambridge 2005) 187-188.
2231 For examples, see chapter two.
2232 For supportive State views and other practice, see chapter six.
2233 On these negotiations, see generally C Kress, ‘The Kampala Compromise on the Crime o f Aggression’
(2010) 8 Journal o f International Criminal Justice 1179. See further, S Murphy, ‘Criminalising Humanitarian 
Intervention’ (2009) 41 Case W. Res J. Inti’ L. 341.
2234 See e.g. Statement o f the Czech Republic at the General Debate at the Review Conference o f the Rome 
Statute o f the International Criminal Court (June 2010) <
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 28 October 2012 (Statement o f the Czech Republic ICC Review Conference).
2235 W A Schabas, ‘Kampala Diary 9 June 2010’ (The ICC Review Conference: 2010, 9 June 2010) 
<http://iccreviewconference.blogspot.co.uk/> accessed 28 October 2012.
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2236 of collective security). Second, the present author considers that there is at least some 
scope to argue that the Outcome Document RtoP paragraphs may have had some bearing on 
the development of the parameters of States’ duty to prevent genocide. It may be significant 
that, when outlining when a breach of the duty to prevent genocide could be said to arise, the 
ICJ employed the standard of manifest failure.2237 Context is important here. To this end, it 
should be recalled that the ICJ judgment came two years after States accepted R2P and 
following its citation in oral argument by counsel.2238 However, we must bear in mind that 
the ICJ did not explicitly refer to RtoP or the Outcome Document in the judgment and, 
therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that the Court was influenced by this activating 
threshold.
Finally, the various components of RtoP cannot be merely ascribed to a restatement of 
existing obligations/practice because the substantive chapters consistently outline that the 
components do, or could evolve to, represent value added. This merits discussion in its own 
right.
3 RtoP can add Value to Existing Obligations/Practice in Four 
Ways
The various components of RtoP can or could represent value added to existing 
obligations/practice in four ways. First, various components of RtoP add specificity to 
relevant existing obligations/practice. In terms of obligations, primary RtoP has a similar 
utility to treaties which clarify what the particular requirements of general treaties are in a 
specific context, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women, by helping to explain the requirements of discharging the rights/obligation inherent 
in general instruments in specific RtoP contexts. In relation to practice, secondary RtoP adds 
value to humanitarian intervention because its activating threshold is less ambiguous. Unlike 
the uncertainty which surrounded what nature, gravity and scale human rights violations
2236 Kress (n 2233), 1207.
2237 The Court stated: ‘[I]t is clear that the obligation in question is one o f conduct and not one o f  result, in the 
sense that a State cannot be under an obligation to succeed, whatever the circumstances, in preventing the 
commission o f genocide: the obligation o f States parties is rather to employ all means reasonably available to 
them, so as to prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the 
desired result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if  the State manifestly fa iled  to take all measures 
to prevent genocide which were within its power, and which might have contributed to preventing the genocide’, 
emphasis added. Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, 221 para 430.
2238 Oral Response o f Counsel behalf o f the Respondent in Application o f  the Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment o f  the Crime o f  Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 7 March 2006, 8-9 < 
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=2&case=91&code=bhy&p3=2> accessed 28 October 2012.
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should entail to warrant humanitarian intervention,2239 examination of relevant practice 
suggests that the nature, character and scope of secondary RtoP’s activation is relatively 
precise. Whilst the legally defined mass atrocity crimes to which secondary RtoP relates can 
be drawn upon with respect to the kind of acts which warrant its application, terms like 
“populations”2240 can be drawn upon to determine the scale of the harm required for its 
activation.
Second, elements of RtoP are novel at a substantive, enforcement and/or policy level 
either because RtoP has (i) itself established a novel approach/mechanism to protection 
issues; or (ii) succeeded in codifying a protective approach/mechanism which was 
recommended in earlier practice. Examples of the former include (i) the possibility that 
primary RtoP may entail a collective right of populations to protection and the way in which 
it encourages new interpretations of States existing treaty obligations by promoting novel 
ways of holding States accountable for breaches thereof; and (ii) the establishment of RtoP 
specific actors, such as national RtoP advisers.2241 Examples of the latter include the way in 
which (i) establishing an early warning system for RtoP crimes gives effect to relevant 
actors’ recommendation for such a system to be established in order to target harmful acts 
which may threaten minority groups;2242 and (ii) segregating the tipping points for the 
activation of secondary RtoP’s assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful components codifies 
the notion of State “sovereignty as responsibility”2243 by denoting, albeit implicitly, the 
varying stages at which States’ are willing to accept that the international community can 
legitimately interfere in their internal affairs.
Third, aspects of RtoP add value by strengthening existing obligations/practice. 
Secondary RtoP bolsters third States’ duty to prevent genocide through appropriate measures 
by encouraging relevant actors to apply assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful measures in 
order to protect populations’ from  RtoP crimes.2244 Furthermore, the heterogeneous character
2239 On this see e.g. G Evans, ‘From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect’ (2006-2007) 24 
Wis. Int’l L.J 703, 707.
2240 UNGA Res 60/1 (24 October 2005) UN Doc A/RES/60/1, paras 138-139. (Outcome Document).
2241 See e.g. Joint Press Statement by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs o f Ghana and Denmark (27 September 
2010) <http://www.um.dk/da/servicemenu/Nyheder/ForsideNyheder/PRESSEMEDDELELSEO> accessed 23 
October 2012 (Joint Press Statement by Ghana and Denmark) and Joint Press Release by the Governments of 
Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana regarding Second Annual Meeting o f the Network o f National RtoP 
Focal Points (29 September 2012) <http://us4.campaign-
archive2.com/?u= 1 fbfaal c8b7e823de28eb944d&id=dl a7ca889c&e=c591 ff507e> accessed 27 October 2012 
(Joint Press Release by Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana).
2242 UN Human Rights Commission, ‘Specific Groups and Individuals: Minorities. Report o f the Independent 
Expert on Minority Issues’ (6 January 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/74, 18.
224 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, Responsibility to Protect (International 
Development Research Centre, Ottawa 2001) 28.
2244 For a similar view, see e.g. A Bellamy, S E Davies and L Glanville (eds), The Responsibility to Protect and 
International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 98.
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of the RtoP framework tends to reinforce the novel notion of “responsibility” emerging in 
the business and human rights context.2245
Finally, RtoP has an expansive effect on existing obligations/practice. For example (i) 
primary RtoP broadens the reach of traditionally “State party”/“State-owed” obligations to 
non-State parties2246 and the international community2247, albeit not in the sense of new 
legally binding obligations; and (ii) secondary RtoP (implicitly) expands the concept of 
imminence from guiding the use of armed force for self-defence purposes to guiding the 
activation of secondary RtoP’s assistance, peaceful and non-peaceful components.2248
4 Efforts to make RtoP more Politically Palatable are of Varying 
Significance and Effectiveness
The potential substantive, legal and policy impediments to RtoP’s effectiveness were 
outlined throughout the substantive chapters. Essentially, what comes through is that several 
steps have been taken to make RtoP more politically palatable to States and other relevant 
actors, such as regional organisations. It is equally clear that these steps are of varying 
significance and effectiveness.
4.1 Effect One: Weaken RtoP’s Capacity to P ro tec ts// Populations
Practice illustrates that secondary RtoP was not formulated, and has not evolved, as a 
binding duty of the international community to protect all populations from RtoP crimes. 
The Outcome Document’s provision for the UNSC to consider the application of non- 
peaceful measures on a ‘case-by-case basis’2249 enables a whole host of factors to be 
legitimately taken into account in the decision making process, including the impact which 
the application of such measures could have upon the political interests of a UNSC member. 
Significantly, the provision also reinforces the UNSC’s discretion over whether or not to 
recognise a situation as a threat to international peace and security and the permissibility of
2245 UNHRC, Protect, Respect, Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (7 April 2008) UN Doc 
A/HRC/8/5. (UNHRC, ‘A Framework for Business and Human Rights’).
2246 For e.g. Kenya and the Genocide Convention. UN Treaty Series, ‘Status o f the Convention on the Prevention 
and Punishment o f the Crime o f Genocide 1948’
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-l&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 16 
June 2012.
2247 For e.g. chapter four referred to the way in which the international community’s cooperation with States in 
ethnic conflict initiatives has evolved to the international community owing its own responsibility to protect 
populations from RtoP crimes. H Nasic, ‘Minority Rights Instruments and Mechanisms: Minority Protection 
Along the Conflict Continuum’ (2007) EURAC Research: European Academy, 40 and Stahn (n 2219), 115.
2248 Report o f the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility’ (2004) UN Doc A/59/562, 64 and 65.
2249 Outcome Document (n 2240) para 139.
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UNSC action being blocked by the P5 veto. 2250 These steps weaken RtoP’s capacity to 
protect all populations from RtoP crimes because they make secondary RtoP’s discharge 
dependent on political will, enabling States and relevant organisations to vary the approaches 
which they take to RtoP in accordance with whether RtoP’s role in a particular situation or 
thematic area will undermine or strengthen broader political interests. Russia’s handling of 
RtoP is perhaps the strongest example of this. During the drafting of the Outcome 
Document, Russia stressed the potential for RtoP to be invoked contrary to the fundamental 
principles of the UN Charter2251 Less than three years later Russia invoked RtoP to justify its 
use of unilateral and unauthorised armed force against Georgia to ‘protect Russia 
citizens’2252 in South Ossetia, thereby abusing RtoP in the very way which Russia feared 
other States’ may do. Four years later in the context of UNSC debate on its ally (Syria), 
Russia has reiterated the importance of non-interference in internal affairs and urging the 
international community to avoid using RtoP to standardise international responses to RtoP
In short, not formulating secondary RtoP as a binding duty enables States to adopt a 
“cherry picking” approach to RtoP and to continue to live up to the phrase coined by Hedley 
Bull, namely that States are predominately uninterested in ‘purposes beyond themselves’.2254 
However, this does not mean that secondary RtoP is entirely ineffective. Primarily, not 
pushing for secondary RtoP to be formulated as a binding duty to protect at the World 
Summit helped secondary RtoP appear less threatening to States’ own interests, not least the 
UNSC P5. Arguably, this may also underscore why it is becoming increasingly difficult to 
identify a State which can be fully classified as an ‘RtoP rejectionist’.2255 For example, 
although Cuba recommended the deletion of the Outcome Document’s RtoP paragraphs,2256 
it joined in the consensus adoption of the 2009 UNGA Resolution on RtoP.2257 Indeed, the
2250 See respectively, UN Charter (n 2227) art 39 and art 27 (3).
2251 Statement o f Russia to the UNGA, High-Level Meeting o f  the Plenary’, (21 June 2005) 
<http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 7 August 2012.
2252 “Interview by Minister o f Foreign Affairs o f the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov to BBC” (Ministry o f  
Foreign Affairs o f  the Russian Federation, Moscow, 9 August 2008)
<www.ln.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf7e78a48070fl28a7b43256999005bcbb3/f87a3fb7a7f669ebc32574al0026259770penD  
ocument> accessed 11 May 2012 and Statement o f  the Russian Federation to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (8 August 2008) UN Doc S.PV.5952.
2253 See respectively, Statement o f Russia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6627 and Statement o f Russia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (25 June 2012) UN Doc S/PV.6790.
2254 H Bull, Justice in International Relations (University o f  Waterloo Press, 1993) 13 cited in G Evans, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and For A ll (Brookings, Washington D.C. 2008)
39.
2255 J Claes, ‘Protecting Civilians from Mass Atrocities: Meeting the Challenge o f R2P Rejectionism’ (2012) 4 (1 )  
GRtoP 67.
2256 Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, ‘Amendments Proposed by the Cuban Delegation to the Second 
Revised Draft Outcome o f the HLPM o f the General Assembly o f September 2005 (A/59/HLPM/CRP.l/Rev.2)’ 
(August 2005) <http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c3957them e=alt2> accessed 12 
September 2011.
2257 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV. 105.
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only State position on RtoP which the present author cannot readily ascertain any evolution 
in is Zimbabwe because, aside from its condemnatory comments on RtoP at the World 
Summit,2258 it has not explicitly remarked upon RtoP in relevant UN debates. Moreover, we 
need to focus on what RtoP is and not ‘what we would like it to be’.2259 Secondary RtoP 
entails utility as a heterogeneous responsibility which, through its moral, political and legal 
elements, echoes the novel notion of “responsibility” emerging in a business and human 
rights context 2260 Specifically, secondary RtoP props up the more mandatory character of the 
primary RtoP duty with the expectation that international protective action (i) should (not 
must) be undertaken; and (ii) should not (as opposed to must not) be prevented from being 
undertaken (e.g. by using the veto). As morally objectionable as it may be, the UNSC’s 
failure to act in a ‘timely and decisive’2261 manner in Syria is consistent with the largely 
discretionary character of secondary RtoP. Accordingly, Syria is more an illustration of 
secondary “RtoP in practice” than a case which represents ‘RIP for RtoP’.2262
4.2 Effect Two: Build Broad Based Political Support for RtoP
Political support for RtoP clearly extends beyond States which promoted the concept of 
humanitarian intervention (e.g. US, UK, France) and which have historical experience of 
RtoP crimes (e.g. Rwanda). Supportive positions on RtoP have been taken by States from 
across the geopolitical spectrum, including the Czech Republic,2263 Hungary,2264 Andorra,2265 
Monaco,2266 Swaziland2267 and Trinidad and Tobago.2268 State views and country- 
specific/thematic practice illustrate that the broad based political support which RtoP has
2258 Zimbabwe denounced RtoP’s incorporation in the Outcome Document, arguing that RtoP was a ‘vague 
concept’ which repackaged humanitarian intervention. Statement o f  the Representative o f Zimbabwe, UNGA 
Meeting Record (14 September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.4.
2259 E C Luck, ‘The Normative Journey: The Evolution o f the R2P Concept’ (Keynote address at the European 
Science Foundation Conference: The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice, Linkoping, Sweden, 9 
June 2010).
2260 UNHRC, ‘A Framework for Business and Human Rights’ (n 2245).
2261 Outcome Document (n 2240) para 139.
2262 S M Patrick, ‘RIP for R2P? Syria and the Dilemmas o f  Humanitarian Intervention’ (Council on Foreign 
Relations, 12 June 2012) <http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2012/06/12/rip-for-r2p-syria-and-the-dilemmas-of- 
humanitarian-intervention/> last accessed 10 July 2012.
2263 Statement o f the Representative o f the Czech Republic to the UNGA, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role o f  
Regional Organisations in the Implementation o f the Responsibility to Protect’ (12 July 2011) 
<http://www.responsibi]itytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 16 June 2012. (Statement o f the Czech Republic 2011 RtoP Thematic Debate).
2264Statement o f the Representative o f Hungary to UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than 40 Delegates Express 
Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 
2009) UN Doc GA/10849.
2265 Statement o f the Representative o f Andorra in UN Press Release, ibid.
2266 Statement o f the Representative o f Monaco in UN Press Release, ibid. (Statement o f Monaco, 2009 RtoP 
Thematic Debate).
2267 Statement o f the Representative o f Swaziland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV. 100. (Statement o f Swaziland).
2268 Statement o f the Representative o f Trinidad and Tobago in ‘Opening o f the Sixty First Session o f the UN 
General Assembly’ (27 September 2006) <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/index.shtml> accessed 14 October 
2012. (Statement o f Trinidad and Tobago).
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acquired is directly linked to its refinement since the World Summit, especially the 
clarification that RtoP and humanitarian intervention are not ‘the same coin with a different 
face’2269 and RtoP is not intended as ‘a tool to exert pressure'1™ on smaller/weaker States. 
Chile points to a main issue which underscores RtoP’s political appeal:
‘Most Latin American leaders wanted to explore a better alternative to the dilemma 
of having to choose between inaction, on the one hand, and unilateral external 
intervention, on the other, to stop a humanitarian catastrophe. In other words, the 
morality of legitimacy had to be reconciled with international legality. R2P is the 
balanced formula we were looking for’.2271
Thus, the fact that secondary RtoP does not simply present a choice between ‘doing nothing 
and sending in the marines’2272 has clearly helped RtoP to be distinguished from 
humanitarian intervention. Similarly, Chile’s view shows that the fact that RtoP does not 
create any legal changes to the existing regime on armed force, at least in the immediate 
term, has also been persuasive.
Essentially, RtoP’s refinement since the World Summit appears to have succeeded in 
reassuring a large number of States/territories that RtoP is an ‘ally of sovereignty, not an 
adversary’.2273 Andorra is a good example of one of the reasons why several smaller and/or 
militarily weak territories find RtoP appealing. Andorra explicitly referred to the fact that it 
values RtoP because it is a small nation ‘without a standing army’.2274 This suggests that 
RtoP may give small States/territories a sense of reassurance that, should their populations’ 
be harmed by non-State actors or another States’ actors, the international community may 
help them to develop the capacity to protect their own population or itself take decisive 
action to protect the population. Of course, we cannot state with certainty why smaller States 
find RtoP politically appealing. Indeed, a variety of issues quite probably underscore this. 
Remarkably, what can be said is that smaller States have made some of the strongest and 
most interesting contributions to RtoP’s development in practice to date. The table displays 
some examples.
2269 Statement o f the Representative o f  Sudan to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97.
2270 Statement o f China to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98, emphasis 
added.
2271 Statement o f Chile to the UN General Assembly, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
2272 A Bellamy, Responsibility to Protect: Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities (Polity Press, Cambridge 2009) 
166.
2273 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 7.
2274 Statement o f Andorra to UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘More than 40 Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, 
Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 2264).
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Table E: Notable Contributions to  RtoP's Developm ent m ade by Small S tates
Czech
One o f few States, certainly the smallest State, to 
expressly incorporate the RtoP framework into 
national security policy2275
Strong illustration o f  the way 
in which relatively recently 
established States can make 
some o f the most innovative 
contributions to RtoP’s 
development
Shows faith in RtoP’s
Republic Stood alone in recommending the establishment of 
regional RtoP focal points in order to ensure that 
regional responses are undertaken in a timely and 
effective manner2276
One o f few States to explicitly refer to RtoP at the 
Kampala conference on the crime o f aggression, 
showing an awareness o f the need to ensure that 
RtoP’s discharge was not impeded by broader legal 
developments, such as defining the crime o f  
aggression in the Rome Statute.2277
capacity to become an 
effective protection 
framework at both the 
national, regional and 
international level.
Peru
Peru has unwaveringly encouraged the UNSC P5 to
commit, albeit at a political level, to not invoke their
2^ 78veto power in cases involving RtoP crimes.
Perseveres to ensure that 
discussions o f the more 
controversial, but practically 
significant, aspects o f  RtoP 
do not fall by the wayside. 
Whilst the UNSC have not 
agreed to this, and may never 
do so, Peru’s efforts in this 
regard are nevertheless 
commendable.
Denmark
Joined Ghana in establishing the first national RtoP 
adviser posts and urging other States to follow.2279
One o f few States to positively connect RtoP with a
2280collective right o f populations to protection.
Shows a strong commitment 
to RtoP and assumes a 
leadership role in the 
development o f novel ways 
to translate RtoP into 
practice.
Norway Explicitly incorporated the RtoP framework into its2281
2008-2009 national humanitarian policy.
Illustrates the scope which 
States have in terms o f the 
modes o f discharging and 
codifying RtoP, including at 
the national level.
Trinidad and 
Tobago2282
Trinidad and Tobago’s UNGA delegation made one 
o f the most explicit statements regarding the legal 
and moral content o f secondary RtoP.
As a small Caribbean island, 
this contribution illustrates 
the extent to which RtoP has
2275 Ministry o f Foreign Affairs o f the Czech Republic, Security Strategy o f  the Czech Republic 2011 (Ministry o f  
the Foreign Affairs o f the Czech Republic, Prague 2011) 13 para 45
<http://www.army.cz/images/id_8001_9000/8503/Czech_Security_Strategy_201 l.pdf> accessed 28 October 
2012. (Czech Republic 2011 Security Strategy).
2276 Statement o f the Czech Republic 2011 RtoP Thematic Debate (n 2263).
2277 Statement o f the Czech Republic ICC Review Conference (n 2234).
2278 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f  Peru to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319.
2279 Joint Press Statement by the Ministers o f Foreign Affairs o f  Ghana and Denmark (n 2241).
2280 Statement o f the Representative o f Denmark, ‘Opening o f the Sixty First Session o f the UN General 
Assembly’ (27 September 2006) <http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/61/index.shtml> accessed 14 October 2012.
2281 Norwegian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Norway's Humanitarian Policy (Report No. 40 to the Storting, 2008- 
2009) 28 <http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/reports-to-the-storting/2008- 
2009/report-no-40-2008-2009-to-the-storting.html?id=577646> accessed 24 October 2012 (Norway’s 2008-2009 
Humanitarian Policy) and Norwegian Ministry o f Foreign Affairs, Climate, Conflict and Capital: Norwegian 
Development Policy Adapting to Change (Report No. 13 to the Storting, 2008-2009) 68 
<http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/documents/propositions-and-reports/reports-to-the-storting/2008- 
2009/report-no-13-2008-2009-to-the-storting.html?id=552810> accessed 24 October 2012. (Norway’s 2008-2009 
Development Policy).
2282 Statement o f Trinidad and Tobago (n 2268).
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become rooted in 
contemporary political
rhetoric and the way in which 
it has crossed territorial and 
political frontiers.
5 A Way Forward? Recommendations for RtoP's Future 
Development
RtoP has been substantially refined and clarified since the World Summit, including in terms 
of its means of discharge and its interplay with existing obligations. Indeed, if the Outcome 
Document were to be rewritten in light of the findings of this thesis, it would probably read 
in a very different way. The table illustrates some of the ways in which it would perhaps be 
worded if  practice between 2005 and 2012 were to be fully incorporated.
Table F: The Outcome Document RtoP Paragraphs in light of Subsequent Practice
Outcome Document Practice 2005-2012
Provisions
‘Each individual State has the 
responsibility to protect its 
populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity’.2283
All non-State and State actors 
have a responsibility to refrain [1] 
from perpetrating genocide, grave 
breaches o f  international 
humanitarian law  [2] and crimes 
against humanity (including ethnic 
cleansing [3]) against citizens, 
civilians and/or people [4] who 
are located inside the S ta te’s 
territorial borders and territories 
under their effective control [5].
Associated Findings
[1] Non-State actors should not 
perpetrate RtoP crimes [chapter 
two] and primary RtoP entails a 
negative component [chapter 
three]. This can be understood as a 
minimum standard o f  primary 
RtoP [chapter three].
[2] Possibility that not all war 
crimes may be considered 
sufficiently grave to fall within 
RtoP’s scope [chapters two and 
four].
[3] The majority o f  States 
consider the reference to “ethnic 
cleansing” to be meant in the 
sense o f ethnically motivated 
crimes against humanity [chapters 
one and three].
[4] Unsettled beneficiary concept 
[chapter two].
[5] Ambiguity over the State- 
centric nature o f the primary RtoP 
bearer [chapter two].
‘This responsibility entails the 
prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement’.2284
This responsibility endures at all 
times [1] and includes a 
responsibility to prevent the 
incitement or perpetration of 
genocide, grave breaches o f  
international humanitarian law
[1] Primary RtoP duty subsists 
before, during and after the 
perpetration o f RtoP crimes and 
can be discharged concurrently 
with secondary RtoP [chapter 
three].
2283 Outcome Document (n 2240) para 138.
2284 ibid.
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and crimes against humanity 
(including ethnic cleansing).
‘[T]hrough appropriate and 
necessary means’.2285
To fulfil this responsibility, 
measures which can protect 
relevant persons, are appropriate 
to the factual context inside the 
territory [1], and pursuant to 
existing legal obligations [2], 
should be discharged 
progressively [3].
[1] States have a margin o f  
appreciation regarding the specific 
measures which they use to 
discharge primary RtoP [chapter 
three].
[2] The measures used to 
discharge primary RtoP largely 
overlap with States’ existing 
human rights, humanitarian and 
criminal law obligations. Primary 
RtoP cannot be used to weaken 
these obligations [chapter three].
[3] States can discharge measures 
to fulfil primary RtoP 
progressively [chapter three].
‘The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage 
and help States to exercise this 
responsibility’.2286
‘We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and 
appropriate, to helping States build 
capacity to protect their 
populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity and to assisting 
those which are under stress before 
crises and conflicts break out’.2287
The international community 
should encourage, help and assist 
State actors [1] to fulfil their 
primary responsibility. 
International assistance will be 
given on a consensual basis [2], 
when the international community 
considers that genocide, grave 
breaches o f international 
humanitarian law and crimes 
against humanity (including ethnic 
cleansing) are imminent. 
Imminence will be determined on 
the basis o f  a range o f  factors, 
including the nature, gravity and 
scale o f  the human rights 
violations being perpetrated  [3]. If 
consent is not forthcoming, 
measures may be taken to coerce 
or induce it, including through the 
threat o f using non-peaceful 
means [4], In some situations, 
such as those involving competing 
claims to national electoral victory 
or where the existing government 
faces an armed insurrection 
because it has perpetrated the 
crimes, the international 
community may provide 
assistance to, or on the consent of, 
whichever actor is considered to 
be the legitimate recipient o f  
assistance [5].
[1] Assistance will typically be 
given to the national authorities o f  
the State at issue [chapters two, 
four and five].
[2]Assistance is provided on a 
consensual basis [chapters four 
and five].
[3]Assistance Pillar appears to 
require that human rights 
violations have emerged to 
suggest that the population may 
sustain RtoP crimes in the near or 
immediate future [chapters four 
and five].
[4] In practice, steps have been 
taken in response to a failure to 
provide consent to the provision 
o f assistance [chapter five].
[5] In Libya, Syria and Cote 
d’Ivoire, assistance appears to 
have been provided to whichever 
actor is considered to have the 
most legitimacy [chapter five].
‘The international community, 
through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use 
appropriate diplomatic,
The international community has a 
responsibility to use peaceful 
measures to help to protect all 
relevant persons from genocide,
[1] States take competing 
approaches to the meaning o f  
“peaceful” responsive measures, 
Whilst some States consider that 
“peaceful” responsive measures
2285 ibid.
2286 ibid.
2287 ibid, para 139.
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humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the 
Charter, to help to protect 
populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity’.2288
grave breaches o f international 
humanitarian law and crimes 
against humanity (including ethnic 
cleansing) [1],
are those which do not challenge 
the State’s national authorities 
(e.g. diplomatic condemnation of  
the situation), other States 
consider that these measures are 
anything which falls short o f the 
use o f collective sanctions or 
armed force. [Chapter five].
’In this context, we are prepared to 
take collective action, in a timely 
and
decisive manner, through the 
Security Council, in accordance 
with the Charter, including 
Chapter VII, on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with 
relevant regional organisations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means 
be inadequate and national 
authorities are manifestly failing to 
protect their populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against 
humanity’.2289
The international community 
should [1] act collectively in a 
timely and decisive manner 
through the UN Security Council 
[2], including through the 
incremental discharge o f  Chapter 
VII enforcement measures [3] to 
protect relevant persons [4] from 
the crimes. Non-peaceful 
responses should be considered 
when the nature, gravity and scale 
o f the human rights violations 
being committed suggest that the 
crimes are imminent, i f  not 
already being perpetrated  and 
peaceful measures have not 
ensured, or would not ensure, 
relevant persons’ protection [5]. 
Regional organisations which 
have the relevant mandate and 
capacity may contribute to the 
application o f non-peaceful 
measures when Security Council 
authority has been given [6].
[1] There is no binding duty on 
the international community to 
discharge secondary RtoP [chapter 
six].
[2] There is a general consensus 
that non-peaceful responses 
should be undertaken through the 
UNSC on a collective basis, 
including with respect to the use 
o f armed force [chapters five and 
six].
[3] In practice, the UNSC have 
discharged Chapter VII 
enforcement measures on an 
incremental basis [chapter five].
[4] The approaches adopted to 
RtoP beneficiaries in international 
practice vary but, in terms o f non- 
peaceful responsive measures, are 
usually linked to the protected 
person o f the RtoP crime 
apprehended in the case at hand 
[chapter two and four].
[5] Pursuant to secondary RtoP’s 
activation occurring largely on the 
basis o f a sliding scale, the 
activation o f non-peaceful 
responsive measures requires 
these two factors to be determined 
[chapter four].
[6] The role o f regional 
organisations is dependent on a 
number o f factors being present in 
a particular case, including that 
the organisation has the necessary 
capacity to undertake a non- 
peaceful response. In accordance 
with secondary RtoP’s pursuance 
to relevant provisions o f Chapter 
VIII o f the UN Charter, regional 
organisations should have prior 
UNSC authorisation for non- 
peaceful responsive measures 
[chapters two, five and six].
The question which we now turn to is what can be done in future practice to address the 
nuances and implications which have arose in practice between 2005 and 2012? There is
2288 ibid.
2289 ibid.
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strong moral appeal to “perfecting”2290 secondary RtoP as a binding duty and using the 
regime on State responsibility to attach legal consequences to non-compliance with 
secondary RtoP.2291 However, neither of these avenues for development has gained broad 
political support over the last seven years and Syria suggests that they are very unlikely to do 
so in the near future. Instead, States appear to have become less hesitant to the overall notion 
of RtoP because developmental initiatives have largely focused on refining what States 
agreed to in the Outcome Document. Consequently, this writer’s recommendations are 
targeted at refining and developing what we already have, specifically (i) settling those 
elements of the Outcome Document which give rise to ambiguity and controversy through 
the UNSG’s annual RtoP Reports and associated UNGA thematic debates, not least because 
these mechanisms are generally welcomed by States; and (ii) strengthening established 
mechanisms like the increasing number of national RtoP advisers 2292
5.1 Recommendation (1): Maximise the UN Secretary-General's Annual 
RtoP Reports and UN General Assembly's Annual RtoP Thematic Debates
Examination of State views illustrates that the UNSG’s annual RtoP Reports have 
productively guided the parameters of the UNGA annual RtoP thematic debates. 
Accordingly, this writer considers that the Reports could be used to constructively contribute 
to RtoP’s further development in two main ways. First, the Reports can open up discussion 
of RtoP’s more intricate, but nevertheless significant, components. The UNSG’s Reports 
have stressed the importance of not prioritising one aspect of RtoP over another, especially 
its timely and decisive response component over assistance.2293 However, whilst Reports 
have been tailored toward particular components of the RtoP framework (e.g. early 
warning,2294 the role of regional organisations,2295 timely and decisive response2296), other 
significant components of the RtoP framework have not been considered in similar depth
2290 K Tan, “The Duty to Protect” in T Nardin and M Williams (eds), Humanitarian Intervention (New York 
University Press, New York 2006) 96.
2291 See e.g. Stahn (n 2219), 115-120; M Payandeh, ‘With Great Power Comes Great Responsibility? The 
Concept o f the Responsibility to Protect within the Process o f International Lawmaking’ (2010) 35 Yale Journal 
o f Int’l L. 469,508-513 and L Glanville, ‘The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders’ (2012) 12(1) Hum Rts. 
L. Rev 1, 18-19 and 27-30.
2292 See e.g. Joint Press Release by Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana (n 2241).
2293 See e.g. UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 9 and Report o f the UNSG, ‘Responsibility to Protect: 
Timely and Decisive Response’ (25 July 2012) UN Doc A /66/874-S/2012/578,4. (UNSG Report, Timely and 
Decisive Response).
2294 Report o f the UNSG, ‘Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (2010) UN Doc 
A/64/864.
2295 Report o f the UNSG, ‘The Role o f Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (2011) UN Doc A/59/744.
2296 UNSG Report, Timely and Decisive Response (n 2293).
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(e.g. bearer/beneficiary concepts, secondary RtoP’s activating threshold). The substantive 
chapters illustrate that ambiguity or controversy in one component o f RtoP entails the 
capacity to trigger a “chain reaction’' by destabilising additional components. For example:
Figure 1: Interaction betw een RtoP Components
Thus, there is merit in fully considering (i) each o f RtoP’s component parts; (ii) the way in 
which one component interrelates with another; and (iii) what impact, if  any, that the 
interconnectedness has upon RtoP’s overall scope and effectiveness, including RtoP’s 
relationship with existing obligations/practice. Accordingly, it could be beneficial for future 
UNSG RtoP Reports and UNGA thematic debates to follow a component-by-component 
approach to RtoP.
Second, the Reports could be used to initiate State discussion o f the potentially 
controversial issues which have arisen in recent practice. The substantive chapters identified 
a number o f issues which the UNSG’s Reports address inadequately (e.g. providing that 
national authorities should receive assistance2297) or overlook entirely (e.g. whether regime 
change is an acceptable outcome o f the use o f armed force). Arguably, this is because the 
Reports have largely focused on affirming and subtly refining the Outcome Document RtoP 
provisions, giving limited attention to elements which may require reconsideration in light o f  
subsequent practice. The pyramid illustrates the main approaches which have been adopted
"Civilians"
Beneficiary
Concept
Narrows the Scope of 
War Crimes which can 
Activate Secondary RtoP
Complicates RtoP's Interaction 
with the Existing Criminal and 
Humanitarian Obligations to 
which it Relates
2291 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 18.
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to date to the Outcome Document’s RtoP provisions in the UNSG RtoP Reports:
Figure 2: The Approaches taken to  the  Outcome Document RtoP Provisions in UNSG RtoP Reports to  date
R eassessm ent
i.e. examine whether the Outcome Document RtoP 
provisions can be applied in practice effectively, e.g. 
whether assistance can be given to States' national 
authorities in all RtoP cases.
R efinem ent
e.g. consensual nature o f  international assistance
R estatem en t
e.g. primacy o f  State responsibility, requirem ent for 
non-peacefiil responsive measures to be undertaken 
through the UNSC
Elements o f the Outcome Document which may require reassessment are understandably 
given limited attention because they often lie at the heart o f RtoP’s interplay with 
sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in States’ internal affairs. Nevertheless, 
failing to address these issues enables competing (and equally controversial) approaches to 
be adopted in practice (e.g. providing assistance to “legitimate” rebel groups). Thus, 
avoiding controversial issues to maintain RtoP’s political palatability can quickly become 
somewhat o f a vicious circle. This writer considers that this tension may be moderated by 
using the Reports and debates to fully delineate the scope o f RtoP’s impact on these 
principles so that States can develop a deeper understanding o f what they can do to avoid 
secondary RtoP being applied against them and, therefore, the prospect o f regime change. To 
do so, the evolution in the way in which States express their concerns about RtoP could be 
usefully drawn upon when formulating future Reports. We still see sweeping statements 
about RtoP’s impact on the principle o f non-interference.2248 However, States have begun to
24S See e.g. Statement o f Cuba to the UNHRC in UN Press Release. ‘UNHRC Debates Situation o f Human 
Rights in Syrian Arab Republic’ (22 August 2011)
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=l 1324&LangID=E> accessed 14 
November 2011.
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clarify, directly or indirectly, the particular elements of RtoP which they are apprehensive 
about. For example, in the lead up to the World Summit Syria contended that RtoP 
contravened international law and had no place in the UN Charter.2299 Whilst RtoP’s 
invocation against Syria in recent times has seen the State resume this standpoint,2300 it is 
important to offset the resistance which follows RtoP’s application to its own internal affairs 
with the fact that Syria’s main criticism of the UNSG’s 2009 Report was that it did not 
explain RtoP’s role in Occupied Territories.2301 RtoP can only be refined in a robust and 
acceptable way if we first understand which aspects of RtoP trouble States. Whilst it is not 
easy to formulate RtoP in a way which reconciles completely the specific concerns of States, 
it seems less complex than engaging with far-reaching issues like RtoP’s overall relationship 
with sovereignty and non-intervention. To achieve the abovementioned objectives, 
consideration could be given to targeting future UNSG Reports to the following range of 
topics.
5.1.1 RtoP’s Beneficiary Concept
RtoP’s beneficiary concept merits reflection in its own right because, as outlined above, 
additional RtoP components seem to depend upon the beneficiary concept being settled and 
contoured effectively. The main issue which requires consideration is whether it is possible 
to maintain an overarching beneficiary concept like “populations” 2302 The varying 
approaches- which have been adopted to RtoP beneficiaries in State views highlight the 
potentially widespread implications of an overarching concept, specifically that it can 
encourage States to engage in a process of auto-interpretation by determining the specific 
sections of populations which they consider warrant protection by RtoP. Similarly, it is 
difficult to reconcile an overarching beneficiary concept with the fact that the crimes which 
RtoP covers have varying protected person concepts and, therefore, that RtoP will often be 
applied in relation to specific groups and not the population more generally.
Developing a beneficiary concept which is attractive to all States and encompasses the 
range of persons for whom RtoP may be applied is certainly difficult. However, this writer 
considers that consideration could be given to following the third approach which has been 
adopted to the beneficiary concept in international practice. By specifying ‘all
2299 Statement o f the Representative o f Syria to the UNGA in World Federalist Movement, ‘State-by-State 
Positions on the Responsibility to Protect’ (11 August 2005)
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/civilsociety?view=fjrelated&id=2411> 
accessed 11 October 2012.
2300 Statement o f the Representative o f Syria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 April 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6524.
2301 Statement o f the Representative o f Syria to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (14 September 2009) UN  
Doc A/63/PV.105. (Statement o f the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNGA, September 2009).
2302 Outcome Document (n 2240), paras 138-139.
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populations’2303 should be protected, the approach makes clear that it is unacceptable for 
States to determine who they will protect from RtoP crimes on the basis of identity (e.g. non­
citizens) or status (e.g. non-civilians). Furthermore, the approach takes into account the 
specifics of each context and adapts RtoP beneficiaries accordingly. For example, political 
violence has been met with emphasising the need to protect all populations, regardless of 
their ‘political affiliation’.2304 In addition, retaining some reference to “populations” helps to 
clarify what scale human rights violations should be perpetrated on in order to warrant 
secondary RtoP’s application. Two issues may arise, however.
First, there is a risk that the approach could be seen as an exhaustive list of who in fact is 
protected under RtoP, triggering arguments over whether or not a group not expressly 
identified within the list is actually a beneficiary. To overcome this risk, we might draw upon 
the way in which international criminal law used the category of “other inhumane acts”2305 to 
reconcile the challenge of ensuring that crimes against humanity were clearly defined, but 
sufficiently flexible to cover new crimes that might emerge within later practice. 
Consequently, this writer would suggest that future guidance might consider affirming that 
RtoP is owed to ‘all persons permanently or temporarily in a territory, irrespective of race, 
ethnicity, nationality, political affiliation or other features’.
Second, there is the possibility that the reference to ‘all populations’2306 could reinforce 
the fact that an overarching concept like “populations” can raise the  possibility of certain 
persons effectively having concurrent status as an RtoP bearer and beneficiary. As Chapter 
two observed this could create a potential circularity in terms of RtoP bearer-beneficiary and, 
therefore, complicate secondary RtoP’s discharge in some cases by requiring the 
international community to ensure protection of all members of the population, including 
those who are perpetrating RtoP crimes. There are no easy answers to this issue. Perhaps the 
most appropriate route forward is to (i) recognise that there may be some points of departure 
between RtoP and existing human rights, humanitarian and criminal law obligations based
2303 See e.g. UN Press Release, ‘Statement attributable to the Spokesperson for Secretary-General on Guinea’ (3 
November 2010), emphasis added <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/185-crisis-in- 
guinea/3046-secretary-general-ban-ki-moon-statement-attributableto-the-spokesperson-for-secretary-general-on- 
guinea-> accessed 12 May 2012 (Statement on Guinea); UN Press Release, ‘UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Advisors on the Prevention o f Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’ (29 
December 2010), emphasis added
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/Special%20Advisers’%20Statement%20on%20Cote%20d’Iv 
oire,%2029%20.12.2010.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012 (Statement on the Cote d’Ivoire, December 2010) and UN 
Press Release, ‘Statement attributed to the UN Secretary-General’s Special Advisers on the Prevention o f  
Genocide and the Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Cote d’Ivoire’ (19 January 2011), emphasis added 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/OSAPG,%20Special%20Advisers%20Statement%20on%20 
Cote%20d’Ivoire,%2019%20Jan%20201 l.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012 (Statement on the Cote d’Ivoire, January 
2011 ).
2304 Statement on Guinea, ibid.
2305 Rome Statute (n 2223) art 7 (1) (k). For a discussion o f this provision see R Cryer (eds), An Introduction to 
International Criminal Law and Procedure (CUP, Cambridge 2007) 219.
2306 e.g. Statement on Guinea (n 2303); Statement on the Cote d’Ivoire, December 2010 (n 2303) and Statement 
on the Cote d’Ivoire, January 2011 (n 2303).
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on a process of prioritisation of who is most in need of protection from RtoP crimes in a 
particular case’, and (ii) ensure that secondary RtoP’s discharge is pursuant, as far as 
possible, to relevant human rights, criminal and humanitarian law obligations (e.g. use of 
armed force and principle of distinction). This could potentially be accommodated in the 
RtoP framework by specifying (i) that secondary RtoP will be discharged for the benefit of 
the particular section of the population who are threatened by RtoP crimes; and (ii) that 
there is some distinction between protection under secondary RtoP and the wider human 
rights framework, not least in terms of the former being activated when the human rights of a 
large number of individuals rights are violated, not isolated violations of the rights of some 
individuals in the State. Of course, this will be challenged by some States. Notably, Cuba 
alluded to the demerits of a process of prioritising who warrants the most protection, 
arguing:
‘[T]he current situation which is not reflected in the report of the Secretary General is the 
illegitimate implementation of the consensus of 2005 which is undermining international 
confidence. If we were to talk about a concept, we should begin by defining what is 
meant by protection and what is meant by civilians. Cuba does not agree that it’s possible 
to arm civilians to end violence in a country or to try someone extra-judicially. All of 
these distortions come at a cost and that cost is credibility. We cannot see a concept 
where civilians can take a certain stand and other civilians become collateral damage’.2307
5.1.2 Primary RtoP
One of the reasons why primary RtoP has broad based political acceptance and appears to be 
at the stage of implementation is because States consider it to be pursuant to their existing 
human rights, humanitarian and criminal law obligations and, therefore, that which poses no 
direct threat to their sovereignty. This appeal could be strengthened by expressly explaining 
the full scope of primary RtoP’s overlap with existing obligations, including primary RtoP’s
(i) enduring nature; (ii) inclusion of a margin of appreciation which enables States to 
determine what measures are most relevant to the specific factual context inside the State; 
and (iii) capacity to be discharged progressively.
Greater emphasis should also be placed upon the fact that primary RtoP is not intended to 
weaken States’ existing protective obligations.2308 Aside from reinforcing the need for State 
compliance with primary RtoP, this presents a useful opening to explain some of the ways in
2307 Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, ‘Interactive Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response’ (5 
September 2012) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 17 October 2012. (Statement o f the Representative of 
Cuba, 2012 RtoP Debate).
2308 On this see UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 5 and Statement o f the Representative of 
Switzerland to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98.
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which primary RtoP adds value to States’ existing obligations without compounding 
concerns over its capacity to expand States’ obligations and ‘creeping legalisation’.2309 For 
example, outlining that primary RtoP is an ongoing duty which can be discharged 
concurrently with secondary RtoP (i) reinforces primary RtoP’s interaction with the existing 
obligations to which it relates (e.g. enduring nature of human rights obligations); (ii) clarifies 
that secondary RtoP is not a matter of the international community subsuming States’ 
protective obligations;2310 and (iii) introduces discussion of the way in which primary RtoP is 
distinct from States’ existing obligations, specifically by reason of the fact that it promotes 
new forms of achieving State compliance with existing human rights, humanitarian and 
criminal law obligations via secondary RtoP.2311
Potential impediments to primary RtoP’s political appeal and effectiveness should also be 
broached as part of the broader consideration of how primary RtoP interconnects with 
existing obligations. A particular issue is the way in which the primary RtoP bearer concept 
can be reconciled with non-“State” territories, including Occupied Territories.2312 Whilst 
providing for the State actors which have effective control over a territory to bear primary 
RtoP is pursuant to existing human rights and humanitarian law obligations,2313 Chapter Two 
emphasised that there is a fundamental difference between recognition of a duty and its 
efficient enforcement. Moreover, practice suggests that there may be some State dissent (e.g. 
US) from using this approach, given that it paves the way for secondary RtoP to be 
discharged against the Occupying Power (e.g. Israel) when it fails to protect the population 
under its occupation (e.g. Gaza).2314
2309 W Burke-White, “Adoption o f the Responsibility to Protect” in J Genser and I Cotier (eds), The 
Responsibility to Protect: The Promise o f  Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time (OUP, Oxford 2012) 2.
2310 Or as Russia phrases the issue, the purpose o f secondary RtoP’s discharge is ‘to prompt the responsible State 
for implementing its obligations and not supplanting its role in doing so’. Statement o f the Russian Federation to 
the UNGA, Interactive Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response’ (5 September 2012) 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 18 October 2012. As noted in chapter four, this is contrary to the view o f commentators like Stahn (n 
2219), 116-117; Payandeh (n 2291) 498 and N Wheeler, ‘A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility 
to Protect After the 2005 World Summit’ (Paper presented at ‘The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?’ 
conference, University o f  Toronto, Canada, 6-7 October 2005)
<http://cadair.aber.ac.Uk/dspace/bitstream/2160/1971/1 /a%20victory%20for%20common%20humanity,%20Whe 
eler.pdf> accessed 12 May 2012.
2311 On this see Chapter six.
2312 Statement o f  the Permanent Observer o f the Occupied Palestinian Territories to the UNGA, UN Press 
Release (July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850 [‘despite the recognition that all populations are entitled to [..] 
protection, we find that relevant literature, including the Secretary-General’s important Reports, to be selective, 
focusing on some situations while ignoring others’] and Statement o f  the Syrian Arab Republic to the UNGA, 
September 2009 (n 2301) [criticising the UN Secretary-General’s Report on Implementing RtoP for its ‘failure to 
refer to the need for due protection for populations under foreign occupation’].
2313 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No. 31: Nature o f the General Legal Obligation Imposed 
on State Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 13; European Court o f Human 
Rights, AI Skeini & Others v. The United Kingdom, 2011, Application No. 55721/07, para 74 and D Giercyz,
“The Responsibility to Protect: A Legal and Rights-Based Perspective” in A Bellamy, S Davies and L Glanville 
(eds), The Responsibility to Protect and International Law  (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden 2011) 109-113.
2314 The US position on the citation o f RtoP in the context o f the Gaza conflict is discussed at length in Chapters 
Two and Six. See Statement o f  the United States to the UNHRC, ‘Human Rights Council Concludes Debate on 
Report o f  High-Level Mission on Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (16 March 2007) UN Doc HRC/07/13
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Perhaps most significantly, a Report on primary RtoP could be used to add greater 
consistency to existing recommendations for monitoring State compliance therewith. Whilst 
the UNSG’s 2009 Report recommended that the UNHRC be used to monitor State 
compliance with primary RtoP,2315 the UNSG’s 2012 Report limited the UNHRC’s role to 
identifying emerging patterns of human rights violations which could result in RtoP 
crimes.2316 Arguably, the fact that some States encouraged2317 and/or challenged2318 the 
“RtoP-right to protection” interplay may underscore this subtle shift. However, the UNSG 
did not state this explicitly and, therefore, the tentative nature of this interpretation must be 
borne in mind. Nevertheless, if States are to be expected to have confidence in RtoP’s 
capacity to function effectively, then policymakers must ensure that delineations about ‘what 
RtoP is and is not’2319 are made consistently and, furthermore, to explain why any departures 
from earlier recommendations have been made.
5.1.3 Secondary RtoP's Activation
In principle, delegating the task of making decisions on secondary RtoP’s activation to one 
particular body could perhaps represent the most suitable way of overcoming the risks of 
variable and politicised decision making. However, this would not be possible in practice 
because the Outcome Document provides for the UNSC to utilise their Chapter VII mandate 
to discharge secondary RtoP2320 and, therefore, the activation of Chapter VII measures would 
still fall to the UNSC even if decision making on secondary RtoP’s activation was allocated 
to one particular body. Prima facie, this could be circumvented by appointing committees 
which deal with decisions regarding the activation of the specific mandates of particular 
bodies in RtoP cases. For example, to take up Gambia’s2321 proposal to appoint a UNSC 
Committee on RtoP and/or the Czech Republic’s2322 recommendation to appoint national 
focal points of regional organisations to streamline their discharge of RtoP. The respective
<http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf7view0 1 /1215DB0D2 AE13E5CC12572A30079E53B?opendocume 
nt> accessed 11 May 2011 and UN HRC, ‘Report o f the UN Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict’ (15 
September 2009) UN Doc A/HRC/12/48, 520.
2315 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 11.
2316 UNSG Report, Timely and Decisive Response (n 2293), 10.
2317 Statement o f Monaco, 2009 RtoP Thematic Debate (n 2266).
2318 Statement o f the Representative o f Morocco to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98 and Statement o f the Representative o f Nicaragua to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 100.
2319 Luck, ‘The Normative Journey’ (n 2259).
2320 Outcome Document (n 2240), para 139.
2321 Statement o f the Representative o f Gambia to the UNGA in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal 
Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
GA/10850.
2322 Statement o f the Czech Republic, 2011 RtoP Thematic Debate (n 2263).
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committees could be mandated to determine when a situation has activated the existing 
mandates of relevant bodies (e.g. Chapter VII of the UN Charter) and perhaps recommend 
suitable measures to apply in the case at hand. However, no other States have supported 
either recommendation to date and, therefore, the prospect for future appointment of these 
committees is questionable.
Contrary to the view of Rosenberg and Strauss,2323 there is also likely to be limited 
viability to developing a ‘common standard’2324 for when particular bodies are required to 
take action in order to protect populations from RtoP crimes. Practice suggests that the 
formulation of objective standards concerning secondary RtoP’s activation would be 
unlikely to positively influence States to act. Although we have objective definitions of RtoP 
crimes, certain States2325 have simply evaded mentioning whether RtoP crimes are being 
committed in practice, particularly Syria. This is quite likely done in order to avoid 
activating the concurrent responsibility to undertake a ‘timely and decisive’2326 response. 
Thus, we cannot be confident that the devisal of objective formulas for activation will 
positively influence international decision making.
The present author considers that it is more feasible for the UNSG Reports to concentrate 
on clarifying secondary RtoP’s activation and the way in which this can f i t  into the existing 
international framework. First, the nature and scope of secondary RtoP’s activation in 
practice to date should be explicitly outlined in order to further contour RtoP’s interplay with 
sovereignty and non-interference in the minds of States. To this effect, explicit explanations 
of the fact that secondary RtoP has segregated tipping points which each require the 
population to have sustained some harm can help to reassure States that secondary RtoP 
cannot be legitimately discharged against them unless the population has sustained harm of a 
particular gravity, scale and nature.
Second, consideration should be given to how to develop upon the more nuanced aspects 
of secondary RtoP’s activation, not least whether it will always be possible to reconcile the 
UNHRC’s human rights mandate with the important role that it plays in identifying patterns 
of human rights violations which may amount to RtoP crimes. This writer would argue that 
consideration could be given to explaining the significance and utility of referring 
throughout earlier UNSG RtoP Reports to secondary RtoP being activated by ‘crimes and 
violations’2327 to which it relates. This approach more appropriately reflects the kind of acts
2323 S Rosenberg and E Strauss, ‘A Common Approach to the Application o f the Responsibility to Protect’ in D 
Fiott et al, Operationalising the Responsibility to Protect: A Contribution to the Third Pillar Approach (The 
Madariaga College o f Europe Foundation, Brussels 2012). (Rosenberg and Strauss, ‘A Common Approach’).
2324 ibid, 59.
2325 Syria is a strong example. See e.g. the Statements o f the Russian Federation, China, Lebanon and India to 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 October 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6627.
2326 Outcome Document (n 2240), para 139.
2327 The phrase is used throughout the UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220) and UNSG Report, Timely 
and Decisive Response (n 2293).
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which can activate secondary RtoP and, furthermore, that activation can occur on a sliding 
scale. To this effect, the approach highlights that secondary RtoP can be activated by (i) 
RtoP crimes; and (ii) human rights violations which, due to their gravity and scale, suggest 
that RtoP crimes may be imminent even if they are not necessarily being committed at the 
time. Accordingly, this approach helps to legitimise (i) RtoP actors (e.g. Special Adviser) 
referring to human rights violations as opposed to only RtoP crimes;2328 and (ii) human rights 
actors (e.g. UNHRC) referring to RtoP crimes as opposed to only human rights 
violations.2329 Some may question whether it is appropriate to retain any reference to 
“crimes” given that activation assessments tend not to consider mens rea issues and, 
furthermore, the prospect for the criminal basis of RtoP to encourage relevant political 
bodies to draw increasingly upon international law in their decision making (e.g. the 
UNSC).2330 However, this writer considers that retaining the reference helps to distinguish 
the dual purpose for which secondary RtoP can be activated, that is (i) to respond to RtoP 
crimes; and (ii) to prevent grave human rights violations from developing into RtoP crimes. 
A UNSG’s Report on secondary RtoP’s activation could therefore be used to raise the 
possibility of basing future decisions on secondary RtoP’s activation on the presence of 
‘crimes and violations relating to’2331 RtoP. Moreover, a Report on activation could provide 
the opportunity for renewed discussion of the scope of the crimes which can activate 
secondary RtoP. Policymakers, such as the (now former) Special Adviser on RtoP have 
recognised that there are divergent views on what war crimes RtoP covers and, therefore, 
that the scope of the crimes to which RtoP relates requires further consideration.2332 This 
writer considers that this issue warrants discussion among States in the near future given the 
capacity for ambiguity and competing interpretations on this issue to form the basis of new 
arguments about when RtoP should and should not be applied.
2328 See e.g. UN Press Release, ‘Statement o f the Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General on 
the Prevention o f Genocide and Responsibility to Protect on the Situation in Syria’ (2 June 2011) 
<http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/statements.shtml> accessed 27 July 2012.
2329 See e.g. UNHRC Res S-16/1 (29 April 2011) UN Doc A/UNHRC/RES/S-16/1, para 1.
2330 Rosenberg is one example, writing: ‘[t]he objective o f the determination o f relevant human rights violations 
is not the identification o f separated legal categories o f mass atrocity crimes on the one hand and other human 
rights violations on the other, but a common consciousness o f the risks involved in any massive violation o f  
human rights’. Rosenberg and Strauss, ‘A Common Approach’ (n 2323) 71.
2331 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220) and UNSG Report, Timely and Decisive Response (n 2293).
2332 E C Luck, ‘Conceptual, Institutional and Political Challenges’ (Forward Looking Session, European Science 
Foundation Conference ‘The Responsibility to Protect from Principle to Practice’, Linkoping, Sweden, 11 June
2010). See further, Rosenberg and Strauss, ‘A Common Approach’ (n 2323) 59; J Kleffher, “The Scope o f the 
Crimes Triggering the Responsibility to Protect” in J Hoffman and A Nollkaemper (eds), Responsibility to 
Protect: From Principle to Practice (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam 2012) 88-89.
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5.1.4 International Assistance
Secondary RtoP’s assistance component has so far only been outlined in the UNSG’s 2009 
Report on RtoP’s implementation. This writer considers that a future report should focus 
specifically on this component in order to (i) open up State discussion of some of the issues 
which have emerged in recent practice; and (ii) to explain to States the scope of this 
component more fully.
In terms of the former, the main issue which requires consideration is to whom assistance 
should be given when national authorities are themselves perpetrating RtoP crimes. There 
are no clear cut solutions to this question. Indeed, some States used the 2012 UNGA 
thematic debate to explicitly caution against providing assistance to non-State actors in order 
to protect the population.2333 Notwithstanding its politically volatile nature, this issue cannot 
be simply avoided by policymakers because it is central to (i) defining the scope of RtoP’s 
impact on non-interference; and (ii) increasing the prospect for RtoP to be applied effectively 
to protect populations in varying factual contexts. Particular attention should be given to 
whether it is possible to reconcile secondary RtoP’s assistance component with the principle 
of neutrality .in civil wars when cases like Libya and Syria illustrate that assistance may be 
provided to whatever actor is considered to have the most legitimacy. It may be that another 
point of departure between RtoP and the existing international framework has to be 
conceded. However, certain steps may be taken to ease States’ reservations over this 
concession.
First, it may be beneficial to recommend that decisions on the legitimate recipient of 
assistance be made collectively, as was the case with the UNSC’s authorisation for the 
extension of peacekeepers based on the consent of the President elect in Cote d’Ivoire.2334 
Admittedly, this will not prevent third States from providing assistance outside of the UN 
framework. However, it may help to ease concerns of prominent States like the UNSC P5 by 
reinforcing their leading role in discharging secondary RtoP, at least in terms of authorising 
military assistance. Second, it is useful to explicitly outline what States can do to avoid 
experiencing the provision of international assistance to “legitimate” actors in their own 
territories. This can be achieved by (i) reinforcing the importance of complying with primary 
RtoP (as the UNSG is increasingly doing)2335; (ii) emphasising that national authorities’ 
failure to consent to the provision of necessary international assistance may compel other
2333 See e.g. the Statement o f the Representative o f Cuba, 2012 RtoP Debate (n 2307) and Statement o f the 
Representative o f South Africa, ‘Interactive Dialogue on Timely and Decisive Response’ (5 September 2012) 
<http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-archive/govemment?view=ijrelated&id=2409> 
accessed 17 October 2012 (Statement o f South Africa, 2012 RtoP Debate).
2334 Statement o f the Cote d ’Ivoire, March 2011 (n 2228).
2335 The UNSG places particular emphasis on this in his 2012 Report. See UNSG Report, Timely and Decisive 
Response (n 2293).
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legitimate recipients to be identified; and (iii) to candidly remind States of the ‘slippery- 
slope’2336 dimension to secondary RtoP, specifically that non-cooperation with international 
assistance encourages the application of responsive measures, including the application of 
collective sanctions and the use of armed force.
Third, the scope of secondary RtoP’s assistance component should be explained in more 
detail, not least because this may help to alleviate concerns over its capacity to increase 
external interference in States’ internal affairs. A number of issues could be made more 
explicit, including (i) that the purpose of RtoP’s assistance component is multifaceted, 
coming into play when States’ national authorities request assistance or when it becomes 
clear that a situation could be on track to entailing RtoP crimes; and (ii) that the international 
community’s role in providing assistance can vary from sending humanitarian assistance to 
deploying peacekeepers.2337 The former reinforces the fact that assistance is not intended to 
apply in advance o f  any RtoP-type harm and, therefore, act as a precursor for the installation 
of structural change in a State like the creation of democracy.2338 The latter emphasises to 
States that international assistance will not always equate to ‘boots on the ground’.2339
A Report and thematic debate on RtoP’s assistance component may also be utilised as an 
opportunity to connect with the more intricate issues surrounding its discharge. Chapter Five 
observed that development assistance is one of the few structural assistance 
recommendations which have some State support2340 and, furthermore, that the UNSG 
recommended that it be discharged ‘to give the poor and minority groups a stronger voice in 
their societies’.2341 An assistance Report could be used to explain to States the significance 
of this recommendation, specifically that it strengthens the component’s pursuance to 
existing approaches, such as (i) the requirement for assistance initiatives to pay ‘due regard 
for the legitimate interests of persons belonging to minorities’;2342 and (ii) rights-based 
approaches to development assistance favoured by some States.2343 In addition, Chapter Two 
noted that the UNSG’S 2009 recommendation for assistance to be given to States which
2336 J Alvarez, ‘The Schizophrenias o f RtoP’ (Panel Presentation, ‘The Hague Joint Conference on Contemporary 
Issues o f International Law: Criminal Jurisdiction 100 Years After the 1907 Hague Peace Conference’, The 
Hague, 30 June 2007).
2337 The various forms o f assistance were outlined in detail in Chapter five, Section.
2338 See N Oman, ‘The ‘Responsibility to Prevent’: A Remit for Intervention?’ (2009) 22 Can. J. L. & 
Jurisprudence 355, 365.
2339 Andrew Mitchell MP, “UN Peacekeeping and the Failure to Protect” (Speech to the Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 18 June 2007) cited in A Brown, ‘Reinventing Humanitarian 
Intervention: Two Cheers for the Responsibility to Protect?’ (2008) House o f Commons Research Paper 08/55, 
51.
2340 See e.g. Statement o f the Representatives o f the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, Uruguay, Malaysia, 
Mexico and Ecuador to the UNGA, ‘Informal Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (9 August 2010) <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 17 October 2012.
2341 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 19.
2342 UNGA Res 47/135, ‘Declaration on the Rights o f Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities’ (1992) UN Doc A/RES/47/135 art 5 (2).
2343 On this see preference see e.g. P Uvin, ‘From the Right to Development to the Rights-Based Approach: How 
Human Rights Entered Development’ (2007) 17 (4/5) Development in Practice 597.
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cannot discharge primary RtoP due to a ‘lack of territorial control’.2344 Thus, some thought 
could be given to explaining that assistance can be given to strengthen a State’s effective 
control over all of its territory and, therefore, easing concerns regarding the primary RtoP 
bearer in secessionist enclaves. Of course, this recommendation should be qualified to (i) 
situations where the States’ national authorities are not perpetrating RtoP crimes; and (ii) 
helping effective control be gained over the State’s internationally recognised borders (i.e. 
Georgia over South Ossetia, not Russia).
5.1.5 Outcomes of Secondary RtoP's Discharge
The 2012 UNSG RtoP Report focuses on secondary RtoP’s timely and decisive response 
component. However, Chapter Five identified that this Report leaves unattended the 
important issue of whether regime change is an acceptable outcome of secondary RtoP’s 
discharge. Acknowledging that regime change is an appropriate outcome of secondary 
RtoP’s discharge in cases where national authorities are perpetrating RtoP crimes is likely to 
be the most politically controversial recommendation. Indeed, States like China2345 and 
South Africa234* stressed at the 2012 UNGA thematic debate, RtoP must not be used to 
facilitate regime change. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how this can be anything but 
necessary if a population is to be protected from RtoP crimes against the existing regime in 
the long term. The present author does not find proposals to regulate against abuse of 
secondary RtoP to create regime change to be compelling 2347 Limiting the acceptability of 
regime change to cases where secondary RtoP is discharged through the use of armed force 
which is authorised by the UNSC is persuasive at a legal level. 2348 However, this is unlikely 
to be practically effective and/or always reconcilable with the moral legitimacy which 
underscores secondary RtoP. The Syria case study has reinforced the fact that P5 members 
like Russia and China will be unlikely to allow populations’ protection to be prioritised over 
non-interference, at least in cases where it is in their national interests to do so. Thus, is it 
viable to restrict the acceptability of regime change to UNSC authorised action? Perhaps the 
only route forward is to emphasise that regime change will only be an acceptable outcome of 
secondary RtoP’s discharge when there is (i) widespread recognition of populations’
2344 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220), 10.
2345 Statement o f the Representative o f China to the UNGA, ‘Interactive Dialogue on Timely and Decisive 
Response’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document- 
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 17 October 2012.
2346 Statement o f South Africa, 2012 RtoP Debate (n 2333).
2347 A Bellamy, ‘The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem o f Regime Change’ (e-International Relations, 27 
September 2011) <www.e-ir.info/201 l/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/> 
accessed 12 July 2012
2348 ibid.
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sustaining RtoP harm; and (ii) broad agreement that a State’s national authorities are highly 
unlikely to heed the request of the international community and protect their population. 
Whilst this approach leaves scope for potential abuse, this writer concurs with the view that 
‘[t]here should be no misuse of the responsibility to protect. But fears of its possible misuse 
should not inhibit us in the face of incitement and grave violence’.2349 Presumably, this 
should encompass the removal of a regime which shows no signs of acceding to its duty to 
protect its own populations from RtoP crimes.
5.2 Recommendation (2): Capitalise on the Increasing Number of National 
RtoP Advisers and Annual Meetings of the Associated Network of RtoP 
Focal Points
Bearing in mind the need to cautiously develop mechanisms which are associated with 
monitoring compliance with RtoP, this writer considers that strengthening the increasing 
number of national RtoP advisers and their associated standing network could be usefully 
explored. The main reason which underscores this recommendation is the willing nature of 
these actors. The appointment of national RtoP advisers by seventeen States (at the time of 
writing) and the participation of these and other States in the annual meetings of the network 
of RtoP focal points is undertaken on a voluntary basis.2350 Accordingly, participating States 
have shown readiness to contribute to RtoP’s furtherance and this could be conducive to 
primary and secondary RtoP’s practical and legal development.
At a practical level, it is notable that novel ways of developing RtoP have been 
undertaken in the national context (e.g. humanitarian, foreign and security policies)2351 and, 
furthermore, that there is increasing ministerial cooperation regarding RtoP issues.2352 The 
annual meetings of the RtoP focal point network could therefore provide a useful opportunity
2349 UN Press Release, ‘Responsibility to Protect Faces Urgent Test ‘Here and Now’, Secretary-General Tells 
General Assembly, Stressing Immense Human Cost o f Failure in Syria’ (5 September 2012) UN Doc G A/11271. 
(UN Press Release, ‘Responsibility to Protect Faces Urgent Test’).
2350 Joint Press Release by Australia, Costa Rica, Denmark and Ghana (n 2241).
2351 See e.g. Czech Republic 2011 Security Strategy (n 2275); Norway’s 2008-2009 Humanitarian Policy (n 
2281); Norway’s 2008-2009 Development Policy (n 2281); Federal Ministry o f Defence, ‘White Paper 2006 on 
German Security Policy and the Future o f the Bundeswehr’ (2006), 44; UK Cabinet Office, ‘The National 
Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World’ (2008), 48; Presidence de la 
Republique, ‘The French White Paper on Defence and National Security’ (2008), 9; Australian Government 
Department o f Defence, ‘Defending Australia in the Asia-Pacific Century: Force 2030’ (2009), 43 and United 
States, ‘National Security Strategy’ (2010), 48. Policies o f Germany, UK, France, Australia and the US are 
available at <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document-
archi ve/go vemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed: 10 October 2012.
2352 Joint Press Release by the Governments o f Botswana, Brazil, Denmark and the Netherlands, ‘Ministerial 
Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect: Deepening our Commitment to Mass Atrocity Prevention’ (28 
September 2012) <http://us4.campaign-
archivel.com/?u=lfbfaalc8b7e823de28eb944d&id=42f9103b88&e=c591ff507e> accessed 10 October 2012. The 
meeting was attended by ministers from fifteen governments.
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for States to share what they have done to strengthen and discharge RtoP at the national, 
regional and international level and, furthermore, encourage other members to take similar 
approaches. This kind of ‘State to State learning’2353 process could motivate efforts to take 
concrete steps to fulfil primary RtoP at the national level and, furthermore, inspire relevant 
regional organisations and national governments to undertake more coordinated and 
consistent responses to RtoP cases in other States. The annual meetings could also provide a 
useful opportunity to produce a non-binding memorandum which summarises RtoP 
achievements and impediments over the course of the year, areas of consensus and 
divergence at relevant State debates and issues which should be given particular attention 
over the forthcoming period. At a legal level, the bodies represent a viable mechanism for 
willing States to put on record what they have done to discharge primary and secondary RtoP 
and the legal significance thereof. For example, to make the connection between primary 
RtoP and the creation of new interpretations of States’ existing humanitarian, criminal and 
human rights treaty obligations more explicit.
5.3 Recommendation (3): Bear in Mind the Broader Existing International 
Framework to which RtoP belongs: Minority Protection
Policymakers cannot disregard RtoP’s interplay with existing protective frameworks, 2354 
including those which have similarly divisive roots like minority protection. The few explicit 
references to this relationship in UNSG Reports2355 and State views2356 to date suggest that 
there is a general reluctance to delve into this specific relationship. Of course, the 
controversial policy issues which surround both areas means that there is a persuasive 
rationale for being cautious about explicitly linking the two. However, leaving this 
relationship to evolve in practice could mean that RtoP’s role in minority protection contexts 
becomes a double-edge sword, adding value in some ways (e.g. increased specificity to early 
warning systems) and compounding existing tensions in other ways (e.g. legitimising the
2353 UNSG Report, Implementing RtoP (n 2220) 13.
2354 The lack o f attention which the UNSG Reports have given to RtoP’s role in women’s rights is outlined at 
length in existing literature. See e.g. H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Reflections on the Responsibility to Protect’ 
(2010) 2 (3) GRtoP 232; J Bond and L Sherret, ‘Mapping Gender and the Responsibility to Protect: Seeking 
Intersections, Finding Parallels’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 133; I Skjelsbaek, ‘Responsibility to Protect or Prevent? 
Victims and Perpetrators o f Sexual Violence Crimes in Armed Conflicts’ (2012) GRtoP 154; E Stamnes, ‘The 
Responsibility to Protect: Integrating Gender Perspectives into Policies and Practices’ (2012) 4 (2) GRtoP 172; S 
E Davies and S Teitt, ‘Engendering the Responsibility to Protect: Women and the Prevention o f Mass Atrocities’ 
(2012 )4 (2 ) GRtoP 198.
2355 See e.g. ibid, 11 and 17; UNSG Report, Timely and Decisive Response (n 2293), 12.
2356 See e.g. Statement o f the Representative o f Holy See to the UNGA, (July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850; 
Statement o f the Representative o f Slovenia to the UNGA in in UN Press Release, ‘More than 40 Delegates 
Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 
2264); Joint Statement o f the Representatives o f Denmark and Costa Rica to the UNGA (July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97 and Statement o f Swaziland (n 2267).
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role of the Kin State through handling of the primary RtoP bearer concept and providing for 
national governments to be primary sources of information about potential RtoP situations). 
Instead, RtoP’s interaction with the field of minority protection should be considered as a 
useful starting point for adding specificity to future Reports (and UNGA thematic debates).
As the substantive chapters and the above recommendations illustrate, casting RtoP 
assessments from the perspective of minority protection can enable a more robust 
appreciation of the potential policy and practical implications of RtoP’s present formulation. 
This can help policymakers to identify some of the more intricate issues which should be 
taken into account when framing future strategies for RtoP’s discharge. This includes (i) the 
need to ensure that development assistance provided under secondary RtoP does not 
discriminate against minorities; and (ii) the fact that present ambiguities in, and formulations 
of, the RtoP framework may enable Kin States to acquire a particular role in RtoP’s 
discharge, including by acting as sources of information for RtoP’s early warning system and 
as the bearer of primary RtoP in secessionist enclaves under their effective control.
5.4 Recommendation (4): Develop RtoP in a Slow but Steady Manner
Resistance to RtoP has been strongest when sudden steps toward its development have 
occurred, such as when the UNHRC high-level mission on the situation of human rights in 
Darfur used RtoP as an analytical framework for its report, declaring Sudan to have 
manifestly failed to fulfil primary RtoP and recommending the application of secondary 
RtoP.2357 Thus, this writer recommends that relevant actors develop RtoP in a slow but 
steady manner, mindful of the potential impact which wider political contexts could have 
upon its mobilisation at any given time. Indeed, signs of this approach come through in 
recent practice. For example, the 2012 UNGA thematic debate was held in September, not 
the usual July. This suggests that the UNSG recognises that the continued debates over Syria 
and RtoP’s role therein could detrimentally impact upon RtoP’s reception by States.
Notwithstanding this, care should be taken to avoid standing back from RtoP too much at 
politically complex times. For instance, it is notable that the UNSG has not explicitly 
referred to RtoP in Mali, despite the RtoP-type crimes being perpetrated therein. Of course, 
the UNSG may be cautious over referring to RtoP in Mali alongside Syria. However, not 
doing so could raise significant questions, such as whether RtoP can be applied in cases 
which overlap with broader contentious issues like terrorism and the extent to which practice 
can be free from selectivity.2358
2357 UN HRC, ‘Report o f the High-Level Mission on the Situation o f Human Rights in Darfur’ (9 March 2007) 
UN Doc A/HRC/4/80, 25.
2358 Indeed, the recently appointed UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson was asked by UN News: “With
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6 The Responsibility to Protect: A Cause for Concern and 
Celebration
This chapter began by noting that RtoP has now been invoked in an expanse of country- 
specific practice. On the one hand, development process has undoubtedly provided greater 
clarity about ‘what RtoP is and what it is not’.2359 Contrary to Shawki’s2360 view that RtoP 
remains in the early stages of a norm’s development,2361 practice suggests that primary RtoP 
has entered the implementation stage, whilst secondary RtoP is broadly regarded to be 
capable o f being implemented whilst it undergoes further refinement. On the other hand, the 
explosive and rapidly evolving nature of world events over the research period have raised 
significant questions about whether the RtoP that stands today is sufficiently compelling to 
contribute constructively to the global protection endeavour.
Attending to these questions is a complex task which is perhaps best addressed through 
the intervention of willing actors (e.g. national RtoP advisers) and well-received mechanisms 
(e.g. the UNSG’s annual RtoP Reports). Sometimes, RtoP’s development may simply 
involve making certain issues more explicit, such as the duration of primary RtoP and the 
way in which this enables it to be discharged concurrently with secondary RtoP. In other 
instances, it may be necessary to re-think elements o f  the RtoP framework itself in order to 
ensure that all requisite components are formulated in a viable manner. This includes 
whether a populations beneficiary concept can hold in practice and the scope of the crimes 
which can activate secondary RtoP. On occasion, it may be necessary to acknowledge that 
there are points o f departure between RtoP and existing obligations/practice, but that this 
usually arises because RtoP is intended to be a corrective framework which makes inroads 
into addressing the tension between the legality and legitimacy of protective action. This 
includes RtoP’s relationship with the principle of neutrality in civil wars and the possibility 
that the UNHRC may sometimes (albeit infrequently) lack a mandate on which to base its 
role in secondary RtoP’s activation. If RtoP is not to dissolve in the same way as 
humanitarian intervention, political palatability needs to be balanced proportionately with
Syria dominating the international media landscape, is there the risk that pressing international crises are not 
receiving the attention that they warrant?” The Deputy Secretary-General answered: “That is a very legitimate 
question. Sometimes we focus on just one conflict and the rest is in tragic shadow”. UN News Centre, ‘Interview 
with UN Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson’ (27 August 2012)
<http://www.un.org/apps/news/newsmakers.asp?NewsID=68> accessed 11 October 2012.
2359 Luck, ‘The Normative Journey’ (n 2259).
2360 N Shawki, ‘Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution o f an International Norm’ (2011) 3 (2) GRtoP 172.
2361 For example, Shawki argues that RtoP remains in the early stages o f a norm’s development because it 
continues to be refined and States’ are still being encouraged ‘into embracing and applying’ its principles.
Shawki, ibid, 183. For a more cautious view, outlining the possibility that the Outcome Document may come to 
be seen in subsequent practice as the ‘tipping point’ for consolidation o f RtoP as a norm, see M Contarino, M 
Negron-Gonzales and K T Mason, ‘The International Criminal Court and Consolidation o f the Responsibility to 
Protect as an International Norm’ (2012) 4 (3) GRtoP 275, 278-280. See also, J Welsh, ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Where Expectations Meet Reality’ (2010) 24 (4) Ethics & Int. Affairs 415.
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protective viability throughout future practice. This means openly confronting the most 
controversial issues, not least whether regime change and providing assistance to a broader 
range of actors can be anything but inevitable when national authorities perpetrate RtoP 
crimes.
From the perspective of international law, RtoP is still in its formative years. There are 
signs that RtoP’s refinement between 2005 and 2012 has worked, not least in the supportive 
statements which have been made from States across the geopolitical regions and the 
significant contributions made to RtoP’s development by small States/territories. There are 
also signs that the refinement may have worked for the wrong reasons. After all, clarifying 
that secondary RtoP is not a binding duty to protect enables States to choose when to support 
and challenge RtoP’s application, irrespective of the cost to human life. However, this 
discretion is pursuant to the RtoP that exists today and, quite likely, tomorrow.
Whether RtoP will be maintained in the years to come cannot be ascertained with 
certainty.2362 What is clear is that RtoP’s preservation over the past eleven years still inspires 
hope that, one day, RtoP will fulfil the promise of “Never Again”.2363 Equally clear is that, in 
the immediate backdrop of some States’ failure to permit morality to prevail over politics, 
policymakers and RtoP ‘face an urgent test here and now’.2364 RtoP may make ‘the 
pendulum’ swing ‘decisively in the direction of greater protection’ for populations. 
However, this writer anticipates that, in the immediate future at least, the pendulum will lie 
somewhere between “RtoP” and what may be termed “PtR”, “Protecting the 
Responsibility”...
2362 Luck illustrates that this uncertainty is not new by posing the following question: ‘[H]ow many pundits 
foresaw how instrumental human rights principles eventually would be in reshaping the geopolitical map’ a 
decade after the adoption o f the Genocide Convention? E C Luck, ‘The Responsibility to Protect: The First 
Decade’ (2011) 3 (4) GRtoP 387, 390.
2363 UN Press Release, ‘Responsibility to Protect Faces Urgent Test’ (n 2349).
2364 ibid.
2365 ibid.
2366 ibid.
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2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statements of the Representatives of Cuba, A ustria, M orocco , South  
A frica, M ali, Canada, Lesotho, Ireland, Venezuela, N orw ay, Germ any, B olivia, Rom ania, S lovenia, 
M onaco, Q atar, Solom on Islands, C roatia, Jordan, Luxem bourg, M exico, Rwanda, Turkey, H ungary, 
India, A ndorra  and San M arino  to the UNGA (24 July 2009)2371 ^ Statements of the Representatives 
of Panam a, G am bia, Peru, A rgentina, H o ly  See, P alestine, A zerbaijan  to the UNGA (28 July
2009)2372 Statement of the Representatives of Sudan, Tanzania, M orocco, Saudi A rabia , K enya, 
B osnia and  H erzegovin a  to the UNGA (23 July 2009).2373
(ii) 20102374
Statement of the Representative of Argentina, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) ^ Statement of the Representative of A rm enia, ‘Thematic 
Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of 
the Representative of B angladesh, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) Statement of the Representative of Benin, ‘Thematic Debate 
on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of the 
Representative of B razil, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (July 2010) ^ Statement of the Representative of Costa R ica, ‘Thematic Debate on Early 
Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) f  Statement of the Representative 
of Czech R epublic, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (July 2010) f  Statement of the Representative of E l Salvador, ‘Thematic Debate on Early 
Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of the Representative 
of G erm any, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July
2010) T| Statement of the Representative of G uatem ala, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, 
Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) ]f Statement of the Representative of 
Lebanon, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July
2010) TJ Statement of the Representative of M exico, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment 
and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) ^ Statement of the Representative of N epal, ‘Thematic 
Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) Statement of 
the Representative of the N etherlands, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) f  Statement of the Representative of N icaragua, ‘Thematic 
Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) Statement of 
the Representative of N igeria, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of the Representative of P akistan , ‘Thematic 
Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of 
the Representative of R epu blic  o f  K orea, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) |  Statement of the Representative of Senegal, ‘Thematic Debate 
on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) Statement of the 
Representative of Solom on Islands, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) ^ Statement of the Representative of Sw itzerland, ‘Thematic
2371 Statements in UN Press Release, ‘More than 40 Delegates Express Strong Scepticism, Full Support as 
General Assembly continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10849 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0849.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012.
2372 Statements in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as 
General Assembly Concludes Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0850.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012.
2373 Statements in UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Seek to End Global Paralysis in Face o f Atrocities as General 
Assembly holds Interactive Dialogue on Responsibility to Protect’ (23 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10847 
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0847.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012.
2374 Statements are available at the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Government 
Statements’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document- 
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 6 January 2012.
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Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) Statement of 
the Representative of Tanzania, ‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010) If Statement of the Representative of the U n ited  States, 
‘Thematic Debate on Early Warning, Assessment and the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2010).
(iii) 201 \ 2375
Statement of the Representative of A rm enia, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations 
in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) 1 Statement of the Representative of 
A ustralia , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of B a rbados (on b e h a lf  o f  
CARICO M ), ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of B elgium , ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of B razil, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Statement of the 
Representative of C anada, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of China, ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) *[[ Statement of the Representative of Cuba, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ]j Statement of the 
Representative of C osta  R ica  (on b e h a lf  o f  C osta Rica, D enm ark  an d  G hana), ‘Thematic Debate on 
the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) f  
Statement of the Representative of Czech R epublic, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) f  Statement of the 
Representative of D em ocra tic  P e o p le ’s  R epublic o f  K orea, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the 
Representative of F rance, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of G eorg ia , ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) U Statement of the Representative of G erm any, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the 
Representative of G uinea, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) If Statement of the Representative of H onduras, ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) T1 Statement of the Representative of H ungary, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) If Statement of the 
Representative of Iran, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of Ireland, ‘Thematic Debate 
on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) f^ 
Statement of the Representative of Israel, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) f  Statement of the Representative of Ita ly , 
‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of Japan , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of 
Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Jordan , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of K en ya , ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July
2375 Statements are available at the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Government 
Statements’ <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document- 
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409> accessed 6 January 2012.
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2011) U Statement of the Representative of L ebanon, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of L iechtenstein , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ]f Statement of the Representative of 
M orocco , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Statement of the Representative of N ew  Z ealan d, ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) T1 Statement of the Representative of P akistan , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ]j Statement of the 
Representative of R epu blic  o f  K orea , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011)1} Statement of the Representative of R ussian  
F ederation , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ^ Statement of the Representative of S ingapore, ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) U Statement of the Representative of Slovenia, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional 
Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) ]f Statement of the 
Representative of Sw eden, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of Sw itzerland , ‘Thematic 
Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 
2011) Statement of the Representative of The N etherlands, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of 
Regional Organisations in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) Statement of the 
Representative of the U nited  K in gdom , ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of the 
U nited  S tates, ‘Thematic Debate on the Role of Regional Organisations in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect’ (July 2011).
(h) UNGA Opening Session Debates, 2006-20112376
Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the 
UNGA’ (September 2006) 1 Statement of the Representative of Sw eden  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of 
the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) If Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to 
the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) Tf Statement of the 
Representative of A ustra lia  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2006) Statement of the Representative of C anada  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) ][ Statement of the Representative of S lovakia  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) f  Statement of the 
Representative of D enm ark  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2006) If Statement of the Representative of L iech tenstein  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) 1f Statement of the Representative of P alau  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) |  Statement of the 
Representative of Sloven ia  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2006) U Statement of the Representative of H ungary  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) |  Statement of the Representative of Ire la n d  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the UNGA’ (September 2006) Statement of the 
Representative of T rin idad an d  T obago  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty First Session of the 
UNGA’ (September 2006) Statement of the Representative of Lithuania  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of 
the Sixty Second Session of the UNGA’ (September 2007) 1f Statement of the Representative of the 
U nited  K ingdom  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Second Session of the UNGA’ (September
2376 Statements available at International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect, ‘Government Statements’. 
Available at: http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/document- 
archive/govemment?view=fjrelated&id=2409. Last accessed 6 January 2012.
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2007) TJ Statement of the Representative of The N etherlands to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Second Session of the UNGA’ (September 2007) |  Statement of the Representative of L iech tenstein  
to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Second Session of the UNGA’ (September 2007) Statement of 
the Representative of L esotho  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Second Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2007) U Statement of the Representative of D enm ark  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Second Session of the UNGA’ (September 2007) ^ Statement of the Representative of Australia to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Second Session of the UNGA’ (September 2007) U Statement of the 
Representative of D enm ark  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2008) K Statement of the Representative of H oly  S ee  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Third Session of the UNGA’ (September 2008) Tf Statement of the Representative of G uatem ala  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ (September 2008) Statement of the 
Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2008) ^ Statement of the Representative of Luxem bourg  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ (September 2008) ]f Statement of the Representative of M alta  to 
the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ (September 2008) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Slovakia  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2008) U Statement of the Representative of S w itzerlan d  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty Third Session of the UNGA’ (September 2008) ^ Statement of the Representative of A rm en ia  to 
the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) Statement of the 
Representative of B elgium  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2009) ]f Statement of the Representative of B ulgaria  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Fourth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) If Statement of the Representative of C om oros  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) 1f Statement of the 
Representative of the D em ocra tic  R epu b lic  o f  C ongo  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth 
Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) ]f Statement of the Representative of F in lan d  to the UNGA, 
‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) |  Statement of the 
Representative of N iger  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fourth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2009) Tf Statement of the Representative of R om ania  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Fourth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2009) ]f Statement of the Representative of A rm enia  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2010) |  Statement of the 
Representative of F rance  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2010) Statement of the Representative of Sw eden  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Fifth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2010) |  Statement of the Representative of M alta  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2010) f  Statement of the 
Representative of G uatem ala  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2010)U Statement of the Representative of G hana  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Fifth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2010) |  Statement of the Representative of D en m ark  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2010) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of H oly  S ee  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Fifth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2010) Statement of the Representative of N orw ay  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) Statement of the Representative of Cuba  to the 
UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2011) f^ Statement of the Representative of L uxem bourg  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of N icaragu a  
to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) Statement of 
the Representative of Syria  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2011) Statement of the Representative of the N eth erlands  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) |  Statement of the Representative of B elgium  to 
the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) |  Statement of the 
Representative of Ita ly  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September
2011) K Statement of the Representative of M acedon ia  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth
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Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of G hana  to the UNGA, 
‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) If Statement of the 
Representative of Sw eden  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2011) If Statement of the Representative of C osta  R ica  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the 
Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) Tf Statement of the Representative of Z im babw e  
to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011) 1f Statement of 
the Representative of B razil to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty Sixth Session of the UNGA’ 
(September 2011)U Statement of the Representative of E stonia  to the UNGA, ‘Opening of the Sixty 
Sixth Session of the UNGA’ (September 2011).
(i) UNSC Thematic Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (2005-2011)
Statement of the Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 
November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l) U Statement of the Representative of Ire lan d  to the 
UNSC, ‘UNSC Verbatim Record’ (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l) If Statement of the 
Representative of B elgium  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6216(Res.l) I f  Statement of the Representative of S ri Lanka  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l) U Statement of the Representative of Sudan  
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l) If Statement 
of the Representative of R w anda  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (11 November 2009) UN 
Doc S/PV.6216(Res.l) 1f Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (4 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 If Statement of the Representative of G hana  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 I f  Statement of the 
Representative of Slovakia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4 December 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5577 1f Statement of the Representative of Japan  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (4  
December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 I f  Statement of the Representative of B enin  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 I f  Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 I f  Statement of the 
Representative of P eru  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319 If Statement of the Representative of C anada  (on behalf of Australia and New Zealand) to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 If Statement of the 
Representative of the R ussian F edera tion  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319 If Statement of the Representative of Japan  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 If Statement of the Representative of Tanzania  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 If Statement of the 
Representative of South A frica  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319 If Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 
December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 I f  Statement of the Representative of D en m ark  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 I f  Statement of the Representative of 
A lgeria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) 1f 
Statement of the Representative of N ep a l to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) I f  Statement of the Representative of E g yp t to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) 1f Statement of the Representative of F rance  to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) 1f Statement of 
the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) 1f Statement of the Representative of N orw ay  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) 1f Statement of the Representative of 
Slovakia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) If 
Statement of the Representative of Liechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 
2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) If Statement of the Representative of the R epu blic  o f  K orea  to the
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UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319(Res.l) U Statement of the 
Representative of R w anda  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (9 December 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5319(Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 TJ Statement of the Representative of Tanzania  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the Representative of 
Q atar  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Congo  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 U 
Statement of the Representative of A rgentina  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) 
UN Doc S/PV.5476 Statement of the Representative of F ran ce  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the Representative of A u stria  (on behalf of 
the European Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 If 
Statement of the Representative of Slovenia  (on behalf of the Human Security Network) to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 Statement of the Representative of 
L iechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement 
of the Representative of C anada  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (28 June 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5476 U Statement of the Representative of G uatem ala  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(28 June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the Representative of Belgium  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 Statement of the Representative of the 
R ussian F edera tion  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 
Tf Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 
2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 Statement of the Representative of P anam a  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 ^ Statement of the Representative of the 
U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 ]| 
Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 
2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 ^ Statement of the Representative of Q atar  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 K Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 Statement of the 
Representative of C ongo  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc 
S/PV.5781 U Statement of the Representative of N ew  Z ea lan d  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 Statement of the Representative of N igeria  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898(Res.l) ]| Statement of the Representative 
of P alestin e  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898(Res.l) U 
Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN 
Doc S/PV.5898(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of Japan  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898(Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of Tanzania  to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 ^ Statement of the 
Representative o f  Benin  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 ][ 
Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 
June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 U Statement of the Representative of The P h ilipp in es  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 ^ Statement of the Representative of 
D enm ark  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 TJ Statement of 
the Representative of L uxem bourg (on b e h a lf  o f  the E uropean  Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 Statement of the Representative of 
C olom bia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 ^ Statement of 
the Representative of Luxem bourg (on b e h a lf  o f  the E uropean  Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 Statement of the Representative of N orw ay  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5209 ]j Statement of the 
Representative of C ote d ’Ivo ire  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (21 June 2005) UN Doc 
S/PV.5209 Tf Statement of the Representative of P o rtu g a l (on b e h a lf  o f  the E uropean Union) to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 (Res.l) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of N igeria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc
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S/PV.5781 (Res.l) T| Statement of the Representative of A ustra lia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 (Res.l) 1} Statement of the Representative of 
C anada  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 (Res.l) T| 
Statement of the Representative of Liechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 
November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 (Res.l) Statement of the Representative of M exico  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5781 (Res.l) If Statement of the 
Representative of C olom bia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November 2007) UN Doc 
S/PV.5781 (Res.l) Tf Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 If Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 If Statement of the Representative of the 
P anam a  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 ]f Statement of the 
Representative of the R ussian F edera tion  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN 
Doc S/PV.5898 ]f Statement of the Representative of B urkina F aso  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 f^ Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 f  Statement of the Representative of 
L ibyan  A rab  Jam ahiriya  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 If 
Statement of the Representative of C roatia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN 
Doc S/PV.5898 If Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 U Statement of the Representative of A ustra lia  
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 If Statement of the 
Representative of Slovenia (on b e h a lf  o f  the E uropean Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 f^ Statement of the Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (27 May 2008) UN Doc S/PV.5898 U Statement of the Representative of 
P eru  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6151 (Res.l) U Statement 
of the Representative of Ita ly  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6151 (Res.l) TJ Statement of the Representative of M orocco  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6151 (Res.l) ]f Statement of the Representative of G uatem ala  to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6151 (Res.l) If Statement of the 
Representative of Venezuela  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (26 June 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6151 (Res.l) U Statement of the Representative of P anam a  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ]f Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ]f Statement of the Representative of 
Ita ly  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 Tf Statement of the 
Representative of Q atar  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 If 
Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN 
Doc S/PV.5703 Tf Statement of the Representative of Slovakia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 f^ Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K in gdom  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ]f Statement of the 
Representative of the R ussian F edera tion  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN 
Doc S/PV.5703 Tf Statement of the Representative of B elgium  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 f^ Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ]f Statement of the Representative of A rgentina  
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 f^ Statement of the 
Representative of M exico  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 
T) Statement of the Representative of G erm any  (on behalf of the European Union) to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 Statement of the Representative of 
N igeria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ]f Statement of the 
Representative of C anada  (on behalf of CANZ) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 
2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 Statement of the Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 ^ Statement of the Representative of the 
R epublic  o f  K orea  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN Doc S/PV.5703 U 
Statement of the Representative of R w anda  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 June 2007) UN
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Doc S/PV.5703 Tf Statement of the Representative of A ustria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 ^ Statement of the Representative of Turkey to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 Statement of the Representative of 
Burkina F aso  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 
Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 
January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 ^ Statement of the Representative of the 
Czech R epublic  (on behalf of the European Union) to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 
2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 |  Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066 If Statement of the Representative of B elgium  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) U Statement of the 
Representative of B angladesh  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6066(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of F in land  (on behalf of the Nordic Countries) to 
the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) Statement of the 
Representative of A ustra lia  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc 
S/PV.6066(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of Tanzania  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) ]j Statement of the Representative of 
Liechtenstein  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) ^ 
Statement of the Representative of N icaragua  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 
2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) If Statement of the Representative of E gyp t to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of 
Venezuela  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) 
Statement of the Representative of Sudan  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (14 January 2009) 
UN Doc S/PV.6066(Res.l) ]j Statement of the Representative of Turkey to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6354 Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6354 ^ Statement of the Representative 
of the E uropean Union  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc 
S/PV.6354(Res.l) T| Statement of the Representative of B angladesh  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6354(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6354(Res.l) 1 Statement of the 
Representative of Venezuela  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (7 July 2010) UN Doc 
S/PV.6354(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of N igeria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427 Tf Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of A rgentina  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc 
S/PV.6427(Res.l) U Statement of the Representative of B angladesh  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427(Res.l) T| Statement of the Representative of G hana  
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427(Res.l) TJ Statement 
of the Representative of Sudan  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc 
S/PV.6427(Res.l) Statement of the Representative of V enezuela  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (22 November 2010) UN Doc S/PV.6427(Res.l) TJ Statement of the Representative of B razil 
to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 J Statement of the 
Representative of P o rtu g a l to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 
Tf Statement of the Representative of G erm any  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) 
UN Doc S/PV.6531 ^ Statement of the Representative of N igeria  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 ^ Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 ]j Statement of the Representative of 
L ebanon  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 Statement of 
the Representative of U ruguay  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531 TI Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May
2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 Statement of the Representative of S ri Lanka  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 Statement of the Representative of Japan  to
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the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 Statement of the 
Representative of Australia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531 (Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of Chile to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 (Res.l) Statement of the Representative of Ukraine to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 (Res.l) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Croatia to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531(Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of Venezuela to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim 
Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 (Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of Peru to the 
UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531(Res.l) ^ Statement of the 
Representative of The Netherlands to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (10 May 2011) UN Doc 
S/PV.6531 (Res.l) ^ Statement of the Representative of Syria to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record 
(10 May 2011) UN Doc S/PV.6531 (Res.l).
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ANNEX II
TRENDS IN STATE VIEWS
(A) The Bearers of RtoP
(a) Statements Affirming “States" as the Bearers of Primary RtoP
Statement of the Representative of A rgentina  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (December 2005) 
UN Doc S/PV.5319 U Statement of the Representative of P eru  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record 
(December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 U Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Meeting Record, (December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 ]| Statement of the Representative of 
N orw ay  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (December 2005) UN Doc S/PV.5319 Statement of 
the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (December 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5577 T1 Statement of the Representative of the U nited  S ta tes  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting 
Record (December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 ^ Statement of the Representative of Slovakia  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of F rance  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (December 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5577 
^ Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (June 
2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting 
Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 T1 Statement of the Representative of G hana  to the UNSC, 
UNSC Meeting Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 ^ Statement of the Representative of 
Tanzania  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 U Statement of the 
Representative of the U nited  S ta tes  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (June 2006) UN Doc 
S/PV.5476 ]f Statement of the Representative of G reece  to the UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (June
2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 T| Statement of the Representative of Sloven ia  to the UNSC, UNSC 
Meeting Record (June 2006) UN Doc S/PV.5476 If Statement of the Representative of S ri Lanka  to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 Statement of the 
Representative of Sierra  L eon e  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV. 100 Statement of the Representative of Jam aica  (on b e h a lf  o f  the C aribbean  Com m unity) 
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 100 Statement of the 
Representative of M yanm ar  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 
100 TI Statement of the Representative of Slovakia  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ]| Statement of the Representative of Iran  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement of the Representative of the R ussian  
F edera tion  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ][ Statement 
of the Representative of Tim or L este  to the UNGA July 2009 (GA/10850)2377 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of P anam a  to the UNGA July 2009 (GA/10850)2378 If Statement of the Representative 
of D em ocra tic  R epublic  o f  K o rea  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 Statement of the Representative of Ire lan d  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
GA/108492379 Statement of the Representative of A rm enia  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record
2377 UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’ (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10850
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0850.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012. (UN Press Release, 
‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate’).
2378 ibid.
2379 UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General 
Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/10849
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(28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 U Statement of the Representative of B otsw an a  to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement of the Representative of 
K azakhstan  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement 
of the Representative of Sw azilan d  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 T| Statement of the Representative of B angladesh  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 Statement of the Representative of P apu a  N ew  G uinea  to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 1} Statement of the 
Representative of A lgeria  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 
U Statement of the Representative of C anada  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) 
UN Doc A/63/PV.98 If Statement of the Representative of P akistan  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of M ali to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 Statement of the Representative of 
A ustria  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 Statement of the 
Representative of S w itzerlan d  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98.
(b) Statements Endorsing the Principle of "Sovereignty as Responsibility"
Statement of the Representative of C anada  to the UNGA, ‘Informal Meeting of the Plenary, on the 
High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005’ (June 2005)2380 U 
Statement of the Representative of F rance  to the UNGA, ‘Informal Meeting of the Plenary on the 
High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005’ (June 2005)2381 f^ 
Statement of the Representative of P an am a  to the UNSC, UNSC Verbatim Record (20 November
2007) UN Doc S.PV.5781 ]f Statement of the Representative of R om ania  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) 
UN Doc GA/108492382 Tf Statement of the Representative of the R ussian F edera tion  to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 Statement of the Representative of 
the Solom on Islands  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492383 Statement of the 
Representative of S ri Lanka  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 T] Statement of the Representative of Tim or L este  to the UNGA (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
GA/108502384 T1 Statement of the Representative of C am eroon  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 ]J Statement of the Representative of Belgium  to the UNGA, 
General Assembly Thematic Debate on the Representative of M ali to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 U Statement of the Representative of M on aco  to the 
UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492385 Statement of the Representative of F ran ce  to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Cuba  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492386 Statement of the 
Representative of U ruguay  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98 ][ Statement of the Representative of N igeria  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2009/gal0849.doc.htm> accessed 2 January 2012. (UN Press Release, 
‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General Assembly Continues Debate 
on Responsibility to Protect’).
2380 Available at <http://old.reformtheun.org/index.php/govemment_statements/c395?theme=alt2> accessed 14 
May 2012.
2381 ibid.
2382 UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General 
Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 2380).
2383 ibid.
2384 UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’ (n 2378).
2385 UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General 
Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 2380).
2386 ibid.
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July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 ^ Statement of the Representative of Japan  to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of H ungary  to 
the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492387 TJ Statement of the Representative of Tanzania  to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 TJ Statement of the 
Representative of L esotho  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492388 Statement of H oly  
S ee  to the UNGA (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108502389 ^ Statement of the Representative of Jam aica  
(on b e h a lf  o f  the C aribbean  Com m unity) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN 
Doc A/63/PV.100 T1 Statement of the Representative of India  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
GA/108492390 Statement of the Representative of Ire lan d  to the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
GA/108492391 U Statement of the Representative of G uinea B issau  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 Statement of the Representative of Sw eden (on b e h a lf  o f  
the E uropean Union) to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 T| 
Statement of the Representative of P apu a  N ew  G uinea  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 
July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement of the Representative of Sierra L eone  to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 100 Tf Statement of the Representative of 
Slovakia  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 Joint 
Statement of the Representatives of D enm ark  a n d  C osta  R ica  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 ^ Statement of the Representative of Canada to the UNGA, 
UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 Statement of the Representative of The 
P hilipp ines  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV. 97 Statement 
of the Representative of South A frica  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98 T| Statement of the Representative of the U nited  S ta tes  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 ^ Statement of the Representative of the N eth erlands  to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 Statement of the 
Representative of N ew  Z ea lan d  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.97 Statement of the Representative of L iechtenstein  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 ^ Statement of the Representative of the R epublic  o f  K o rea  to the 
UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 U Statement of the 
Representative of P akistan  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of Ita ly  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 
2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 1} Statement of the Representative of S w azilan d  to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 TJ Statement of the Representative of C roa tia  to 
the UNGA (24 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108492392 ^ Statement of the Representative of B angladesh  to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 Statement of the 
Representative of B otsw an a  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 T[ Statement of the Representative of A rm enia  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ]j Statement of the Representative of B osnia  & H erzegovin a  to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 U Statement of the 
Representative of P alestin e  to the UNGA (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108502393 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of A zerbaijan  to the UNGA (28 July 2009) UN Doc GA/108502394 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of B ra zil to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97 
Statement of the Representative of C hile  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN
2387 ibid.
2388 ibid.
2389 UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’ (n 2378).
2390 UN Press Release, ‘More than Forty Delegates Expressed Strong Scepticism, Full Support as General 
Assembly Continues Debate on Responsibility to Protect’ (n 2380).
2391 ibid.
2392 ibid.
2393 UN Press Release, ‘Delegates Weigh Legal Merits o f Responsibility to Protect Concept as General Assembly 
Concludes Debate’ (n 2378).
2394 ibid.
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Doc A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of the U nited  K ingdom  to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (23 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.97.
(c) Statements Defining Primary RtoP Bearers as "Governments"
Statement of the Representative of Icelan d  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (September 2005) 
UN Doc A/60/PV.6 ^ Statement of the Representative of L iech tenstein  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting 
Record (September 2005) UN Doc A/60/PV.7 ^ Statement of the Representative of P anam a  to the 
UNSC, UNSC Meeting Record (June 2007) UN Doc S/PV/5703 ^ Statement of the Representative of 
S ri Lanka  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement of 
the Representative of M acedon ia  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 U Statement of the Representative of the D em o cra tic  R epu blic  o f  K orea  UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 H Statement of the Representative of S w azilan d  
to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.100 ^ Statement of the 
Representative of Tanzania  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (28 July 2009) UN Doc 
A/63/PV.100 U Statement of the Representative of Singapore  to the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record 
(24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of China  to the UNGA, UNGA 
Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 U Statement of the Representative of C anada  to 
the UNGA, UNGA Meeting Record (24 July 2009) UN Doc A/63/PV.98 Statement of the 
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